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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The present thesis is essentially a study of the 
law of extradition in the light of the Indian Constitution* 
It is a study of case law and of relevant statutory provi­
sions on the subject not yet judicially considered* Cases 
on similar provisions decided by English, American, Austra­
lian, .Canadian and Civil-law countries* courts have been 
considered*
The early chapters of the thesis set the scene 
and establish the tone of the subject, which has unique
features as a topic of law*
Chapter I gives the details of the Constitutional
aspects of the subject in general, including the powers of
the legislature, judiciary and the executive* Chapter II 
gives the definition; general survey of the subject; 
historical background of the different extradition Acts 
in force in India; pre- and post-Constitution treaties, 
and the necessity of giving them the force of municipal 
law; the distinctions between extradition, deportation, 
expulsion, kidnapping and the right of asylum; special 
features of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962, and the 
improvements made in it compared with the earlier Extra­
dition Acts and international practice tand procedure*
Chapter III deals with the procedure provided 
under Chapter II of the Extradition Act, 1962, with details 
of the jurisdiction of the magisterial and superior courts, 
and the Central Government’s powers*
Chapter IV deals with political offences and 
grounds of refusal for extradition.
X*
Chapter V deals with various topics on extradition 
with special reference *to the relevant Articles of the Indian 
Constitution, with detailed Indian and foreign case law.
Chapter VI deals with remedies available both to 
the fugitive offender and the requesting State, before the 
Superior Courts under tlhe Indian Criminal Procedure Code 
and the Constitution, amd before the Central Government.
Chapter VII d<eals with practice and procedure of 
rendition within the Commonwealth, giving details of the 
differences in procedure under Chapters II and III of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
Practice and procedure in International Law has 
also been considered. Suggestions have been made to 
amend further the present Act wherever necessary, and 
towards the framing of JRules under Section 36 of the Act.
PREFACE
There is no up-to-date work on the law of 
extradition in the light of the Indian Constitution and, 
therefore, I ventured to take up this study for a thesis.
It is to be noted that R.C. Hingorani in 'The Indian 
Extradition Law' (1969, Asia Publishing House, Bombay), 
and S.K. Agarwala in ' International law - Indian Courts 
and Legislature' (1965, Bombay), inPart III,’Extradition* 
have not: covered the Constitutional aspects of Extradition 
proceedings. This thesis attempts to deal with the Consti­
tutional dimensions in much detail that the other Works on
extradition have not attempted* This is the main contri­
bution of this thesis. Cases subsequent to these publi­
cations which have proved to be important are also discussed 
here.
While dealing with the historical aspect of the 
extradition law in general, and Indian Extradition Law in 
particular, in the light of the Indian Constitution, up-to- 
date case law has been given on judicial inquiry, non-extra­
dition of political offenders and lack of definition of 
political offences, extradition o;r non-extradition of 
nationals, the doctrine of double criminality, the rule 
of 'speciality', the rule against double jeopardy, non­
extradition for time barred offences, or offences of a
trivial nature, the interpretation of extradition treaties,and 
related matters.
Since the law of extradition comes within the 
concurrent dominion of international and national law, I 
have dealt with the Indian as well as customary rules of 
International law. On the present Indian Extradition
Act of 1962, the case-law being scanty, numerous judgments 
of foreign courts on similar provisions on the subject have 
been included in this study. Cases of the International 
Court of Justice and other foreign courts have been cited 
to show practice in International Law, which may be useful 
in India as persuasive authorities.
Though some discussion of the international aspect 
of the law of extradition was essential for this study, I 
have essentially concentrated on the Constitutional aspect 
on the subject in the light of the Indian Constitution.
That is the heart and core and proper theme of this thesis.
Though I registered for the research in 1959, and
commenced active work on the thesis soon after March, 1971, 
it includes case-law up to June, 1973, relevant for the 
purpose and on the subject of extradition law.
I am highly indebted to Professor J.D.M. Derrett 
who from time to time suggested material and books on the 
subject and kept me informed about them, even when I was 
in India.
I aim also highly obliged to Mr A. Dicks, my Super­
visor, who ably guided me in my study and who extended his
help in making suggestions for re-writing portions, wherever 
necessary.
I would like to thank Mr. T.K.K. Iyer for his 
immense help in getting this thesis revised and in offer­
ing suggestions on points of Constitutional Law.
I have consulted the libraries of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, the Senate House Library, the India House
Library, the Britidh Museum Library, the Library of the 
Supreme Court: of India, and the Library of the Rajasthan 
High Court; and I am much indebted to the staff of these 
libraries who made available the books I needed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
The Indian law of extradition is operated under a 
central statute (see below), and the interpretation of this 
statute is entrusted to the High Courts and the Supreme Court. 
Although the basic principles of the Indian legal system are 
very well known, a few words of a purely introductory character 
are necessary to recapitulate in general the relationship be­
tween the statute-making power, the powers of the judiciary, 
and the legal limits on the discretion of the executive. The 
latter looms very large in Indian extradition practice, and 
to it space is devoted in detail in this thesis.
The Indian Constitution has adopted not the Conti­
nental system of law, but the British system under which the 
Rule of Law prevails. Every act done by the Government or 
by its officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice 
of any person, be supported by some legislative authority,^ 
and as will be shown subsequently, the Indian law of extra­
dition is no exception to this rule. The law of extradi­
tion is a special branch of criminal law. The present Indian 
Extradition Act derives from the Constitution of India. The 
theme of the law of extradition in this work will be discussed 
and examined in the light of the provisions of the Constitu­
tion of India. The law of extradition operates both on the 
national and the international level, and in this work the 
provisions and practice of international law in the field 
of extradition will be discussed, with special reference to
1 . nf Madhya. Pradesh v. Thakur Bharatsingh. A.I.R. 1967
S.C. 1170 at p. 1173.
the impact of constitutional provisions on the present Indian 
Extradition Act of 1962* The extradition law of the common 
law and civil law countries will also be considered in a modest 
endeavour to give an account of the law of extradition in 
India in a comparative as well as an international context*
Extradition is a subject specifically provided for
as the object of legislation as Entry 18 of List I, Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India*^ The Constitution
of India is the paramount law and source of all laws in India*
It is the mechanism under which laws are made, and not merely
legislation which declares what the law on any subject is to 
2
be* It is the Supreme Charter which the people have given
3
themselves*
The Indian Constitution is meant to be a complete 
structure of governance which lays down in detail individual
rights as against the rights of the State, and the powers of
the legislative, the executive and judicial authorities of
4
the State in their respective fields.
While in England, Parliament is supreme and omni­
potent; in America, the judiciary can review the laws for 
their Constitutionality, which would include an examination 
of their compliance with * due process of law* India* s 
Constitution is a compromise between these two extremes, 
and under it neither the legislature nor the judiciary 
is supreme. On the whole, our Constitution has pre­
ferred the supremacy of the Legislature, and subject to 
the constitutional limitations (Articles 13, 245 and 246
1* Anantanarayanan J, in Re Chockalingam* A*I*R* 1960 Madras 
548 at p.563.
2* Kania C.J* in A.K* Gopalan v* State of Madras* A.I.R. 1950 
S.C. 27 at p*42.
3* S.R. Das J. in Gopalan*s case* ibid** at p*119»
4* Kania C*J» in Gopalan*s case* ibid* at p«38* and Das J 0 at 
p.117.
and in Legislative lists), the legislatures are at liberty to 
pass any laws, and the validity of: these laws cannot be ques­
tioned by the Supreme Court on anyr ground other than the trans­
gression of constitutional limitations*’*’
Subject to the provisioms of the Constitution, power 
has been given to Parliament and tco the State legislatures to 
make laws as they please to meet t;he needs of the people, and 
power has been given to the Supremte Court to declare any en­
actment ultra vires or void only i:f it exceeds the limits of 
the legislative competence or confflicts with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed to the citizen* But its power stops there, 
arid the court is not at liberty to> judge the validity of a 
law on any other ground; the courrt cannot place on the powers 
of the legislature any limitation 'which the constitution it­
self does not place, either expresisly or by necessary intend­
ment* In other words, the power <of the Supreme Court, under
the Constitution, is, in this conniection, confined to two 
things: the interpretation of the? Constitution and of any
impugned legislation, and the declaration that the legisla­
tion is either constitutional or uinconstitutional and void,
depending upon whether or not it v/iolates any constitutional 
2
limitation*
Outside the field of constitutional limitations, 
the Supreme Court cannot play the Ihigh role of the Supreme 
Court of America* It has no authiority to test a law on the 
anvil of natural justice, and has no power to examine the 
justice, or the propriety of any j law according to its own 
ideas of what a law on the subject; in question ought to be*
1* S.R. Das J* in Gopalan's case* ibid* , at p.107,
2. Kania C.J. in GopaIan*s case* ilbid** at p.42.
If a law keeps within constitutional limitations, it cannot be 
touched however harsh, unreasonable or onerous it might be, 
according to the court's own notions*
As we have seen, Parliament and the State Legis­
latures are at liberty to pass laws subject to the constitu­
tional limitations in Articles 13, 245 and 246* Article 245 
requires that all laws shall be subject to the provisions of 
the Constitution* Article 13 provides that the State shall 
not make any law which takes away or abridges a Fundamental 
Right conferred by Part III of the Constitution, and Article
246 lays down the ambit of the law-making powers of Parlia­
ment and the State legislatures* The combined effect of 
these articles is that a law is good in constitutional terms, 
unless it transgresses the legislative competence of legis­
lature under Article 246, and the legislative lists in the 
Seventh Schedule, or takes away or abridges any Fundamental 
Rights•
It will be appreciated that fugitive offenders sure 
'persons' and therefore, have certain rights guaranteed to 
them under Part III; and since India will grant extradition 
of her nationals (see below), many persons whose extradition 
is requested will be citizens, to whom yet other rights are 
guaranteed* It follows that the constitutional limitations 
upon Parliament and the actions of the Central Government may 
at any time prove to be of the highest importance, and their 
definition is an on-going process of considerable concern*
Any person who is directly affected by any law, or 
by any executive order made under it, can challenge it before 
the Supreme Court or any of the High Courts, either as ultra 
vires or as being in conflict with a Fundamental Right*
No doubt the Constitution has given the legislature 
power to determine what is good for the people, but this power 
is circumscribed, and the legislature cannot go beyond its 
bounds* If the court finds that a law has transgressed 
those limitations, it must declare the law to be bad and 
the question whether it benefits the people in , e.g. any 
political sense, does not arise for consideration* All 
these principles will apply in regard to the challenge of 
any provisions of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, and the 
extradition proceedings themselves*
Ihe court*s power is confined only to the deter­
mination of the question whether an impugned law transgresses 
any constitutional limitation, and if it does not, it is the 
duty of the court to uphold the validity of the law, what­
ever the view of the court may be as to the effect of its 
operation*^
The present Indian Extradition Act, 1962, has been 
enacted by the Indian Parliament in exercise of the powers
conferred upon it by Articles 246 and 253 of the Constitution, 
read with Entries 10, 14, and 18 of the Union List as given 
in the Seventh Schedule* Article 246(1) gives exclusive 
power to the Parliament to legislate with respect to any 
matter given in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule*
Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law in order 
to implement any international agreements such as extradi­
tion treaties and the arrangements with foreign countries
1* Bose J. in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, A*X.R. 1952 
S.C. 75 at p*103*
2* S.R. Das J* in State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, A.I.R. 1953 
S.C. 10 at p.13*
into which the Government of India may have entered* Entry
10 ctf the Union List makes ’foreign affairs* the monopoly 
of the Central Government of India* Foreign affairs are 
interpreted to include **all matters which bring the union 
of India into relation with any foreign country**. Entry 
14 empowers the Union Government to enter into treaties 
with foreign countries and to implement the same*
Entry 18 specifically deals with^extradition*, 
i*e* the delivery of an accused or convicted individual to 
the State on whose territory he is alleged to have committed 
or to have been convicted of, a crime, by the State on whose 
territory the alleged criminal happens for the time being to 
be*^ The entry itself merely reads the single word »Extra­
dition* • Although the interest of civilised communities 
requires that such persons should be extradited, states have 
claimed the right to give asylum to such persons on the
2
ground that it follows from their territorial supremacy* 
Consequently, extradition has been the subject of treaties 
between various States* Extradition treaties may be ex-
3
pressly or impliedly subject to extradition laws*
. £s extradition is a specific subject of legislative 
power, it follows that the rendition of an offender for an 
extraditable offence could not be£n derogation of Fundamental
4
Rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of India,
1. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol.I, p*696; State of West
Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, A.l.R. 1969 S.C* llVl at p*1175*
2* H.M. Seervai. Constitutional Law of India, p.946.
3. Seervai, ibid*, p.946.
4. Anantanarayanan J.In Re^  Chockalingam,.A.I.R. 1Q6Q Madras 548 
at p*564.
and therefore, the present law of extradition in India has 
to be tested in the light of the Constitution of India,
If any provisions of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, or 
any Rules framed (eventually), under section 36 of the 
said Act, or any action taken by the court or the Central 
Government under the Act, or any treaty provision are in 
derogation or in infringement of the provisions of the Con­
stitution, the superior courts in India would not hesitate 
to strike down the provisions of the Act or Rules or the 
action of the investigating Magistrate or the Central Govern­
ment* Ihe testing of the extradition laws in the light of 
the Constitution has produced a new body of jurisprudence 
on the approach to these problems in India, and it is this 
which is the subject matter of this work. Current trends 
in judicial thinking suggest many complicated questions of 
constitutional law which did not arise before the coming 
into force of the Constitution*
After C;G. Meno^s case,1 and before the enactment
of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962, there was an interregnum
and the extradition was ordered at the request of foreign and
commonwealth countries on the basis of the instructions issued
by the Government of India, and such instructions were held
2valid by the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore More1 s case*
Even now, no Extradition Rules have been framed by the 
Central Government in exercise of its powers under section 36 
of the Indian Extradition Act* No court can issue a mandate
1. State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.l.R. ' 1954. S.C. 517.
2* State of West Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, A.l.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171 at pp‘.1179,1152’. --------------
to a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, no 
court can direct a subordinate legislative body to enact or 
not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact. Con­
versely, no court can give a direction to a government to 
refrain from enforcing an existing legal provision, the 
constitutionality of which has not been impugned.*1’
Under the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, the exclu­
sive power of determination whether to grant extradition or 
refuse extradition is vested in the executive wing of the
i
Central Government by virtue of sections 29 and 31 of that 
Act. Assuming that the Act of 1962 has been enacted 
validly, the power of extradition can, subject to certain 
conditions (laid down e.g. in sections 29 and 31 of the 
Indian Extradition Act of 1962) be delegated to some other 
authority. But the exercise of that power by the legis­
lature^ delegatee is still an exercise of a legislative 
power. The Supreme Court and High Courts can examine 
if any of the provisions of the Act are in violation of any 
provision of the constitution, and so beyond the legislative 
competence of Parliament.
There is a natural tendency on the part of the 
State of asylum to facilitate the surrender of fugitives*.
Bringing a fugitive to justice is one motive, reciprocity
1. Narinder chand v. Lt.Governor, Administrator. Union^Territory, 
&tm. Pra. and Others, A.l.R. 1^71 S.C. 2399 ai p.34Ql.(^/Lr/v^_
2. Narinder chand. ibid., at p .2401.
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is another; keeping cordial relations with the requesting 
State is another motive* Extradition proceedings involve 
complicated procedural matters aid a balance has to be struck 
between the life and liberty of a person accused and the vindi­
cation of justice on the part of the requesting State, so that 
the fugitive offender may not escape the consequences of the 
crime he has committed*
The liberty of an individual being supposedly an 
important right, nowadays, many States, particularly the 
United States and the United Kingdom, prescribe that no fugi­
tive will be extradited in the absence of an extradition 
treaty between the two countries concerned* But the exist­
ence of a treaty is not always a prerequisite for securing 
the return of the fugitive* Some States do not insist on 
the existence of a treaty as the basisIbr extradition and 
India is one such country* Under the Indian Extradition 
Act of 1962, notification of the application of the Act to 
a particular country under sections 3 and 12 is enough to 
enable the foreign State to request the surrender of the 
wanted fugitive, although the liberties of the individual 
are, of course, protected by the provisions of the Indian 
Const itut ion•
The Russian sailor Tarasov*s case  ^is an instance 
of a non-treaty country demanding the extradition of the 
fugitive on the basis of notification* Canada, Prance, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey do not require an extradition
1* Hingorani,R*C., The Indian Extradition Law, pp*25, 53, 55; 
see J.N* Saxena; Extradition of a Soviet Sailor, A.J.I*L* 
(1963), vol*3, p*883; Agarwala, S.K., International Law.Indian 
Courts and Legislature, p.219; Bedi, S.D., Extradition in 
International Law and ^ Practice, p*150*
treaty for the surrender of the fugitive, and thus, India 
does not lack precedents*
Apart from the basis of requisition for the sur ­
render of the fugitive, the territorial State has a dual re­
sponsibility* On the one hand, it is obliged by treaty or 
its own notification, to extradite the fugitive, if he is 
held to have committed an extraditable offence; and on the 
other hand, it has to safeguard the interest of the fugitive 
who according to the Indian legal system,1 is supposed to be 
innocent until a prima facie case has been established against 
him, and also his constitutional Fundamental Rights are to be 
safeguarded* The danger of jeopardizing the cordial relations 
between the requesting and requested State on account of pro­
cedural requirements cannot be ruled out,as procedures for 
extradition vary from State to State and it may sometimes be 
onerous for a demanding State to be confronted with searching 
inquiries•
The surrender of a political offender can be a 
thorny problem, Now, the legislation in Britain also 
prohibits extradition of * political offenders** Extradi­
tion and .granting political asylum are two intersecting doc­
trines which conflict with each other, and the Central Govern­
ment may face difficulties in drawing a line between the two, 
so that the law is not sacrificed to political consider at ionS.
This is why a magistrate* s enquiry has been provided in the
1* Field, J* in Reg v* Rogers (1877), 2 Q.B.D. 28 at p*34*
2* J.N. Saxena: Extradition of a Soviet Sailor, (1963) 57 A*J*I*L.
883 at p.887(Hy:
3* The Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967.
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Indian Extradition Act of 1962, to avoid the requesting State* s 
displeasure. Thereafter, according to the set standards laid 
down in the Act, the Central Government has discretion to grant 
or refuse the extradition.
Due to the many meanings attributed to the phrase,
* political offender*, by the various commentators and judges, 
a discretion is left initially with the magistrate to deter- 
mto'whether in the given circumstances, the fugitive offender 
is an ordinary criminal liable to be extradited or is a poli­
tical offender entitled to asylum within the territorial State 
or elsewhere. The courts may find it difficult to determine 
whether a given offence is a political one when a political 
offender commits an ordinary crime to achieve political ends. 
Sometimes the fugitive is falsely implicated in the commis­
sion of a crime which is ostensibly non-political. The 
Central Government must remain alert against possible abuse 
of extradition facilities and, as in Zacharia*s case,1 the 
Central Government, by virtue of section 29, has the dis­
cretion to refuse or to grant extradition of a fugitive 
offender. The grounds for refusal or grant of extradition 
in the Extradition Act itself were held (see below, p. 55 ) 
within the legislative competence of the Indian Parliament: 
the court could not examine their desirability and undesir­
ability, but would only see if the procedural and substan­
tive law had been followed. Even then, above all, the 
discretion of the Central Government was supreme.
Zacharia v. Cyprus (1962 ) 2 All E.R. 438.
2. Hans Muller v. Supdt. Presidency Jail, Calcutta, A.I.R. 1955
S.C. 367, at p.3^.
Some States are known to have refused to surrender 
their own nationals for eventual trial in foreign States, but 
there are some other States which do not hesitate to surrender 
the wanted fugitive to the demanding State, irrespective of the 
fact that the fugitive is a national of the surrendering State. 
The United Kingdom, United States and India are such States and 
do not discriminate on the basis of nationality. The Consti­
tution itself has made applicable articles in Chapter III, 
applicable to citizens and aliens alike, except Article 19 and 
31. The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, does not restrict the 
extradition of Indian fugitives who have taken shelter in India 
after commission of an offence in a foreign country, and con­
sequently, even Indian citizens can be extradited to a foreign 
State, if a prima facie charge is established against them, 
unless of course, there is a treaty between them excluding 
the extradition of nationals.
In extradition proceedings, some of the fugitives 
are bound to be mere suspects, and yet others, falsely accused: 
all of them are not necessarily actual offenders. The fugi­
tive offender feels great difficulty in conducting his own 
defence, compared to the efforts of the demanding State. The 
government machinery of the requesting State works to effect 
his extradition while the fugitive offender, is rarely 
able to defend himself properly, a difficulty enhanced by 
foreign exchange restrictions. Cases can go undefended
for want of funds, even to call witnesses to rebut the evi­
dence against hinn. This problem is sometimes solved by 
the legal aid society, and the courts may request a compe­
tent lawyer to defend the fugitive offender. But a handi­
cap remains, of which the courts are aware.
In extradition proceedings, any surrender must be 
preceded by precautions to the effect that nobody is denied 
the process of law and that no fugitive offender is made the 
victim of political vindictiveness. The Indian Extradition 
Act, read with our constitutional provisions, provides all 
these safeguards. The extradition or the surrender of a 
fugitive is essentially a political act done in pursuance 
of treaty or an arrangement ad hoc. The Central Govern­
ment has been given powers under sections 29 and 31 of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, to refuse extradition if the 
offence is of a political character or is barred by time 
(sde below), or if the law of the requesting State does not 
contain a rule of speciality (see below), or if the fugitive 
has been accused of some offence in India, not being the 
offence for which his extradition is sought. Similarly, 
if he is undergoing sentence, or the case is a trivial one, 
or the application for surrender is not made in good faith 
or in the interest of justice or for a political reason, or 
otherwise, it is unjust and inexpedient to surrender or re­
turn the fugitive criminal. All these conditions will be 
examined in detail below. The Central Government is 
authorised, in fact, to exercise these powers after the 
magistrate has made his report for committing of the accused 
under sections 9(2) and 17(1) of the Indian Extradition Act, 
and the Central Government can arrive at conclusions differ­
ent from those arrived at by the magistrate.
If the executive exceeds its powers, the judiciary 
will restrain it, but when the conditions laid down by the 
legislature as a prerequisite to extradition are fulfilled 
and the judiciary has, therefore, no power to intervene,
the executive is, nevertheless, under no legal compulsion to 
surrender the prisoner* It retains discretion in the matter, 
and may, for reasons which appear to it be valid, cancel the 
warrant which has been issued.^
The Central Government is to see whether or not 
sufficient grounds have been made out for depriving the de­
manded person of his liberty and sending him out of India 
to answer a charge in a foreign country* The Central Govern­
ment will decide the matter in accordance with the principles 
laid down in sections 29 and 31 of the Indian Extradition Act*
The present Indian Extradition Act does not speci­
fically provide for refusal of a surrender if the request is 
made for the purpose of-prosecuting or punishing the fugitive 
offender on account of his race, religion, nationality or 
political opinions, or that it might prejudice his trial, 
or on the ground that he may be punished, detained or re­
stricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, 
religion, nationality or political opinions, sis provided
2in the United Kingdom* But when a person is guaranteed
fundamental Rights in Chapter III of the Indian Constitution, 
there is no need for making separate provisions for these in 
the Indian Extradition Act, 1962*
Even prior to the enactment of the current Indian 
Statute, an examination of the scheme of the Indian Extra­
dition Act, 1903, showed that it was not an abritrary or
1. Shearer, J*: In Hadi Bandhu Prcfdhany. Emperor, A.I.R* 1940 
Patna, 196 at p• 199; see also section 29 of The Extradition 
Act, 1962*
2. See Fugitive Offenders Act. 1967, sections 4(l)(a)(b)(c): R* v*
Governor of Pentonville Prison. Ex parte Fernenaez. (1971) "^ 2 
All E.R. 24
capricious piece of legislation,but is a careful product of 
a balance between what was due by way of reciprocal inter- 
national courtesy to achieve the common objective of sup­
pression of crime,and what was due by way of protection of 
oneTs own citizens before being delivered up for trial in a 
foreign country whose law£ they were accused of having broken.^
That Act, while maintaining the rights of the indi­
viduals as fax as possible and adequately safeguarding them, 
did not overlook the rights which the public and State are 
entitled to claim. Thus, even that Extradition Act was a 
harmonious combination of what was agreeable to the consti­
tution sind laws, and the voluntsiry exercise of the power to
surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from which 
he has fled. It has been said: "It is our moral duty to do
so."2
The English Extradition Acts on the lines of which 
the Indian Extradition Act of 1962 has been modelled have been 
praised:2
"The Extradition Act stands, I think, as 
f a monument of successful draftsmanship,
it has so established itself that almost 
one has come to believe it could take 
rank as a doctrine inherent to scienti­
fic law-making. The successful statutes 
make little fuss, cause little argument 
in the courts. And judged by the stan­
dard (the brevity of the case law arising 
under it\) ,this statute must be pronounced 
to be very successful."
1. Ramaswami J.,In Re Chockalingam, A.I.R. 1960. Madras, 548 
at p.553.
2. Ramaswami, J., in Re Chockal ingam, A.I.R. I960. Madras, 548 
at p.553.
3. Piggot C.J. (HongKong): The Law of Extradition, preface remarks; 
Ramaswami, J., in Re ChockajLingam. A.I.R. jL 9 o O  Madras, 548
at p.553.
The remarks of Ramaswami J* and Piggot C.J. (Hong Kong) would 
apply to the present Indian Extradition Act of 1962 with full 
force* Improvements regarding reciprocity and otheijprovi- 
sions, such as non-extradition for political offences, have 
been provided in the present Act* When the Indian Extradi­
tion Act, 1903, was framed the Indian Constitution was not in 
force, but when the new Act was enacted the Constitution was 
already in fores and its framers took into consideration the 
drawbacks and lacunae of the earlier British and Indian Acts, 
and re-modelled the new Act in the light of the Constitution*
It is important to note that in cases of extradi­
tion for ordinary offences, as distinguished from political 
offences, no infringement of Fundamental Rights of an Indian 
citizen is involved*^ The imprisonment of a criminal, or 
of a persoijwho is arrested and detained according to law does 
not offend any Fundamental Right, for to hold otherwise would
result in a virtual paralysis of the administration of crimi- 
2
nal justice* Extradition is a subject specifically pro­
vided for as the object of legislation, as Entry 18 of the 
Seventh Schedule, List I, in the Constitution* Since extra­
dition is a specific subject for the legislative competence 
under the Constitution, it follows that the rendition of 
offenders for extraditable offences cannot be in derogation 
of Fundamental Rights of freedomf of movement or residence 
and this restriction is in the interest of general public, 
as provided in Article 19(5), which reads as under:
1. In Re Chockalingam A.I.R. 1960 Madras 548 at p.559*
2. A.K. Gopalan v* State of Madras, A.I.R., 1950, S.C,27;
Anantanarayananv J* in Re Chockalingam, ibid*, at p*564*
"Nothing in sub-clauses (d),(e) and (f) 
of the said clause shall affect the opera­
tion of any existing law insofar as it im­
poses, Qr prevent this State from making 
any law imposing reasonable restrictions 
on the exercise of any of the rights con­
ferred by the said sub-clauses in the 
interest of the general public or for the 
protection of the interests of any Sche­
duled Tribe."
Rendition for trial to another country, in accord­
ance with international law and the municipal law under the
Indian Extradition Act, cannot constitute an infringement of 
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(d) of the 
Const itut ion . 1
As it is a valuable right of a citizen that he 
should not be sent into a foreign jurisdiction, unless the 
law is strictly complied with, the decisions are uniform 
that a court must give a strict interpretation to the pro- 
visions of the Extradition Act. The decision on any points 
raised by the accused is a judicial order,3 though the pro­
ceedings before the magistrate are in exercise of the special
jurisdiction conferred by the Act, and though? they arise out
^ 4of^criminal cause or matter. The proceedings are not that
of an inferior court under the Criminal Procedure Code, as
1. Anantanarayanan J. in Re Chockalingam. ibid.. at p.564.
2. Ramprags v. Emperor. A.I.R. 1948 All 129 at p.130; Emperor v. 
Gulli. A.I.R. 1914 Cal.22 at p.24; Santabir Lama v. Emperor. 
A.I.R. 1935 Cal.122 at p. 124. -------------  ----
3. H.K. Lodhi v. Shyamlal, A.I.R. 1950 All 100 at p.104.
4. Re Alice Woodall. (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 832; 59 L.T.549; R. v. 
Fletcher (1876). 2 Q.B.D. 43; The King v. Governor o? Brixton 
Prison. Ex parte Savarkar (1910) 2 K.B. 1056. ' "
the magistrate is specifically appointed under section 5 or 
23 of the Act of 1962, Conversely, the jurisdiction of 
ordinary criminal courts would seem to be ousted,*
«###*###*•*****«»
While a state of war exists, there is no place for 
extradition proceedings between the belligerents and all 
treaties on the subject are at least suspended during con* 
tinuance of war. Whether extradition treaties are abro­
gated during the continuance of hostilities is. doubtful« 
Perhaps the safer view is to regard such treaties as abro­
gated and to hold that they do not revive on the restoration
of peace, save by express agreement. This theory was followed
2after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871,
These brief remarks are intended to set the scene 
and introduce the technical chapters which follow. It was 
thought inappropriate and unnecessary to qualify each and 
every remark above by reference to particular details of the 
law as they will emerge below. In view of the failure of 
the Central Government to provide Rules for the working of 
the Act, and in view of the absence of the arrangements 
which would call into force the provisions of a whole Part 
of that Act, it is both requisite that the statute's pur­
pose and potential should be investigated in great detailf 
and that this investigation should be angled somewhat in
1, The Norwich Corporation v. The Norwich Electric Tramways Co. 
(1966) ± K.B. Ii9 (C.A. )•
2, Law of Extradition: Muddiman: Preface to first edition.
the direction of enlightening the 
for development which extradition 
possesses (subject to the factual 
above).
reader as to the scope 
law in India still 
limitations mentioned
CHAPTER II
(1) EXTRADITION IN GENERAL
(a) Def init ion
The origin of the word "extradition" lies in a com­
bination of two Latin words, viz. "ex" and "traditio " which 
means deliver from. This word was first used in a French 
decree of 1791 and later in a Treaty of 1828, after which 
the word has been uniformly used.*
Extradition has been defined as the surrender by
one State to another of a person desired to be dealt with for
crimes of which he has been accused or convicted and which
are justiciable in the Courts of the other State. Surrender
of a person within the State to another State, whether a
citizen or an alien, is a political act done in pursuance
2
either of a treaty or of an arrangement ad hoc. It is 
the surrender by one State of an individual accused or con­
victed of an offence committed outside of its own territory 
and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, to
that other which, being competent to try and punish him, de­
mands his surrender. Extradition is founded on the broad 
principle that it is in the interest of civilized communities 
that crimes should not go unpunished, and on that account it 
is recognised as a part of the comity of nations that one
1. Harvard Research Draft, 1935; 29 A.J.I.L. (supp.), p.66.
2.  ^sta,tq of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore, A.I.R. - 1969:
S.C. Il7l at pTilV^; Terliden v. Ames (1902), 184 U.S. 270 
at p.289.
State should ordinarily afford to another State assistance to­
wards bringing offenders to justice. The law relating to 
extradition between independent states is based on treaties 
or ad hoc arrangements. However, the law of extradition 
operates nationally as well as internationally. Inter­
national law governs the international relationship between 
sovereign states which is secured by treaty obligations.
But whether an offender should be handed over pursuant to a 
requisition is determined by the domestic law of the State 
on which the requisition is made. Though extradition is 
granted in implementation of the international commitments 
of the State, the procedure to be followed by the courts in 
deciding whether extradition should be granted and on what 
terms, is determined by the municipal law.*
"The Constitutional doctrine in England 
is that the Crown may make treaties 
with foreign States for extradition of 
criminals, but these treaties can only 
be carried into effect by the Act of
the Parliament, for the executive has
no power, without statutory authority, 
to seize an alien here and deliver him 
to a foreign power." 2
According to Professor Oppenheim, extradition is 
the delivery of an accused person or convicted pefson to the 
State on whose territory he is alleged to have committed or
to have been convicted of a crime, by the State on whose
territory the alleged criminal for the time being happens
1. Wheaton: International Law, vol.I, 6th ed., p.213.
2. Jugal Kishore More, ibid., at p.1175.
22.
to be.*
Extradition must be distinguished from transporta­
tion and from deportation, which also result in the removal 
of a person from the country.
In either case, questions of esqpediency loom large.
The consequence of disregard of (extradition will only lead 
to virtual exclusion of citizens of this country from all 
foreign countries. No country is going to tolerate Indian 
citizens coming and injuring tbe:ir citizens and then escaping. 
Secondly, India will be helpless if culprits committing of­
fences in Indian territory slip (out to contiguous countries.
In fact, Bentham pointed out in amother connection:
"If all the criminals of all the countries 
has assembled and frfamed a system after 
their own wishes, is not the abolition of 
extradition the very first which they^would 
have established for their security."
The early history of tlhe practice of extradition in
Roman Empire, England and Prance., will be found set out in
3
Sir Edward Clarke1 s Law of Extradition, from which it is 
desirable to reproduce a short stummary since Indian courts 
have found it helpful to orientaite themselves in such terms.
- . * - - -  -
1. Oppenheim, International Law; Eighth Ed., Vol.I, p.696. See 
also, J.G. Starke. An Introduction to International Law, 4th 
ed., p.260; Halsbury1 s Laws cof England, 3rd ed., vol.16, p.560; 
22 Am jur p.244, S2; Russell L.C.J., In Re Arton 1896-1, Q.B. 
108; Piggott, Extradition, 1<910, at p*8; Clarke, Law of Extra- 
dition, 3rd ed., p.223.
2. Quoted by Rama^waroL J^, In Rse Chockalingam. A.I.R. 1960,
Madras 548 at p.559•
3. Edward Clarke: Law of Extradition, 3rd ed., Ch.II, p.16.
(b) Practice of Extraditions
The practice for extradition amongst the nations 
is based upon sound principles and reasons and they are, 
first, to warn the criminals that they cannot escape punish­
ment by escaping or fleeing to a foreign country or terri­
tory, and secondly, that it is the interest of the terri­
torial State that a criminal who has fled from another 
country after having committed the crime and taken refuge 
and shelter in its territory should not be left free, be­
cause he may commit a chain of crimes and continue endlessly 
escaping to other states, and thus, may get a free hand to 
commit endless crimes without fear of punishment. Extra­
dition is based upon the principle of reciprocity; and the 
third reason for recognition of the practice of extradition 
amongst nations is that the territorial state which has been 
asked to surrender a fugitive criminal may have, in turn, to 
request an extradition from the requesting State at some 
future date. The fourth reason for recognition of the 
practice is in fulfilment of the maxim: ”at{t punire aftt 
dedere", meaning that the offender must be punished either 
by the State of asylum or the State within whose territory 
the fugitive is found or by the State within whose territory 
the crime was committed.
To put it tersely, the following rational consider­
ation has conditioned the law as to extradition: the general
desire of all States to ensure that serious crimes do not go 
unpunished. Frequently, a State in whose territory a crimi­
nal has taken refuge cannot prosecute of punish him because 
of some technical rule of criminal law or lack of jurisdiction.
Therefore, to close the net round such fugitive offenders, 
international law applies the maxim "aiut punire aut dedere”,
i.e. the offender must be punished by the State of refuge 
or surrendered to the State which can and will punish him.*
The State on whose territory the crime has been 
committed is best able to try the offender, because the evi­
dence is more freely available there, and that State has the 
greatest interest in the punishment of the offender and the 
greatest facilities for ascertaining the truth. It follows
that it is only right and proper that to that State should 
be surrendered such criminals as have taken refuge abroad.
With the increasing rapidity and facility of inter­
national transport and communications, extradition began to 
assume importance and prominence in the 19th Century. On 
the one hand, customary international law imposed no duty 
upon States to surrender alleged or convicted offenders to 
any other State, while on the other hand, it did not forbid
the State to refuse to deliver over the alleged delinquent
2
to the State requesting his surrender. Therefore, because 
of the negative attitude of customary international law on the 
subject extradition was first dealt with in bilateral treaties. 
These treaties, in as much as they affected the rights of 
private citizens, required;in their turn, alterations in the
laws and statutes of the States which had concluded them.
Hence, the general principles became established that with­
out some formal authority either by treaty or by statute 
fugitive criminals would not be surrendered, nor would
1. HingoranL-, R.C., The Indian Extradition Law, p.6.
2. Arnold McNair: Extradition and Exterritorial Asylum, B.Y.I.L., 
1951 at ,p". 172«
their surrender be requested. For this reason, extradi­
tion was called by some writers a matter of "imperfect obli­
gation". In the absence of any treaty or statute, the grant 
of extradition depended purely on ’reciprocity* or ’courtesy*.
In bygone times, common criminals had rarely the opportunity
of escaping and chiefly so-called political criminals succeeded. 
Quick transportation has altered radically this state of things. 
Further, on account of the variations in the definitions of 
crime in different countries, there has been a reluctance to 
surrender persons who, whatever their alleged crimes else­
where, have not committed offences against the laws of the 
country in which they are actually present.* This, in 
course of time, encouraged the States entering into treaties 
and their passing of extradition statutes to obviate, gener­
ally, these difficulties and impediments in the way of sur­
render of fugitives.
But the granting of asylum as opposed to a fugi­
tive's entry as an escape from criminal justice, presupposes
that there will be no extradition, as has been held by the
2
World Court in the Asylum case. The Indian Plane hi­
jacking case, in which the so-called Azad Kashmiris hijacked 
the Indian plane from Kashmere to Lahore and blew it up, is 
a recent instance of an agiLum being given to criminals, not 
allowing them to be extradited to India. But this pre­
supposition may not come out true in all cases, because the 
requested State may later on change its mind or because of 
pressure from other nations may extradite the criminal in
1. Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 19/^ . Ed., Extradition . Vol.9, 
p.l and following.
2. (1950) I.C.J. Reports, 266.
spite of asylum having once been granted. The Mexican 
Supreme Court in 1882 held in the Mas case that extradi­
tion of a fugitive criminal is a moral duty even in the 
absence of a treaty. But according to Oppenheim, "In 
the absence of extradition treaties stipulating to the 
contrary, no state is by any international law obliged 
to expel or deliver him up to the prosecuting State."*
In some countries, extradition is not permitted in the 
absence of treaties. Thus, in the cases in which, not­
withstanding, a fugitive is extradited without treaty 
obligation, it is done because of ’comity1, ’polity’ or 
’courtesy' of international law and not because of any 
international duty or obligation.
India inherited treaties between the former 
British Government and other foreign States for the extra­
dition of criminals from and to India. Similarly, the 
British Government had entered into treaties with the 
erstwhile princely States of India for extradition, but
after India became sovereign democratic Republic after
2
independence, those later treaties lapsed, and became 
incapable of execution by the merger of the princely
States in either of the Indian or Pakistan Dominions.
1. Oppenheim, International Law, 8th Ed., Vol.I, p.677.
2. Dr. Ram -Babu Saics^ na v.The State, A.I.R., 1950 S.C. 155.
(2) THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXTRADITION ACT, 1962
The earliest law in India regarding extradition of 
fugitives from British India was the Extradition Act, 1870, 
passed by the British Parliament and made applicable to India 
in .pursuance of section 17. Similarly, the Fugitive Offenders 
Act, 1881, was applied to India by virtue of section 32 of that 
Act. Until 1903, these two British Acts were applicable to 
India and comprised the whole of the law of extradition.
The Indian Extradition Act of 1903 was the first Indian legis­
lation in the field of extradition; but this enactment did 
affect the British Extradition Act of 1870 or the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, which had been made applicable to India, 
but was passed to supplement them. Like the two British 
enactments, the Indian Extradition Act of 1903 made a dis­
tinction between foreign and non-foreign States. Countries 
which later formed the Commonwealth and British colonies 
were categorised as non-foreign States; whereas other States 
were categorised as foreign States. However, extradition 
requests between India and French Indian possessions were 
governed by treaty of 1815 which stipulated for surrender 
of fugitive criminals without furnishing of prima facie 
proof of evidence against the fugitive, and the French and 
Portuguese possessions were not treated as foreign States 
for the purposes of extradition.* Princely States in 
India were not » treated as foreign States for the purposes 
of extradition. Chapter III of the 1903 Extradition Act 
regulated extradition proceedings with regard to non-foreign
1. In re Muthu Reddi, 59 M.L.J. 278. See also, S.K. Agarwala: 
International Law, Indian Courts and Legislature, pp.197-198.
States, and Chapter II governed extradition proceedings with 
regard to foreign States* United Kingdom extradition 
treaties with foreign States were made applicable to British 
India also*
The Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879 
(21 of 1879) was amended and supplemented on more than one
occasion and practical difficulties arose, however, in its 
administration and questions arose about its scope and con­
struction of some of its provisions* Thus, as regards 
extradition, the British Indian Government on the one hand, 
had been confronted with the advice that section 14 of that 
Act had no application to a requisition for surrender made 
by native States in India; on the other hand, doubts were 
suggested as to whether the section could be applied where 
such a demand was presented by or on behalf of an European 
State, and it led a few years later to the passing of the 
supplementary enactment in the form of the Extradition 
(India) Act, 1895 (Act No*IX of 1895).  ^ The law as it 
stood before the passing of the 1903 Act contemplated the 
extradition of 'accused' or 'suspected persons* only, and 
the result was that there was no provision or procedure 
applicable to the case of a convicted criminal who had
escaped into British India or had been surrendered on the
2
demand of the British Government*
3
The passing of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
had introduced in respect of criminals seeking refuge from
1* Statement of Objects and Reason£ ; (The Indian) Extradi­
tion Act, 1903: Gazette of India* part V, p.24.
2* Ibid*, p*24«
3* 44 and 45, Viet* C.69.
other parts of His Majesty's dominions, a procedure which was 
not consistent with the laws of British India* Various 
matters were unprovided for, such as the means of enforcing 
against absconders by proclamation and attachment warrants 
issued in extradition proceedings, and the method of dealing 
with the applications for surrender of persons under trial 
or sentence in British India for offences other than those 
for which their extradition was desired* In the circum­
stances, the necessity for further legislation engaged the 
attention of the Government,of India* The proposal as 
first formulated, took the shape of a consolidating and 
amending bill, repealing and re-enacting, with the modifi­
cations desired, the whole of the Act of 1879 which related 
both to foreign jurisdiction and extradition* But the two 
subjects were quite distinct in England* They are dealt 
with by different statutes, while in India they were prior 
to 1872, similarly dealt with by Acts No*l of 1849 and VII 
of 1854; and the courts before which extradition cases 
came for disposal are by no means always the same as those 
which hadrto exercise foreign jurisdiction* Although, then, 
it appears to have been deliberately decided, when Act No*
11 (XI) of 1872 (eventually superseded by Act No*21 (XXI) of 
1879) was passed, to frame a general Act relating to foreign 
jurisdiction and extradition, the Government of India after 
careful consideration and communication with His Majesty's 
Secretary of State, arrived at the conclusion that the law 
would probably be clearer and more intelligible if the two 
matters were once more kept apart; and in view of this, 
the 1903 Act was made*
The legislation in India had to make provision 
for extradition of criminals in cases of two different 
kinds, viz. firstly, where the Government was asked by a 
friendly State to surrender a person in fulfilment of treaty 
obligations imposed by a treaty to which the British Extra­
dition Act, 1870,* applied; where it was so, it seemed ex­
pedient that the provisions of the English Statute and more 
especially, those which were intended for the protection of 
accused persons should be followed as closely as might be; 
and secondly, the surrender of an accused or convicted per­
son miQ^t be sought by a native State in India, or by a 
neighbouring Asiatic State in pursuance of the terms of a 
treaty or friendly understanding, to which the Government 
of India was a party, and it was desirable that the pro-
o
cedure prescribed should be both simple and expeditious.
The Select Committee to which the bill was referred, 
submitted its report on 18th March, 1903, to the Council of 
the Governor-General in India for the purpose of making laws 
and regulations to consolidate and amend the law relating 
to extradition and rendition of criminals. The Select
3
Committee suggested considerable alterations.
The United Kingdom Extradition Act, 1870, in its 
application;; to India, authorised the extradition of fugi­
tive offenders between India and * foreign States*, a term 
which meant states to which that Act was made applicable
1. 33 and 34 Viet. C.52.
2. Taken from Statement of objects and reasons to the Extra­
dition Act, 1903, published in the Gazette of India, 1901, 
Part V, p.24.
3. Gazette of India. 1903, Part V, p.469.
by Her Britannic Majesty’s Order in Council* The Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, on the other hand, provided a method 
whereby extradition of Fugitive Offenders could be effected 
between the British dominions and possessions by a simpli­
fied form of procedure* The Indian Extradition Act, 1903, 
modified and supplemented the other laws by:
a) prescribing the procedure for the surrender of 
fugitive criminals in the case of 1 Foreign 
States*;
b) providing a special machinery for the surrender
of fugitive criminals in case of states other 
than * Foreign States*, and
c) specifying the officers in India who may exer­
cise the powers conferred by the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881*
to Part B States when the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951, was 
enacted,as it was felt even then that this should be done by 
a separate law after a proper examination of the position*
The result was that the legal position relating to the sur­
render of fugitive criminals to ’foreign States' and Common­
wealth countries under the existing law from the erstwhile 
Part B States was somewhat doubtful*1 After the passing 
of the Indian Extradition Act of 1903, an Order in Council 
dated 7th March, 1904, had declared that Chapter IV of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1903, might beoonsidered as a part
1* Ag:arwala, S.K., International Law* Indian Courts and legis­
lature , p« 199 *
2* Gazette of India* 1904, Part I, p*363*
T o
/The Indian Extradition Act, 1903, was not extended
of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881* The cumulative effect
of these Acts was that fugitives could be extradited to the 
Commonwealth or colonial countries without the procedure of 
formal proof, of prima facie evidence*
The President of India adapted the Extradition Act, 
1903, in certain particulars* The Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1881, and the Extradition Act, 1870, in their application to 
India were, however, not repealed by the Indian Parliament, 
and to the extent that they were consistent with the consti­
tutional scheme, they remained applicable by virtue of Article 
372 of the Constitution* In order to maintain the continued 
application of laws* the British Parliament notwithstanding 
India*s becoming a Republic, enacted the India (Consequential 
Provisions) Act, 1949, which by Section 1 provided:-
"(1) On and sifter the date of India's 
becoming a Republic, all existing law, 
that is to say all law which, whether 
being a rule of law or a provision of 
an Act of Parliament, or any other en­
actment or instrument whatsoever, is in 
force on that date or has been passed 
or made before that date and comes into 
force thereafter, shall, until provi­
sion to the contrary is made by the 
authority having power to alter that 
law and subject to the provisions of 
sub-section (3) of this Section, have 
the same operation in relation to 
India, and to persons and things in 
any way belonging to or connected 
with India, as it would have had if 
India had not become a Republic*11
###«#*##**#«
"(3) His Majesty may by Order in Coun­
cil make provision for such satisfaction 
of any existing law to which this Act 
extends sis may appear to him to be 
necessary or expedient in view of 
India*s becoming a Republic while re­
maining a member of the Commonwealth 
and sub-section (I) of this Section
shall have effect In relation to any 
such laws as modified by such an order 
insofar as the contrary intention ap­
pears in the Order, An Order in 
Council under this section:-
a) may be made either before or after 
India becomes a republic, and may
be revoked or varied by a subse­
quent Order in Council; and
b) shall be subject to annulment in 
pursuance of a resolution of either 
House of Parliament ,** 1
In 1954, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide
a case relating to extradition to Singapore, a British Colony,
of a person alleged to be a fugitive offender, an Indian
2 . . .  ...............................................
National, In that case, Menon and his wife were appre­
hended and produced before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, 
Madras, pursuant to warrants of arrest issued under the pro­
visions of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Arrests were 
made in pursuance of a requisition made by the Colonial 
Secretary of Singapore requesting the assistance of the Govern­
ment of India to arrest and to return the Menons to the colony 
of Singapore under warrants issued by the police magistrate cf 
Singapore, The Menons pleaded that the Fugitive Offenders 
Act, 1881, under which the action was sought to be taken 
against them, was repugnant to the Constitution of India, 
and was void and unenforceable. The Chief Presidency 
Magistrate referred two questions of law for the decision 
of the High Court of Madras:-
1) whether the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, applies 
to India after 26th January, 1950, when India
1, State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 , 
S.cY 1171 at p.117?.
2. State of Madras v, C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1954 , S.C.517,
became a Sovereign Democratic Republic; and
2) whether, even if it applied, it or any of its 
provisions, particularly Part II thereof was 
repugnant to the Cpnstitution of India and was 
therefore, void or inoperative*
The High Court held  ^that the Fugitive Offenders 
Act was inconsistent with the Fundamental Right of equal pro­
tection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Consti­
tution and was void to that extent and unenforceable against 
the petitioners*
On appeal brought before the Supreme Court, it was 
2
then observed:-
"It is plain from the above provisions of 
the Fugitive Offenders Act as well as from 
the Order in Council that British possess­
ions which were contiguous to one another 
and between whom there was frequent inter­
communication were treated for the pur­
poses of the Fugitive Offenders Act as one 
integrated territory and a summary proced­
ure was adopted for the purpose of extra­
diting persons who had committed offences 
in these integrated territories* As the 
laws prevailing in those possessions, 
were substantially the same, the require­
ment that no fugitive will be surrendered 
unless a 1 prima facie1 case was made 
against him was dispensed^with• Under
the Extradition Act, 1903, also a similar 
requirement is insisted upon before a 
person can be extradited*"
"The provisions of that Act could only 
be made applicable to India by incorpor­
ating them with appropriate changes into 
an Act of the Indian Parliament and by 
enacting an Indian Fugitive Offenders 
Act* In the absence of any legislation
1* In Re C.G. Menon, A.I.R., 1953^ Madras- 279*
2* State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.I.R. , 1954, S.C.51? at 
p*519, paras*l6, 11.
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on those lines, it seems difficult to 
hold that Section 12 or Section 14 of 
the Fugitive Offenders Act has force in 
India by reason of the provisions of 
Article 372 of the Constitution* The 
whole basis for the applicability of 
Part II of the Fugitive Offenders Act 
has gone; India is no longer a British 
possession and no Order in Council can 
be made to group it with other British 
Possessions*"
“The political background and shape of 
things when part II of the Fugitive Of­
fenders Act, 1881, was enacted and en­
visaged by that Act having completely 
changed, it is not possible without 
radical legislative changes to adapt 
that Act to the changed conditions*
That being so, in one opinion, the 
tentative viewexpressed by the Presi­
dency Magistrate was right♦“
“The situation completely changed when 
India became a Sovereign Democratic 
Republic* After the achievement of 
independence and coming into force of 
the new Constitution by no stretch of 
imagination could India be described 
as a British possession and it could 
not be grouped by an Order in Council 
amongst those possessions* Truly 
speaking, it became a foreign terri­
tory so far as other British possess­
ions are concerned, and the extradi­
tion of persons taking asylum in India, 
having committed offences in British 
Possessions, could only be dealt with 
by an arrangement between the Sovereign 
Democratic Republic of India and the 
British Government and given effect to 
by appropriate legislation* The Union 
Government has not so far enacted any 
law on the subject and it was not sug­
gested that any arrangement has been 
arrived at between these two Govern­
ments* The India Extradition Act,
1903, has been adapted, but the Fugi­
tive Offenders Act, 1881, which was 
an Act of the British Parliament has 
been left severely alone*“
After this judgment was delivered, the Government 
of India, Ministry of External Affairs, issued a notifica­
tion on 21st May, 1955, to all the State Governments of
Parts A, B, C and D states as an interim arrangement* The
notification of the Government of India dated 21st May* 1955,
was an interim arrangement and not a law* It was an execu­
tive fiat which continued up to the time when the new Extra-
1 2 dition Act came into force in 1962. We read in it:
”•*• In a certain case of extradition 
of an offender, the Supreme Court of 
India recently ruled that in the 
changed circumstances, the English 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, is no 
longer applicable to India* There 
can therefore, be no question of issu­
ing a warrant of arrest, addressed to 
a foreign police or a foreign court, 
in respect of persons who are residing 
outside India, except in accordance 
with the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898*
“(2) In the circumstances, to obtain a 
fugitive offender from the United King­
dom and other commonwealth countries, 
the following procedure may be adopted 
as long as the new Indian Extradition 
law is not enacted and the Commonwealth 
countries continue to honour our re­
quests for the surrender of the fugi­
tive offenders notwithstanding the 
decision of the Supreme Court*
(a) The Magistrate concerned will 
issue warrant for the arrest of the 
fugitive offender to Police officials 
in India in the usual form prescribed 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898.
(b) The warrant of arrest, accom­
panied by all such documents as would 
enable a prima facie case to be esta­
blished against theaccused, will be 
submitted by the Magistrate to the 
Government of India in the Ministry 
of External Affairs, through the 
State Government concerned*
1* State of West Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969,
%.C. 1171 at p«1182 «
2. State of West Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, ibid*, at p*1178*
11 (c) This Ministry, in consultation
with Ministry of Home Affairs, and Law, 
will make a requisition of the surrender 
of a fugitive offender in the form of a 
letter requesting the Secretary of State 
(in the case of Dominions, the appropri­
ate authority in the Dominions) to get 
the warrant endorsed in accordance with 
law* This letter will be addressed 
to the Secretary of State (or other 
appropriate authority in case of Domi­
nions) through the High Commissioner for 
India in the United Kingdom/Dominion con­
cerned and will be accompanied by the 
warrant issued by the magistrate at 
(a) para*2 above and other documents 
received therewith•“
With respect to these British statutes which were 
applicable to India before the commencement of the Constitu­
tion, the Law Commission of India, in its Fifth Report dated 
11th May, 1957, made the observation 1 that:
“We have got a law of our own on the 
subject - the Indian Extradition Act 
(15 of 1903)* This lays down the 
procedure to be followed in India 
sifter a valid requisition for extra­
dition is received from a Foreign 
State* The right of a foreign 
Government to make such requisition, 
however, rests on treaty between the 
two countries concerned* *** Now, 
so far as the right of England or 
any British possession to demand 
extradition from India is concerned, 
the law is provided by the English 
Statutes mentioned above and the 
Indian Extradition Act proceeds on 
the assumption that these statutes 
apply to India* These statutes, 
however, apply to 'British Posess- 
ions* The Supreme Court held v 
that India was no longer a 'British 
Possession1 and the English Statutes 
will, therefore, no longer be appli­
cable to India after it had become
1. Law Commission of India, Fifth Report, 1957, pp.49, 50, 54*
2. State of Madras v* C.G. Menon, A.I.R. e 1954, S.C.517*
a Republic ... observations were made 
by the Supreme Court as to the need of 
making fresh treaties with the Republic 
of India and the need for fresh legis­
lation in this respect,2- Government 
should take early steps in the matter 
of fresh legislation in view of the 2 
observations made by the Supreme Court,M
In view of the Law Commission’s Report, the Act of" 1962 was 
enacted and received the assent of the President on 15th 
September, 1962, and was published in the Gazette of India 
on 5th January, 1963, as provided in Section 1(3) of that 
Act from which date it came into force.
The Act of 1962 was passed by Parliament in exer­
cise of the powers given to it by Entry No,18, schedule 7, 
list I, of the Constitution of India, This« entry is held 
to empower Parliament to make laws in regard to extradition
3
even of aliens. Extradition is a different and distinct
subject from expulsion, although both may overlap in certain 
aspects. Entry 19 of the same List empowers Parliament to 
make laws in regard to expulsion. The Union Government is 
vested with absolute power to expel foreigners from India, 
There is no provision in the Constitution to fetter this 
discretion. Entries Nos,9, 10, 17, 18 and 19 in the Union 
List confer wide powers on the centre to make laws about, 
among other things, admission into and expulsion from India, 
about extradition and aliens and about preventive detention
1, State of Madras v, C.G. Menon, A.I.R. , 1954 S.C., 517 at p,
519:
2, Law Commission of India, Fifth Report, dated 11th May, 1957, 
pp,49, 50, 54,
3, Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, A.I.R. 
1955, S.C. 367 at p,^V4.
4, Hans Muller, ibid.. at p,374.
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connected with foreign affairs. Therefore, the right to 
make laws about both the extradition of aliens and about 
their expulsion from India is expressly conferred, extra­
dition and expulsion are contained in separate entries indi­
cating that,though they may overlap in certain aspects, they
are distinct subjects. The Foreigners Act, 1946, deals, 
amongst other things, with expulsion. The Foreigners Act,
1946, confers the power to expel foreigners from India. It 
vests the Central Government with absolute discretion, and 
as there is no provision in the Constitution fettering this 
discretion, an unrestricted right to expel a foreigner re­
mains in the Central Government. The law of extradition 
is quite different. Because of treaty obligations, it 
confers a right on certain countries to ask that persons 
who are alleged to have been accused of or convicted of 
those offences by these courts, be handed over to them.
However, the Government of India is not bound to comply 
with the request and has an absolute discretion to refuse
extradition of the fugitive criminal whether he be an alien 
or citizen of India.^
However, on the question posed in Menon1s case, 
viz. whether the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, applies to 
India after 26th January, 1950, when India became a Re-
2
public, the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore More1s case 
disapproved of its earlier decision in the Menon*s case 
and re-answered the question in the affirmative, and it
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 
A.I.R."" T§55 S.C. 367 at p.37-4.
2. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969, S.C. 
11'/ i ax p.nb2.
was observed:^
f,In Re Government of India and Mubarak 
All Ahmed an attempt to resist in the 
High Court in England, a requisition by 
the Republic of India to surrender an 
offender who had committed offences in 
India and had fled from justice, had 
failed* Mubarak Ali, a native of 
Pakistan, was being tried in the courts 
in India on charges of forgery and 
fraud* He broke his bail and fled 
to Pakistan and thereafter to England*
He was arrested on a provisional war­
rant issued by the London Metropolitan 
Magistrate on the application of the 
Government of India* After hearing 
legal submissions, the Metropolitan 
Magistrate made an order under Section 
5 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
for Mubarak Ali's detention in custody 
pending his return to India to answer 
the charges made against him* Mubarak 
Ali then filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus before the Queens 
Bench Division. It was held that the 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, was in 
force between India and Great Britain 
on 26th January, 1950, when India be­
came a Republic and it continued to 
apply by virtue of Section l(i) of 
the India (Consequential Provisions)
Act, 1949, and therefore, the Magi­
strate had jurisdiction to make the 
order of return of the applicant*
Pursuant to the requisition made by 
the Government of India, Mubarak Ali 
was surrendered by the British Govern­
ment* Mubarak Ali was then brought 
to India and was tried and convicted*
On one of the offences for which he 
was tried and convicted, an appeal 
was brought to the Supreme Court of 
India and failed there*n3
There were other cases as well, in which orders were 
made by the British Courts complying with the requisitions 
made by the Governments of Republics within the Commonwealth
1* State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R., 1969, S.C. 
11^1 at p.ll80.
2. In Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed (1952) 1 All 
E.R. 1060*
3* Mubarak Ali Ahmed v* State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957. S.C. 857*
for extradition of offenders under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1881 • An offender from Ghana was ordered to be extradited 
pursuant to Ghana (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1960 (like 
the Indian (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949) even after 
Ghana became a Republic*1 Kwesi Armah who was a Minister
in Ghana, fled from the country in 1966 and took refuge in 
the United Kingdom* He was arrested tinder a provisional 
warrant issued under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. The 
Metropolitan Magistrate being satisfied that the Act of 1881 
still applied to Ghana, even after Ghana became a Republic,
and that a prima facie case had been made out against him in
respect of two alleged contraventions of the Ghana Criminal
Code, 1960, by corruption and extortion when he was a Public
Officer, committed Kwesi Armah to prison pending his return
to Ghana to undergo trial. A petition for habeas corpus
before the Queens Bench Division was refused. Edmund Davis J.
(as he then was) was of the view that the Act of 1881 applied
to the Republic of Ghana in its new form, just as it did be*
fore the coup d»etat of February, 1966. The case was then
2carried to the House of Lords. Before the House of Lords
it was not even argued on behalf of Armah appellant, that a 
fugitive offender from a Republic which was a member 6f the 
Commonwealth could not be extradited under the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881$ like the argument in the Menon*s case 
before the Supreme Court of India. In the Menon*s case,
1. Re Kwesi Armah (1966) 2 All E.R. 1006: On 1st July, 1960, 
Ghana remaining by virtue of the Ghana (Consequential Provi­
sions) Act, 1960, a member of the Commonwealth, became a 
Republic.
2. Armah v. Government of Ghana (1966) 3 All E.R. 177 (HU.)
the India (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949, was not 
brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, whereas it was
brought to the notice of the English Courts in Mubarak Ali1 s
1 2 case; and in Armah1s case where similar provisions were
present in Ghana and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was 
held continued to apply to Ghana. The Menon*s case de­
cided by the Supreme Court is no longer good law, as ex­
plained by the Supreme Court in the case of Jugal Kishore
More. That Court expressed regret that the provisions of
the Consequential Provisions Act, 1949, were not brought 
before the Court and the Supreme Court did not think it 
proper to refer the case to a larger bench, because they 
thought that as the new Indian Extradition Act, 1962, had 
come into force, there would in future be no cases under 
the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881.
It may be further mentioned that Lord Denning 
in Gohoho* s case, ^applying the Ghana (Consequential Pro­
visions) Act, I960, (giving the same reasoning as in Mubarak
\?r+*r3 ~
Ali1s case, Aheld that the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881,
remained operative as if Ghana had not become a Republic) ^
 ^. j was still in the Commonwealth. To the same effect, 
the Supreme Court of India in the case of Jugal Kishore More 
held that by virtue of the provisions of the India (Conse-
1. In Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed (1952) 1 All
E.R. 3-060, supra. " . ,
2. Re Kwesi Armah (1966) 2 All E.R. 1006, supra^
3. Gohoho v. Guinea Press Ltd. and another (1963) 3 W.L^R.
3 <*U e  Rs.7%j ro* p 'j%i( JLAjULj  Aftc., Me  «. C-U. i— ^
4. Mubarak Ali*s case '(1952) 1 All E.R. 1060, and inArmalPs case 
(1966) I All E.R. 1006.
quential Provisions) Act, 1949, the Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1881, was still in force in India; that the Fugitive Of­
fenders Act, 1881, had not been expressly repealed even 
after 26th January, 1950; it had a limited operation; and 
other countries of the Commonwealth were apparently willing 
to honour the international commitments which arose out of 
the provisions of that Act. The Court was not called upon 
to consider whether in exercise of the powers under the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, a magistrate in India may direct 
extradition of a fugitive offender from a * British Possess­
ion* . The question was left open,otherwise the Supreme 
Court would have examined the case of C.G. Menon in this 
light after taking into consideration the provisions of
the India (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949, and the
1 2dicta uttered in the cases of Mubarak Ali Ahmed. Arm&h,
3and Gohoho; in the English courts and a dictum uttered in
4
the Federal Court of Pakistan, in which it was held that 
in view of the Consequential Provisions Act passed by the 
British Parliament, the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 is in 
force and effect in Pakistan.
Ohene-Djan has stated: Even though Ghana has
repealed the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and therefore, 
it is inoperative in that country (Commonwealth), she has 
from time to time, exercised the right to ask for return
1. Mubarak Ali Ahmed* s case, supra
2. Armah v. Government of Ghana supra
3. Gohoho v. Guinea Press Ltd. supra,
4. E.M. Bhaba v. The Crown« P.L.D., 1954 Sind.101.
of the alleged Ghanian fugitive offenders from Britain and 
other Commonwealth countries where the Act is still in 
operation**1 This reasoning and the reasoning in Jugal 
Kishore More * s case are based on the principle of recipro­
city and the surrender or extradition to Ghana or India is 
dependent on 1 courtesyf or Comity* and the willingness of 
those countries to honour international commitments which 
arose out of the provisions in force in these countries*
It must be noted that India,(Ghana, too) became
a Republic within the Commonwealth* The Fugitive Offenders
Act will be in effect between all Commonwealth countries
Rafter leaving Commonwealth Pakistan would be an exception
to it), whether they are Republics or Realms within the
Commonwealth, because of the provisions of the Consequential
Provisions Act passed for such Commonwealth country by the
British Parliament, it being customary to pass such acts in
anticipation of their gaining independence in order to allow
the continuance of the existing laws in those countries until
the proper authority repeals and replaces them by other laws,
"unless provision has been made to the contrary in the laws
of the particular Commonwealth country" . And even where a
country like India (or Ghana) has specifically repealed the
Fugitive Offenders Act, she may still exercise her right to
ask for surrender or return of a fugitive offender under
the Act from any Commonwealth country in which the. Act hats
2
not been repealed* The decisions of the Supreme Court
1. Ohene-Djan, I.L., The Fugitive Offender and the Law of Extra­
dition in the Commonwealth, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1965,London 
University, p.143.
2. Jugal Kishore More, supra * A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1171: Ohene-
D ja n V S E A C it • * P • ^ ? • ■ «
to that extent in the case of More is correct for it was a case 
of extradition to India "extradition in reverse", and not a
case of extradition from India* But the legality of the pro­
position in a converse case of extradition from India would be 
subject to objections and the converse would not be true*
Section (l)(i) of the India (Consequential Provisions) 
Act, 1949, makes provision for the continuance of the existing 
laws * until provision to the contrary made by the authority 
having power to alter that law*, and the Indian Parliament in 
exercise of the powers given to it by Entry 18, Schedule 7,
List I of the Constitution enacted the Indian Extradition Act 
and repealed the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and all other 
previous existing laws including the Extradition Acts, 1870 
to 1932, insofar as they applied to and operate as part of 
the law of India, by section 37 of that Act. That being 
so, it could not be said that the Fugitive Offenders Act,
1881, or the Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1932 made the Fugitive
Offenders Act applicable to India after the Indian Extradi­
tion Act, 1962ijn came into force in India merely by virtue of 
section 1(1) of the India (Consequential Provisions) Act,
1949.
Besides, the continuation of an existing law by 
Article 372(1) of the Constitution is subject to other pro­
visions of the Constitution; and the continuance is only 
until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legis­
lature*1 So when the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, re­
pealed theFugitive Offenders Act, 1881, (and the Extradi­
tion Acts, 1870 to 1932) insofar as they applied to and
x< J°gjupa45vcf?ed v- — " T-~c" A -1‘R-
operate as part of the law of India, how could the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, remain in force by virtue of section 1(1^ 
of the India (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949, and Art­
icle 372(1) of the Constitution? To this extent, the dictum
1
of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore Mpre*s case seems not 
to be correct. The Supreme Court thus left the matter open 
whether in exercise of the power under the Fugitive Offenders 
Act a magistrate in India may direct extradition of a fugitive 
offender from a ’British Possession* who had taken refuge in 
India. To leave such a question open reveals, it would seem, 
a want of comprehension of the law which their Lordships had 
already correctly understood: the want of actual reciprocity
was, and remains, intelligible. It seems that if India had 
not enacted its Extradition Act, 1962, and had not repealed 
the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, so far as India is con­
cerned, the Act of 1881 would have continued by virtue of 
Section 1(1) of the India (Consequential Provisions) Act,
1949, and the fugitive could have been extradited from India 
under the provisions of that Act, but when another Act of 
1962 has been passed by Parliament repealing the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, the India (Consequential Provi-
sions) Act, 1949,|hardly keep the Fugitive Offenders Act 
alive, especially when that very Act contemplates the con­
tinuance of existing laws * until.provision to the contrary 
made by the authority having power to alter that law*.
Therefore, the Fugitive Offenders Act is, it is submitted, 
not in force in India sifter the coming into force of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, by virtue of the provisions
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171.
of the India (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949. Pro­
ceedings under that Act can be held contrary to Article 21, 
and as and when the occasion arises the Supreme Court would 
reconsider the dictum uttered in the case of Jugal Kishore 
More so far as the continuance of the Act of 1881 is con­
cerned. Until then, indeed, that case, including the un­
fortunate dicta in it, is part of the law of the land; all 
courts in India are bound by it by virtue of Article 141 of 
the Constitution.1 i
It may also be mentioned here that in More's case, 
it was not necessary to decide about the continuance of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, as it was a case of straight­
forward extradition. More had not been brought to India, 
as happened in Savarkar's case (below), and especially after 
the court had held that there was no bar in securing the 
extradition of the Fugitive Offender through diplomatic 
channels, by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Govern- 
ment of India, if (t^ wa£ able to persuade the Colonial
Secretary of Hong Kong to deliver More for trial in India.
The procedure was held neither to be illegal nor irregular. 
Even otherwise the jurisprudence of the common-law countries 
has consistextLy denied that the circumstance under which a 
person may have been brought before a competent court in any 
way affects the jurisdiction* of the court to try him. Scott 
C.J. in the case of Savarkar had observed:
"where a man is in the country and is 
charged before the magistrate with an 
offence under the Penal Code, it will 
not avail him to say that he was
1. B.M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
H5Q2^E~p7ny03.
brought there illegally from a foreign 
country
This case received the approval of the Supreme Court in More * s
case (supra) where Justice Shah observed:
*
"But on the principle of Savarkaf s 
case (1911)2 the contention aboux 
the invalidity of the arrest can­
not affect the jurisdiction of the 
courts in India to try More if and 
when he is brought there."
To the same effect were the judgments, of British Courts in
3
Ex parte StesannakScott and other cases*
In Eichman's case, the District Court of Jerusalem
relying upon the British, American and Israeli authorities,
4
took a similar view* For Eichman had been kidnapped, but 
this did not render his trial in Israel illegal*
However, Paul 0*Higgins,5 considering the proposi­
tion that a British court would probably exercise jurisdict­
ion over a person brought before it in violation of inter­
national law, and argues, that there is no precedent which
necessarily binds any British courts to this view*
1* Emperor v* Vinayak Damodar Savarkar & others (1911), I.L.R.
jsbsst 225"at p ; w ; ----- ----------------
2. Savarkar1 s case (1911) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 225, supra.
<uiitirPtn I
3. Ex parte*Scott (9 B. & C. 446) (1829); Sinclair v. H.M. Advo­
cate (1890) 17 R.J.C. 38; Ex parte Elliot (1949) 1 All E.R.373; 
and of the American courts, Ker v* Illinois (1886) 119 U.S.436; 
Frisbie v. Collins, (1951) ,342^ U.S. 519 ; United States v. 
Sobell (1957) 244 F 2d 520 2nd Cir.; ILS. v* Unver Sagt (1924) 
299 Fed. 1015; U.S. v. Dixon (1947) 73 F Supp. 683, and by the 
South African court in Abrahamo^ v. Minister of Justice (1963) 
So.Afr* L.R. 542*
4. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v* Adolf Eichmann, 
36 Int. Law Rep. 5- 56-57.
5* * Unlawful seizure and irregular extradition', 36 British Year 
Book of International Law, 279 at p.319 (1960).
Re the second question in Jugal Kishore More's
case, viz. whether even if the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
applied to India after the coming into force of the Consti­
tution, Part II of theAct was repugnant to the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court answered in the affirmative that the Act 
of 1881 still applied to Indiaabd Part II was not inoperative, 
and observed:
"merely because for the purpose of the 
extradition procedure, in a statute 
passed b e f e  the attainment of inde­
pendence, by the fo^per colonies and 
dependencies,certain territories con­
tinue to be referred to as 'British 
Possessions' the statute does not be­
come inapplicable to these territories.
The expression*British Possession' in 
the old statutes merely survives as an 
artificial mode of reference, undoubt­
edly not consistent with political 
realities, but does not imply, for the 
purposes of the statute or otherwise, 
political dependence of the Government 
of the territories referred to. It is 
not for the courts of India to take 
umbrage at expressions used in statutes 
of other countries and to refuse to 
give effect to the Indian laws which 
govern the problems arising before 
them. It is interesting to note that 
by express enactment, the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, remains in force 
as a part of law of the Republic of 
Ireland: See Ireland Act, 1949 (12,
13 & 14 Geo.6 c.41)."A
Whether India be termed, after coming into force of 
the Constitution,as Her Majesty's Dominions, the Supreme Court 
quoted, with approval, passage from Halsbury's Laws of England 
as under:
"The term 'Her Majesty's Dominions' 
means all the territories under the 
sovereignty of the Crown and terri­
torial waters adjacent thereto.
1. State of West Benqal v. Jugal Kishore More. A.I.R., 1969 S.C. 
1171 at 1181.
In special cases it may include terri­
tories under the protection of the 
Crown and Mandated and Trust terri­
tories. Reference to Her Majesty's 
Dominions contained in statutes pass­
ed before India became a Republic are 
still to be construed as including 
India; it is usual to name India sepa­
rately from Her Majesty's Dominions in 
statutes passed since India became a 
Republic."!
The Supreme Court commenting on the above passage 
from Halsbury, further observed:
"In footnote (1) on page 433, it is 
stated, British India, which included 
the whole of India except princely 
states; and the Government of India 
Act, 1935, as amended by section 8 of 
the India and Burma (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act, 1940, formed part 
of Her Majesty's Dominions and was 
a British Possession; although it 
was not included in the definition 
of a 'Colony'• The territory com­
prised in British India was parti­
tioned between the dominions of 
India and Pakistan (Indian Independ­
ence Act, 1947), but the law relating 
to the definition of Her Majesty's 
Dominions was not thereby changed 
and it was continued in being by 
the Indian (Consequential Provisions)
Act, 1949 (12, 13 and 14 Geo.6 C.92) 
passed in contemplation of the adopt­
ion of a republican constitution of 
<Endia. India is now a sovereign re­
public but that by itself does not 
render the Fugitive Offenders^Act,
1881, inappliaable to India."
1. Halsbury*s Laws of England, 3rd ed., <Vol.5, Art.987, p.433.
2. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969, S.C. 
1171 at p.1182.
(3) EXTRADITION AND EXPULSION: FORMAL ASPECTS
There are important differences between the two 
Acts, viz. The Foreigners Act, 1946 (Act 31 of 1946), and 
the Extradition Act. In the first place, the Extradition 
Act applies to everybody, citizen and foreigner alike, and 
to every class of foreigner, that is to say, even to foreign­
ers who are not nationals of the country asking for extradi­
tion. But because of Article 19 of the Constitution of 
India, no citizen can be 'expelled1 (as opposed to extra­
dition) in the absence of a specific law to that effect; 
and in India there is none; moreover, a law touching expul­
sion (as opposed to extradition) would have to be restricted 
in scope if it were to apply to a citizen. That is not the 
case where a foreigner is concerned, because Article 19 does 
not apply to an alien. A citizen of India who has commit­
ted certain kinds of offences abroad can only be 'extradited' 
if the formalities prescribed by the Extradition Act are ob­
served and completed. A foreigner has no such standing; 
he can be expelled without any formality beyond the making
of an order by the Central Government.1 Thus, an alien
2has got no right to be heard before deportation. Admit­
tedly, there are cases where without a hearing it might not be 
clear whether he is a foreigner or a citizen. The hearing 
may not be necessary when admittedly one who is going to be 
expelled is a foreigner, but when the facts are in dispute 
a hearing is in the interest of justice and in consonence
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta- 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
2. Hans Muller's case, ibid.. and R.V. Heman Street Police In­
spector Ex parte Venicof^ (1920) 3 K.B. 72. —
with the salutary principle, *Audi alteram partem* (a prin­
ciple of natural justice) - no man should be punished un­
heard; no order should be passed in violation of principles 
of natural' justice. A deportation order without determi­
nation of Citizenship is invalid.1 On the other hand, if 
the foreigner is * extradited* instead of being * expelled*, 
then the formalities of the Bxtradition Act must be complied 
with. The importance of the distinction between extradi­
tion and expulsion will be realised from what follows and 
that applies to citizen and foreigner alike.
The Extradition Act is really a special branch of 
the law of criminal procedure. It deals with criminals and 
those accused of certain crimes. The Foreigners Act on the 
other hand, is not directly concerned with criminals or crime
though the fact that a foreigner has committed offences, or is
suspected of that, may be a good ground for regarding him as
undesirable. Therefore, under the Extradition Act warrants
or summonses must be issued; there must be a magisterial
enquiry, and when there is an arrest it is by way of action
by the police. When the person to be extradited leaves
India, he does not leave the country as a free man. The
police in India hand him over to the police of the requisi-
3
tioning State and he remains in custody throughout.
In the case of * expulsion* , no idea of punishment 
is involved, at any rate, and if a man is prepared to leave
1. Mukhtar Ahmed v. State pf U.P. A.I.R. 1965 All 191 at p.193;
Government o£ A.P. v. Syed Md. Khan. A.I.R. 1962 , S.C. 1778
at p.1780.
2. Hans Muller v. Presidency Jail. Calcutta A.I.R. 1955 S.C.
367 at £7375. -------- ------
3 . Hans Muller v. Presidency Jail. Calcutta A.I.R. 1955 S.C.
367 at p.375.
voluntarily he can ordinarily go as and when he pleases.
But it is not his right so to do. Under the Indian Law, 
the matter is left to the unfettered discretion of the 
Union Government, and that Government can prescribe the 
route and the port or place of departure, and can even 
place him on a particular ship or plane.1 Whether the 
Captain of a foreign ship or plane can theoretically be 
compelled to take a passenger he does not want, or to follow 
a particular route, was left untouched by the Supreme Court 
in Hans Muller1s case, as that question did not arise in 
that case. But assuming that he is willing to do so, the 
right of the Government to make the order vis-a-vis the man 
expelled, is absolute. This may not be the law in all the 
countries. For example, Oppenheim says that in England 
until December, 1919, the British Government had
"no power to expel even the most danger­
ous alien without the recommendation of 
the Court, or without an act of Parlia­
ment making provision for such expulsion 
except during war or on an occasion of 
imminent national danger or great emer­
gency."
Herei* the matter of expulsion has to be viewed from 
three points of view.
(1) Does the Constitution permit the making of such a law?
(2 ) Does.it place any limits on such laws? and
(3) Is there, in fact, any law on this topic in India and 
if so, what does it enact?
1. See Sec.3(2)(b) and 6 of the Foreigners Act, 1946: Hans Muller
v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta A.I.R7" 1955.
367 at p.375.
2. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol.l, 7th ed., p.631.
(1 ) and (2 ) have been answered in the affirmative 
by the Supreme Court in Hans Mullets case. As to the third 
question, this matter is embodied in India in the Foreigners 
Act, 1946, which gives an unfettered right to the Union Govern­
ment to expel* But there is this distinction* If the order 
is one of ’expulsion* as opposed to ’extradition*, then the 
person expelled leaves India a free man* So far as India 
is concerned, there must be an order of release if he is in 
preventive custody, and though he may be conducted to the 
frontier under detention, he must be permitted to leave a 
free man and cannot be handed over under arrest* In the 
case of 'extradition*, he does not leave a free man* He 
reamins under arrest throughout and is merely handed over 
by one set of police to the next. But in that event, the 
formalities of the Extradition Act must be complied with*
There must be a magisterial enquiry with a regular hearing 
and the person sought to be extradited must be afforded the 
right to submit a written statement to the Central Govern­
ment, and to ask, if he so chooses, for political asylum*
He has the right to defend himself and the right to consult 
and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice 
(Article 20(1)).
Of course, he can also make a representation 
against an order of expulsion and ask for political asylum 
apart from any Act, but these are not matters of right as 
under the Extradition Act*^ A foreigner is not allowed tp
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail,_Calcuitta 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 at p.375*
flout the orders to leave the country** According to the
S.C. in Hans Mullets case, the Foreigners Act, of 1946, is 
not governed by the provisions of extradition* The two are 
distinct and neither impinges on the other*
Even if there is a requisition and a good case for 
extradition, the Government is not bound to accede to the re­
quest* It is given an unfettered right to refuse* Sec*3(1) 
of the Extradition Act of 1903 says 1 the Central Government 
may, if it thinks fit*, like Sec.5 of the Extradition Act of 
1962* Therefore, if it chooses not to comply with the re­
quest, the person against whom the request is made cannot in­
sist that it could* The right is not his and the fact that 
a request has been made does not fetter the discretion of the 
Government to choose the less cumbersome procedure of the 
Foreigners Act of 1946 where a foreigner is.concerned, pro­
vided always that in that event the person concerned leaves 
India as a free man* If no choice would have been left with 
the Government, the position would have been different but as 
the Government is given the right to choose, no question of
want of good faith can arise merely because it exercises the
2
right of choice which the law confers*
The right to expel is conferred by Sec*3(2)(c) of 
the Foreigners Act, 1946 on the Central Government and the 
right to enforce an order of expulsion and also to prevent 
any breach of it, and the right to use such force as may be 
reasonably necessary ’for the effective exercise of such
1* Registrar Judicial Commissioner’s Court v* S* _ Francisco, 
A.I.R. I9V0 , 6 0 a. $ 6 at p.59.
2* Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 
A.I.R. 19i>5 SVCT.V H67 "Kt"£73775. " “ ’
power1 is conferred by section 11(1) also, on the Central 
Government* Therefore, a State Government has no right 
either to make an order of expulsion or to expel, for the 
conferring of the right can only mean that the State Govern­
ment is given (at most), the power to decide and to satisfy 
itself whether expulsion is desirable or necessary* If it 
thinks it is, then it may detain the person concerned until 
proper arrangements for expulsion are made - one of them, 
and an essential one, being reference to the Central Govern­
ment for final orders* It is evident that the authorities 
must be vested with wide discretion in the present field 
where international complications might easily follow in 
a given case* Unless a State Government has authority to 
act in anticipation of orders from the Centre, it might be 
too late to act at all*'1' There is, as we have seen, impli­
cit in the right of expulsion a number of ancillary rights; 
among them, the right to prevent any breach of the order and 
the right to use force and to take effective measures to
carry out those purposes* The most effective method of
2
preventing a breach of order and ensuring that it is duly
i
observed and obeyed is by arresting and detaining the persons 
ordered to be expelled until proper arrangements for expul­
sion can be made* Therefore, the right to make arrangements 
for an expulsion includes the right to make arrangements for 
preventing any evasion or breach of the order and the Pre-
3
ventive Detention Act of 1950 (Act 4 of 1950) (see below),
1* Hans Muller’s case, supra, at p.372.
2. Hans Muller’s case, ibid*, at p.372.
3. Preventive Detention Act of 1950 (Act 4 of 1950)*
confers the power to use preventive detention as one of the 
methods of achieving this end. How far it is necessary to 
take this step in a given case is a matter that must be left 
to the discretion of the Government concerned^but, in any 
event, when criminal charges for offences said to have been 
committed in this country and/or abroad are levelled against 
a person, an apprehension that he is likely to disappear and 
evade an order of expulsion cannot be called either unfounded 
or unreasonable. Detention of the foreigner in such circum­
stances is rightly termed preventive and falls within the ambit 
of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 and is reasonably re­
lated to the purpose of the Act,
Now the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 expressly 
confers the right to detain ‘with a view to making arrange­
ments* for the expulsion upon both the State and the Central 
Government and the satisfaction required by Section 3(1)(b) 
can be of either Government, The right to satisfy itself 
that the drastic method of preventive detention is necessary 
to enable suitable arrangements for expulsion to be made is,
therefore, expressly conferred on the State Government, and 
as a State Government cannot expel, the State Government must 
be construed to have the power to decide and to satisfy it­
self whether expulsion is desirable or necessary and if it 
thinks it is, then to detain until proper arrangements for 
expulsion are made.
Section 3(l)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act of 
1950 lays down, to this end, that:
rtThe Central Government or the State 
Government may ••• (b) if satisfied
with respect to any person who is a 
foreigner within the meaning of the
Foreigners Act 1946 (31 of 1946) that 
with a view to regulating his continued 
presence in India or with a view to 
making arrangements for his expulsion 
from India, it is necessary to do so«* 
make an order directing such person to 
be detained,”
The section, therefore, gives power both to the 
Central Government and the State Government to make an order 
of detention against a foreigner, on satisfaction, 'with a 
view to make arrangements for his expulsion from India' •
The competence of the Central Legislature to enact 
a law dealing with this aspect of preventive detention is 
derived from Entry 9 of the Union List read with Entry 10,
The scope of Entry 9 is in regard to 'Preventive detention 
for reasons connected with ••• Foreign Affairs' and the 
scope of expression 'Foreign Affairs' is indicated in Entry 
10; 'Foreign affairs; all matters which bring the Union
in relation with any foreign countfy*• It is well settled 
that the language of these Entries must be given the widest 
scope of which their meaning is fairly capable, because they 
set up a machinery of Government and axe not mere Acts of a 
legislature subordinate to the Constitution, Giving Entry 9 
its widest range, it is impossible to hold that legislation 
that deals with the right of a State to keep foreigners under 
preventive detention without trial does not bring the Union 
into relation with a foreign country. Every country claims 
the right to the allegiance of its subjects wherever they may 
be, and in return, guarantees them the right of diplomatic 
protection when abroad. It is, therefore, the privilege 
and anxiety of every civilized nation to keep vigilant watch 
over its subjects abroad and to ensure for them, as fax as 
that is possible through diplomatic channels, fair play and
justice administered along lines of what is called, broadly 
for want of a better term, natural justice. A foreign 
State has a very direct interest in what is done to its 
subjects in a foreign land. Therefore, legislation that 
confers jurisdiction upon Governments in India to deprive 
foreigners of their liberty can not but be a matter that 
will bring the Union into relation with foreign States, 
particularly when there is no public hearing and no trial 
in the ordinary courts of the land. In cases of expulsion 
or deportation of a foreigner from India, the relation with 
a foreign Government is direct. The Preventive Detention
Act provides for the detention of the foreigner with a view 
to expel him from India. A foreign State has deep interest 
in knowing where and how its subjects can be forcibly expelled 
from India. The legislative competence of the Indian Parlia­
ment to deal with this question is clear, and this covers not 
only section 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, 
but also the Foreigners Act, 1946, insofar as it deals with 
the powers of expulsion and the right of the Central Govern­
ment to restrict the movements of foreigners in India and 
prescribe the place of their residence and ambit of their 
movement in the land.'*’
While legislative competence may be clear, the 
delicate questions of choosing between expulsion and extra­
dition, when a foreign State requests extradition, and 
whether or not to employ preventive detention in case the
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 at pp.370-371.
Government decides upon the former method, require treatment 
on a broad basis, in which the distinction between the require­
ments of law and the needs of policy for the time being must 
be constantly borne in mind* An accurate impression of the 
exact requirements of the law, not exaggerating them, nor under­
valuing them, is essential before theGovernment, whether it be 
the State Government within its restricted but often vital 
sphere, or the Central Government, can decide which course it 
is expedient, or even necessary, to take* Extradition, as 
we have seen, lies between municipal and international law in 
a peculiar sense*
(4) EXTRADITION VERSUS DEPORTATION
Extradition is the legal procedure for bringing the 
fugitive criminal to stand trial in accordance with law at 
the place where the offence was committed by him. Deporta­
tion is the exercise of the sovereign right of the terri­
torial State to expel any alien whose presence is not con­
sidered desirable within its territory. Both have differ­
ent purposes though sometimes deportation may have the sem­
blance of extradition. Sometimes deportation may be merely 
a way of extraditing persons. Extradition may be refused
if the offence is a political one, or non-extraditable or
s
the evidence is not adequate to sustain an order of surrender 
or the prosecution for the offence according to the law of 
the requesting State or country is barred by time, or be­
cause of the rule of ‘speciality* or because of the doctrine 
of ‘double criminality* or on any of the grounds mentioned in 
sections 29 and 31 of the 1962 Act. There may be a legal 
bar for extraditing the fugitive criminal, for want of extra­
dition treaty, where the fugitive can not be surrendered in 
the absence of such treaty or for absence of issue of noti­
fications under section 3(1) and 3(2) and 12 of the Extradi­
tion Act, 1962. Yet deportation may be feasible on the 
political plane, and pressure is used by way of effecting 
extradition because extradition is usually too technical, 
cumbersome, time-consuming and costly procedure, especially 
if the Government may refuse to extradite for the reasons 
mentioned in sections 29 and 31 of the India Extradition 
Act, 1962, or in its discretion, pure and simple.
In some cases, the fugitive cannot be extradited 
for a number of reasons and nations>therefore, have in a 
circuitous way resorted to the practice of securing the 
fugitive from a territorial State to the State of domicile 
or even a different and another foreign State, if the latter 
State happens to be interested in obtaining custody of him 
for purposes of prosecution in its territory. Such a pro­
cedure is highly irregular, if not altogether illegal, and 
is frowned upon. Paul O*Higgins has said (though not a 
propos of India) that the case of Dr. Soblen in 1962 re­
vealed a device whereby the safeguards of the relevant Extra­
dition Act could be evaded by means of deportation.'1' He has 
also said that there was clearly no doubt but that Soblen1s 
case had obscured the distinction between deportation and 
extradition. Soblen*s departure was much frowned upon when 
the Home Secretary made the order in the United Kingdom. 
Similar was the case of Hans Muller in India.
Deportation is obtained amongst the friendly nations 
by political pressure when extradition is not possible. Be­
hind-the-scenes diplomatic activities persuade a friendly 
territorial State to order the deportation of the fugitive
r
to the State of his nationality on the plea that he is not 
a ‘desirable* man. This process of ‘back door extradition* 
bypasses extradition treaties (if any), and tends to obscure 
the distinction between extradition and deportation. Of 
course, international law does not prohibit the prosecution 
of a criminal whose custody has been obtained from the other
1. 1963 Criminal Law Review, 805.
2. Hans Muller* s case, supra, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
State through the back door. The prosecution of such per­
sons is l e g a l I n  India, the deportation is provided
2
under the Foreigners Act* In Government of A.P. v.Syed 
3
Mohd* Khan, however, the Supreme Court held that an order 
of deportation passed by the State Government against an 
alleged Pakistani found in the State, could not be sustained 
if there has been no inquiry by the Central Government under 
Section 9(2) of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, about his 
status, whether he is a Pakistani National or Indian National, 
or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan*
A basic safeguard is thus secured to the deportee* In 
Britain, the court would probably look into the
of mala fides to set aside the order of illegal deportation, 
and if it finds there is an ulterior motive, set aside the 
order;otherwise^the King* s prerogative power of esqpelling 
an alien has been historically exercised to *send him home*, 
and the national State of the deportee was obliged by the
4
internal law to accept him*
A deportee who complains about his deportation as 
* extradition in disguise*, complains of depriv&ft of the 
rights to which he would be entitled if he were extradited, 
particularly, his right not to be returned to the demanding 
State for an offence of a political character, and for the
1. Ex parte Elliot (1949) 1 All E.R. 373 at pp.376-377* See 
f *n.5 above at p.48*
2. See Sec*3(2)C of the Foreigners Act, 1946: Hans Muller.
"supra, A.I.R. 1955 S.cV'367 at 'p. 371.
3. Government of A.P. v* Syed Mohd* Khan (1962): supp*3 S.C.R.288.
4. R. v. Brixton Prison (Governor) ex parte Soblen (1962) 3 All 
IT.R. 64l •
principle of speciality or doctrine of double criminality*
A deported person may find himself in an unprotected situa-
flJLrOJJL
tion, and he may enjoy no provision[for appeal in
both the deporting and receiving territory* A deported 
person, a national of a third State may be protected by 
protest of his state; but most of the cases of deportation 
pertain to nationals of the receiving State* In such cases 
before deportation, the intended deportee may move the High 
Court or Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus complain­
ing about the mala fides of the Government* Extradition 
and deportation are distinct both in form and purpose (Hans 
Muller*s case, supra), but it is (at least) a justiciable 
question whether the use of one in order to effect the other 
could constitute an abuse of power under Indian law,'1' as 
under English law. The Supreme Court (as we shall seej^  
has taken the view that * abuse of power* cannot be relied 
on by the deportee, but it is not certain that the climate 
will continue to favour the executive to this degree.
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent; Presidency Jail; Calcutta, 
A.I.R.\ 1955, S".C.“"3'67‘ aTp.37F;
(5) DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
(a) General
In England, the Home Secretary may order the deport­
ation of an alien, requiring him to leave and to remain out­
side the United Kingdom, where (i) the alien has been con­
victed of an offence punishable with imprisonment and the 
court has recommended his deportation, or (ii) where the 
Home Secretary ‘deems it to be conducive to the public good*
Since 1956, the Home Secretary has allowed aliens in clase 
(ii) above, whom it is proposed to deport on grounds other 
than illegal entry or security to make representations to a 
Metropolitan Magistrate at Bow Street, provided that if he 
has been in the United Kingdom for less than 2 years he has 
observed the regulations* The Chief Magistrate hears the 
representations and advises the Home Secretary, who almost 
invariably accepts the advice, whether the proposed order 
should be made* This is the minimum safeguard of indivi­
dual interests required by European Conventions, whereas in
India in the discretion of the Central Government, he can be
2expelled and deported* The court cam go behind an alleged
deportation order to see that it is an order of the Home
Secretary himself and that it is for the bona fide purpose
3 4of deportation of an alien, but in India no question of
1* The Aliens Restriction Act, 1914; Aliens Order, 19531 Aliens 
Order, 1960 *
2* Hans Muller v* Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta,
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 at p.375.
3. Per Scrut.ton L.J., R. v. Chiswick Police Superintendent Ex 
parte Sacksteder (1918) 1 K.B. 578 at p.592 (C.A.)
4* E* Shugbayi Eliko v* Government of Nigeria (Officer Administer­
ing ) (1931) A.C* *662 (P.C.)* Also see, Government of Andhra 
Pradesh v. Sayed Md. Khan. 1962(2) S.C• R. .
bona, rides can be ,
The Home Secretary has no power to deport an alien 
to a particular country; but he may cause the alien to be 
placed on bpard a particular ship (or aircraft) and be de­
tained therein until it leaves the United Kingdom which, in
most cases, will have the same effect. This was decided
2
by the Court of Appeal, considering a deportation order in
fulfilment of a mutual treaty with Prance in the First World
War to deport each other»s nationals who were of military age.
The action of the Home Secretary has been regarded as an
abuse of power under the Aliens Order, as the case should
have been dealt with under the Extradition Act, but as far
as the Horae Secretary is concerned, the ship may be diverted,
or the person rescued by his friends, or he may escape over-
3
board outside British waters. The Home Secretary need not
first give the alien an opportunity of leaving the United
Kingdom voluntarily, e.g. to avoid being taken to a parti- 
4
cular country. But the Supreme Court of India in Hans
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail. Calcutta 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 at p.376.
2, Per Swinfen Eady L.J.. R. v. Home Secretary Ex parte Duke of 
Chateau Thierry (1917) 1 K.B. 922 at p.931; also R. v. 
Chiswick Police Superintendent Ex parte Sacksteder (1918) 1 
K.B, 578 at p.591; Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians 
v. Attorney General. L.R. (1947) A.C. 87 (P.O.) per Lord 
Wright, followed in Attorney-General for Canada v. Hallet & 
Carry Ltd.. L.R. (1952) A.C. 427 at p.451 (p.C.) per Lord 
Redcliffe.
3* Paul ©•Higgins, Disguised Extradition. : The Soblen Case (1964) 
27 M.L.R. 521 at pp.525-530.
4. Per Singleton, L.J., R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte 
Pawel Sliwa (1952) 1 K.B. 169 at p.178 (C.A.).
Mullets case has held that the Central Government may deport 
him or give him a chance to leave the country and he then 
leaves a free man.
The relation between deportation and extradition 
was pointedly raised in Soblen1s case.* Solblen was a 
United States citizen who had been convicted in the United 
States of conspiring to convey secret defence information 
to Russia. He jumped his bail pending appeal and escaped 
to Israel on a false passport, but he was deported thence 
by a plane bound for New York. He inflicted wounds on 
himself, so that when the plane landed in London en route 
he had to be taken to hospital. Notice of refusal of 
leave to land was served on him there, and his application 
for habeas corpus on the ground there was an implied grant 
of leave to land was unsuccessful. The Home Secretary then 
made a deportation order, with the intention that Soblen 
should be put on an aircraft bound for the United States.
Soblen aga£n*applied for habeas corpus, mainly on the ground 
that, as the United States had requested England for his 
return, deportation order was invalid as it was being used
2for the purpose of extradition. The Court of Appeal held 
first that the Home Secretary may deport an alien to whom 
he has refused leave to land; and secondly, that the Home 
Secretary need not hear any representation on behalf of the 
alien before making a deportation order for reasons of secu­
rity; and thirdly, that a bona fide deportation order ma<^.
1. R. v. Home Secretary Ex parte Soblen (1963) 1 Q.B. 829 (C.A.);
See also Hans Muller1s case supra.
2. R. v. Brixton Prison Governor, ex Parte Soblen (1963 ) 2 Q.B.
243 (C'.AT)'; :
be used in such a way as to send the alien back to his own
for
country (which has requested/him) for an offence committed 
there, although it is not an extraditable offence. The 
action of the Home Secretary has been strongly criticised 
as ’disguised extradition1 .1 It is true that deportation 
otherwise than on the recommendation of a court must be 
’conducive to the public good*. Practically the only 
judicial control (apart from the question whether the per­
son is an alien) is whether the exercise of the power is 
bona fide. It might not be bona fide if it were exercised 
in response to a request from a foreign country for the 
surrender of a fugitive criminal, though the burden of proof 
would be on that person. But the mete fact that the country
of which that person is a national requests his surrender
2
does not itself invalidate a deportation order.
States are generally recognised as possessing the 
power to expel, deport and reconduct aliens. Like the power 
to refuse admission (exclusion) this is regarded as an incid­
ent of a State’s territorial sovereignty. Not even a State's 
own citizens are immune from this power, as witness the de­
nationalisation and expulsion by certain States of their own
/
nationals in recent times.
The power to esqpel and manner of expulsion are, 
however, two distinct matters. Expulsion (or reconduction) 
must be effected in a reasonable manner and without unnecessary
1. Paul O’Higgins ’Disguised Extradition': The Soblen case (1964) 
27 M.L.R. 521. See also C.H.R. Thornberry, "Dr. Soblen and 
the Alien Law of the United Kingdom” (1963) 12 I. C.L.Q. 414.
2.0. Hood Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th 
ed., pp.420-422.
injury to the alien affected. Detention prior to expulsion 
should be avoided, unless the alien concerned refuses to 
leave the State or is likely to evade the authorities* Also, 
an alien should not, it is generally felt, be deported to a 
country or territory where his person or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality or 
political views. Nor should he be exposed to unnecessary 
indignity.
International law does not prohibit the expulsion
en masse of aliens, although this is resorted to usually by
/
way of reprisals only. It may, however, be treated as an 
unfriendly act.^ As distinct from expulsion, reconduction 
amounts to a police measure whereby the alien is returned to 
the frontier under escort.
If the Home Secretary is honestly satisfied that 
the deportation of an alien is conducive to the public good 
and there is some basis for his belief, his deportation order 
is valid although the practical effect (and perhaps the de­
sired effect) of the order is to secure the extradition of
an alien to another country seeking his rendition for a non-
2
extraditable offence. In Soblen's case, the Home Secre­
tary's decision was couched in subjective terms and was
exercisable on 'policy' grounds. With regard to the
I LtZ
control of aliens for the security of^realm in time of war,
1. Starke, An Introduction to International Law. 4th ed., p.260.
2. Fer Lord Denning M.R., R. v. Ex Parte Soblen, supra (1963),
2 Q.B.D. 243 at p.302. “
3. Judicial Review of Administrative Action by S.A. De Smith, 
Second ed., pp.309-310.
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the original distinction between enemy and friendly aliens 
is commonly used. Wartime legislation and emergency 
powers during both the two world wars gave the Crown very 
extensive powers of control over enemy aliens in this sense. 
Legislation in England expressly preserved the Crown’s pre­
rogative in relation to enemy aliens. At common law, their 
licence to remain at large may be revoked at any time at the 
complete discretion of the Crown, and they can be interned 
The internment of an enemy alien is an act of State, and he 
has no right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus against
the executive to challenge the Crown*s power to intern or 
2deport. It has been discussed, but not decided, whether
an interned enemy alien is in the position of a prisoner-of- 
war. Internment, however, does not revoke the licence to 
bring civil actions in the courts; or, probably, to commence 
habeas corpus proceedings against private persons.
The Home Secretary is also authorised by Part II 
of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, to deport from 
the United Kingdom Commonwealth citizens. An offender who 
is both a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and a 
citizen of another Commonwealth country is not exempt from
4
deportation, but the Home Secretary has stated that he will
1. R. v. Commandant of Knockalor Camp (1917) 117 L.T. 627;
Ex parte Liebmann (1916) 1 K.B., 268; Ex_parte Weber (1916)f 
A.C. 4^1; Att.-Gen. for Canada v. Cain (1906) A.C. 542 at 
p.546 (P.C.yj Netz v. Ede (1946) Ch.224.
2. R. v. Bottrill Ex parte Kuechenmeister (1947) K.B. 41 at p.56
Tc .a . ).
3. Per Asquith L.J. in Bottrill*s case (1947) K.B. 41 at p.57 
(C.A.)
4. R. v. Sabri; The Times, Nov. 10, 1964 (C.A.).
not deport such persons, British protected persons, now as de­
fined in the British Protectorates, Protected States and Protect­
ed Persons Order, 1965, and Irish Citizens, except persons con­
nected with the United Kingdom by birth, parentage, naturalisa­
tion, adoption or registration and their wives (Section 6 )* De­
portation of Commonwealth immigrants is only authorised if they 
have been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment, 
and the Court which convicted them or an appeal court recommends 
that a deportation order be made; and no recommendation shall 
be made if the person has been ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom for at least 5 years before conviction (section 7). As 
at least 7 days notice must be given to a person hefore the Court 
may make a recommendation for his deportation, he may appeal to 
the appropriate appellate court either against the recommenda­
tion or against the conviction on which it is made (section 8 ). 
Deportation is not a part of conviction.*
tion held that the Immigration Act of 1971 had retrospective 
effect and the Commonwealth Citizens who illegally entered
to stay in the United Kingdom. Section 1(2) of the Immigra­
tion Act, 1971, was interpreted to benefit all those persons 
as 'settled' who (i) as Commonwealth citizens arrived before 
the period of control, namely the Act of 1962; (ii) Common­
wealth citizens who arrived after the Act of 1962 but before 
the Act of 1968, but otherwise than through the port of entry;
1. See R. v. Bdgihill (1963) 1 Q.B. 593 (C.C.A.); Cf. R. v. 
Lyncfr (1966) 1 Q.L.R. 92; (1965) 3 All E.R. 925 (C.C.A.).
2. Azam v. Secretary of State; Khara v. Secretary of State: 
Sidlhu v. Secretary of state (H.L.); The Times.11 June, 1973.
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The House of Lords on the illegal entrants deporta-
could be deported, the persons ' settled' were allowed
they were not in breach of any immigration laws; and (iii) 
Commonwealth citizens admitted unconditionally under the pre- 
1973 Control Procedure. They were held to be treated as having 
indefinite leave to remain. But persons who entered the United 
Kingdom unlawfully after a refusal (as Sidhu) and persons whose 
original entry was lawful but who had remained unlawfully, be­
cause the conditions on which they entered were not complied 
with, such persons, however long they had remained in the 
United Kingdom were excluded from those deemed to have leave 
to remain. But Lord Wilberforce held that though the Act of 
1971 had to be construed as retroactive effect, it also made 
provision for the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
to consider each case and give full weight to human factors in 
deciding whether or not an individual illegal entrant should 
remain in the United Kingdom.
The power to deport in such cases is possessed by 
practically every other territory in the Commonwealth. The 
Supreme Court of India in the case of Hans Muller has held that 
the power to expel (deport) an alien is inherent in the Central 
Government as distinguished from the act of extradition, which 
action can be taken and orders passed for the same on the ful­
filment of certain conditions precedent and which order is sub­
ject to j‘udicial review. But there are no conditions or pre­
requisites precedent to the passing of the order of expelling 
an alien by the Central Government if, in its discretion,it 
exercises its powers: a mere expulsion may result in and have
the effect of extraditing an alien. But it is submitted the 
same principles would not apply so far as the citizens of India 
are concerned, and if they are deported or expelled, the chapter 
of Fundamental Rights will come to their rescue and the aggrieved 
party may move the High Court or the Supreme Court for a writ
of habeas corpus or prohibition or certiorari as the circum­
stances of the case require.
(b) Deportation of Pakistani Nationals
There are cases of deportation of former Indian Nation­
als who migrated to Pakistan after 26 January, 1950, Pakistan 
Nationals or other nationals, and these can constitute except­
ions. The Supreme Court of India held * that prosecution of 
an Indian national under section 14 of the Foreigners Act,1946, 
on a charge of over-staying in India the period of whose Paki­
stani permit has expired, is not maintainable, where there is 
no determination by the Central Government under section 9 of 
the Citizenship Act that he had acquired Pakistani nationality, 
and had thereby, become a foreigner. The Supreme Court in 
that case, held that the respondent even though held to be a 
Pakistani and therefore, a foreigner before the charge framed 
against him was entitled to the protection of Indian laws.
The ratio of the decision in that case, even after the deter­
mination under section 9 of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, 
was based on the finding that the determination by the Central 
Government in that case could not have the effect retrospect­
ively rendering penal an act which was not so at the time of 
its commission by ex post facto legislation.
But the Supreme Court left the matter open for the
Central Government to take such action against the respondent
as it thought fit either under the Foreigners Act, 1946, or
under any other provision of the law which might be applicable
to him; for the purpose of either deporting him or otherwise 
dealing with him as it thought fit.
1. State of U.P. v. Rahmatullah, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1382.
(6) Irregular or Mistaken Extradition
There can be a mistaken extradition or irregular 
surrender. It may occur when the fugitive criminal is surren­
dered to a foreign State without formal extradition proceedings 
or the fugitive is surrendered in situations where he could not 
and should not have been surrendered. Savarkar*s was an in­
stance: the French Policb surrendered Savarkar to the Captain
of the ship without any authority from the Paris Government, 
and without proper extradition proceedings.* SAvarkar was a 
revolutionary who was being transferred to India for prosecu­
tion on charges of treason in India, according to the allega­
tions of the British Government. He believed that Britain 
would leave India only by the use of force by Indian National­
ists. He was a political offender and he could not have been 
extradited or surrendered. Such instances may occur in case 
of aliens in India, and such surrenders will be mistaken ones. 
Deportation, expulsion, kidnapping or mistaken extradition do 
not affect the prosecution of the criminal, and he can still
2be prosecuted validly as if there has been valid extradition.
On the other hand, if the accused has been secured 
without extradition, the prosecuting State has no limitations 
as it would have had under the rule of speciality had he been 
brought through the proper extradition proceedings. This is 
a situation where the law-breaker State is in a more advantageous
1. More instances are given by Professor Oppenheim at p.703.
2. 1919-1920 A.D., Case No.185. Delivery without Extradition 
(Germany) case: 1929-1930 A.D., Case No.107, Extradition 
(Germany-Italy) case; State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore 
More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. '11715 Ex-parte Elliot (1949) 1 A H  
E.R. 373; In the matter of Rudolf Stallmann, I.L.R. 39 Cal. 
164^ A U i o L s^ r /-?//.
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position than the State who may have obtained the extradition 
and surrender of the fugitive offender legally. In a very few 
cases, to arrive at the same effect of deportation, kidnapping 
is another form which is resorted to, for securing the custody 
of the offender. This mostly happens in cases of political 
offenders who cannot otherwise be extradited and in whose kid­
napping sometimes the Government also may be interested.
Eichman was kidnapped by Israel1 s agents in Argentine, and pro­
secuted and executed in Israel for his crimes against Jews 
during Hitler's regime in Germany. Ihe Moroccan leader, Mehdi 
Ben Berka, was kidnapped and murdered in France. There are a 
number of instances of kidnapping. Deportation and kidnapping 
differ in that while in cases of deportation, the foreign State 
is a willing and active party in surrendering the fugitive to 
the requesting State; in the case of kidnapping, it is the 
forceful removal of the fugitive against the will of the State 
where he is, though in some cases, the States may be a conniv­
ing party by keeping silent, though the other State may be a 
party in the forceful removal of the offender to take him to 
its territory.
(7) Extradition and Asylum
(a) General
The liberty of a State to accord asylum to an alien 
overlaps to a certain extent with its liberty to refuse extra­
dition of him at the request of some other State, an overlap­
ping best seen in the grant, commonly, of asylum to political 
offenders, who correspondingly are not as a rule, extraditable. 
Asylum stops, as it were, where extradition begins, and thas 
interdependence makes it convenient to consider the two subjects 
viz. extradition and asylum together. No question of asylum 
and, therefore, of interdependence^between it and extradition, 
arises however, where a State is requested to extradite its own 
resident nationals.
The concept of asylum in international law involves 
two elements:- (a) shelter, which is more than merely tempor­
ary refuge; and (b) a degree of active protection on the part 
of the authorities in control of the territory of asylum.
Asylum may be territorial (or internal), i.e. granted 
by a State on its territory; it may be extra-territorial, i.e. 
granted for and in respect of legations, consular premises, 
international headquarters, warships and merchant vessels to 
refugees from the authorities of the territorial State. The 
differences between the principles applying to the two kinds 
of asylum flow from the fact that the power to grant terri­
torial asylum is sin incident of territorial sovereignty it­
self, whereas the granting of extra-territorial asylum is 
rather a derogation from the sovereignty of the territorial 
state insofar as that State is required to acquiesce in 
fugitives from its authorities enjoying protection from appre­
hension.
Consistently with this distinction, the general prin­
ciple is that every State has a plenary right to grant terri­
torial asylum unless it has accepted some particular restrict­
ion in this regard, while the right to grant extra-territorial
asylum is exceptional and must be established in each case.
Both types of asylum have this in common, that they 
involve an adjustment ;between the legal claims of State sover­
eignty, and demands of humanity.
(b) Territorial Asylum
A State’s liberty to grant asylum in its territory 
is of ancient origins, and extends not only to political, 
social or religious refugees, but to all persons from abroad, 
including criminal offenders. It is one aspect of a State's 
general power of admission or exclusion from its territory. 
Normally, however, persons not being nationals of the terri­
torial state, and who axe held in custody on foreign vessels 
within that State1s waters will not be granted asylum. It 
is a matter of controversy whether a State may grant asylum 
to prisoners-of-war detained by it but unwilling to be repatri­
ated.^ "
It is now sometimes said that the fugitive has a 
' right of asylum' • Judge Lauterpacht has suggested that there 
is such an individual right because the fugitive is not usually 
surrendered, in the absence of an extradition treaty, and be­
cause if his offence is political, he is not generally subject
1. Starke, Introduction to International Law, pp.266 and 372.
to extradition.1. But according to J.G. Starke, this is in­
accurate, as fugitives have no enforceable right in inter­
national law to enjoy asylum, either by grant from the State 
of refuge, or by acquiescence as against the pursuing State.
The only international legal right, according to Starke, flows 
from the right of the State of refuge itself to grant asylum. 
Muncipal legal systems do indeed, sometimes provide for a 
right of asylum to individuals fleeing from prosecution, and 
an example of a modern international instrument (not being a 
binding convention) providing for an individual right of asylum 
from prosecution is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948 (see Article 14). But, so far, no such individual right 
is guaranteed by international law, although proposals to se­
cure recognition of this right are under consideration by the 
United Nations.
The liberty of States to grant asylum may, of course, 
be cut down by treaties between the States concerned, of which 
extradition treaties are the commonest illustration, and these 
treaties will be an exception to the right of the State of re-
3
fuge to grant asylum.
(c) Extra-territorial asylum
(i) Asylum in legations
Modern international law recognises no general right 
of a head of a mission to grant asylum in the premises of the
1. H. Lauterpacht: The Law of Nations and Punishment of War Crimes 
B.Y.I.L. 1944 at pp.87, 8 8 .
2. See, for example, Prance and Italy.
3. Starke, Introduction to International Law, 4th ed., pp.265- 
266.
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legation. Such grant seems rather prohibited by international 
law where its effect would be to exempt the fugitive from the 
regular application of laws and administration of justice by 
the territorial State. The lack of any such general right of
diplomatic asylum was affirmed by the International Court of
1 2 Justice in the Asylum case. In the Haya de la Torre case
arising out of the same facts, the court held that where asylum
in legation premises has been granted without justification,
the head of the mission concerned is not obliged to deliver
the fugitive to the local authorities, in the absence of any
treaty binding him to do so.
(d) Right of Asylum
Persecution in the home State is the usual incentive 
for crossing its frontiers and taking refuge in the State of 
Asylum. These persecutions may be mainly on grounds of poli­
tical opinions, race, religion, linguistic reasons, etc. Every­
one has a right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum
3
from persecution. A sovereign State exercises its terri­
torial supremacy over all persons on its territory. It is a 
right of every State to offer refuge to those who ask for such 
protection and resist all demands, where one is made for the 
extradition of the individual granted asylum. But the right 
of asylum cannot be claimed as of right, but it is a right of
the State to grant asylum at its discretion, which could be
granted if the prerequisite conditions are fulfilled. Gener­
ally, an asylum is asked for by people whose extradition is
1. (1950) I.C.J. Reports 266.
2 . (1951) I.C.J. Reports 71.
3. Commd. 7662, 1948 B.Y.I.L. 374.
demanded and the fugitive claims that he is a political offender, 
and if he successfully proves it in extradition proceedings, his 
surrender is refused, and he is given asylum to remain permanent­
ly or provisionally in the country of asylum**
International customaxy law recognises the legal right 
of the States to admit and grant asylum to refugees within their
territorial jurisdiction, whether the refugees* extradition is 
demanded or not* Political asylum has been described as an 
institution of a humanitarian character and therefore, not sub­
ject to reciprocity and that any person may resort to its pro*-
I
2tection whatever his nationality* Such protection is neces­
sary in order to secure to the members of a racial, religious 
(as in the case of Jews in Germany), or linguistic group, just 
and fair conditions of life* Danger in regard to life or 
liberty from political or other forms of persecution, and
serious danger to the life and liberty and subjection to per-
4
secution of such nature as to render life insupportable in 
case of return of the asylee to his home State were stated to 
be grounds for grant of political asylum in British practice,5
1* Ofrane-Djan , I.L., The Fugitive Offender and the Law of Extra­
dition in the Commonwealth, unpublished Ph*b*Thesis,' London 
University at pp.Ssi, 2&2*(1965),
2. Article III of the Convention on Political Asylum adopted by 
the Pan-American Conference held in December, 1933*
3* 529 H.C. Deb* 1508, 1st July, 1954.
4* 668 H.C. Deb* 429, 28th November, 1962* Br. Home Secretary, 
Mr. Henry Brooke, and 613 H.C. Deb* 495, 11th November, 1959, 
Minister of State at Home Office (Mr. Renton).
5. Ohene-Djan, op.cit.* pp.285-286.
and no different patterns would be adopted in India on the 
subject•
In the case of grant of political asylum claimed by 
aliens in India, the fear of persecution should be shown to be 
well-founded and also the life and liberty of the asylee in 
peril, because of his views and activities* This test is 
difficult for the asylee to prove and injustice may not be 
eliminated in a few cases but it would weed out frivolous 
applications for asylum; and in case of refusal, the appli­
cant asylee will meet deportation. Dr. Ghene-Djan * has 
noted two cases of Nikola Martinovic and Captain Galvao, who 
were refused asylum, because they could not prove that there 
was any evidence of their prospective persecutions*
1* Ohene-Djan, op.cit* (f*n.94A) , p.285
(9) Salient Features of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962
(a) Basis and Extent of Extradition
The basis and extent of extradition differ in differ­
ent countries* The law of England with regard to extradition 
is based entirely on statutes* A fugitive criminal found in 
England may be surrendered to a foreign State only in accord­
ance with the provisions of the Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1935, 
by proceedings which are regulated and authorised by those Acts*
The Extradition Acts do not apply in the case of any foreign 
State unless Her Majesty so directs by Order in Council* The 
Acts extend to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man as if 
they were part of the United Kingdom and, when applied to a 
foreign State unless the Order in Council provides otherwise, 
and extend, subject to certain modifications, to every "British 
Possession".* Prior to the Extradition Act, 1870 (33 and 34 
Viet. Ch.52), there was no general statute giving legal validity 
to extradition treaties concluded with Foreign states by Her 
Majesty, and a separate Act had to be passed on the occasion 
of each new treaty. This statute, as subsequently amended —  
it was the subject matter of a review by Royal Commission ap­
pointed in 1877,consisting of eminent jurists like Cockburn,
Lord Selborne, Lord Esher^»has been the foundation of the law 
of extradition in the whole of the British Empire, except in 
the case of Canada, whereby an Order in Council dated 6 July, 
1907, issued under Section 18 of the Act, the operation thereof 
in Canada was suspended so long as Part 1 of Ch.155 of the 
Revised Statutes of Canada (and now the revised Statutes of
1. See Halsbury, Laws of England. 3rd ed., Vol.16, p.360.
Canada, 192, C,322) continued in force,1
The Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1935, do not apply in 
the case of any foreign State unless Her Majesty so directs by 
Order in Council (just like the provisions contained in Sections
3 and 12 of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962), The applica­
tion of the Act of 1870 to ’British Possessions1 outside the 
United Kingdom has been provided by Section 17, while Section 
18 provides for the saving^laws of ’British Possessions’, By 
an Order in Council, dated 7 March, 1904, it was declared that 
Chapter II of the Indian Extradition Act will have effect in 
British India as if it were part of the Extradition Act, 1870 
(vide Section 18 of that Act). This chapter was intended to 
substitute the Indian procedure for that contained in Sections 
7 to 12 of theipxtr adit ion Act, 1870,2
The basis and extent of extradition in the U.S.A. is
3
set out, as follows:-
’’Ihere is no obligation upon a Govern­
ment, under the law of nations, to surrender 
fugitive criminals to a foreign power, and 
the sovereign power upon which demand is 
made may exercise its discretion and may 
investigate the charge upon which the sur­
render is demanded. In United States it is 
well settled that independently of statutory 
or treaty provision, no authority exists in 
any branch of thebovernment to surrender a -■ 
fugitive criminal' to a foreign Government, 
although in 1864, Mr. Steward, Secretary of 
State of the United States, with the sanct­
ion of President Lincoln, directed the ar­
rest of a fugitive from Cuba, as a purely 
executive Act in a case in which this 
country had no extradition treaty with the 
country from which the criminal had fled, 
and there are text writers and dicta in
1. Ramaswami, J. In Re Chockalingam, A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 548 at p.551
2. Ramaswami, J • In Re Chockalingam, ibid. at p . 551.
3 . 25 Corpus Juris, pp.273 to 275 (Ss.52-53).
some cases which assert that it is the duty 
of one nation to surrender fugitive criminals 
upon demand to another nation, especially in 
the case of more heinous offences as a matter 
of ’international comity* in the absence of 
treaties*
**It is the present doctrine in England and 
Canada that the extradition of a fugitive cri­
minal cannbt be granted in the absence of 
specific legal authority. As the United 
States do not surrender fugitive criminals 
in the absence of a treaty stipulation, its 
practice is to decline requests of extradi­
tion from a foreign Government with which 
this Government has no treaty providing for 
surrender, although there are isolated cases 
in which this Government has requested to 
foreign Governments the surrender of fugitive 
criminals as an act of comity, but in these 
cases, the request has always been accompanied 
by the statement that under our law ’recipro­
city* cannot be granted*
”As no authority exists in any branch of 
this Government to surrender a fugitive crimi­
nal in the absence of treaty stipulation^ 
extradition can be granted, where a treaty 
exists, only for an offence enumerated in 
the treaty and this Government will request 
extradition from a foreign Government only 
for an offence included in the treaty and 
the same rule of law has been laid down by 
the Canadian Courts, although there appears 
to be some authority for the doctrine that 
the existence of an extradition treaty be­
tween two countries does not prohibit the 
surrender by either Government of a person 
charged with a crime not enumerated in the 
treaty* Where a person charged with a 
crime not provided for by treaty is deliver­
ed to the authorities of the United States 
as an act of comity, such person is not 
entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus, 
and none of his personal rights have been 
violated* It is within the power of the 
Congress to provide by statute for the 
extradition of fugitives from justice of 
a foreign country without regard to any 
reciprocal treaty obligation, and this 
power is not affected by the character 
of the criminal procedure of the foreign 
country or by the fact that the alleged 
offender is a citizen of United States*
’’International extradition in United 
States is based on treaty stipulation*
The United States has treaties of extra­
dition with most Governments* A treaty 
stipulation on the part of the Government 
of the United States to surrender fugitives
from justice is a lawful stipulation, 
and within the authority of the treaty- 
making power. The treaties of Great 
Britain with United States have been 
extended to include the surrender of 
the fugitive offenders between the 
States of North Borneo and the Phillip- 
ine Islands or Guam."*
There is an interesting study of extradition in the
2Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The provision in the 
Soviet law dealing with extradition is para.2 of Section 16, 
Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. It reads:-
"Section 16 (para.3)
The extradition of persons against 
whom the investigation is pending or who 
are committed for trial or convicted by 
judicial bodies and whose extradition is 
requested by a foreign Government from 
the Government of U.S.S.R. shall be per­
mitted only in cases and in the manner 
established by the treaties, agreements 
and conventions of the U.S.S.R. with 
Foreign Governments, as well as by a
special law, enacted in the form of
Federal legislation."
The Soviet Union has entered into treaties with their associate 
States of Eastern Europe from 1957.
Assuming a treaty to exist, or even in cases where no 
treaty exists but a territorial State (as in India's case) sur­
renders fugitive offenders by way of extradition to the request­
ing country, there remain two sides to the procedure, and both
must conform to the requirements of the case before it will
come within the concept of * extradition'•
1. See also 22 American jurisprudence, p.244 - Basis of Rights 
of Extradition.
2. Edited by Vladimir Gsovski and Kazimiers Grzybowski (1959) 
in two volumes published by Stevens & Sons Ltd., London; 
"Government law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe"•
The functions which the courts in the two countries 
perform are(different. The court within whose jurisdiction 
the offence is committed decides whether there is a prima 
facie evidence on which the requisition may be made to another 
country for the surrender of the offender. When the State 
to which a requisition is made agrees consistently with its 
international commitments to lend its aid, the requisition 
is transmitted to the police authorities, and the courts of 
that country consider, according' to their own laws, whether 
the offender should be surrendered.*
The sanction behind an order of extradition is, 
therefore, the international commitment of the State under 
which the court functions, but courts jealously seek to pro­
tect the right of the individual by insisting upon strict com-
o
pliance with the conditions precedent to surrender.
The Indian Extradition Act of 1962 envisages the 
extradition both of citizens and alien fugitives from India 
under three situations. It may be on the basis of a treaty 
which the requesting State has entered with India. It is 
immaterial whether the treaty has been entered into after 
India gained independence, 1947, or the treaties were entered 
into earlier by the Government of the United Kingdom on behalf 
of India, or by India's own Government.
The second situation is that a non-treaty State can 
also request the surrender of the fugitive if it is one of the 
States which have been notified under Section 3(1)(a) of the 
1962 Act; and similarly, under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act.
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
1171 at p.1176.
2. Jugal Kishore More, ibid. at p.1175.
3. For the texts of these clauses, see Appendix A, p.58ii, below.
A similar notification may be made with respect to a Common­
wealth country which has made no extradition arrangements with 
India.
Ihe third situation is when a Commonwealth country 
which has entered into an extradition agreement with India may 
also request for the surrender of a fugitive without proof of 
prima facie case against him. In all these three situations, 
the notification of the Central Government in the Government of 
India Gazette is essential either under Section 3 or Section 12 
of the Act.*1 In the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. Fugitive
Criminals cannot be extradited without extradition treaty be-
otween them and the requesting State. But in India such a 
treaty is not essential for securing the extradition of a fugi­
tive criminal. In this respect, the Indian Bxtradition Act of 
1962 <is like the Canadian Extradition Act of 1889 or the French 
Act of 1927, wherein extradition can be demanded even by a non­
treaty State, so long as the crime attributed to the fugitive
is listed in the second schedule of the Indian Extradition Act^ *
of 1962 and notification has been made in the Gazette, under 
Section 3(1) of the Act, to the effect that the State mentioned 
therein is entitled to secure extradition. Therefore, it is 
a prerequisite condition that before any requisition is made, 
there must have been notification in the Government Gazette of 
the applicability of the Act to the requesting State, irrespect­
ive of whether it is a treaty State or otherwise.
Section 3(1) of the Act of 1962 provides that the 
Central Government may, by notified order, direct that the pro-
1. See Appendix.
2. Felice Morgenstern. The Right of Asylum, 1949 B.Y.I.L. pp.328- 
329.
visions of this Act other than Chapter III shall apply (a) to 
such foreign State or part thereof; and (b) to such Commonwealth 
country or pant thereof to which Chapter III does not apply as 
may be specified in the order. Notification is also necessary 
under Section 12 cf the Act with regard to Commonwealth countries 
which have extradition arrangements with India. Sections 3(1)
and 12(2) imply that in order that a foreign State may have de­
livery of a fugitive in whom it may be interested,it is essential 
that notification as to the applicability of the Act with regard 
to that State has been made under the relevant section. This is 
so, even with regard to foreign States that have extradition 
treaties with India. Regarding treaty States, section 3(3) pro­
vides that the notification should publish the relevant treaty in 
full. Non-publication of the treaty may vitiate the notification. 
While the validity of the notification with regard to a treaty 
State is limited to the tenure of treaty and terms of the treaty, 
there is no such limitation with regard to States which have 
neither an extradition treaty nor an arrangement for extradition 
with India, and the latter categories of countries are in a more 
advantageous position. Thus, the 1962 Act becomes effective with 
regard to a given State only after the appropriate notification 
of the applicability of the Act to that State.
(b) Necessity for Treaties and Municipal Laws in Extradition 
Matters
Extradition is a political question, the law governing 
it having been created by statute and treaty. Common law . so 
far as it t&^subject , deals with two questions. First,
the personal liberty of all persons who came within the area of 
its application; and second, territoriality of all laws, unless 
it is specially expressed to apply extra-territorially. The law
on these two questions can be put thus: A person who has not
committed an offence against the laws of the country in which 
he is actually present is a free mam and can apply to the courts
to protect him from any violation of his personal liberty. The 
law of extradition is an exception to the common law doctrine of 
personal liberty of a subject or a person who comes within the 
peace of the king. The common law doctrine of personal liberty 
involves the notion of right to liberty and locality of the crime. 
The latter means that crime is local in its commission; local in 
its legal effect; local in its punishment; that is a specific 
illustration of the larger doctrine that all laws are territorial- 
local to the country in which they have been promulgated - which 
in turn, is based upon the larger doctrine that sovereignty is 
local and its exercise circumscribed by the limits of the terri­
tory subject to the sovereign. Each phase of this doctrine is 
involved in the common-law right of liberty upon which extradi­
tion encroaches. The Government of the country whose laws are 
violated feels powerless in all its branches either to punish 
or to bring to punishment the offender who escapes to another 
territory; and conversely, the Government in whose territory 
he has escaped feels powerless to punish him because none of 
its laws have been violated or infringed. Hence, the necessity 
for treaties and enactment of municipal law for extradition.
In the United States, treaties are * self-executing1 
and no municipal law is necessaryas Art.VI of the U.S. Consti- 
tut ion makes the treat ies * the Supreme Law of the land* and such 
treaties are to be regarded in Courts of Justice, as equivalent 
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself,
1. McNair, Law of Treaties, 78-81.
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the 
terms of the stipulation impose a contract when either of the 
parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses 
itself to the political department not the judicial department, 
and the leg^lature must execute the contract before it can be­
come a rule for the courts.1 But in the United Kingdom, no 
treaty is self-executing. Municipal law has to be passed by 
Parliament; if this does not occur, the relevant treaty will 
not be executed. If per incurjam it is done, the Crown is 
internationally omnicompetent in the matter, but the British
courts would not give effect to it if it conflicts with the law 
2
of the land.
Lord Atkin observed:
"within the British Empire there is a well- 
established rule that making of a treaty is 
an executive’Act, while the performance its 
obligations, if they entail alterations of « 
the existing law, requires legislative action."
As regards English municipal law, the special tradi­
tions of common law conditioned the necessity for treaty and 
statute. At common law, the Crown had no power to arrest a 
fugitive criminal and to surrender him to another State; 
furthermore, treaties as to extradition were deemed to derogate 
from the private law rights of English citizens, and required 
legislation before they could come into force in England. Ihe
1. C.J. Marshal in Foster v. Neilson (1829) (quoted by McNair, 
ibid. p.80); Dickinson, Law of Nat ions, p.1057; Fujji v. 
State of California, 38 Cal. 2d-718; 242 F-2d 617.
2. McNair, ibid. p.82.
3. Attorney-Oeneral for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario: 
1937' A.C.' 326 at p.347, per Lord Atkin. — —
British practice as to treaties, as distinct from customary 
international law, is conditioned primarily by the constitutional 
principles governing the relations between the Executive (i.e. 
Crown) and Parliament. The negotiation, signature, and ratifi­
cation of treaties are matters belonging to the prerogative powers 
of the Crown. If however, the provisions of a treaty made by 
the Crown were to become operative within Great Britain automa­
tically, and without any specific act of incorporation, this 
might lead to the result that the Crown could alter the British 
municipal law or otherwise take some important step without con­
sulting Parliament or obtaining Parliament's approval.
Hence, it is established in England that among other 
things, treaties which affect the private rights of British sub­
jects or involve any modification of the common or statute law 
by virtue of their provisions or otherwise, must receive Parlia­
mentary assent through an enabling Act of Parliament and, if 
necessary, any legislation to effect the requisite changes in 
the law must be passed.1 Under the above-mentioned rules, a 
British treaty is required to be implemented by legislation, 
and a mere general or vague allusion to the treaty in a statute
is not sufficient to constitute the necessary legislative imple- 
2
mention. Thus, from both points of view, legislation was 
essential and the solution adopted was to pass a general extra­
dition statute - the Extradition Act, 1870 (which was made appli­
cable to India also), which applies only in respect of countries 
with which an arrangement for the surrender of fugitive offenders 
has been concluded, and to which the Act itself has been made
1. Walker v. Baird (1892) A.C. 491 at p.497. The Parliament 
Beige (1879) 4 P-D.129; Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney 
General for Ontario (1937) A.C. 326 at p.347.
2. Republic of Italy v. Hambros Bank (1950) Ch.314.
applicable by an Order in Council.
Two principles are to be kept in mind in the surrender 
of the criminal. Treaty-making power is the prerogative of the 
sovereign and in India, of the executive, i.e. the Central Govern­
ment,and the treaty per se requires no ratification. Law-making 
power is the prerogative of the Parliament. From these two 
principles emerge that the Executive cannot alter the law; nor
command anything, to be done in violation of law. The right of 
the Indian citizen or an alien within the territory subject to
Indian law, to his personal liberty, cannot be invaded by the 
Executive even though it binds itself by treaty with another 
State to do so. Consequently, in order to carry out that vio­
lation of common law, including any fundamental or legal right 
which is involved in the surrender to foreign country of per­
sons who have committed no offence against Indian law,both the 
legislative and the executive wings of India must be in agreement 
that it should be done; and in addition to the treaty there must 
be municipal law in existence in India for extradition of persons 
whether citizens or aliens. Thus, it has come about that the 
machinery for extradition from this country is contained in two 
documents, of coordinate but independent authority, viz. the 
treaty and the statute. But treaty is always not essential
for extradition; this is based on the policy of making recipro­
city the basis of extradition^and this is how in the Indian 
Extradition Act, separate chapters have been provided for extra­
dition of fugitives to treaty and non-treaty, extradition arrange­
ment and non-extradition arrangement countries.
The sanction of the Parliament for enacting municipal 
law is necessary because the surrender of the fugitive will in­
volve his arrest and the arrest will deprive the fugitive of
his personal liberty and therefore, it necessitates the authority 
of Parliament, though expulsion and exclusion simpliciter would 
not need such a sanction. Mere arrest and surrender on requisi­
tion are obviously not contemplated>for some enquiry is essential 
in order to ensure proof of the fact that the fugitive not only
is a criminal, but also is the person he is alleged to be, so as 
to safeguard the liberty of the person. Such enquiry would natu­
rally be by an independent judiciary and in order to see that the 
offence committed is not only against the laws of India, but is 
against the laws of the foreign State, the necessary jurisdiction 
to hold the inquiry must be derived from Parliament. Thus, it 
follows that the whole procedure of surrender of the fugitive 
criminal from the arrest onto his final delivery over to some 
person to take him out of this country, must be created by 
statute,and this is why the earlier English and Indian Statutes 
and the present Extradition Act of 1962 have been enacted by 
Parliament and both the procedural law and the substantive of­
fences have been mentioned in the Act with a liberty to the 
Executive to enter into treaties with foreign States.
The Constitution of India in Chapter III has given 
fundamental rights regarding personal liberty to citizens and 
aliens - though their enforcement in terms of emergency can be 
suspended by the President under Art.259-and the Supreme Court 
and the High Courts^being the sentinels of the Fundamental rights^ 
have, under Art. 32 and 226 of the Constitution, been given power 
to safeguard the personal liberties and therefore, the Extradi­
tion Act is silent on this, and they are thus not specifically 
dealt with as part of the extradition machinery, and require no 
special legi slation to warrant their interference. Of course 
the question of the infringement of personal liberty would not
arise in case generally when a fugitive criminal is surrendered 
by a foreign State to India, though on account of the 'Equality 
before law* or 'Equal protection of law* clauses, a person sur­
rendered to India can move in India for constitutional remedies 
available, if any^to him. Specific provisions are not needed 
in this respect, and the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, has by 
section 2 0 therefore, provided that the person surrendered from 
a foreign country will be dealt with in accordance with law in 
force in India. When once he is surrendered, he is amenable to
the jurisdiction and laws of India and he may be innocent, but 
once charged, he will be tried according to the laws in force in 
India. Therefore, there are no authorities to whom jurisdiction 
must be given by Parliament specifically^this is why fundamental 
rights provided under Chapter III of the Constitution and the 
constitutional remedies are not separately mentioned in the 
Extradition Act.
Reciprocity is the obvious and common basis of treaties, 
but it is not insisted on in the Act.
Treaties per se are not law and this is why Section 
3(3)(c) of Indian Extradition Act, 1962, provides for the imple­
mentation of the treaty by a separate notified order. So also 
Section 3(3)(a) provides for the setting out the treaty in full 
in the notified order so that the other States and everybody 
concerned may know about it.
Further, Section 3(3)(b) provides about the duration
of the treaty, viz. that the treaty shall not remain in force
after its period. Section 3(i)(a) and (b) empowers the Central
Government to make the Act applicable for the surrender of
fugitives, by a notified order other than the provisions of 
Chapter III: (a) to such foreign States, or part thereof
or (b) to such Commonwealth Country or part thereof to which 
Chapter III does not apply* Section 12 of the Act empowers 
the Central Government to apply Chapter III to such Commonwealth 
Countries with extradition arrangements which it deems expedient*
In regard to extradition, for the applicability of the provisions 
of the Act or treaties the principle may again be emphasised 
that the order of the Central Government as required under Section 
3 of the Act is necessary for the applicability of the provisions 
of the Act and treaty, if ,any, made for surrender of fugitives 
from India* But conversely, it is not necessary and essential 
that there should be a treaty in force between India and^foreign 
country for the surrender of criminals by foreign States to India 
and no notification under Section 3 of the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, is necessary and a mere initiative from the Central 
Government for requisition from a foreign Government of the 
fugitive criminal is enough*1
(c) Pre-Independence Treaties and their Continuity
Oppenheim says that in the absence of extradition
treaties stipulating to the contraxy no State is obliged by
international law to expel or delivee a fugitive offender to the
2
prosecuting State. No State considers itself under any inter­
national duty to extradite a fugitive unless there is some treaty
3
obligation on it. From time to time, attempts were made to 
conclude a convention governing extradition requests amongst natiois
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171, supra.
2. Oppenheim, International Law, 8 th ed., Vol.I, at p.696.
3. Arnold McNair, 'Extradition and Territorial Asylum' , 1951 
B.Y.I.L., pp.174-177; Felice Mordjenstern, 'The Right of 
Asylum' 1949, B.Y.I.L., p.327; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 
U.S. 276 at p.283.
but nothing was achieved. In the absence of any extradition con­
vention amongst nations, nations have resorted to bilateral extra­
dition treaties by which they have agreed between themselves to 
surrender the accused or convict to the requesting State in case 
such a person comes within the purview of the given treaty.
France was the pioneer in the development of bilateral 
extradition treaties. As early as 1371, France entered into a
treaty with Savoy and with Austria and Spain in 1612. By 1668, 
France had extradition treaties with 53 States. For the sake 
of convenience, and to avoid misunderstanding, extradition 
treaties generally enunciate a list of crimes for which extradi­
tion may be demanded and granted. When disputes arise about 
the interpretation of clauses of treaties, the territorial state 
courts decide it. Bilateral treaties at the national level are 
supplemented by national laws or legislation at the municipal 
level. Belgium which is ,also^considered as one of the pioneers 
in extradition law, was the first country to bring out national 
legislation on the subject in 1833. It remained a solitary 
power in the field for quite some time, until Great Britain passed 
theExtradition Act in 1870. These municipal laws purport to 
implement the obligations undertaken by the territorial State 
under extradition treaties. Besides they also prescribe the 
procedure to be followed in case of any request for the surrender 
of the fugitive.1
The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, has been enacted for 
this purpose. Section 2(d) of the Act defines an extradition 
treaty as including a treaty which was entered into 'before the
1. Hingorani R.C., The Indian Extradition Law, p.8 .
15th day of August 1947 which extends to, and is binding on 
India', prior to Independence. Apart from treaties with 
foreign States, there were agreements between the British Govern­
ment and the princely States in India. With regard to the 
princely States, British paramountcy lapsed and they became free 
to remain independent enclaves or to join one or the other sover­
eign States, viz. India or Pakistan. With this merger, the 
extradition arrangements and treaties between the erstwhile prin­
cely States and the British Government lapsed* In the altered 
circumstances, the princely States having merged in independent 
India, lost their separate identity and therefore, their sover­
eignty, and consequently, the treaties became incapable of exe­
cution.1 The mention of pre-Independence treaties inSection 
2(d) of the Extradition Act of 1962 consequently excludes the 
treaties between the British Government and .princely Indian
States. In Oppenheim's view such treaties are political and
2therefore, do not pass 6n to the new State. But the Government 
of India by the 1962 Act has considered unilaterally pre-Independ­
ence or pre-1947 treaties as binding on itself, and therefore, 
section 2 (d). has set at rest the controversy whether or not extra­
dition treaties are inherited by a hew State. Treaties with 
Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were made after Independence, whereas 
treaties with other countries by which India considers itself 
bound were made and entered into between the British Government 
and the Foreign States.
There seems to be no reason why a successor State 
should not feel bound by the treaties of the extinct State and
1. Dr. Ram Babu Saksena v. The State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 155; see 
below, p . ,99 .
2. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol.I, p.159.
this seems to be the reason why India by enacting section 2(d)
has said that it is bound by the pre-Independence treaties
Though India feels bound by the pre-Independence treaties with
foreign States,nothing could be said about their attitude when
the question arises between those States, and India whether
those States feel bound by the treaties which they entered with
the British Government* When the circular letters were issued
by the Government of India to the various foreign Governments
with which extradition agreements and treaties were entered by
the British Government and the Indian Government asked them if
they feel bound by its treaties; many countries gave no reply,
others said they are bound by it and others said they have entered
into fresh treaties with the British Government and the oid trea-
2ties stood cancelled*
A further question again arises as to which branch of 
the Government namely, executive or the judiciary has the privi­
lege, authority and jurisdiction to say whether a treaty exists 
between India and another country regarding extradition of 
aliens and nationals* Ihe United States District Court has 
decided that it is not exclusively the privilege of the execu­
tive department to determine whether such a treaty between the
two countries exists; and that it can as well be a judicial
3
question to be decided by the court. Although the superior 
court, namely the United States Circuit Court, set aside the
1. See L.C. Green: * Recent Practice in the Law of Extradition* 
(1936) 6 Current Legal Problems 274 at p.295,
2. For the list of replies, see R.C. Hingorani, * Ihe Law of 
Extradition* , p*119*
3. Artu v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 at p*33*
above decision it assessed the existence of a treaty on the basis
of historical facts.1 The view of the District Court of United
States in Artu* s case seems to be correct. The Indian Supreme
Court in Ram Babu Saksena* s case had to consider whether a treaty
entered into between the British Government (Government of India)
and Tonk State before Independence existed or not, and the
Supreme Court said that with regard to princely India, British
paramountcy lapsed, and it became free to remain independent
enclaves or join one or the other sovereign States; resultantly
all the States merged with Pakistan or India and with this merger,
the extradition treaties or arrangements between the erstwhile
2princely States and British Government also lapsed.
A certification by the Ministry of External Affairs 
in India that a treaty exists between India and another country 
should be eiough to show that such a treaty exists between the two 
countries and such a certificate should be conclusive proof of 
the fact of existence of treaty between India and a foreign 
State or a Commonwealth country; otherwise a contrary judgment 
of the court to the certification about the existence or non­
existence of a treaty may embarrass th^overnment • It is with­
in the domain and province of the executive wing of the Govern­
ment of India to enter into treaty with foreign Governments or 
Commonwealth countries to extradite the criminals, and conse­
quently, if the executive wing certifies that a particular treaty 
exists on a date and the treaty is binding upon the Government of
1. Ivancevie v. Artucovic, 211 F. 2d. p.565.
2. Ram Babu Saksena, supra, A.I.R. 1950, S.C. 155.
India, the courts of law should take such a statement. Be that 
as it may, in some cases the Government should be left free to 
decide whether a treaty in fact and as such exists or not; of 
course, the question of validity or interpretation of the treaty 
can be a subject of decision by a competent municipal court.
(d) Characterisation of States and Extraditable Offences
Parliament enacted the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, 
which came into force on 5 January, 1963, by publication in the 
Government of India Gazette, published by virtue of Section 1(3)
of that Act. This Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the 
law relating to the extradition of fugitive criminals. It makes 
provisions by Chapter II for extradition of fugitive criminals to 
foreign States and to Commonwealth countries with no extradition 
arrangement, to which Chapter III does not apply. Chapter III 
deals with the return of fugitive criminals to Commonwealth 
countries with extradition arrangements. By Section 12 it is 
provided:
"(1) This chapter shall apply only to any 
such Commonwealth country to which by an 
extradition arrangement entered into with 
that country, it may seem expedient to the 
Central Government to apply the same.
"(2) Every such application shall be by 
notified order, and the Central Government 
may, by the same or the subsequent notified 
order, direct that this chapter and chapters 
I, IV and V shall, in relation to any such 
Commonwealth country apply subject to such 
modifications, exceptions, conditions and 
qualifications as it may think fit to 
specify in the order for the purpose of 
implementing the arrangement
Section 13 provides that the fugitive criminals from 
Commonwealth countries may be apprehended and returned. Chapter 
IV deals with surrender or return of the accused or convicted
1
persons from foreign States or Commonwealth countries* Extra­
ditable offences are provided in the Second Schedule of the Act 
or may be provided in the treaty.
(e) Extradition with or without Formalities
Under the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, which applies 
equally to Indian citizens and aliens, the States have been divi­
ded into two categories: one is foreign States and another the
Commonwealth countries* Foreign States have been further sub­
divided into ’treaty States* and ’non-treaty States’; Common­
wealth countries similarly have been divided into two categories, 
viz* one having an extradition arrangement with India and the 
others having no such arrangements. From the point of view of 
extradition procedure States are divided into two categories.
In one case, extradition is granted on proof of Prima facid evi­
dence against the fugitive offender. Ihis category includes 
States which have entered into an extradition treaty with India 
or which is benefited by notification under Section 3(1)(a) with­
out having any extradition treaty, or even a Commonwealth country 
which has no extradition agreement with India but which is bene­
fited by notification under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act.
Ihe second category includes Commonwealth countries 
which have extradition arrangements with India and regarding whom 
notification under Section 12(2) of the Act has been made. Extra­
dition will be granted to these Commonwealth countries without 
proof of prima facie evidence against the accused. Ihe delivery 
of the fugitives to these countries will be regulated under 
Chapter III of thelAct and a simple endorsement of a warrant
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, supra, A.I.R. 1969, 
5.C. 117l.
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signed by any authorised officer of the Commonwealth country 
will be enough.
The Extradition Act envisages two types of extradition 
offences as mentioned in Section 2(c)(i) and (ii). Section 
2(c)(i) provides that with regard to a treaty State, extradition 
offences may be given in the treaty. As regards other States 
benefited under the Act, the extradition offences are enumerated 
in the Second Schedule as per Section 2(c)(ii). The latter cate­
gory includes all Commonwealth countries irrespective of whether 
or not there is an extradition arrangement with India. The 
extradition agreement, therefore, has to be confined to only 
such offences as are given in the Second Schedule, unless the 
list is revised, for which power has been given under Section 
3(3)(c) of the Act.
The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, provides two types of 
procedure for determining the surrender of the fugitive criminal, 
whether alien or citizen. In one case, the surrender is to be 
ordered only if the prima facie case is established and made out 
against the fugitive criminal or convicted fugitive by evidence 
produced before the magistrate. This kind of procedure provided 
in Chapter II will apply to a request for surrender of the fugi­
tive offender or convicted criminal from any foreign State, in­
cluding any Commonwealth country which has no extradition arrange­
ment with India, Another and second type of procedure is pro­
vided in Chapter III of the 1962 Act for the surrender of a fugi­
tive criminal or convicted fugitive without a prima facie case 
having been established against him if the request is made for 
surrender by a Commonwealth country which has an extradition 
treaty or arrangement with India. Authentication of a warrant 
from such a Commonwealth country is enough to order his surrender.
But there are exceptions to.this procedure. 8 y vir-
o^\j- fa (£Ix&3 eg_ (LZ. 1762^
tue of ^ Section 32, * Sections 29 and 31 of the Act,
£y^JL
^sections put limitations on the surrender and benefits 
the fugitive on the grounds given in those sections* In other
words, if in such a case the authentication of the warrant is 
enough for the surrender of the fugitive criminal and no prima 
facie case need be established against him, the surrender may be 
refused on the ground mentioned in Sections 29 and 31 of the 1962 
Act in 'both cases* The magistrate and the Central Government 
have both been given concurrent powers with regard to restrictions 
imposed upon the surrender of fugitives, under Section 31 of the 
Act, which provides that a fugitive shall not be surrendered if:
a) the offence is of a political character or his surrender 
has been demanded with a view to try and punish him for 
an offence of a political character;
b) it is barred by lapse of time according to the law of the
requesting State;
c) there is no rule of speciality either in the national law
or in the treaty of the requesting State;
d) he is under trial or is undergoing any sentence in respect
of any other offence.
Even if the magistrate has already considered the restrictions on 
surrender, as provided under Section 31, there is no bar to the 
Central Gove^cment reopening the above issues and reconsidering 
them, and make an adjudication thereupon afresh and deciding for 
itself whether the fugitive should benefit by any of these re­
strictions surrender. Therefore, he is invited (Section 17(3)] 
to submit a written statement in regard to that which he may like
to be considered by the Central Government before it decides
whether or not to extradite him. But the magistrate or the
Government is not obliged to call for the written statement of
the fugitive criminal.* The magistrates report is not binding
on the Central Government, although his report is likely to weigh
considerably with it. Therefore, even if the magistrate holds
that the offence is not a political one, or the prosecution for
the offence is not time-barred or that the rule of speciality has
been complied with, the Central Government may and can still de-
2cide otherwise and refuse extradition.
The British Courts have also held that even if the
court orders extradition, the Home Secretary can refuse to imple- 
3
ment the order. It follows, therefore, that even after the 
magistrate has committed the fugitive and submitted his report to
that effect to the Central Government under Section 7(4) and 
Section 17(1), a new stage of executive enquiry is started wherein 
the Central Government has to consider the report of the magistrate 
in the light of the restriction placed by Section 29 and 31 of the 
Extradition Act, 1962. The Central Government may agree or dis­
agree with the magistrate and even refuse extradition in its dis­
cretion and for that the Central Government have to give no spe­
cific reasons, although the giving of the substance of the finding 
to the requesting State will be conducive to maintain good rela­
tions with that State and avoid misunderstandings or future
(V
1. Hairihar Chaturbhai v. Unioij of India. A.I.R. 1963 Guj/rat 330 
at p.336. ^
2. Hans Muller1 s case, supra, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 367 at p.374.
3. Zacharia v. Cyprus (1962) 2 All E.R. 438, but for the contrary 
view, see Ex Parte Enahoro (1963) 2 W.R. 1260.*
complications. Giving of the substance is desirable, parti­
cularly when the finding of the Central Government seems counter 
to the finding of the magistrate. Under Section 31, powers have 
been given both tb :the magistrate and the Central Government to 
consider the restrictions, but under Section 29, the power to 
stay proceedings or cancel the endorsement on a warrant and with­
hold the surrender of the fugitive criminal have been given to 
the Central Government only if it appears to the latter that:-
1) Ihe offence is of a trivial nature, or
2) Ihe application for the surrender of the fugitive
criminal is not made in good faith, or
3) the application has been made for political reasons, or
4) the application for surrender is not in the interest
of justice, or
5) it is unjust or inexpedient to surrender the fugitive.
It would appear thus, that the power under this section can be 
exercised by the Central Government even before the magistrate 
is nominated, or during the pendency of the judicial inquiry and 
committing the criminal to custody and submission of the report 
by the magistrate to the Central Government. The powers whether 
under Section 29 or 31 of the Central Government are supreme and 
in its discretion, the Central Government may accept or refuse 
extradition of a foreigner or Indian national. This is a good
example of the peculiar character of extradition law, for such 
executive interference with judicial functions would normally be 
regarded as highly anomalous.
The very natural question arising from the fact that 
in one case proof of prima facie case was a prerequisite before 
extradition order was passed, and in another case extradition
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could be ordered without proof of a prima facie case, and that 
this might be a discriminatory treatment under Article 14 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees equality before law *\nd equal pro­
tection of law, irrespective of the fact whether he was an Indian 
citizen or alien or foreigner, came before the Madras High Court 
for consideration in the Menons* case arising under the old 
Indian Extradition Act of 1903.
The Madras High Court held that Section 14 of that Act 
was ultra vires Article 13 (1) of the Constitution and that there 
would be a denial of equal protection of law if the fugitives 
were extradited without the requirement of prima facie evidence 
against them, ns‘ any surrender without proof of prima facie evi­
dence was opposed to the principles of natural justice.* When 
the matter went before the Supreme Court in appeal, the Supreme 
Court did not consider the question whether Section 14 of the 
1903 Act was ultra vires Article 13(1) of the Constitution or
whether the equal protection clause contained in Article 14 of
£
the Constitution was infringed or not. The Supreme Court upheld 
the judgment of the Madras High Court, - on other grounds, and it 
was decided firstly that sifter the achievement of Independence 
and coming into force of the new Constitution, India could not 
be described as a * British Possession*; secondly, that the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1903, has been adapted, but the Fugitive Offend­
ers Act, 1881, which was an act of the British Parliament, had be® 
severely left alone, and on this ground the Supreme Court held 
that no surrender could be effected without proof of a prima
1. In Re. C.G. Menon and Another, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 279.
2. State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 517.
facie case. Later on, this case was held to be no good law 
in More* s case,*' as we have already seen ^-^3) •
Madras case, therefore, was never affirmed by the Supreme Court
on the ground of * equal protection1. But it is submitted that
othe Supreme Court had held that grouping of countries for 
treating them differently is permissible and in number of cases 
the Supreme Court held that classification under Article 14 was
3
permissible. In view of the permissibility of classification
of countries under the other Acts according to the Supreme Court,
it cannot be said that extradition without proof of prima facie
evidence on grounds of reciprocity is an infringement of Article
14 of the Constitution, particularly where the Commonwealth
countries which have extradition treaty arrangements with India
have the same system of administration of Justice and Judicial 
4impartiality* In the absence of a ruling by the Supreme Court, 
the matter is open to argument from the points of view of abstract 
Justice as well as esqpediency. Ihe surrender or extradition of 
the fugitive alien is not his condemnation; the trial is yet to 
begin in the case of accused fugitive and in any case, if the 
requests for surrender or requisition is mala fide he can chal­
lenge the requisition on the grounds mentioned in Sections 29 and 
31 of the 1962 Act, That gives ample scope and power to the
1, State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R, 1969 S.C.« 
ll7l at p.1182.
2, In C.G. Menons1 case, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 517, and in Hans Muller*s 
case, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 36 7.
3, Budhan Chowdhry v. IheState of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 191; 
Chxranjit Lai v. Union of India, aTT.R. 1951 S.C. 41; Ram 
Krishna Dalmia v. Justice T&n3olkar,A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 539.
4, State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
1171 supra.
inquiring magistrate, and to the Central Government, to withhold 
or refuse his extradition or surrender. Particularly when the 
requesting State is the country of origin or of which the alien 
is a national, he should be surrendered on the pure and simple 
warrant, without any necessity or proof of prima facie evidence 
against him. Of course, in cases of an alien being demanded 
by a Government of which he is not a national, whether it is a 
foreign Government or a Commonwealth country, even with extradi­
tion arrangements with India, insistence should be made on proof 
of prima facie evidence.
) Ihe Rule of Speciality
Rule of speciality is embodied in Section 31(c) of the 
Indian Extradition Act of 1962. It applies to the cases of 
extradition both of aliens and citizens from India. Conversely, 
the Government of India by Section 21 of this Act, has also bound 
itself by this Rule of Speciality, in case of fugitives who have 
been extradited to India from foreign countries and for surrender 
of whom India has made a request. Prior to the rule of special­
ity being embodied in Section 31(c) (or conversely, Section 21) 
of the 1962 Extradition Act, the Rule of speciality was not found 
in the Act of 1903, nor was it approved, nor looked upon with 
favour by the Indian Courts. Mubarak Ali who had been extra­
dited from England under the Fugitive Offenders Act took this
plea of the Rule of speciality before the Supreme Court of 
India,but this plea did not find favour and was rejected.
Justice Jagannadha Das speaking for the court said the prin­
ciple or rule of speciality could not be considered as a general 
rule or rule of general applicability in every case.* Ihe
1. Mubarak Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay.A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 857 at
p.866.
Rajasthan High Court also, considering the applicability of 
Section 7 and First Schedule to the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 
has held that a person arrested under a warrant issued under 
Section 7 of that Act and extradited to a native Indian State 
(meaning the then Indian Princely State) could be tried in that 
State for some other offence in addition to those mentioned in the 
warrant, even though such offence is not an extraditable offence 
But these decisions were given because of the absence of the rule
of speciality in the Indian Extradition Act of 1903*
In order to avert the difficulty of non-availability of
the rule of speciality to a fugitive offender in the absence of
clause in the Extradition Act of 1903, this new clause was in- \ *
serted as Section 31(c) and 21 in the Act of 1962. Section 31(c) 
applies to cases of extradition of fugitive criminals, both 
Indian citizens and aliens, in which their surrender is requested 
by a foreign Government or a Commonwealth country with or without 
extradition treaty or arrangements with India.
Ihe rule of speciality according to Oppenheim, is a uni­
versally recognised rule of international law that a fugitive 
criminal whose extradition has been obtained in connection with 
some given offence cannot later be tried for another offence be- 
fore surrendering him to the country which extradited him.
Ihis rule is an attempted safeguard against fraudulent extradi­
tion, and is an extension of the above rule enunciated by 
Oppenheim that no person should be extradited on the pretence
1. Nanka v. Government of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 153 at 
p.154.
2. Oppenheim, international Law1, Vol.I, p.702, f.n.3.
and pretext of extraditable crime, while the ulterior motive was 
either to try and punish him for an offence of political character, 
or an unextraditable crime* In the Extradition case, the German 
Reichsgerecht acquitted the petitioner on the ground that in the 
absence of a treaty, the accused* s trial after extradition was 
governed by customary rules of international law which stipulates 
that the accused could only be tried for the offence for which 
extradition has been granted.* The rule of speciality guaran­
tees protection to the fugitive against a fraudulent securing of 
his custody with a view to try him for an offence other than the 
one for which he was ostensibly extradited. Section 31(c) of 
the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, pu^ rports to make it obligatory 
that the inhibition of the trial for an offence other them that 
for which he has been extradited should either be incorporated in 
a treaty or arrangement with the foreign State or Commonwealth 
country or it should find place in the legislation of the foreign
State or Commonwealth country when extradition is sought without
2a treaty or arrangement. Lawrence has tersely placed the 
rationale behind the rule of speciality as follows:
*'The object of this proviso is to guard 
against the surrender of a person for one 
offence when the real reason for deffland*- 
ing him is to try him for another, pos­
sibly a political crime, possibly an of­
fence not mentioned in the treaty. The 
condition is perhaps not unreasonable in 
view of the great divergencies of politi­
cal conditions and theory between some 
of the most powerful states of the civil­
ised world, though it may easily operate 
in favour of a criminal whom it was emi­
nently desirable to punish.**
1. Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1919-1922, A.D. case No.182.
2. Lawrence: The Principles of International Law, 1937, p.238.
A further question arises if an alien or subject of a
i
third State is extradited to his own State or a third State, 
why Section 31(C) should insist on the rule of speciality* His 
own State, once he is there, has jurisdiction to try him for any 
offence and it is no business of the surrendering State to ask 
the foreign State to send him back and then again submit prima 
facde proof or get another warrant and then extradite him or re­
fuse extradition* In the case of aliens, they cannot stay un­
less a visa is granted by India* So the rule of speciality 
would create complications if India insists on this rule for 
aliens*
Two questions arise, further, whether a fugitive crimi­
nal may raise the point of speciality and whether the rule of 
speciality may be waived by him. Regarding the first question, 
Paul O*Higgins is of the view that he can. The better view 
seems to be that the accused may raise the plea of speciality if 
it is either in the treaty or in the national legislation, but 
if there is no such provision either in the treaty or national 
legislation, the plea should not be entertained. This is how 
the Supreme Court, in Mubarak Ah?s case repelled the plea of 
speciality.
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Regarding the second question, it was held outside 
India that the accused may waive the rule of speciality and thus 
be tried on the charge on which he was not extradited. But in
1. McNair: Law of Treaties, p.336.
2. Paul O* Higgins ^ Unlawful Seizure or Irregular Extradition1*, 
1961 B.Y.I.L. 279 at p.318.
3. In Re Arietto et al. ,1933-34,A*D. Case No.140*
a contrary view,* it has been held that the consent of the accused 
does not waive the rule of speciality* It is obvious that the 
problem has a different aspect when viewed in the country request­
ed to surrender the person who takes this plea, and when the 
plea is raised by the extradited accused before the court in the 
country to which he has been extradited* It requires great self- 
command for the legal system of the receiving country to deny it­
self the right to try the accused on a charge of its own choice 
merely because the extradition was requested on a different, but 
perhaps equally sustainable charge* A gradual increase in sophi­
stication in extradition law can be observed* It was stated in
2rather old case-law outside India that a fugitive who had been 
returned by a Commonwealth or Colonial territory might well be 
tried for an offence other than that upon which he has been re­
turned. But now by virtue of Section 21 of the 1962 Act, India 
has taken upon itself the strict observance of the rule of 
speciality and the prisoner extradited from another country can 
successfully move the court or the Central Government that he 
should not be tried for any offence other than that for which 
he has been extradited*
(9) Territory to which the Act Applies 
(i) General
Notification of the application of the Act to a given 
country may mention therein whether it is to be applied to the 
whole of its territory or part thereof: Section 3(1) of the
1* Vailini v* Grandi, 1935-37,A.D. case No.176.
2. In R. v. Phillips. 1858 1 F. & F. 105 and R. v. Cohen,(l907) 71 
j7 p.190, ana R v. Esser 9 Natal Law Reports, VoI.V-9, (1886- 
1888).238. ~
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Indian Extradition Act of 1962 contemplates the situation when
the Act may be applied to a part of a foreign State, although in
practice no such occasion may arise except in cases where part
of the territory is held by rebels or where it is not under the
control of the treaty state for whatever reason.* Of course,
it is possible that the Act may be applied on the basis of a
treaty or otherwise to only the metropolitan territories of a
foreign State, thus excluding colonies or so-called overseas pro-
2
vinces of foreign States.
Section 2(e) of the 1962 Act defines a foreign State
as:
"any state outside India other than a 
Commonwealth country, and includes every 
constituent part, colony or dependency 
of such State."
The definition of a foreign State is exhaustive and it is clear, 
therefore, that unless non-metropolitan territories are specifi­
cally excluded, notification under Section 3(1) with regard to 
any foreign State would include the latter*s constituent parts, 
colonies and dependencies.
(*-i) Constituent part
The further question arises what is meant by fconsti­
tuent part*• Is it de jure part or de facto as well. In the 
case of Schtraks, where the fugitive claimed that Jerusalem was 
not a de jure territory of Israel, which was claiming the extra­
dition of the petitioner for his having committed a crime in 
Jerusalem, the House of Lords held that since territorial juris­
1. Hingorani, R.C. The Indian Extradition Law, at p.27.
2. Hingorani, ibid., at p.27.
diction was exercised by Israel in the City of Jerusalem, the 
place would be considered as de facto territory of Israel for 
purposes of extradition.1 Consequently, any territory which 
is under the de facto jurisdiction of the State would be consider­
ed as a part of it, even though its de jure position may be doubt-
2ful. This matter pointedly arose before the Indian Court where 
the petitioner put forth the pleas that Goa was under the de jure 
suzerainty of Portugal and he being a Portuguese national 
could not be expelled or deported out of Goa. The Court held 
that the petitioner was a foreigner and Goa was both de facto 
and de jure Indian territory and the petitioner being a foreigner 
was not permitted to flout the orders to leave the country. It
is hard to see how an Indian court could take another view.
(iii) Dependency
The word ’dependency1 seems to be quite vague. If it 
is to be taken in a liberal sense, ’dependency1 would mean that 
any territory which is dependent upon a given State for its 
national or international relations would be treated as its ’de­
pendency’ . On this basis, the trust territories as well as pro­
tectorates and vassal States would be included in one* s depend­
encies. In practice, mandated or trust territories are treated
3
as territories of the State for purposes of extradition.
Protectorates and vassal States cannot technically be 
considered as dependencies but the foreign relations of these 
States are regulated by the protecting State or Suzerain State
1. Schtraks v. Government of Israel & others (1962) 3 W.L.R. 1013 
at p.1022.
2. Registrar Judicial Commissioner’s Court v.£Francisco, A.I.R. 
1970 Goa 56.
3. See N. Bentwich, The Mandates System (1930) at p.105.
and, therefore, any extradition treaty concluded by a sovereign
State would also be normally applicable to its protectorate or
vassal State.*" The foreign relations of Sikkim and Bhutan are
governed by India and therefore, the surrender of fugitives from
Sikkim and Bhutan can be had only through the Government of India,
which governs the foreign relations of these two countries though
they are not the dependencies of India# India itself has extra-
2dition treaties with Sikkim and Bhutan# The Indo-Sikkim treaty 
does not say anything about how a fugitive from a foreign country 
can be extradited to Sikkim# But as would be evident from para#
3 of the notification, the Extradition Act of 1962 has been men­
tioned to define a ’fugitive offender’ so the procedure mentioned 
in that Act will .govern the proceedings# The agreements are 
reciprocal.
(h) Extraditable Offences
(i) Characterisation of Extraditable Offences in the 
Extradition Act of 1962 and Treaties
The inadequacy of the range of offences covered by 
treaties is a most serious drawback in extradition law# The 
reasons may be that treaties do not keep pace with the increasing
range of offences or novel offences; j^ *10 habit of specifying 
extraditable offences by name in treaties, with greater chances
1. Article 21 of the Anglo-Polish Extradition Treaty of 11 January 
1932, bring the British Protectorates under the perview of the 
treaty. Article 20 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 2 May, 1932, 
also brings British protectorates under the perview of the 
treaty. Article 16 of the Anglo-American Treaty of 1931 ex­
tends the treaty to Protectorates as well as Mandated terri­
tories. Cited by R.C. Hingorani: The Indian Extradition Law, 
p#27, f#n#3#
2. The notification for the treaty with Sikkim treaty was made on 
7 July, 1966# Hingorani, ibid. Appendix IV.
omission: of offences of a more serious criminal nature, and 
the restricted interpretation of the enumerated offences in 
treaties by municipal courts, especially in interpreting the of­
fence under the * same name* in both the requesting and requested 
State*
Extradition offences are either specified by name; , 
terme/as the *enumerative method1, or defined by reference to 
their punishability according to the laws of the requesting and 
requested State by a minimum standard of severity, called the 
1 eliminative* or 1 no list* method.
The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, has adopted the * enu- 
merative method* and the omissions in the list of the offences 
can be filled in by amending the terms of the treaty and its due 
notification under Section 3(1)(c) of the Act, or by amendment 
of the Second Schedule and notification under Section 12. The 
defects of this method of 'assurance of reciprocity* and * ad hoc 
arrangements* by filling omissions of offences by supplementary 
treaties can be removed. Though they take some time, they sire 
not time-consuming in themselves. The Anglo-American treaties 
did not take place on an ad hoc basis,^ and the same is the case 
with India; the British treaties have employed the ’enumerative 
method* of specifying extraditable offences, and in the Indian 
Act as a succeeding law, the same method has been adopted.
The advantages of the 'eliminative method* are that
’standard of severity* would ensure that serious and not trifling
crimes were made extraditable, and also the inconvenience of
different descriptions of offences in the requesting and requested
2State and of chance omissions would be avoided.
1. Shearer, op.cit., p.28,.Extradition in International Law.
2. Shearer, ibid.. pp.133-134.
Though it appears that in the Extradition Act of 1962, the enu- 
merative method has been adopted, as also in the treaties, the 
Act itself says that extradition for offences of a trivial nature
will be refused. The Act exhaustively provides the list of 
offences in the Second Schedule and in treaties offences are 
enumerated and both the chances of defects in the two methods 
have been brought to a minimum. Provision for a supplementary 
treaty in the Act is an added factor which cures the defect, if 
any, of the *enumerative method1.
The Indian law seems to have not adopted the *elimina­
tive method* for the obvious reasons that the standards of sever­
ity of minimum or maximum punishment are not the true guide under 
these systems. Now the idea is that the punishment is for the 
offender and not the offence, due to advanced correctional methods 
in criminology and penology; and specific instances are the Acts 
like Probation of Offender^ Act where, though the court finds the
accused guilty and awards sentence of punishment, by giving the 
offender the benefit of Section 4 or 6 of that Act, as the case 
may be, lets him off on probation for good behaviour. The 
1 eliminative method* would hardly fit in, in the legal system in 
India and this is why the *enumerative method* is adopted as 
the more appropriate. This argument will find further support 
from the fact that in India, murder is made punishable by the 
death sentence, but due to mitigating circumstances punishment 
^life imprisonment can be awarded, whereas in cases of culp­
able homicide not amounting to murder and/or in other offences of 
a less severe nature, less punishment in the discretion of the 
court may be awarded. Countries appear to be (transitionally) 
out of sitep in these matters.
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(i) Principle of double criminality
The requirement of the doctrine or rule of 1 double 
criminality* is that an act shall not be extraditable unless it 
constitutes a crime according to the laws of both the requesting 
and the requested StatejJ. The basis of this rule is in part the 
principle of reciprocity and in part the maximum * nulla poena 
sine lege* •
This rule ensures that a person* s liberty is not re­
stricted as consequence of offences not recognised as criminal 
by the requested State. In India, the provisions of Article 21
of the Constitution would be attracted and this seems to be the 
reason why this rule, unlike the rule of speciality^ was not found 
necessary to be incorporated in the Extradition Act of 1962.
Under the ’reciprocity* principle, this rule ensures 
that a State is not required to extradite categories of offenders 
for which it, in turn, would never have occasion to make a demand 
for extradition. This rule seems to be universally established 
as a customary rule of international law. The use of this rule 
itself would be superfluous because the rule appears * expressis 
verbis* in the Second Schedule of the Indian Extradition Act,
1962, and the treaties entered into by India with different 
countries. Further, the superfluity of appealing to this rule 
is not only because it has a sure basis in customary international 
law, but also because it is implicit in the precise specifica­
tion of the offences in the Second Schedule of the 1962 and the 
treaties. A further direct importation of the rule is to be 
seen in Chapter II of 1962 Act and the treaties where the
requirement of the establishment of prima facie case of guilt is
a prerequisite condition according to the laws of the requested
State. Also some of the treaties * mention that the offence
for which extradition may be demanded must be extraditable by the
laws of both the countries, i.e. the High Contracting parties.
The notion of * double extraditability* necessarily subsumes the
2
principle of * double criminality*.
This doctrine is capable of producing great inconven­
ience and subjects the extradition process to unnecessary perils 
of litigation in cases where the courts of the requested country 
(for example, Indian courts and the Central Government too) are
required judicially to determine foreign law, i.e. the law of
3
the requesting State, to determine whether the offence consti­
tutes an offence according to the lex loci delicti. The House 
4
of Lords undertook a detailed examination of the law of Israel 
in response to a submission on behalf of the fugitive that the 
facts alleged do not constitute an offence against the laws of 
the requesting State, but in doing so, the Court expressly as­
sumed that the Israeli rules of statutory interpretation were the 
same as English law; it may be so in the case of India with 
Britain and other countries, the systems of jurisprudence of 
which are the same, but in cases where the systems of jurispru­
dence are different, the task for the courts of the requested 
State and its Government would be arduous to examine the foreign 
laws, in different languages based on different jurisprudential
1. Like the Indo-American treaty of 1966, clause 3.
2. Shearer Extradition in International Law, p.138.■ f ■
3. Lex fori or lex loci delicti.
4. Schtraks v. Government of Israel (1962) 3 All E.R. 529 (H.L.)
systems, with different rules of interpretation, and the courts 
*ex loci or lex fori without the evidence of experts on foreign 
law are sometimes ill-equipped, and expenses must be incurred and 
the results may sometimes be based on speculation. The extra­
dition proceedings, particularly for examination of the lex loci 
delicti, will be subjected to additional hazards of proof of cri­
minality according to a law unfamiliar to the Court before which 
the fugitive is brought. The non-mention or express insertion 
of the rule of 1 double criminality1 in the Extradition Act of
1962 may be a pointer to a that Parliament assumed
that a foreign State would make a request for extradition only 
when the offence stated was punishable by the law of that country. 
It may be conjectured that it did not give a mandate to the 
courts or the Executive (Central Government) to embark upon the 
inquiry whether the offence was punishable according to lex loci 
delicti. It contended itself by providing in the Act that the 
courts in the requested State (India) should determine whether 
the Act for which extradition is claimed or requested would, if 
committed in India, constitute an offence within the Second 
Schedule♦
Similar difficulties would be faced by the courts of 
India in examining the prescriptive period of limitation of the
requesting State. Here also, some nice points of foreign law of 
limitation may arise,. ‘ ■„ which the courts of India may be ill- 
equipped to determine. But in this regard, Section 31(b) of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, gives a mandate both to the judi­
ciary and the executive to refuse the surrender of the fugitive 
if prosecution for the offence in respect of which his surrender 
is sought is * according to the law of that State or country 
barred by time.1 Obviously, therefore, the courts and the
executive have to inquire into the law of prescription of the 
requesting State, whatever difficulties there may be. This 
clause also presupposes that firstly there should be an offence 
according to the law of the requesting State for which the re­
quest has been made, and a subsequent step is to see if prosecu­
tion under such law for such offence in the requesting territory 
has become barred by the operative law of limitation. The 
rule of 1 double criminality* or * double extraditability* seems 
to be implicit in clause (b) of Section 31 of the 1962 Act.
The presence of expert witnesses to testify^the foreign laws of 
limitation is thus presupposed by the Act. Happily the fact 
may be found more readily than the fact whether an act is or is 
not a particular crime in that jurisdiction.
The rule of speciality, as incorporated in Sections 21 
and 31(c) of the Indian Extradition Act, and the words * other 
offences proved by fie facts* used tend; to resolve one problem 
which often arises before the municipal courts both under the 
* no list* treaties and treaties in which the *enumerative method* 
is used; whether the act, to be extraditable, must be punishable 
in the requested State under the »same name* as it is punishable 
by the laws of the requesting State (lex loci delicti) or whether 
it is sufficient that the facts adduced in support of the claim 
for extradition, while not constituting the * named crime* by the 
laws of the requested State, constitute crime by-law of that 
State.
Many acts constitute offences by the laws of both the 
States but are designated differently. What constitutes * false 
|>retences* in one country may constitute * abuse of confidence* 
in another; the same act may be larceny or embezzlement in yet 
other countries. The British Court in the case of
Dix * held that it was not essential that the offence be called
by the * same name* in both countries, and that the facts alleged
would constitute one of the special offences created under Section
18 of the Act of 1924* Reliance was placed in the case of Dix 
2
on Re Arton where Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J. had observed:
"Is extradition to be refused in respect of 
acts covered by the treaty, and gravely 
criminal according to the law of both 
countries, because in the particular case 
the falsification of accounts is not forgery
according to English law, but falls under
that head according to French law, and I
think not."
3The Federal Court of Germany held that:
"the set of facts underlying the offence 
charged was decisive, and that Germany 
was under a duty to extradite notwith­
standing that the legal qualifications 
of the offence according to German law 
differed from its legal qualification 
according to Swiss law."
The Court observed:
"When dealing with a request by a foreign 
country to extradite, the basis of the 
request is not the legal qualifications 
of the offence according to the foreign 
law concerned, but the facts underlying 
the offence as ascertainable from the . 
warrant or judgment, as the case may be."
The provisions containing the words as 1 proved by the
facts on which his surrender or return is based* as used in
Sections 21 and 31(c) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, have
t. R. v. Dix (1902) 18 T.L.R. 231. See Sections 21 and 31(c) of
Ihe Extradition Act, 1962, where the words ’offence proved by
the facts* have been used. See Appendix I.
2. (No.2) (1096) 1 Q.B. 509 at p.517.
3. In Re Gerber 24 Int. Law Reports 493 (1957).
4. In ReGerber 24 Int. Law Reports 493 (1957). See also Re 
Bellencontre (1891) 2 Q.B. 122; U.S. v. Watson (1924)”T'3 Que. 
57CTT9!— Re Insull (1934) 2 D.L.R7“U96. -----
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been modelled on the lines of the reasoning of the above cases. 
Thus, the Indian legislature seems not to have adopted the narrow 
approach which would require an 1 identity1 of the offence charged
and the offences made out by the law of the requested State, as
1 2 was done in Hatfield, and in Factor*s case.
Shearer is also of the view that the requesting State 
is free to try the fugitive for any offence established by the 
facts adduced in support of the request, provided only that this 
offence is also a treaty offence; and that there is no limita-
3
tion to the nominal crime proved by the facts.
It is possible, however, to construe Section 21 and 
Section 31(c) of the Indian Act of 1962 as requiring that the 
exttadited person shall not be tried for any offence other than 
the extradition offence proved by those same facts on which his 
surrender or areturn was actually based; and proof of the same 
crime by other facts would not suffice. This is a more sophi­
sticated and advanced understanding of the law than Shearer pro­
posed, extending (in principle} a greater protection to the re­
quested person.
(3) Objects of Extradition - General
From a practical standpoint, extradition is only re­
quested in cases of particularly serious crime or crimes of some 
public important. It is generally a slow and expensive proced­
ure and, as between countries separated by vast stretches of ocean
1. Hatfield v. Guay 87 F. 2nd 358 (1st Cir. 1937).
2. Factor v. Laubenheimer 290 U.S. 276 (1933). See contrary view, 
to Factory'svcase in Collins v. Loisel 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
3. I .A. Shearer: Extradition in International Law, p.146.
is not frequently availed of.
International law concedes that the grant of and pro­
cedure for extradition are mostly left to municipal law. There
are some divergencies on the subject of extradition between the 
different State laws, particularly relating to (a) extraditabi- 
lity of nationals of the State of asylum; (b) evidence of guilt 
required by the State of asylum, and (c) the relative powers of 
the executive and judicial organs in the procedure of surrender­
ing fugitive criminals.
Before an application for extradition is made through 
the diplomatic channel, two conditions as a rule are required to 
be satisfied:-
a) there must be an * extraditable person* ; and
b) there must be an ’extradition crime*.
(i) Extraditable persons
There is uniformity of State practice to the effect 
that the requesting State may obtain the surrender of its own 
nationals or nationals of a third State. But most States usu­
ally refuse the extradition of their own nationals who have taken 
refuge in their territory, although as between States who observe 
absolute reciprocity of treatment in this regard, such requests 
for surrender are sometimes acceded to.
(ii) Non-extradition of nationals
The word ’persons* in an exttadition treaty etymologi- 
cally includes ’citizens* and there is no rule of international 
law by which citizens are exempted from extradition unless such 
an exemption is made in the treaty itself.^ Under the British
Chaxlton v. Kelly, 229 U,S, 447 at p.467 (1913)
and Indian statutes no distinction has been made in regard to 
the extraditability of British and non-British, and Indian and 
non-Indian nationals, unlike most of the civil law countries.
The fairly uniform exclusion of nationals of civil law 
countries from extradition presented by the municipal laws of 
these States is qualified by three factors. First, asl in the 
European countries, so in Latin American countries the rule of 
personal jurisdiction allows an offender to be prosecuted in his 
home state for crimes committed abroad, provided that such crimes 
are cognizable and punishable by the laws of both the States.
A prosecution may be instituted at the instance of the prosecu­
ting authorities of the fugitive1s own State acting on material 
supplied by foreign police authorities. Exercise of such juris­
diction is provided by the laws of most of the Latin American 
countries.* Secondly, in countries having civil law system, 
international is generally of superior force to municipal law.
Thus, contrary to British and Indian common law jurisprudence an 
extradition treaty imposes an obligation on those countries to 
extradite a national, and this obligation must be discharged, 
notwithstanding any contrary provisions contained in the munici­
pal law. But in India unless a treaty has acquired the force 
of municipal law, no international obligations can be discharged 
under the treaty, and if the provisions of the treaty are con­
trary to municipal law, its enforcement will be denied by the 
Court as contrary to the provisions of Articles 13 and 21 of the 
Constitution in habeas corpus proceedings.
Thirdly, in the Latin American countries, practice is
1. I.A. Shearer: Extradition in International Law, p.115.
leaning towards the surrender of nationals** The clauses pro­
viding for refusal to extradite one*s nationals are, amongst
other reasons, based on * the risk of possible grave dangers 
2
abroad* , But Lord Goddard, C.J. observed that "it would
be an insult to the Indian court to refuse to return the
3
fugitive on the ground that he would not get a fair trial*11
4In Pharma Teja1s case it was again observed that the 
courts in India, including the High Court and Supreme Court, 
would not be influenced by the debates in Parliament and what 
has been said,about Teja in Parliament and in the Press and 
held that it could not be said that it would be unjust and op­
pressive to return him. Like the treaty clauses between India 
and Nepal, the Supreme Court of Nicaragua considered the clause 
in a treaty that the *High Contracting parties are not obliged 
to surrender their nationals1 , and preferred the principles of 
*best elucidation of truth of the facts1 and 1 avoiding impunity 
of crimes1, supposing these to be met when the criminal is 
judged by the authorities of the jurisdiction where the crime was
committed, and extradition was allowed.5 A midway course is
6
adopted by Argentine courts by taking into account 1 personal and 
family cifcumstances of the individual demanded1 in exercising
1* Shearer, ibidp.116.
2. In Re Arevals (1941-2) A.D. 329 (No.99).
3. In Mobarak Ali Ahmed, supra (1952) 1 All E.R. 19:60 at p. 10*63. 
See Soblen (1962) 3 W.R. 1145 at p.1154; In Re Arton (1896)
1 Q.B. 108 at p.UO.
4. R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison,Ex parte Xeja (1971) 22k 1 e - _ n _
5. Re Extradition of Leocadio Rodriguez (1919-22), A.D. 269 (No.
imr.---------   —
6. In Re Milazzo (1956) Int. Law Reports, 404.
its discretion under the treaties.
According to Bedi, only two principles have been con­
sistently adduced in favour of the exclusion rule (i) that a man 
ought not to be withdrawn from his natural judges; and (ii) 
that a state owes to its subjects the protection of laws.^ How­
ever, Shearer is of the opinion that the whole theory of appli­
cation of the * natural judges1 falls to the ground where the 
crime has been committed in another State. On the second prin­
ciple, he is also of the opinion that if it were a true rule 
then this duty ought equally to apply to aliens lawfully resid­
ing within the State, since international law generally obliges 
States to extend the equal protection of its laws to all persons 
within its jurisdiction. Ihis opinion is in consonance with 
the law contained in the Indian Constitution where Articles 13, 
14, 20, 21, 22 (not 19) apply equally with other Articles to 
citizens and foreigners alike.
In some States, a right is guaranteed in the Consti­
tution itself that a citizen may remain undisturbed in his home­
land. But such a prohibition of the extradition of nationals, 
contained only in the penal code or an extradition law, would 
(in one view) not be a ’constitutional provision1 giving ground
3
for refusal. But according to Sheairer, thid is a weak basis 
because the limited surrender of sovereignty represented by the 
institution is itself a form of protection of that sovereignty
1. Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, p.210 
(1966)*:
2. I.A. Shearer: Extradition in International Law, pp.118-119.
3. Argentine Court: In Re Artaza (1951) Int. Law Reports, 333.
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from the incursion of foreign criminals.'1' It will be agreed 
that the rule of exclusion of nationals from extradition is 
undesirable among States having a common legal inherit since and
o
mutual confidence in their judicial institutions.
Strict territoriality of criminal justice is a con­
cept of Anglo-American, and more so of Indian jurisprudence. 
Although the laws of these countries provide for jurisdiction in 
respect of certain crimes committed by their subjects abroad, 
this jurisdiction is very limited. In general, the criminal 
laws of these countries are not regarded as having extra-terri­
torial effect unless they so apply expressly or by necessary 
intendment. Ihat persons committing crimes d>road should escape 
from the jurisdiction of the forum loci delicti and return to 
their homeland is not favoured by the Anglo-^American jurispru­
dence; Indian jurisprudence has its origin there and (in this 
respect) similarity with it.
Practical objections and difficulties have to be faced 
to bring the fugitive offender home to justice from foreign 
countries under civil-law jurisprudence, where the rule of per­
sonal jurisdiction over the offender can be invoked. The prac­
tical difficulties are: witnesses must be brought long distances
at inconvenience and expense, or else they must give their evi­
dence in the unsatisfactory form of written affidavits. Expense 
and inconvenience may altogether preclude access to expert and 
eyewitness testimony which would otherwise be available to give 
a full and complete picture of the crime. Arrangements must
1. Shearer, ibid. p.119.
2. Bedi, op;cit., p.210.
be made for transportation of documents and exhibits; and in 
some cases, e.g. of theft of idols from India from ancient monu­
ments, the carrying of idols to foreign countries and the wit­
nesses would be difficult due to paucity of foreign exchange and 
damage may be done to tie heavy idols in the course of transporta­
tion. Possibility of a local inspection of the site or place 
of crime or offence, view of the locus in quo, sometimes an im­
portant advantage to a trial court is ruled out. Such and other 
difficulties constitute a handicap to both prosecution and de­
fence. Looking to all these difficulties, India, like the 
British and American Governments, does not forbid extradition of 
its nationals.
There is a significant.omission in the Act of 1962 
with regard to the extradition of Indian nationals. 2he Act 
does not seem to throw any light on the question whether India 
should extradite its own nationals on a charge of having com­
mitted an extraditable offence in a foreign state or whether they 
should be tried in India itself. The majority of States de­
cline to extradite their own nationals, and many of them have 
expressly provided in their municipal legislation for the prin­
ciple of non-extradition of their nationals.* Such states 
punish the offenders according to the laws in force for :crimes 
committed abroad. Refusal to surredder a national of the re­
quested State appears to rest on the unwillingness of that 
country to expose its nationals to a trial in a foreign court
and also (as we have seen) to the rooted suspicion that foreign
2countries cannot be trusted to administer justice fairly.
1. Harvard Research Draft (1935); 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 125, Note 2;
2. See *Some Problems of the law of extradition* (1959) 109 L.J.
198 by F.M.
No such provisions are contained in the Indian 1962 Extradition
Act or the Municipal Statutes of India, Great Britain or other 
Commonwealth countries or of States under British Mandate or 
guidance.* By implication, therefore, the present Act is in 
line with the existing practice, that India adheres to the prin­
ciple of ‘ extraditing its own nationals, permitting their extra­
dition.
For clarity1s sake, mention may be made of the memo­
randum on ’Extradition* submitted by the Government of India to
the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee at its third 
session.held in Colombo in 1960, wherein it was said:
**It is however not easy to justify on 
principle the policy of refusing to 
extradite nationals. The theory that 
a State should try its own nationals 
for crimes wherever committed fails as 
a suggestion for two reasons: (a) be­
cause in many Cases it is impracticable 
to try a crime committed in another 
country on account of the impossibility 
of securing the relevant evidence, and 
(b) because the argument can not have 
any application to a national who has 
escaped to his own country after con­
viction in a foreign country since on 
general principles of j'ustice such a 
person may not be tried again for the 
same offence (in the country of the 
refuge)•
11 It has been suggested that if a national 
is alleged to have committed an offence 
abroad and returns home then it is only 
fair that he would be tried in his home 
country according to the laws and pro­
cedure with which he is familiar. It 
has been said that if a foreign national 
commits an offence in smother State and 
then leaves that State for his own home 
State, that State may well be rid of him 
and the necessity of punishing that
1. See (1935) 29 American Journal cLf International Law, supp.125. 
ibid.
offender may not appear so great as that 
of a national of a State*
"It has also been said that in many coun­
tries notions of administration of crimi­
nal justice differ widely and he may not 
receive a fair trial* These considera­
tions, however, do not seem to be suffi­
cient justification for refusal to extra­
dite a State*s own national since a per­
son who commits an offence in another 
State must be expected to take conse­
quences like all other persons in that 
State according to the laws in force 
there."*
But an analysis of the extradition treaties of India indicates 
that in many cases, it is not bound to surrender its own1 
nationals.^
A number of the States, such as France and Germany, 
do not, as a matter of policy, conclude treaties in which they 
agree to extradite their own citizens. They punish them at 
home. Great Britain and the U.S.A. (as we have seen), have 
not always insisted on following the above principle.
1. See pp.165-166 of the Report. See India-The Extradition Act, 
1962; J.N. Saxena: International & Comparative Law Quarterly,
Vol.13 (1964) pp.136-137.
2. See A. Palnjswami: The Law of Extradition in India (1954)
TIT I. Y. B *1. A ives a list of such countries^,al' fP.
3. Oppenheim: International Law, 8th ed., p.638.
CHAPTER III
EXTRADITION PROCEDURE UNDER CHAPTER II OF THE ACT
OF 1962
A. REQUISITION OR REQUEST FOR AND MODE OF - EXTRADITION
(1) The Request for Extradition
(i) Nature of request
EXTRADITION of - the power to surrender - a person 
who infringes the law, or who is a violator of law in the re­
questing State, is exclusively in the sovereign prerogative 
of the national Government - as distinguished from the various 
States - (Constitution of India, Article 246 and Union List I 
of the Seventh Schedule, Entry 18) and Parliament is alone em­
powered by the Constitution to make extradition laws. The 
same was the case under the Government of India Act, 1935 
(Seventh Schedule, List I, Entry 3).
i
The Supreme Court of United States has observed:
"It cannot be doubted that the power to 
provide for extradition is a national 
power; it pertains/&the National Govern­
ment and hot the States."
"A requisition is an essential element 
in the proceedings under the Extradition 
Act, 1870* The Act does not say that 
the requisition must precede the warrant 
by a Magistrate, but it must ultimately 
come, otherwise there is no power to 
deliver up the prisoner.u2
This pattern is followed in India regarding requisition under
Section 4; only after receipt of the requistion may a warrant
1. Valentine et al. v. U.S. ex rel Neidecker (1936) 299 U.S. 5.
2. Ministry J. in R. v. Ganz (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 93 following the 
case of Re Counhave (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B.D. 410.
be issued by the Magistrate under Section 6, after his appoint- 
ment has beenjunder Section 5 of the Act. The alternate method 
is issue of warrant by the magistrate himself under Section 9.
Therefore, requsitidns can be made to the Central 
Government in India and not to the Government of the State where 
the accused is, the National Government of the requesting State, 
and not any State forming part of the Union, if any, where the 
accused committed the crime, is the proper source of the request. 
For instance, if a crime is committed in California and the 
accused is in Madras, the request should not be made by the Cali­
fornia State to the Madras Government, but by the United States 
of American Government at Washington to the Central Government 
in New Delhi. Therefore, all requisitions for extradition must 
come from the Executive authority of the demanding State through 
its diplomatic representatives and should be made 1d the Central 
Government of India. But a prerequisite before entertaining of 
demand is that there is a municipal Extradition Act applicable
to the requesting State, or an extradition treaty (with a; foreign 
country) or existence of an extradition arrangement or treaty 
(with a Commonwealth country) which has been notified under 
Section 3(l)(a)(b) of the Extradition Act of 1962 applying its 
provis ions.
Requisition for surrender is not the function of the 
courts but of the State. The Courts of the country which make 
requisition for surrender deal with the prima facie proof of the 
offence and leave it to the State to make a requisition upon the 
State in which the offender has taken refuge.
Section 4 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, provides 
that a requisition for surrender of a fugitive criminal of a 
foreign State or of a Commonwealth country may be made to the
Central Government (a) by a diplomatic representative of a 
foreign State or a Commonwealth country at Delhi, or (b) by 
the Government^that foreign State or Commonwealth country commu- 
nicating with the Central Government through its diplomatic repre­
sentative in that State or country; and if neither of these 
modes is convenient, requisition shall be made in * such other . 
mode as is settled by arrangement made by the Government of the 
foreign State or Commonwealth country with the Government of 
India*# The diplomatic representatives will include Consul 
General or in the absence of a diplomatic agent, a senior Consu­
lar Officer or other Agent specifically authorised for the pur­
pose or, as an alternative to the use of the diplomatic channel, 
a mode settled by arrangement between the two Governments# The 
mode of request by direct communication between the two Govern­
ments is also provided through the diplomatic channels# Section 
4 gives facilities to send requi&itions either through diplomatic
Y v
chanjel. s of those Governments located in Delhi or in their re­
spective countries, or by a mode settled by arrangement# Actu­
ally, in different State practices under different treaties, one 
or more o^Tthe alternative modes or additional modes for request 
have been adopted and India has adopted them all according to 
Indian conditions# If the request is not through these channels 
it will be rejected*
(ii) Form of request
No particular form is needed as no rules have been 
framed by the Central Government so far under Section 36(2) (a) 
of the Act prescribing * Form* in which a requisition for sur­
render of a fugitive criminal may be made# It should, however, 
be in writing supported with the required documents and in other 
respects, it should be in conformity with local municipal laws
or existing treaties, if any* The information upon which the
requsition is based must also be in writing and on oath or
i
affirmation in accordance with the general rules* A request 
or requisition in cases of urgency, when the fugitive is trying 
to escape by plane, surface, e*g* sea or train, then the request 
can be sent by telegram or cabled through the Department of Ex­
ternal Affairs to the authority in the foreign State, or may 
even be by telephone by the requesting State to the Central 
Government. Speaking in some other context, Lord Alverstone 
C.J.2 said:
r,I sim unable to draw any distinction be­
tween sending information by post or 
telephone and giving the same information 
by direct personal communication*"
3
Such is the case of request by letter* Field J. 
observed:-
4
"In the case of Evans v. Nicholson 
the Court regarded a let t erAaspeaking 
continuously from the moment of its 
being posted until its receipt by the 
addressee for the purposes of giving 
jurisdiction and the reasoning is in 
this way: a letter is intended to act
on the mind of the recipient, its ac­
tion upon his mind takes place when 
it is received* It is like the case 
of firing of a shot , or the throwing 
of a spear* If a shot is fired, or 
a spear thrown from a place outside 
the boundary of a county, into an­
other county, with intent to injure 
a person in that county, within which 
a blow is given. So with a letter."
1* In Re Cr* Proceedings ex parte Seitz (No.l) (1899) Que* Q.B. 
3?57 Re Harsha (No*2) (1906 ) 42 C.L.J* 356.
2. In Rex v* Oliphant (1905) 2 K.B. 67 at p.72.
3. In Reg* v. Rogers (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 28 at p«34*
4. 32 L.T. (N.S.) 778 cited in Taylor v. Jones * 1 C.P.D. 87.
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These two cases received the approval of the Court of Appeal* 
wherein the defendant, resident in Northern Ireland, posted 
letters there by him to Pools Promoters in Liverpool falsely 
claiming that he had correctly forecast the results of certain 
competitions and was entitled to the winnings, the claims were 
unsuccessful and he was indicted in England for attempting to
obtain property by deception* Repelling his argument that the 
English courts had no jurisdiction as the attempts were com­
pleted in Ireland, with the posting of the letter, the Court 
of Appeal, dismissing his appeal, held that the deception occur­
red at the moment of discovery, i.e. when the 3 letters were 
seen by the Pools Promoters in Liverpool, and as part of the
crime was committed in England, the Liverpool Court had juris-
o
diction* The judgment of the House of Lords is to the same
3
effect and was considered in Baxter1 s case;
For common law countries, telegrams and other circu­
lations through Interpol or otherwise, can form no more than 
such * information and belief* as may persuade a local magistrate
4
to issue his warrant* Further warrants issued on sworn testi-
5
mony on such telegrams were held valid by Canadian Courts*
Arrest on information by the police on a telegram, however, was 
not held valid*^ There may be cases where the Ministers or
1* In Regina v* Baxter (1971) 2 W.L.R. 1138 at pp*1141, 1142 
(C.X)7
2. In Regina v* Treacy (1971) 2 W.L.R. 112 (H.L.).
3* In Regina v* Baxter (1971) 2 W.L.R, 1138 at p*1148*
4* Rice v* Ames 180 U.S. 371 (1901);A.G. for Canada v* Fedorenko 
L.R. (1911X^.0. 735; Re Dickey <No.i) (l904) 8 Can Crim*
Cas 318; Re Weber (19l£) 19, Can Crim Cas 515*
5* Re Dickey (1904) 8 C.C.C. 318 (N.S.); Re Ko I lings (1874) 6
R.L.Q.S. 213.
6* Re Dickey, supra.
Presidents even verbally may inform their counterparts by 
•phone, and it seems there will be no irregularity in it pro­
vided the formalities axe completed later*
The otherwise agreed method is demonstrated in Article 
14 and 15 of the Indo-American Treaty which seemed more conven­
ient to the parties.*
Some of the treaties which are considered binding upon
India by virtue of Section 2(d) of the Indian Extradition Act,
2
1962, provide the mode of requisition*
A complaint in writing would be necessary even in 
cases of those conventions, and treaties and statutes (if any) 
which do not even specifically provide for a written requisition 
but merely require its transmission through the diplomatic 
channels* Further, the requirement that it shall be accompanied
by documents is mentioned in Section 10 of the Indian Extradi­
tion Act, 1962.
The alternative mode is provided of apprehending the 
accused by the Magistrate himself under Section 9 of the Act, if 
it appears to him on information under Section 190, Criminal 
Procedure Code, by way of complaint by the aggrieved complaint^" 
or a third party or local or foreign police, that a person in 
his local jurisdiction is a fugitive criminal of a foreign 
State or Commonwealth country* If he thinks fit in his dis­
cretion, to be exercised judicially, he may issue a warrant for
1* Indo-American Extradition Treaty, dated 1 April, 1966, Art­
icles 14, 15. See R.C. Hingorani, The Indian Extradition Law*
p.116.
2. Article 8 of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1872; Articles 2 & 3 
of the Anglo-Danish Treaty of 1873; Article 9 of the Anglo- 
Italian Treaty of 1873; see also Hingorani, ibid*. p*29; 
see also, S.D. Bedi, Extradition•in International Law and 
Practice, p*108*
the arrest of that person on such information and on such evi- 
dence as would in his opinion justify the issue of a warrant ** 
if the offence *** had been committed within the local limits 
of his jurisdiction*1 * He can then make enquiries as provided 
under that section* So Sections 4 and 9 are to be read to­
gether as they lead to the same results*
In some State practices, a phrase like ’on telegraphic 
or other information* $ in the United States of America * direct 
communication*, 'request made by post or letter or writing or 
telegraph or other means affording evidence in writing* are used 
in cases of provisional arrest,and sometimes for cases of emer­
gency Interpol Organisations are used as means of communication* 
Television and Telstar might also be used as media of transmis­
sion or communication for the provisional arrest of the fugitive 
from justice*
(iii) Mode of Requisition
Section 4 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962 pre­
scribes the procedure to be adopted by the foreign States, in­
cluding to a Commonwealth country having no extradition arrange­
ment, for requesting the surrender of the fugitive wanted by such 
a State* It prescribes two modes of lequisition (see above)*
In case such an eventuality arises, requisition may be made by 
any other method as may be * settled by arrangement* between the 
States*2
It is also possible to make requisition through the 
aggrieved complainant if the procedure is not objected to by
1* See also Bedi, op*cit*, pp*122-123*
2* Section 4(b) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962* See also 
R.C. Hingorani: The Indian Extradit ion Law* p *28; Bedi, op * 
cit*, p*109. -------------------------
the territorial State. Another mode is contemplated by 
Section 9 of the Act (see above). Obviously, such a contin­
gency is contemplated either under information from the com­
plainant or somebody else whether affected or not.
The Central Government may yet make rules under 
Section 36(2)(a) of the Act. However, some treaties which 
are considered binding upon India already provide the mode of 
requisition.*
Article 12 of the Harvard Draft says:-
"(i) The requisition shall be made in 
writing and shall be communicated by a 
diplomatic or consular officer of the 
requesting jBtate to the constituted 
State.
M(ii) The requisition shall contain
(a) A description for the purpose of 
identification of the persons 
claimed;
(b) A statement that a warrant of ar­
rest, or other document of equi­
valent import in the prosecution 
of the person claimed, has been 
issued;
(c) A statement of the act or acts 
for which it is intended to pro­
secute or punish the person claim­
ed, together with a statement of the 
punishment or correctional measures 
which may be imposed for such act
or acts by the law of the request­
ing State, or of the sentence for 
such act or acts which has been 
imposed by the requesting State 
and which remains unfulfilled*
n(iii) The requisition shall be supported by:
(a) the original or authenticated copy 
of the warrant of arrest or other 
document of equivalent import in 
the prosecution of the person claim­
ed, or the original or authenticated
1. Hingo^ni, op.cit.j P*29, note 7* Article 8 of the Anglo- 
German Treaty of 1872; Articles 2 and 3 of the Anglo-Banish 
Treaty of 1873; Article 9 of the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 
1873; Anglo-Polish Treaty of 1932; Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 
1932.
copy of the judgment of convict­
ion against the person claimed, 
and of any sentence imposed in 
execution of such judgment*
(b) an authenticated copy of statement 
of the law of the requesting State 
under which it is intended to pro­
secute or to punish the person 
claimed which shall show that such 
law was in force when the act was 
done for which extradition is re­
quested*
n(iv) The requisition may be accompanied 
or followed by a request for the 
delivery of property.f,l
The Government of India, by virtue of the rule-making 
powers under Section 36(2)(a) of the Act might conceivably 
frame rules on the lines of Article 12 of the Harvard Draft pro­
viding the form of requisition. It would be reasonable to 
provide that the document§,including warrants and judgments and 
copies of statements of witnesses and provisions of other rele­
vant law, are sent along with their authenticated English trans­
lation so that no difficulty may be faced by the Government of 
India or the Magistrate while taking action in extradition pro­
ceedings*
(2) Ingredients of a Request or Requisition
Section 4 of the Indian Extradition Act does not 
mention anything about the form or ingredients or details of a 
requisition made* Section 36(2)(a) of the Act (as we have seen) 
empowers the Central Government to frame rules, and it is neces­
sary it should frame them on the lines adopted in the inter­
national practice* The identity of the person and extraditable 
offence is of an immediate importance, besides the information 
on which requisition is based; it must be in writing and on
1. Hingorani, ob;cit*« p*29, n.6.
oath or affirmation in accordance with the general rules of 
criminal proceedings.^*
The written information must present all information 
in possession of the applicant to the requesting State so that 
it may serve to establish the identity of the person for whose
2
extradition the application is made* It must furnish the name. 
Italy once refused to surrender Rukavina because Yugoslavia could 
not establish his identity beyond doubt, due to some misunder­
standing with regard to the name of the person demanded. The 
High Court of Eire rejected the demand of England for extra­
dition of the two appellants as the persons were not named in
the warrants, and were only identified by general referenceas to
4
age, height, colour of hair. Details of the fugitive with 
alias or aliases, if any, and with a photograph when or wherever 
possible, shall also be given. The details should be 1 as accu­
rate as possible* or *as detailed*as possible*, together with 
.the nationality and identification marks of the person with his 
age and other description. The requisition, therefore, in order 
to avoid the possibility of arguments about the iddntity of the 
accused, should be accompanied as far as possible by a personal 
accurate description, with physical characteristics and particu­
lars of the person claimed, particulars regarding his nationality 
or citizenship, information concerning his domicile and his
Ex parte Seitz (No.l) (1899) 8 Que. Q.B. 345. Re Harsha (No. 
Sy(i9b6) 42 C.L.J. 356, supra. See also Bedi, opicit., p.109, 
n.13.
2. In ReRukavina, 1949 A.D. Case No.88 decided on 29 July, 1949.
3. In the State (Rossi) and Blythe v. Bell, decided on 2 July, 
1956, 23 Int. Law Reports, 1956, p«4lV.
4. See also Bedi, opicit., p.109, n ,14.
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photograph with autographs and finger-prints, if any*^
In addition to the description of the identity of the
person involved, the requisition roust contain, in cases under 
investigation or accusation, a statement or description esta­
blishing the nature and gravity of the alleged crime or offence 
constituting the grounds of requisition, together with the place, 
date and time of its commission, with the names and description 
of the witness, if any, the circumstantial evidence, if the accu^ 
sation is solely based upon it, in detail sufficient to prove 
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt* If document­
ary evidence is to be given in connection with the crime, the 
photostat copies should be sent* The requisition must also 
describe the participation of the accused in the commission of 
the crime* The request must be accompanied with the original 
or authenticated copy of the penal law relating to the said 
crime or offence which, according to the laws of the demanding 
State, authorise the prosecution and conviction of the accused
person, together with its authenticated translation in the
language of the requested State* All evidence in the form of
depositions or original documents roust be accompanied with a 
2translation*
In addition, the warrant of arrest or other substitute 
order having that effect in accordance with the law of the re­
questing State, issued by a competent court in cases under 
Chapter II should accompany the request, because in cases of tiial 
under Chapter II, the Central Government nominates a magistrate 
under Section 5 and he issues a warrant under Section 6; or on
1* Bedi, op.cit*, pp*109-110*
2. Bedi, op.cit.. pp*110-lll and 11?,.
information under Section 9 and Section 23 of the Act in cases
of the commission of offence on the high seas or an aircraft#
The request must also be accompanied with the original or authen­
ticated copy of law of prescription of the crime together with 
the rule of speciality contained in the municipal law of the re­
questing State and a copy of the investigation proceedings made 
and duly certified by the appropriate legal authorities together 
with statements of witnesses and other reports of investigation 
and medical reports or other ballistic or chemical, reports or 
other expert reports on the subject of the crime with all docu­
ments on which the reliance is to be placed in the extradition 
proceedings in India
In cases of requisition of persons already convicted
par contumace or in absentia or where the accused is tried in
person, the copies of legal evidence accepted by the competent
court of the demanding State together with the original or authen*
ticated copy of the final sentence passed against the accused
2with its translation must be sent#
In cases of the offences resulting in material loss or 
injury against property - embezzlement, cheating;defrauding 
banks or private persons, arson, mischief, etc* - the amount of 
damages of such injury or loss, if inflicted or intended, should 
be set forth in the requisition of complaint accompanying it# 
Though Section 4 of the Act does not mention these details, they 
should necessarily be furnished so that the Central Government 
at the initial stage before nomination of a Magistrate, may have
1# See Section 10 of the Extradition Act of 1962#
2. Section 10(2)(c) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962#
See also Bedi,op;cit#, p#lll#
the occasion to see whether it is a »fit case* for nomination 
of a Magistrate, and the Central Government can come to this 
conclusion only if the above details are there# If the request 
is not accompanied by all this information and documents, it 
will not be possible for the Central Government to come to a 
conclusion whether it is a *fit case* or not, and to this extent 
that section will become otiose# In international practice, 
the treaties between States, statutes and municipal laws of the 
States have made these provisions in one form or the other and 
they should as soon as possible be made in India too, as the 
rights of a citizen or a non-citizen and even his life and per­
sonal liberty may be jeopardised or curtailed in extradition 
proceedings#
The problem raises two intertwined questions, namely, 
whether the rules w£en framed will bind the Government of India 
while making a request to a foreign country or Commonwealth 
country and whether these rules will bind the requesting State 
also or whether those States may still make their requests in 
accordance with their own laws and rules# By the publication 
of extraditable offences in the Second Schedule, States have 
notice that persons could be extradited for these offences only# 
The case with a treaty is similar and they know about those of­
fences in advance and would not make request in respect of other 
offences if a list of further offences is added by a. treaty# 
Similarly, when rules are framed under Section 36 of the Indian 
Extradition Act about requisition the States will have notice 
of the rules and will make requests according to them#
The rules are required to be placed before the Parlia­
ment under Section 36(3) of the Act, so that they will then 
have the force of law# The Central Government on the other
hand, will of course, be bound by them and will make any re­
quest of its own for extradition in accordance with them*
But non-compliance with any such rules verbatim by the 
Government of the requesting State does not necessarily lead to 
the consequences of dismissal of the request for extradition on 
this ground# They will be directory and not mandatory in 
nature, and unless and until penal consequences follow by their 
non-compliance, they will be directory only; but penal conse­
quences cannot be attached by rules as the latter would enlarge 
the scope of the provisions of the Act and would^in that case, 
be ultra vires the Act# The Act does not itself lay down any 
form or procedure for submission or receipt of extradition re­
quest from a foreign country and it does not say that in case 
of non-compliance of them the request will be dismissed* Ob­
viously, it cannot be#
(3) Action on Requisition
When the requisition is received by the Central Govern­
ment, Section 5 of the Act empowers the Government to nominate
a magistrate to enquire into the prima facie guilt of the fugi-
1
tive * if it thinks fit1 * The Central Government has powers 
under Sections 29 and 31 to see whether the requisition or de­
mand for surrender is hit by any of the provisions and clauses 
of these sections# In other words, the Central Government it­
self can also reject the requisition outright if it deems fit 
to do so, e#g# the offence or the person or both are non- 
extraditable* However, such a situation would rarely arise 
where either there has been no notification with regard to the 
requesting State as required bySection 3 or 12 of the Act or 
the .Government thinks that the fugitive in question is not
1. Hingorani, op.cit*, p.34.
charged with any extradition offence, as given in the Second 
Schedule or under a treaty as the case may be* The words * as 
it thinks fit* would permit the Central Government to verify, 
before ordering an inquiry, whether or not there has been notifi­
cation (see above) and secondly, whether the fugitive is charged 
with an extraditable offence* These are the two requisite pre­
conditions to be fulfilled before an inquiry cam be ordered, and 
if one of them is lacking, the Government may not, lawfully, and 
should not, nominate any magistrate to hold an inquiry* In 
addition, to these two ' prerequisites, the Central Government 
may, on the grounds mentioned in Sections 29 and 31, and its 
general political or executive power of refusal to extradite a 
person, refuse the request for extradition#
(4) Nomination of a Magistrate
Under the Act, certain provisions in regard to the nomi-
nation of the magistrate differ.T Under Section 5 in a trial 
under Chapter II, the nomination of the magistrate by the Central 
Government is necessary, whereas in trials under chapter III no 
such nomination of a particular magistrate is necessary, but the 
accused can be brought before any magistrate for inquiry# No 
such nomination is necessary under Section 23 of the Act (of­
fences on a vessel or aircraft)* In the first case, the Centred. 
Government, if it thinks fit, may, where a requisition has been 
made under Section 4, issue an order to any magistrate who would 
have jurisdiction to inquire into the offence if it had been an 
offence committed within the local limits of his jurisdiction, 
directing him to inquire into the case# However, if the Central
1. Hingorani, op.cit*, p.34.
Government, receiving a requisition under Section 4, outright 
rejects the request for requisition (presumably on the grounds 
mentioned in Sections 29 and 31 or in its prerogative powers of 
the executive to refuse extradition if the person and offences 
are not extraditable), no question arises of the nomination of 
a magistrate under Section 5 of the Act#
If there are several magistrates having territorial 
jurisdiction to try the offence, the Central Government may nomi­
nate any one of them to make an inquiry# If the magistrate dies 
or is transferred or is otherwise unable to make inquiry, his 
successor would not automatically have jurisdiction to continue 
inquiry, but a formal order has to be made# The matter of nomi­
nation is an executive act only, and not a judicial or quasi­
judicial function of the Central Government# The accused may 
object to the inquiry being made by the magistrate on the grounds 
of personal bias, enmity or interest of the magistrate or his 
mala fides, etc# before the magistrate himself, before the Central 
Government or before a superior court#
In proceedings under Chapter III, no such particular 
nomination is necessary, as in that Chapter vany magistrate* has 
been throughout mentioned, viz# in Section 15 an offender on the 
’backed warrant* by the Central Government can he brought before
any magistrate in India* Under Section 16 of thejlct, the issu­
ance of a provisional warrant for the apprehension of the offender 
has been made dependent on the magistrate’s having jurisdiction 
in the matter 1 if the offence |be€iv committed within his juris­
diction* # Section 17 also mentions a magistrate ’before whom 
[the accused] has been brought* and not any magistrate having 
been appointed or nominated by the Central Government as under
Section 5* Section 23 confers powers on any magistrate having 
jurisdiction in the port or aerodrome where the offence has been 
committed on board ship or on an aircraft, to exercise powers of 
inquiry conferred by the Extradition Act of 1962* Section 23 
confers concurrent jurisdiction on the magistrate or the Central 
Government in the circumstances mentioned in Section 23, provided
Indian territory is the last aerodrome or port of entry after the 
commission of the extraditable offence. Unlike Section 5, no 
nomination of the magistrate under Section 23 is ndcessary* The 
Port Magistrate by virtue of the provisions of Section 23 assumes 
powers as ^ any other magistrate may assume power under Section 9(1) 
of the Act. However, the Port Magistrate while exercising 
jurisdiction, must inform the Central Government, which may (but 
need not) formally nominate him under Section 5tr the purposes 
of holding an inquiry.*
In all three cases, the magistrate must be a first-class 
magistrate as required under Section 2(g)* If the inquiry is 
started while all or any one of the prerequisite formalities are 
not completed, this will be a case of inherent lack of jurisdic­
tion and the accused may challenge the proceedings before a 
superior court by way of writ proceedings or criminal revision, 
as discussed elsewhere.
The magistrate nominated under Section 5 or working 
under Section 9 or 17 or 23 is more than a mere administrative 
officer or an official bound to show courtesy towards a friendly 
Government* Since Parliament has entrusted the responsibility 
to the magistrates (and, necessarily to the superior courts) it
1. Hingorani, op.cit., p.36.
follows that the hearings must be held judicially and in con­
formity with the law, and not as simple administrative proceed- 
1mgs.
(5) Apprehension and Detention of the Fugitive
When the magistrate is nominated under Section 5 by the 
Central Government by Section 6, it is provided that on receipt 
of such an order the magistrate shall issue a warrant for the 
arrest of the fugitive criminal and under this section, there 
seems to be no discretion vested in him to issue bailable or non- 
bailable warrant even if the offence is a bailable one. The same 
provision seems to have been implied in Sections 9 and 23 of the 
Act. In all these ca&es, as provided under Section 25, the ac­
cused may move the magistrate for bail who will exercise the 
powers of a sessions court to grant bail under Indian criminal 
procedure, which means under Sections 497 and 498, Criminal Pro­
cedure Code. Under Section 9(1) the power may be exercised by 
the magistrate under Sections 37, 190 and 204 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code.
The provisional arrest may be ordered even on the basis
oof the telegraphic message, as mentioned above (pJL35^ >) and by
3 4a letter also and sworn information by telegram by the foreign
diplomatic officer or foreign police or by international organisa­
tion like Interpol, to the effect that a fugitive criminal is sus­
pected to be or is likely to arrive soon in the country. In 
such a case, the report has to be made by the magistrate to the 
Central Government under Section 9(2) of the Act. Unless
1. U.S.A. v. Link. 21 C.R. 177, 111 C.C.C. 225 (1955).
2. In the case of Rex v. Oliphant (1905) 2 K.B. 67, supra.
v« Rogers (1877)(3) Q.B.D. 28; 47 L.J.M.C. ll.
4. R. v. Dickey (1904) C.C.C. 318 (N.S.); Re Rollings (1874) 6 
R.L.O.S • 213.
the Central Government nominates a magistrate under Section 5, 
the accused cannot be detained in other cases for more than 3 
months, to be computed from the date of his arrest, and if no 
release has been ordered he can move the High Court or the Su­
preme Court under Articles 226 (read with Section 491 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code rHabeas Corpus!) and 32 of the Consti­
tution respectively, invoking Article 21 of the Constitution
which guarantees personal liberty.
The apprehension of the fugitive is the primary object 
of the request for the purposes of extradition, provided as men­
tioned earlier, the request is supported with the necessary docu­
mentation and in other respects in conformity with local laws or 
existing treaties.
An interesting question arises whether the fugitive 
arrested under Section 6*9(1) or 23 of the Act may move the judi­
ciary alleging his unlawful arrest without having committed an 
offence in India. In order to meet such a situation, Section 22 
of the Act has been enacted that the person will be liable to be 
arrested and surrendered, subject to the provisions of the Extra­
dition Act, whether the courts in India have jurisdiction or not. 
The provision is based upon the power of a sovereign State to 
transmit the accused, punishable for the offence according to the 
municipal law of the country, to the country against the laws of 
which he has committed the breach.*
According to British practice also since 1794 there can 
be no extradition from the United Kingdom without statutory autho-
1. East India Co. v. Campbell (1794) 27 E.R. 1010; Mure. v. Kaye 
(1811) 129 E.R. 239; R. v. Kumburlay 93 E.R. 890.
risation* Lord Alverstone, C.J. observed:*
"We are also dealing with a branch of 
criminal law which affects the liberty 
of the subject, and that condition should 
under ordinary circumstances be clearly 
fulfilled*"
and this case was followed by Lord Parker, C.J. in Shutters case*
2Lorde Parker, C.J. observed:
"Matters (under the Extradition Act) 
should be looked at strictly*"
(6) Release on Bail (or Temporary Release) at Two Stages
On the arrest of a fugitive, as mentioned above, under 
Sections 6 or 9(2) or 23 of the 1962 Act, Section 25 of the Act 
makes a provision for the release of the person on bail and 'the 
provisions of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, relating 
to bail* hay© been made applicable
"in the same manner as they would apply 
if such person were accused of commit­
ting in India the offence of which he 
is accused or has been convicted, and 
in relation to such bail, the magistrate 
before whom the fugitive criminal is 
brought shall have, as far as may be, 
the same powers and jurisdiction as a 
court of session under that Code*"
The magistrate, therefore, while exercising the powers under 
Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code will, in accordance 
with the well-established principles of law, exercise his dis­
cretion to grant or refuse bail looking to the circumstances of 
the case* As the Criminal Procedure Code, as such, regarding 
bail has been made applicable to the fugitive offender, the High
1. In R* v* Brixton Prison Governor Ex parte Percival (1907) 1 
K.B. 696 at p*70b.
2* flEn Re Shutter (1959) 2 All E.R. 782 at p.785A (brackets are 
mine)*
Court in exercise of its powers under Section 498 would be em­
powered to int^fere and so may the Supreme Court under Article 136 
of the Constitution*
This would obviate the controversy in British and other 
practice whether the discretion to grant or refuse bail vests in 
the magistrate only and not in the High Court* Terasov, a 
Russian sailor, was released on bail during the pendency of extra­
dition proceedings* Depending upon the circumstances of the 
case, the Court will exercise its discretion, though in such 
cases, the amount of bail will be high due to the offender's fears 
of extradition and desire to seek asylum in a more convenient 
State* Such escape of the fugitive may embarrass the Central 
Government, and may result in tension between India and the de­
manding State* True, a difficulty arises where nobody is able
to furnish bail, so that the provisions of bail may become nuga­
tory: but they can become so even in cases of ordinary crimes
committed in India, which are triable under the Indian Penal Code*
Indian Courts under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
or the British Extradition Act, 1870, made applicable to India 
by Order in Council,refused bail to the accused because the view 
then was that the proceedings under the Extradition Act were not 
subject to any appellate or revisional jurisdiction, as the magi­
strate's findings were held to be in the nature of an administra­
tive order and hence, immune from any interference by the judi­
ciary* Similarly, there was a conflict of opinion in British 
Courts regarding the bail.* LordWright in the case of R. v*
1. The case of R. v* Phillips (1922) All E.R. 275 was contrary 
to R* v. Larking (1914) 48 I.L. T.95, and also Larking's case 
was “directly contrary to R. v* Foote (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 378 and 
R* v* Spilsbury (1898) 2 Q.B.D. 615*
Spilsbury 1 observed:
"I wish to add this observation that 
cases arising under the Fugitive Of­
fenders Act will not in all instances 
apply as precedents in cases under 
the Extradition Acts. Under the Fugi­
tive Offenders Act it is generally a 
question between different parts of 
Her Majesty’s Dominions, but under 
the Extradition Acts the jurisdiction 
depends in all cases on treaties with 
foreign countries.”
In H. v. Phillips, the accused was arrested on a war­
rant on 11 July, 1922, under Section 8(2) of the Extradition Act, 
1870, for obtaining money by false pretences in Switzerland,and
owing to non-arrival of information was remanded in custody. The 
magistrate declined bail on the ground that it was not the prac­
tice of the Court to grant bail in extradition cases; refusing 
the application the Court held that a person arrested on a war­
rant under the Extradition Act, 1870, and charged as a fugitive 
criminal with a crime for which he is liable to be extradited is 
in the same position as a defendant under remand on charge of 
misdemeanour committed within this jurisdiction in that he has 
no right to bail, and it is up to the magistrate to refuse or 
or grant bail. Lord Hewart, C.J. observed:
”The learned Attorney-General did not 
say that the learned Magistrate here 
had no power to grant bail. He denied 
that the accused had the right to insist 
upon bail. In that contention I think 
the Attorney-General was right. It is 
a matter for the discretion in the first 
instance of the learned magistrate 
whether bail in smch case shall be 
granted or refused ... It is quite true 
that he said it was not the practice to 
grant bail in cases of extradition.
That does not mean that it is the prac­
tice always to refuse bail.”
1. (1898) 2 Q.B.D. 615 at pp.624, 625
Insisting upon the consideration of 'special grounds of caution 
and care1 about treaty obligations, Lord Hewart C.J. further ob­
served: *
"It does not appear to me that it is true 
to say that he was bound to grant bail, 
nor does it appear to me that it is true 
to say that this court is bound to grant 
bail."
Larking's case was held to have been decided contrary 
to the authority of the cases of Foote and Spilsbury decided by 
a Full Bench of the Queen's Bench Division^and Darling J. held
2Larking1 s case was not binding upon the Court in Phillip's case.
In Ezekiel's case, the applicant was committed to prison 
on 7 March, 1941, having been charged in India under Sections 
120-B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, by order of the 
Metropolitan Police Magistrate sitting at Bow Street, to await 
his return to India in accordance with the provisions of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. He was later admitted to bail
3
by the order of a judge.
In Regina v. Spilsbury. Lord Russell C.J, observed:4
"This inherent power to admit to bail~ 
is historical, and has long been exer­
cised by the Court and if the Legis­
lature had meant to curtail or circum*- 
scribe the known power, their intention 
would have been carried out by express 
enactment."
Thus, under British Law, a magistrate has the same jurisdiction
1. In R. v. Phillips (1922) All E.R. 275 at p.277, F,G,H,I; 
Darling and Branson J.J. agreeing.
2. R. v. Phillips, ibid. at p.278.
3. In R. v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Others
Ex parte Ezekiel (1941) 2 All E.R.P. 546 at p.547.
4. (1898) 2 Q.B.P. 615 at p.622.
and powers as near as may be (including the power to remand and
admit him to bail) as if the fugitive were charged with an of-
t -in
fence committed witly his jurisdiction and on two occasions bail 
1
was granted,
2
The Supreme Court of the United States accepting the 
right of a court to admit to bail observed:
**We are unwilling to hold that the circuit 
court possesses no power in respect of ad- 
mitting to bail other than as specifically 
vested by Statute, or, that while bail 
should not ordinarily be granted in cases 
of foreign extradition, those courts may 
not in any case, and whatever the special 
circumstances, extend that relief. Nor 
are we called upon to do so as we are 
clearly of opinion, on this record, that 
no error was committed in refusing to 
admit to bail, and that, although the re­
fusal was put on the ground of want of 
power, the final order ought not to be 
disturbed,11
The power of the Federal Cours to accept bail has been recognised 
prior to the final commitment for extradition. Court apprehend- 
ing undue delay in the arrival of witnesses granted bail; the 
court enlarged the accused on bail as the pressing circumstances
4
were found to justify it. Enlargement on bail was also allowed 
pending extradition proceedings,5
Great Britain, the United States of America (unlike 
India), and Canada under the municipal laws do not provide
1, R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Percival (1907) 1 
K.B. 696; v, Harvey (1895) cited in Biron & Chalmers: The 
Law and Practice of Extradition» London, 1903,
2, Wright v, Henkel (1903) 190 U.S. 40,
Re
3,/Gannon (1928) 27 F, (2d) 362.
i
4, In Re Mitchell (1907) 171 Fed. Rep. 289.
5. In Re ICeene* s Extradition (1934) 6 Fed. Supp, 308.
expressly for bail, but the right of a Court to grant bail inde­
pendently of the statute is recognised, pending final commitment
1
if the circumstances seem to warrant.
India taking advantage of all these controversies, gave 
a statutory recognition to such power to the Courts by Section 25 
of the 1962 Act, particularly by making the provisions of bail 
provided in th^Criminal Procedure Code applicable under the Extra­
dition Act. Thus, in the laws of the United States of America, 
the United Kingdom and Canada, the grant of bail in extradition
o
proceedings pending before committal is not as of right, but the
3
Court has got every right to grant it. In India, statutory
recognition has been given to this power of the court. But in
all cases, including India,it is the discretion of the judge
whether bail should be granted or not, and in practice, it is
only in the exceptional case that bail is granted*
4 5In the United Kingdom, United States of America, on
the cne hand, and Canada on the other, differ on the point
whether a person held in custody after commitment for the purpose
of surrender can be bailed out or is entitled to be bailed out*
According to the former practice, the answer is in the negative,
1. Regina v* Spilsbury. supra (1898) 2 Q.B. 615; United States v* 
Weiss (1904) 8 C.C.C. 62; Xn Re* Gaynor v* Greene (1905) 9 
C.C.C. 542; R v. Phillips (1922) 128 L.T.R. 113; Re. Gifford 
(1930) I D.L.R. 800.
2. Wright v* Henkel (1903) 190 U.S. 40*
3. Regina v.Spilsbury (1898) 2 Q.B. 615; R. v. Phillips (1922)
128 L.T.R. 113; In Re* Keene (1934) 6 Fed* Sup. 368.
4. R* v. Spilsbury; supra (1898) 2 Q.B. 615.
5. Wright v. Henkel, supra (1903) 190 U.S. 40.
6. Re. Low (1932) 41 O.W.N. 468.
while in the latter case is in the affirmative.
*t
According to Halsbury, the Queen* s Bench Division or
in vacation, any judge thereof may ordinarily admit to bail, but
a person committed with a view to surrendered under the extra* 
dition treaty has no right to bail and this statement is based 
upon Lord Russell*s observations and the decision in Regina v. 
Spilsbury (supra) recognising the inherent powers of the British 
Courts to enlarge people on bail in extradition cases. In the 
United States* practice there is no case of grant of bail after 
commitment* Further, the Chief Justice of the United States 
speaking for the Court, held that allowance on bail after commit" 
ment was inconsistent with the statute (Section 5 270 of the Re­
vised Statutes) and the demanding State, having done all required 
under treaty or law, is entitled to the delivery of the accused. 
In a case of release of the accused on bail, it might become im­
possible to fulfil the obligation.
498 or 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court cam 
grant bail after conviction, ordinarily there should be no object­
ion to grant bail technically, but in an ordinary case if the man 
is in India he can be arrested and brought back, whereas in 
extradition proceedings if he escapes after commitment, the rela­
tions between the States may become strained.
granted in India sifter the commitment has been ordered. This 
view is supported by the further fact that if the fugitive is not
Even though under powers to grant bail under,.Sections
The better view seems to be that no bail should be
1. Halsbury, Laws of England. 3rd ed., Vol.16, p.571
2. In Wright v. Henkel (1903) 190 U.S. 40 at p.62.
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conveyed out of India within two months he may be discharged by 
the High Court on his application, unless sufficient cause is 
shown to the contrary by the Central Government* But it seems 
that no dogmatic and legalistic approach in such cases may be 
appropriate and the High Court or theipupreme Court, while pro­
tecting the Fundamental Rights of a person, may order the person 
to be released on bail. This will be a midway path between the 
views. For in Canada, the power to release on bail after com­
mitment has been fully recognised and once the Court of Appeal in
o
Ontario allowed bail after commitment.
There are other States which do not make any provision 
for release of the accused on bail before or after the commitment 
and the ordinary provisions of the criminal procedure are not 
made applicable. In Re Brain, Argentine Camera Federal de la 
Capital rejecting the bail application, held that the provisions 
of the relevant Criminal Procedure Code were subject to impera­
tive considerations of social order requiring assistance, so far 
as possible, in the delivery of accused persons. They did not 
apply to the special proceedings of extradition.
There is a provision for total prohibition for grant 
of bail in extradition in countries like Sweden,^Yugoslavia,5 
and Chile.
1. Section 24 of the 1962 Act.
2. In the Case of Re Low. supra (1932) 41 O.W.N. 468.
3. 1941-1942 A.D., Case No.105 decided on 21 February, 1940*
4. The Law of Extredition of Sweden, 1957.
5. Code de Procedure Penale, 1954.
6. Code of Penal Procedure, Book 111, Title 6 regarding extradi­
tion, Art.698. See also Bedi, op.cit.. pp.113-116.
(7) Request for Provisional Arrest
A request by the demanding State for the extradition of 
a fugitive requires that it should be accompanied by various docu­
ments, establishing his identity, etc. (as above, p. 141 )* other­
wise * there can be no actual extradition without proper requisi­
tion to that e f f e c t * B u t  all these processes are time-consum­
ing and nowadays with fast means of communication and transporta­
tion, the accused on getting warning of his being wanted for 
extradition, may fly to another country and thus, make the request 
for extradition abortive. Therefore, the British Extradition 
Act, 1870, made applicable to India also by Order in Council by 
Section 8 authorised the magistrate to issue a warrant for the 
apprehension of a fugitive criminal wanted by a foreign State, 
whether accused or convicted of a crime, who is, or is suspected 
of being, in the United Kingdom or on his way to the United 
Kingdom. This would be a provisional warrant. The same pro­
vision was made in the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1903, and Sections 14 and 16 of the 1962 Act to 
meet such emergencies.
France took the initiative in this respect, and the 
treaties of this country entered into with other countries pro­
vided that it was a duty to make provisional arrest in the ab­
sence of documents if request came by telegram through diplomatic 
channels. The United States also recognised the necessity of 
provisional arrest and the United States Supreme Court express­
ed the same views. In most State practices, municipal foreign 
statutes, and treaties provisional arrest is provided for and 
detention of such persons pending the receipt of a formal
1. J.B. Moore Digest, op.cit♦» Vol.IV, p.355*
2. In Benson v. McMohan. 127 U.S. 457.
requisition with its supporting evidence.*
The provisional arrest under Section 9 of the Act 
(where the magistrate issues a warrant on information alone) will 
become ineffective if the magistrate does not hear from the 
Central Government within three months. This may occur if the 
requesting State makes no request or it is rejected by the Cen­
tral Government without the nomination of a magistrate under 
Section 5.
This provision for arrest without a preceding request 
from the foreign State has been provided because a requisition 
for the extradition of the apprehended person may reasonably be 
expected, and th^tate concerned must be given reasonable time 
to present a requisition for his extradition*
(8) Warrant of Arrest
(a) Form and contents
The warrant need not state that the offence charged
2
is an offence within the Act* Regarding the argument of the 
accused that the form and contents of the warrant for his arrest 
differed from the charges which were brought against him before 
the magistrate with particulars of the offences, Lord Parker C.J. 
observed:^
"It would be far more satisfactory in 
the future if the warrant contained on 
its face a reference to the charges with 
which it is sought to deal and that those 
charges with proper particulars should 
be attached to the warrant*"
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.118.
2. Irish Free State v. Little (1931) I.R. 39.
3. In Ex parte Mourat Mehmet (1962) 2 Q.B.D. 1 at p.9.
In Ezekiel1 s case,^  it was stated that no reference to 
the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was required in the warrant of 
arrest and, should the Court find, relating to the person before
it, evidence which raises a strong presumption that he has com­
mitted an offence named in the warrant, being one to which the 
Act applies, the duplicity in the warrant, i.e. that it contained 
another charge, is immaterial and will not render the warrant 
void. Humphrey J. (at p.550) observed:
11 It is clear that by English Law no object­
ion to a warrant on the ground of duplicity
can be effective although the prosecution
may be called upon to elect.Rodgers v.
Richards.1*2
The term * warrant1 in the case of any foreign State, includes
any judicial document authorising the arrest of a person accused
or convicted of a crime. Therefore, the magistrate proceeds 
upon the production, not of a warrant of a foreign State or 
power according to the technical rules of English Lav/ , but upon
any judicial document authorising the arrest of a person accused
of a crime maybe a decree or a judgment of a foreign court.
(b) Warrant of foreign arrest find warrant of committal in 
extradition proceedings
A warrant of ’foreign arrest’ must be distinguished 
from a warrant of committal in the extradition proceedings. In
4
the case of Fedorenko the question was raised whether it is 
necessary in extradition proceedings to put in evidence before
1. R. v. Secretaryof State for India Ex parte Ezekiel (1941) 2 
Kll E.R. 346 at pp.£56, 5ii.
2. Rodgers v. Richards (1892) 1 Q.B.D. 555 at p.557.
3. R. v. Ganz (1881-5) All E.R. 621 Pollock B. at p.625. B,C 
T1882) 9 Q.B.D. 93.
4 . Attorney-General of Canada v. Fedorenko , L.R. (1911) A.C.735.
the judge to whom application for a warrant is made, the requi­
sition by the foreign State requiring the extradition. Robson J. 
in the Court of first instance, held that it was necessary, but 
the Privy Council in appeal reversing the judgment held that the 
committal warrant was good, without the proof of a requisition 
having been made.
The requisition for the extradition of a fugitive 
criminal must be accompanied by a warrant of arrest issued by 
the judicial authorities in the country seeking the surrender.
It does not appear that the surrender would be granted without 
such warrant. There is no authority to support the view that 
a police officer can justifiably arrest a person without a war­
rant, on reasonable and probable grounds of suspicion that the 
person had committed elsewhere an offence which would be a 
felony in the State of asylum.1 Brett L.J. indeed observed 
(at p.706) that:
111 doubt much whether a policeman is not 
justified in arresting a man without a 
warrant on reasonable grounds of suspi­
cion of his having done that which would 
be a felony if committed in this country•**
The opinion on the face of it seems reasonable, but a person* s 
liberty cannot be curtailed otherwise than by a procedure esta­
blished by law under Article 21 of the Constitution and as there 
is no such provision in the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, no 
policeman in India is authorised to arrest any person without a 
warrant. For extradition purposes the Extradition Act is a 
* self-contained code* providing both the substantive as well as
procedural and substantive procedural law. Arrest in extradi-
2
ddition procedings without a warrant is, therefore, illegal.
1. In R. v. Weil, 9 Q.B.D. 701.
2. Diamond v. Minter and Others (1941) 1 K.B. 656 at pp.666,673.
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The foreign warrant must disclose the identity of the alleged 
offender sufficiently to enable his apprehension to be effected.
Foreign warrants accompany a request to the Indian 
Government to back them under Chapter III, whereas under Chapter 
II, the magistrate issues the warrant under Section 6 after his ( 
appointment of nomination by the Central Government, or otherwise 
under Section.9. These foreign warrants are different from the 
warrants issued by the Indian Government or magistracy, which are 
a command to the Indian Police to apprehend the person, as was
i
said in Jugal Kishore More’s case (supra)•
The above-quoted direction in R. v. Weil was not follow-
2 3ed by the High Court of Australia, nor by: the English Court
in a case under the Fugitive Offenders Act.
4As observed in Halabury* s Laws of England:
"When a treaty has been made with a 
foreign State and the Extradition Act 
has been-applied by an Order in Coun­
cil, one of Her Majesty’s principal 
Secretaries of the State may, upon a 
requisition made to him by some per­
son recognised by him as a diplomatic 
representative of that foreign State 
by order under his hand and seal, 
signify to a police magistrate that 
such a requisition has been made and 
require him to issue his warrant for 
the apprehension of the fugitive crimi­
nal if the criminal is in, or is sus- !
pected of being in, the United Kingdom."
The warrant may then be issued by a Police Magistrate 
on receipt of the order of the Secretary of the State, or upon
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171.
2. In Brown v. Lizars (1905) 2 C.L.R. 837 at p.849.
3. In Diamond v. Minter (1941) 1 K.B. 656 at pp.666, 673.
4. Vol.16, 3rd ed., 61 at p.567.
such evidence as would in his opinion, justify the issue of the 
warrant if the crime hasi been committed or the criminal convicted 
in England.
A warrant issued by the Court for an offence committed 
in its own territory has no extra-territorial operation. A 
warrant issued in the State where the fugitive offender is does 
not have any extra-territorial significance. It is only a com­
mand by the court in the name of the sovereign to its officer to 
arrest an offender and bring him before the court. By making a 
requisition in pursuance of a warrant issued by a court of a 
State to another State for assistance in securing the presence 
of the offender, the warrant is not invested with any extra­
territorial operation. If the State requested agrees to lend 
its aid to arrest the fugitive it is made by the issue of an 
independent warrant or endorsement or authentication of the war­
rant of the court which issued it. By endorsement or authenti­
cation of a warrant, the country in which an offender has taken 
refuge signifies its willingness to lend its assistance, in imple 
mentation d£ the treaties or international commitments and to se­
cure the arrest of the person. The offender arrested pursuant 
to the warrant or an endorsement is brought before the court of 
the country to which the requisition is made, and the court 
holds an inuqiry to determine whether the offender may be extra­
dited*
The.procedure for extradition of fugitive offenders
from ’British Possessioii*^ ) was less complicated when the Extra­
dition Act was applied by Order in Council, for unless it was 
otherwise provided by such Order, the Act extended to every 
’British Possession’ in the same manner as if throughout the Act
the ’British Possession’ were substituted for the United Kingdom 
but with certain modifications in procedure.
The Extradition Acts of 1870 and 1873 sought to give 
effect to arrangements made with foreign States with respect to 
the surrender to such States of fugitive criminals. Her Majesty 
might by Order in Council, direct and prescribe the procedure 
for extraditing fugitive criminals to such foreign States.
Under Part I of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, a 
warrant issued in one part of the Crown* s Dominions for appre­
hension of a fugitive offender, could be endorsed for execution 
in another Dominion. After the fugitive was apprehended he was 
brought before the magistrate, who heard the case in the same 
manner and had the same jurisdiction and powers as if the fugi­
tive was charged with an offence committed within the magistrate’s 
jurisdiction. If the magistrate was satisfied, after the expiry 
of 15 days from the date on which the fugitive was committed to 
prison, he could make an order for surrender of the fugitive on 
the warrant issued by the Secretary of the State or an appropri­
ate officer. There was also provision for ’inter-colonial 
backing of warrants’ within the group of ’British Possessions* 
to which Part I of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, had been 
applied by Order in Council. A more rapid procedure for the 
return of fugitive offenders between possessions of the same 
group was in force. Where in a ’British Possession* of a group 
to which Part II of the Act applied, a warrant was issued for the 
apprehension of a person accused of am offence punishable in 
that possession and such person is or was suspected of being on 
the way to smother British possession of the same group, a magi­
strate in the last-mentioned possession, if satisfied that the
warrant was issued by a person having lawful authority to issue 
the same, was bound to endorse such warrant, and the warrant so 
endorsed was sufficient authority to apprehend, within the juris­
diction of the endorsing magistrate, the person named in the war­
rant, and to bring him before the endorsing magistrate or some 
other magistrate in the same possession* If the magistrate be­
fore whom a person apprehended was brought was satisfied that the 
warrant was duly authenticated and was issued by a person having 
lawful authority to issue it, and the identity of thejjprisoner was 
established, he could order the prisoner to be returned to the 
British possession in which the warrant was issued, and for that 
purpose to deliver him into the custody of the persons to whom 
the warrant was addressed or of any one or more of them and to 
be held in custody and conveyed to that possession, there to be 
dealt with according to law as if he had there been apprehended. 
This was in brief the procedure up to 26 January, 1950.1
2In R. v. Ganz (supra) .. it was stated that a general
description of the offence in the English warrant of apprehen­
sion issued by the Police Magistrate was enough* In a case of 
issue of a warrant by the magistrate without authority from the
q
Home Secretary, it was observed:
"Under the Act of 1870, the Magistrate 
is required to take evidence and to 
consider whether a case is within the 
Act, and therefore, after having satis­
fied himself in this case, his warrant 
sufficiently described the offences 
committed."
1* State of West Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969. S.C*
TT7T. — ------------------------
2* R. v. Ganz (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 93.
3. In the case of Re Terray (1878) 48 L.J. Ex* 214.
The facts by which the offence for which the accused
is to be detained can be ascertained from the depositions sent 
with the requisition* But although a foreign warrant must 
sufficiently disclose the offence charged, it is not the warrant 
that is to be looked to for ascertaining what the offence or 
crime is, for which the man is to be detained. The facts for 
the arrest and detention and surrender are to be found in the 
depositions but not in the foreign warrant* If the foreign 
warrant reasonably discloses the offence charged, it need not 
do this in detailin lorder to justify the detention of the accused,
In the recent case of G a r d n e r on a warrant issued 
from New Zealand - „ for false pretences as a representation of
a future event, not being an offence according to English law, 
on a petition for habeas corpus * Lord Parker C.J. accepting the 
petition (Lord Edward Davis L.J. and Widgery J* agreeing with 
him) held that the authority to proceed, albeit in general terms, 
must be taken as relating to offences of which the applicant was 
accused in New Zealand, viz. in the absence of any indication to 
the contrary, those which were set out in the warrants which 
accompanied the request to the Secretary of State, and, as it 
was clear that the acts complained of in those warrants would 
not constitute offences under the law of England, a writ of 
habeas corpus should issue.
Gardner1 s case is of the greatest importance in India, 
where it will certainly have great persuasive authority. It 
raises in an acute form the problem of the fugitive’s predicament,
1. R. v. Governor of Brijrton Prison, Ex parte Gardner (1968) 1 
Kll E.R. 636 at p.641,' E,G,H.
In order to discover that the offence described in the warrant 
- perhaps described in terms only minutely different from those 
used in the Indian Penal Code or other penal statute of India - 
does not exist in Indian law highly specialised knowledge and 
advice must be available to him. It is no consolation if it can I 
be made available in an appellate or revision court after the 
expenditure of substantial fees and the passage of time during 
which he is likely to be an iconf inement.
* *n 1By contrast / Caldough* s case, a warrant of arrest of
the accused, a Canadian citizen, was issued on 3 October, 1960, 
on four counts in Vancouver. When depositions of witnesses
were being taken, the counsel for the prisoner was not allowed to 
cross-examinej.^di'^^/^/the proceedings were ex parte, and the 
warrant issued. The objection was taken in habeas corpus that 
the charges were not such as, according to the law, ordinarily 
administered by the City Magistrate, to quote the words of 
Section 5 of the 1881 Act, entitled him to commit; rejecting 
the pleas on this ground, the court held that there was nothing 
in the formulation of the charges set out in the warrant that 
would entitle the magistrate to disregard the warrant.
~ 2
In Caborn-Waterf ield, it had been held that the appli­
cant would be discharged from custody, since the warrant of ar­
rest and warrant of committal described the applicant as ’accused* 
of the crime of larceny, whereas by virtue of the *Juggment
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Caldough (1961) 1
A !£ll, E,R, 666 at p.bQS^.^ C <1 2Sr) ti.-L.L-.a~ 3J-^ /<*£
ikZ
2. I^ ^Caborn-VJaterf ieId (I960) 2 All E.R. 178: See also Section
2(b) of The Extradition Act, 1962# See also Athanassiadis v* 
Government of Greece (1969) 3 All E.R. 293, per Lord D jlheorne 
affirming £• v. Caborn-Wat erf ield (i9 6 0 ) 2 All E.R. 178.
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iteratif, defaut1 he was virtually a convicted person, and in 
that case no question of extradition within the meaning of Art­
icle VII(c) of the Extradition Treaty between France and England
of 1876 arose. That treaty provided that 1 persons convicted by 
/ A
jugement par defaut or arret de contumace shall be in the matter 
of extradition considered as persons accused and, as such, sur­
rendered1 , and as he is not a person accused but person convicted, 
he should be discharged because of wrong mention.
Caborn-Waterfield1s case  ^emphasises what meticulous 
care is necessary, what nice distinctions will be made, what 
specialist advice is required by the fugitive, by the Central 
Government, and before the magistrate (if one is appointed), and
what handicaps the State requesting extradition labours under even 
in cases which, on the merits, fully justify an extradition.
In India, the *jugement iteratif1 in Caborn-Waterfield*s riot — .
case, wouldr be a judgment in accordance with Indian law, as the
latter does not recognise conviction in the absence of accused,
which is regarded as a violation of the principles of natural
justice.
Regarding a second arrest, it was observed by Philli-
2more J. in the case of Stallmann:
MBut if the second arrest is for the same 
cause, while the discharge in the first case 
was because the warrant was bad, or the re­
turn to the warrant was bad, then it would 
be lawful to re-arrest for the same offence 
with a proper warrant and one making a 
different return.”
3
Following a Canadian case, Phillimore J. observed:
”That being the case, the fact that the 
applicant in this case was discharged, • * 
not because it was not an extraditable 
crime, or for any such reason, but be­
cause full opportunity to make his de­
fence had not been given to him before
1. R. v. Caborn-Waterf ield (1960) 2 All E.R. 178.
2. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Stallmann (1911-13) 
All E.R. 385 at p.395.
3. In Re Parker Canadian Prisoner1s case (1839) 5 M & W. 32 and 
of R. v. gatcheldor, 1 Per. & Dav. 5l~6 and Watson1 s case, 112 
E.R? 1389.
the Magistrate, cannot be a reason why 
he should not be re-arrested and have 
the case fully investigated before 
this committal for extradition *,f
(c) General validity and its endorsement and proper 
signing of warrant
In England the endorsement on the warrant must be by 
the authority endorsing it and it need not be signed both by the 
magistrate and the Home Secretary. The word 1 and1 in category 
(2 ) of the authorities, who may endorse the warrant in the 
British Act, is used disjunctively and therefore, any such war­
rant need not be endorsed both by a magistrate and the Secretary 
for State.'*’
Section 15 of the Extradition Act, 1962, lays down
that theCentral Government may, if Satisfied that the warrant
was issued by a person having lawful authority to issue the same,
endorse such, warrant in the-; manner prescribed, and the warrant
so endorsed, shall be sufficient authority to apprehend the
person named in the warrant and to bring him before any magi-
2
strate in India. This section applies where the warrant has
been issued for the apprehension of the fugitive criminal in any 
Commonwealth country with extradition arrangements made, if any, 
and notification has been issued under Section 12 of the Act. 
Thus, under Section 15 of the Act of 1962, it is only the Central 
Government whose satisfaction and endorsement is necessary, and 
unlike the British Act, endorsement by the magistracy and execu­
tive [both “arenotf necessary, and therefore, in India such a
problem would not arise.
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Bidwell (1937) 1 
K.B. 30^1 (1936) 3 All E.R.l.
2. The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, Section 15.
(9) Concurrent Demands by Various States in International
Practice
International law does not impose any obligation on a 
State of asylum to which requesting States the offender should 
be surrendered in case of simultaneous multiple demands for his j 
surrender by several States for the commission of the same or 
different Acts*
The States are left free in the absence of a treaty 
or agreement to exercise their own discretion to which State 
the fugitive offender should be extradited, taking into consider­
ation . all the circumstances including the gravity of the 
alleged offence, the place of its commission, and the nationality
of the person sought. On the other hand, a State entering into
a treaty or agreement with other State or States, may restrict
its own freedom on the subject^  It cannot unilaterally alter
or modify the treaty or the agreement without the consent of the
2other party or parties.
Section 30 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, gives 
a full discretion to the Central Government to determine inde­
pendently a question arising out of simultaneous demands as to 
which State the accused should be surrendered and the Central 
Government ’having regard to the circumstances of the case* may 
surrender the fugitive to such State or country as it ’thinks
1. Zenica-Company v. AustrianFederal Railways, 1929-1930, A.D. 
pp.364-365 decided on 30 October, 1929.
2* In Re Brooks. 1931-1932,- A.D. Case No.5 decided on 1 May, 1931. 
In Re Reir~et al. 1943-1945, A.D. Case No.73 decided on 11 May 
1944; In Re Krikor, 1943-1945, A.D. Note p.239 decided on 1 
November, 1943; Bedi, op.cit., p.129.
fit* • The crux of the matter would be the interpretation of 
the words ’having regard to the circumstances of the case’ and 
’thinks fit’* The section nowhere lays down any criteria for 
the determination of this question. There is no mention of 
any treaty or international agreement with other States, in which 
case if it does not provide anything in this regard (like Indo-
Nepalese treaty), Section 30 will prevail. If a treaty (like 
Indo-American treaty by Article 1 0 ) provides that in cases of 
simultaneous demands the accused will be surrendered to the State 
who made the earliest claim, the treaty may provide different 
modes with different States and if they all make simultaneous 
demands the question arises in a two-fold form, viz. whether the 
provisions of Section 30 of the Act would apply, or the treaty 
provisions in this regard, and secondly, in case of different 
provisions in different treaty-clauses to which State the accused 
will be surrendered. The answer to the first question can be 
disposed of by reference to and on the analogy of the principles 
enunciated by the British Courtsj1 by virtue of Section 3(3) of 
the Act of 1962 after notification the treaty must be taken to be 
incorporated and to limit the operation of the Extradition Act. 
The answer to the second question will depend upon whether the 
request is for the same act or for different acts, which will be 
considered presently. There are different international prac­
tices but so far as India is concerned, the formula of ’having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case’ would resolve the 
problem, at least in legal terms.
1. In Queen v. Wilson (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42; R. v. Ashforth (1892)
8 T.L.R. 283; R. v. Governor Brixton Prison (1911) 2 K.B. 82.
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(a.) Simultaneous requests for the same act or offence
In the case of simultaneous demands for the same act 
municipal statutes of States generally give priority to the 
State within whose territory the crime was perpetrated. it 
is the practice of those States also who emphasise the terri- 
toriality of the act rather than of the actor.
On the other hand, French Law gives first preference
to the States against whose interest the wrong was done and
secondly, in whose territory, the act was performed* There are
other States who give first preference to the States in respect
2 3of their own nationals. States like Mexico, Equador give 
first preference to treaty States and amongst many treaty States 
to that State in whose territory the offence was committed - 
presumably, because that State is the proper forum as the evi­
dence is there. Peru, like India, leaves it to the discretion 
of the executive to decided according to the circumstances of
4
the case. The exercise of discretion will be presumed also
in cases of those States without any treaty or statutory provi­
sions providing for the same. In cases of a treaty like Indo- 
Nepalese non-mention of anything on this point will give occa­
sion for the 1 exercise of discretion principle*♦
A number of bilateral or multilateral treaties make 
no difference between the multiple request for one offence or
different offences. The Indo-American treaty specifically lays
1* J.B. Moore, Extradition Law, pp.134-135.
2. Extradition Law of 1897, Art.7.
3. Article 48 of 1921 Act concerning Foreigners Extradition and
Naturalisation Act.
4. Peru Extradition Act of 1888, Article 7.
down the principles of surrender to the State whose claim is 
earliest in date, unless such claim is waived. There are other 
treaties making no difference for the same act and for different 
acts, leaving the discretion of the requested State as under 
Section 30 of the Indian Extradition Act, untramelled by the 
rule of precedence* There are treaties which give complete 
discretion in cases of one or different acts in whose favour it 
will extradite after taking into consideration all the circum­
stances of the case, and in particular, the seriousness and 
gravity of the offence, place of the commission of the offence, 
the date of each request, the nationality of the person claimed, 
and the possibility of subsequent extradition to another State* 
The United Kingdom and United States of America give first pre­
ference to territoriality and between two States within whose 
jurisdiction the offence or offences were committed, also give 
preference to that State which made the prior requisition in 
time* Such is the effect of the Indo-American treaty unless 
such claim is waived, and treaties between the United States of 
America and South Africa, and between the United Kingdom and 
Israel* Other State practices only give preference on the pri­
ority of requisitions without referring to the seriousness of 
crime or nationality of the person wanted*
But it seems a majority of them apply the test as 
adopted under Section 30 of * having regard to all the circum­
stances* of the case*
The conclusion can be drawn that the principle of 
territoriality is immaterial when the same offence is committed 
in the territory of more than one requesting State or in the 
territory of none of the requesting States, and in such cases, 
the principle of priority of requisition will ‘be recognised.
The principle of territoriality will be recognised only in those 
cases when the offence was committed in the territory of the re­
questing State or States.
(b) Simultaneous requisitions under the Indian Extradition 
Act of 1962
Requisition can be made only for an extraditable of­
fence. It is possible that a number of States in respect of 
whom notifications have been made, may make a request for the 
surrender of the same fugitive criminal about the same time.
This is not impossible, because the fugitive may be a profession­
al swindler or habitual offender who may have cheated or commit­
ted other extraditable crimes in different countries at differ­
ent times. India had such an experience of having received at 
least one such person, in de Bremington, who was required by the
i
police in 11 countries.
In such cases, Section 30 of the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, provides that the Central Government may, having re­
gard to the circumstances of the case, surrender the fugitive 
criminal to such State or country as that Government thinks fit.
The principle of ’first come first served* has not 
been made applicable by Section 30 and the Central Government may 
surrender the fugitive to any State although there may have been 
other States which requested the extradition earlier. While 
doing so, the Government may take an undertaking for the return 
of the criminal after either he has been acquitted of the offence 
or he has served his Sentence, for eventual surrender to another 
country or countries which has or have made similar requisi-
1 . In Re de Bremington, The Statesman» 10 October, 1964.
2. R.C. Hingorani, The Indian Extradition Law. p.30.
tions.^
A serious question about the priority in surrender 
may arise when a magistrate has to decide between Section 30,
which gives discretion to the Central Government to extradite 
the person to any one of the foreign States or Commonwealth 
countries who have sent requisition for the extradition of the 
fugitive criminal, and the provisions of a treaty which may run 
counter to Section 30, and difficulties may arise in resolving 
this conflict. For instance, Article 10 of the Anglo-American
Treaty of 1931, which is binding on India and has been notified
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 2 ...................
in the Gazette of 1 April, 1966, has by Clause 10 provided
that:
11 If the individual claimed by one of 
the High Contracting parties in pursu­
ance of the present treaty should be 
claimed by one or several other powers 
on account of oHier crimes or offences 
committed within their respective juris­
dictions, his extradition shall be 
granted to the power whose claim is 
earliest in date, unless such claim 
is waived."
In the treaty, the principle of first come first served has been 
recognised and accepted by the High Contracting parties, whereas 
in Section 30, this principle has not been recognised. In the 
Hungarian-Canadian Treaty for extradition of fugitive offenders, 
it has been provided that in case of multiple demands for sur­
render of the same fugitive, he shall be returned to the country 
where he has committed the more serious crime. The pattern
1. R.C. Hingorani, ibid., p.30.
2. R.C. Hingorani, ibid., p.115. For similar provisions, see 
treaties between United States and South Africa, Art.9; United 
Kingdom and Israel, Art.13; Iraq-Egypt, Art.13, No.152; South 
Africa-Rhodesia, Art.13, No.28, cited by S.D. Bedi: Extradi­
tion in International Law and Practice, p.132, note No.r ,163, 
164, 165.
3. R.C. Hingorani, ibid.. p.30, note 9.
in this treaty is different from the pattern of the Anglo- 
American Treaty. Pente  ^has said that there can be three 
ways of dealing with simultaneous requsitions for the surrender 
of the same fugitive:-
Formula T: a) Gravity of the offence;
b) if equal gravity, priority in time;
c) if all are of equal gravity, at the dis­
cretion of the territorial State.
II: Treaty and non-treaty States
III: Priority of presentation.
Therefore, Section 30 has been enacted on such lines 
that it gives discretion to the territorial State, i.e. the 
Central Government, to take into consideration all the attending 
circumstances of the case, including the principles of priority,
gravity of the offence, whether either or both of the requesting 
States are treaty and non-treaty States, and then to use the judi­
cial discretion - as qpposed to arbitrary discretion - and finally 
to decide to which State the accused should be surrendered.
The magistrate, therefore, should follow the general 
rule of interpretation, and should try to reconcile the two pro­
visions, viz. Section 30 and the treaty clause. In other words, 
the Act should be so interpreted that it will not conflict with 
an international undertaking in the treaty containing a priority 
clause. The latter will have to be given effect in such a 
situation so as to limit discretion of the Government and the
fugitive has to be surrendered to the country that has applied
2 ~ 
earlier. But if other treaties contain other clauses refer-
1. See Julius J. Pente: "Principles of Extradition in Latin 
America", 1929-30, Michigan Law Review. pp.671-672.
2. R.C. Hingorani, ibid.. p.30.
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ring^seriousness of the offence or place of offence, etc. then 
those clauses will be given weight while deciding as to which 
country the fugitive offender should be extradited, or ulti­
mately, the principle laid down by jurists like Pente and others 
should be followed in deciding the question.
It may be mentioned that Article 8 of the Harvard Re­
search Draft has divided simultaneous requisitions into two 
categories:
i) When several requisitions are made for the same 
man and for the same crime.
ii) Requisition is made by several States for the 
same man but on different charges.
In the first case, Article 8 (a) would provide that the 
man may be extradited to the country where the offence was actu­
ally committed. In the second case, Article 8 (b) would provide 
that the person shall be extradited after taking into account:-
a) the seriousness of each charge;
b) the place of incidence^
c) the nationality of the person; and
d) the time of requisition — " '
ihe Harvard scholars placed mere priority lowest amongst the 
factors.
Section 30 of the Indian Act (in my submission) impli­
citly follows Article 8 (b)*s principles. It is possible (as I 
suggested above) that in case of simultaneous requests, a treaty 
State may be preferred to a non-treaty State as propounded by 
Pente (above). In exercise of its ru3e-making power (above) 
the Central Government should frame rules laying down the cri­
teria and guiding principles as to how the discretion is to be
used 1 having regard to the circumstances of [each] case1.
(c) Simultaneous requests for different offences
In treaties where distinction is not made between 
multiple demands for the same or different offences, the State 
of Asylum is free to exercise its discretion.
The same will follow from treaties which vest the 
requested State with such discretion in the absence of any pro­
vision controlling the activities of the State on the subject.
In cases of several offences, preference may be given to the 
State in whose territory the offence was committed and if several 
States apply in whose territories different offences were com­
mitted by the same person, then preference may be given to the 
State in whose territory the offence of greatest gravity was com­
mitted, and when offences are of equal gravity, to the State 
which applied first. In other State practices, first preference 
is given on the basis of relative seriousness of the offence, 
second on the strength of nationality of the offender, and third
i
of the order in which the applications were received. The 
United States and British practices give consideration to the 
principle of territoriality in case of the States in whose terri­
tory commission of same offence took place and in cases of mul­
tiple requests to the State which made the demand first, without 
taking into consideration the seriousness or gravity of the 
offence.^
In municipal laws generally, three principles are
3
not ed:-
1. S.D. Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, 
p.134, note 177.
2. Bedi, ibid., p.134, note 178.
3. Bedi, ibid., pp.134, 135, notes 177, 180, 181.
i) preference is primarily based on relative gravity 
of the offence;
ii) order of receipt of applications (as under the Indo- 
American treaty), and
iii) on the discretion of the State of asylum, like Section 
30 of the Indian Act, 1962* The United States and 
the United Kingdom do not make any distinction between 
a country in whose territory the principal offence was 
committed and a country where non-principal or simple 
offences were perpetrated. They surrender on the 
basis of priority of requisitions as under the Indo- 
American Treaty.^
(10) Extraditable Offences
The requisition can be made only for an extraditable
offence. The Extradition Act of 1962 defines an extraditable
offence by Section 2(c), as^either in the Second Schedule
2
or in the treaty*
The language used in Section 2(c)(ii) of the Act so 
far as Commonwealth countries with extradition arrangements are 
concerned, is ambiguous. The Section says that an extraditable 
offence with regard to a * Commonwealth country* will be as men­
tioned in the Second Schedule. Ostensibly here * Commonwealth 
country* includes both types, viz. one having no treaty relations 
and the other having extradition arrangements, the request of the 
latter is handled favourably under Chapter III. . Like the
1. Bedi, ibid., p.135, note 183.
2 . Section 2(c) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962. See also 
Oppenheim: International Law. 8th ed., pp.697-700.
treaties with foreign States, the extradition arrangements be­
tween India and Commonwealth countriese may enumerate extraditable 
offences.
A question will arise in this eventuality whether such 
an enumeration will be limited by the list given in the Second 
Schedule or it will be treated independently, if it is an extra­
dition offence under the treaty* The Central Government has 
powers (see Clause 18, Second Schedule) always to amend the 
Second Schedule and add new offences to it and whatever is added 
as a supplemental provision in the agreement will be deemed to 
be a part of the Second Schedule, provided a notification under 
Section 3(1) and 12 is made in accordance with law because the 
whole treaty is added and reproduced in the notification.
A possible interpretation of Section 2(c)(ii) of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, would hold that any list enunci­
ated in an extradition arrangement with a Commonwealth country 
would be limited by the list in the Second Schedule, which may 
be supplemented under the powers given to the Central Government 
under the Act. Wherever there is national legislation govern­
ing extradition which also gives a list of crimes for which extra­
dition may be granted or demanded, such legislation circumscribes 
the scope of treaties which that State may enter into with other 
countries. As Oppenheim sayd, ’These municipal laws furnish 
the basis for the conclusion of extradition treaties.* 1 Con- 
cio'fe^ly, it follows that if the list in the Second Schedule is 
not increased and if the extradition arrangement enumerates 
offences other than those listed in the Second Schedule, it will
1. Oppenheim: International Law, 8th ed., p.697.
be a hardship for a Commonwealth country because the fugitive 
may not be extradited for an offence which though included in 
the arrangements is not in the Second Schedule*
Actually Section 2(c)(ii) of the Act needs redrafting 
to avoid ambiguity and anomaly, namely, a Commonwealth country, 
which tends to be treated more favourably under Chapter III, 
applying a simplified extradition procedure, should be in a more
advantageous position than a treaty state which can demand extra­
dition for offences which are found in the treaty, irrespective 
of whether or not they are listed in the Second Schedule*
Ihe common practice is that either the extradition 
offences are mentioned in the individual treaties or are listed 
in municipal legislation. The Indian Government has adopted a 
dual method for determining extradition offences and this dual 
enunciation is more convenient, particularly in cases where a 
foreign State or a Commonwealth country wants to have a separate 
treaty or extradition arrangement and does not want to agree to 
the Schedule mentioning the list of extradition offences in the 
national legislation. But in that case, a Commonwealth country
Cr
with a treaty arrangement should enjoy at least the same rights
as a treaty State insofar as the list of extradition offences are 
concerned* This would require either an amendment of the Act 
ox supplementing the Second Schedule, which power, of course, 
may be assumed by the Government as and when necessary
The adoption of a dual method for determining whether 
the offences are extraditable or not, has facilitated observance 
of the doctrine of double criminality on different planes.
1* R.C. Hingorani; The Indian Extradition Law, p.33.
Thus, for example, so far as treaty States are concerned, extra­
dition offences will be given in the treaty. In this process 
it is but natural that the Indian Government as well as the treaty 
State will agree to only such crimes being extraditable as are 
punishable in both the territories, although they may be called 
by different names and having different punishments. Similarly, 
the enumeration of extradition offences in the Second Schedule 
would enable the foreign non-treaty States, including the Common­
wealth countries, to be forewarned as to the crimes for which 
the Government of India will permit extradition. Such states 
will, therefore, ask for extradition of only such fugitives as 
have been accused of one or more of the enumerated offences in 
the Second Schedule. It can be presumed that the requisition
can be made only when the fugitive has committed the offence 
according to its municipal law, otherwise the necessity of requi­
sition for surrender would not arise. The rule of double crimi- 
nality has thus been followed here also.
Generally States extradite only for serious offences
2or crimes, the offences under the Defence of India Rules are 
also regarded as extraditable offences. There is an obvious 
advantage in limiting the list of extradition crimes since the 
procedure is cumbersome and expensive. Certain States, for 
example, France, extradite only for offences which are subject 
to a definite maximum penalty, both in the State requesting and 
in the State requested. In the case of Great Britain, extra­
dition crimes are scheduled in the Extradition Act of 1870.
In India, extradition crimes are scheduled in the Indian
1. R.C. Hingorani, ibid., pp.33, 34.
2. War crimes are now generally treated as extradition crimes.
See Felice Morgenstern, B.Y.I.L. 1948, pp.236-241.
Extraditiona Acts of 1903 and 1962.
As a general rule, the following offences are not 
subject to extradition proceedings:-
i) political cfimes;
ii) military offences, for example, desertion;
(the latter offence is an exception in Article 3 
of the Indo-Nepalese Extradition Treaty of 1963);
iii) religious offences.
The principle of non-extradition of political offenders (see 
Chapter IV below) crystallised in the 19th century, a period 
of internal convulsions, when tolerant countries insisted on 
their right to shelter political refugees. At the same time, 
it is not easy to define a ’political crime’. Different 
criteria have been adopted:-
a) The motive of the crime;
b) Circumstances of its commission;
c) that it embraces specific offences only, e.g. 
treason or attempted treason; the test follow­
ed in the English cases^  that there must be 
two parties striving for political control in 
the State where the offence is committed, the 
offence being committed in pursuance of that 
goal, thereby excluding an anarchist and terror­
ist acts from the category of ’political crimes’ .
2In a recent English decision the Court favoured 
an even more extended meaning, holding in effect
1. Re Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415 and Re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B.
2. R. v. Brixton Prison Governor, Ex Parte Kolezynski (1955) 1 
Q.B. 540: (1955) i All E.ti. 31 • See also Tzu-fsai Cheng v• 
Governor ox Pentonville Prison (1973) 2 All e.k. £04 (tl.L.)
that the offences committed in association 
with a political object or with a view to 
avoiding political persecution or prosecu­
tion for political defaults, are ’political 
crimes’•
International law leaves to the State of asylum the
sovereign rights of deciding, according to the municipal law
and practice, the question whether or not the offence which is
the subject of a request for extradition is a political crime.
( >
(11) Rule of Double Criminality
As regards the character of the crime, most States 
follow the rule of double criminality, i.e. it is a condition 
of the extradition that the crime is punishable according to the 
law both of the State of asylum and the requesting State. The 
application of the rule to peculiar circumstances cane before the 
United States Supreme Court in 1933.1 These proceedings were 
taken by the British authorities for the extradition of Jacob 
Factor on a charge of receiving in London money which he knew to 
have been fraudulently obtained. At the time extradition was 
applied for, Factor was residing in the State of Illinois, by the 
laws of which the offence charged was not an offence in the
State of Illinois. It was held by theSupreme Court that this 
did not prevent extradition if according to the criminal law 
generally of the United States, the offence was punishable', 
otherwise extradition might fail merely because the fugitive 
offender would succeed in finding in the country of refuge some
1. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276.
province in which the offence charged was not punishable* On 
this subject, see above, Chapter IX, (9)(i)^p.ll8.
(12) Principle or Rule of Speciality
A further principle sometimes applied is known as the 
principle of speciality (see above, p* 108 ), i*e* the request­
ing State is under a duty not to punish the offender for any 
other offence than that for which he was extradited* This 
principle is frequently embodied in treaties of extradition and 
is approved by the Supreme Court of United States, where 
treaties are law of the land without sanction of municipal law* 
In the United Kingdom, its application is a little uncertain.^ 
Iho Extradition Act was held to prevail over a treaty of extra­
dition with France embodying the speciality principle, and it 
was ruled that the accused could be tried there for an offence 
for which he was not extradited* ^-fc^is ,the case in India*
The Rajasthan High Court held that a person arrested and 
extradited to a native Indian State could be tried in that State 
for some other offence in addition to those mentioned in the 
warrant even though such offence 5^ not an extraditable offence* 
It appears that India as the receiving country need not obey a 
speciality undertaking, though whether this would be expedient 
politically is another (and unresolved) question*
On the current position in India with regard to 
surrender, see further, above Chapter II (9 )(f ) * at p. 108.
1* R. v* Cortigan (1931) 1 K.B. 527.
2* Nanka v. Government of Rajasthan* A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 153;
Blrma v. State* A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 127.
B* JUDICIAL INQUIRY
(1) Necessity of Judicial Intervention
As has been seen above, extradition is that process
by which one State delivers up a person accused or convicted of
a crime to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction
the offence or crime was committed and which State asks for his
surrender with a view to administer justice.** Ihe surrender
of a fugitive from foreign justice is a prerogative of the exe-
cutive of the State. In absence of a treaty of extradition
between the two States and the non-existence of municipal law
on the subject, a State is not bound to surrender the fugitive
2
under international law. Extradition, as such, does not in­
volve the execution of enforcement of law; and thus, it is an 
administrative measure confirming the executive decree of rendi­
tion of the demanding State and the judiciary of the requested 
State has no concern in principle whether the fugitive should 
be extradited or not.
But judicial inquiry now has become an integral part 
of extradition procedure and current practice is to grant extra­
dition only if, according to the authorities of the requested 
State, the evidence furnished before it by the requesting State 
would be sufficient to justify committal for trial, if the of­
fence had been committed within the jurisdiction of that State.
1. J.B. Moore, Extradition, p.4.
2. Birma v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 127; Nanka v. Govern­
ment of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 153.
Previously, some States like Cuba, Egypt and Ecuador considered
extradition a pure administrative act,**’ but now the self-restraint
by the Governments by way of careful examination of the case by
the judiciary has in practice, if not in theory, shifted the
notion from treating extradition as an administrative act to
treating it as a judicial act and has thus saved the territorial
State from an embarrassing situation where it had to refuse
extradition in some cases - for different political reasons - and
has saved the territorial State from straining its relations
2
with the requesting State. Therefore, it is customary in 
practically all States to whom a request has been made to hold 
some kind of judicial inquiry after the receipt of a request. 
Today, no Government surrenders any fugitive without judicial 
determination as to the identity of the accused and his involve­
ment in the crime attributed to him, in addition to whether the 
offence is extraditable or not, political or non-political, with­
in time or barred by time, whether there are provisions of law 
in the requesting State for observing the rule of speciality*
The magistrate has also to observe the doctrine of double 
criminality, rule of double jeopardy or non bis in idem, and 
whether the extradition demand has an ulterior motive, i.e. is
3
made bona fide or mala fide. Under national statutes, the 
proceedings for extradition in the requested State fall into two 
categories, the executive on the one hand and the facultative or 
judicial on the other.
1* R.C. Hingorani: The Indian Extradition Lawa p.35.
2. B.C. Hingorani, ibid., p.35,
3. SeeSection 29 and 31 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
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(a) The Executive method
Under this system, a request is generally made by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the President or the 
King, and is transmitted to the Minister of Justice, together 
with the relevant documents, containing proof or prima facie evi­
dence showing the involvement of the fugitive in the commission 
of the alleged offence, and the Minister decides whether the 
requisition should be honoured or not and accordingly advises 
the President or the King who, in turn, has the final authority 
to grant or withhold extradition. The House of Lords held, 
in Atkinson*s c a s e that:
''There is however, a complete discretion 
in extradition cases in the Secretary of 
State and it will be for him to decide 
whether in all the circumstances the 
appellant should or should not be 
surrendered."
Lord Morris in his judgment, placed reliance upon Connelly v.
2Director of Prosecutions.
3The English Courts have held that * even if the 
court orders extradition, the Home Secretary can refuse to 
implement its order* • Under the Irish Extradition Act, 1965, 
the Minister of Justice is given power to refuse to permit the
surrender on grounds like those on which the High Court can
4 5interfere. The Supreme Court of India has held, that:
1. Atkinson v. U.S, Government (1969) 3 All E.R* 1317 at p.1327 
(H.L.).
2. (1964) 2 All E.R. 401; (1964) A.C. 1254.
3. In the case of Zacharia v. Republic of Cyprus (1962) 2 All 
. E.R. 438 (H.L.)
4. Paul O'Higgins, I.C.L.Q. 1966, Vol.15, 372 at p.393.
5. See Hans Muller* s case, A.I.R. 1955, S*C. 367 at p.376.
"The Government of India has an unfetter­
ed right to refuse to comply with a request
made to it by a foreign Government even if 
there is a good caee against the person 
whose extradition has been requested*"
The Indian Extradition Act of 1962, by Section 29, 
empowers the Executive, namely the Cent rail Government, to dis­
charge a fugitive criminal if it appears to it that by reason
of the trivial nature of the case, or by reason of the applica­
tion for the surrender or return of a fugitive criminal not 
being made in good faith, or in the interest of justice, or 
for political reasons or otherwise it is unjust or inexpedient 
to surrender or return the fugitive criminal. This provision 
is in substance akin to Section 10 as well as Section 19 of the 
Fugitive Offendjs Act, 1881, with an important change, namely 
that, while the Fugitive Offenders Act empowers a superior court 
to discharge the fugitive, the present Indian Act vests powers 
in the Central Government. Under the Indian Extradition Act, 
1903, read with the Fugitive Offenders Act, the Executive as 
well as the magistracy had powers to examine the matter. By 
virtue of Section 435 and 439 of the Indian Criminal Procedure 
Code, the High Court also could examine the order of the magi­
strate and after the coming into force of the Constitution of 
India; matters arising under the 1903 and 1962 Act could be re­
viewed by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, in addi­
tion to its revisional powers under Sections 435, 491, 561A and 
439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and by the Supreme Court 
in exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 32 of 
the Constitution by a writ of habeas corpus and in exercise of 
its appellate powers under Article 136 against the judgment of 
the High Court.
The powers of the Central Government in India under
the 1962 Act to discharge a fugitive offender under Section 29 
are a special feature of the Act. In addition to this power, 
concurrent power under Section 31 of the Act has been given to 
the Central Government, wherever,Rafter the decision and recommend­
ation by the magistrate, it is empowered on the grounds mentioned 
in that Section to decline to extradite a fugitive criminal.
The powers under Section 29 are very wide and the Central Govern­
ment may at any time order the stay of any proceedings pending 
before the magistrate on the grounds mentioned in that Section, 
and direct any warrant issued or endorsed under the Act to be 
cancelled and the person for whose arrest the warrant has been 
issued or endorsed to be discharged.
The Central Government has also been empowered with 
the discretion to appoint or not to appoint a magistrate to make 
an inquiry as provided under Section 5 of the Act. So after 
receiving the requisition it may or may not appoint a magistrate 
to make an inquiry and obviously it may decline to extradite the 
requested fugitive offender before any inquiry is made. Further, 
the Central Government, even after the recommendation made by 
the magistrate for the surrender of the fugitive to the request­
ing State, may refuse his extradition on grounds mentioned in 
that Section. The incorporation of these provisions giving 
vast powers to the Central Government do not leave arbitrary 
powers in the hands of the executive, but these are circumscribed 
by the provisions of the Act and demonstrate a good example of 
restraint by the executive on its own powers, and inspires our 
confidence in the Rule of JLaw.^' ^  ^
The powers conferred by Section 29 of the present Act, 
upon the Central Government are ~ far greater than the ones 
given to the Secretary of State under the English Fugitive
Offenders Act under which the ultimate authority to extradite 
rests in the Secretary of State. Recent British practice
demonstrates this executive fiat. Two persons were imprisoned
to await their extradition to Cyprus, one of the members of the 
Commonwealth. Their applications for habeas corpus and for 
relief under Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act were dis­
missed by the House of Lords, but the Home Secretary, Mr.Butler, 
presumably on the authority of Section 6 of the Fugitive Offend-
i
ers Act,intervened and their extradition to Cyprus was refused.
Practice under the Extradition Act, 1962, demonstrated parallel
2 . . .
powers of the Executive.
This administrative system of disposing of the request 
for extradition was highly developed in France in the early 
years of the last century, thoughFrance abandoned this system
3
in 1929. The method is still in operation in certain 
4countries. A halfway power is found in the laws of Panama, 
where though the power to grant or deny rests with the execu­
tive, the exercise of that power must be in keeping with the 
procedures established by the Courts, which require the matter 
to be referred to the Supreme Court for its decision on the 
merits. In addition to this, it provides for the right of
5
the person claimed to move objections to his extradition.
1. 1962 Crim. L.R. 350.
2. J.N.'Saxena, *-The Indian Extradition Act, 1962*, 13 I.C.L.Q. 
1964, pp. 116-138 at p.129.
3. The Law of Extradition of March 10, 1927, Art.11-18.
4. S.D. Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, 
p.137, supra.
5. Panama Law of Extradition, Noi44, November 22, 1930, Articles 
9 and 11; Bedi, supra, p.137*
The law of Thailand is rather at the other extreme, which gives 
the Executive the upper hand in its decision against or in favour 
of the person claimed,^ like the Indian Act of 1962*
(b) The Facultative or judicial method
The facultative or Judicial method requires a decision 
of a Tribunal prior to compliance with a requisition for extradi­
tion* Under this system, no person cam be extradited unless his 
case has been judicially adjudicated* This investigation must 
be done by an independent court: both the substantive and proce­
dural law and the proceedings must be authorised by some municipal 
law of the requesting State; otherwise the extradition will be
refused and the extradition proceedings will be quashed by the 
2
Courts* These proceedings will in India be examined on the
anvil of Articles 13, 14, 20 ,21 and 22 of the Constitution of
India, as the power to surrender is subject to the fundamental 
consideration that the Constitution admits no executive preroga­
tive to dispose of the liberty of the individual, whether a citizen 
of India or an alien*
The proceedings will be tested by the laws of the country 
particularly Chapter III of the Constitution which safeguards the 
Fundamental Rights* The general view and practice even in.inter­
national law is that in the absence of a conventional or a legis­
lative provision, there is no authority vested in any department 
of Government to seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a 
foreign power. There is thus no inherent executive discretion 
for grant of extradition where it may exist for refusal to
1. Bedi, supra* p.137.
2* Birma v» State* A;I,R. 1951 Rajasthan 127; and Nanka v* Govern- 
ment of Rajasthan* A.I.R, 1951 Rajasthan 153*
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extradite. The executive discretion is for refusal only and 
facultative method . both to surrender a fugitive to a foreign
A _
Government.1 In the investigation by the Court, the involve­
ment in the offence and the criminality of the fugitive must be 
proved according to the laws of the place where the fugitive was 
found. Under this system, therefore, extradition of persons 
cannot be granted without judicial authorisation; a sentence of 
the court favourable to the person claimed results in his immedi­
ate discharge. But sin unfavourable decision does not bind the
2
executive authority to grant extradition. This system has bean
3 4 5 6 7adopted by India, Canada, Iraq, Israel, , the United Kingdom,
o
the United States of America, and other Commonwealth countries, 
viz. Australia,9 Tanzania,10 as well as Ireland.11
In France, the traditional executive system of dealing 
with requests for extradition was abandoned in 1927, when provi-
12
sion was made for a judicial hearing and a judicial determination.
1. J.B. Moore, Extradition, p.21.
2. S.D. Bedis Extradition in International Law and Practice, p.137,
3. The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, Chapter II.
4. Canada, Extradition Act, 1952, Articles 10-18.
5. Iraq Extradition Law of 1923, Articles 11-15.
6. Israel Extradition Law of 1954, Articles 9 & 10.
7. The United Kingdom Extradition Act of 1870, Articles 7-9.
8. The United States Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure,
Section 651.
9. Extradition Acts, 1903-1950, Article 5.
10.Tanzania Extradition Act, 1965, Article 7.
11. The Irish Extradition Act, 1965, Section 11.
12. S.D. Bedi, opjcit.. p.137.
As in the common law system, including Britain, the United States 
of America, and India, the judicial determination is final if the 
Court decides not to extradite, but not so if its decision is in
i
favour of extradition. Section 7(3) of the Indian Act of 1962 
provides that if the magistrate is of opinion that a prima facie 
case has not been made out in support of the inquisition of the 
foreign State or Commonwealth country, he shall discharge the 
fugitive criminal. That is the end of the whole matter and the 
order of the magistrate is final. If, on the contrary, the magi­
strate is of the opinion that a prima facie case is made out in 
in support of the requisition, he may commit the fugitive criminal 
to prison to await the orders of the Central Government, and shall 
report the result of his inquiry to the Central Government and 
shall forward, together with such report, any written statement
which the fugitive criminal may desire to submit for the consider-
2ation of the Central Government.
Section 8 provides that if upon receipt of the report 
and statement under Section 7(4), the Central Government is of 
opinion that the fugitive criminal ought to be surrendered to the 
foreign State or Commonwealth country, it may issue a warrant for 
the custody and removal of the fugitive criminal and for his 
delivery at a place and to a person to be named in the warrant.
The hearing will be in accordance with the provisions of the 
Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, and the magistrate will for 
the purpose of trial and bail enjoy the same powers as if the
1. See Section 7(3)(4) and Section 8 of the Indian Extradition Act, 
1962.
2. Section 7(4) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
offence was committed within his jurisdiction,* subject^of course, 
to the supervisory jurisdicti on of the High Court in exercise of 
its revisional powers under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898. An Order passed in proceedings subse­
quent to arrest under the Act of 1903 when the magistrate was re­
quired to decide the matter raised by the accused was judicial and 
revisable by the High Court. Under the Orders passed by the
magistrate or the Central Government when the accused was detained
o
under the Extradition Act, 1903, the court could inquire whether
q
its somewhat detailed provisions had been complied with or not.
The position under the present Act is no less favourable to the 
fugitive.
4
The German Extradition Act of 1929, on the other hand, 
makes the determination as to extradition an entirely judicial 
natter, for by that law not only is the judicial decision against 
extradition final but it is not subject to any discretion of the 
executive.
Between these two methods dealing with the requests for
extradition indicated above, adopted by France and India and 
other common law system countries and Germany, Belgium has devel­
oped an intermediate system for handling applications for
1. See Sections 9, 10 and 25 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, 
Appendix 1.
2. Also under the Act of 1962; See also Hans Muller* s case.
3. Alan G^  ledhill: The Republic of India - The Development of its 
Laws and Constitution, p.177 - Hans Muller and Mubarak All* s 
cases, supra.
4. See Articles 8, 28, 29(2) and 30. Bedi, opicit., p.140, note 
217.
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extradition, which requires that, before extradition is granted, 
each case be submitted to judicial consideration, without making 
the judicial determination binding either for or against extradi­
tion# This system was introduced in 1833 and was modified by an 
Act of 18 March, 1874, now in force in Belgium#1 The procedure 
under this statute is mostly similar to the procedure prescribed 
under the Indian Extradition Act# Under the Belgian Act, as 
under the Indian Act, on receiving the documents, and requisition 
from the requesting State, on which the application or request for 
extradition is based, the Minister of Justice may refuse extradi­
tion on his own authority (compare Section 5 of 1962 Act wherein 
the Central Government may if it thinks fit, issue an order to the 
magistrate)# In both these cases, the executive can turn down
the request when the case is clear on the face of documents#
Under Belgian law, if the Minister does not reject the request, 
he may transmit the requisition to the Chambre de Con>seil du 
Tribunal de Premiere Instance, of the foreigner1s place of resi­
dence in Belgium or the place where he may have been found. The 
court thereupon issues a warrant for the arrest of the person con­
cerned, who is arrested after the due notification# The Govern­
ment also on the arrest of the foreigner, seeks the opinion, as 
soon as possible, of the court of Appeal, within whose jurisdiction 
the foreigner is arrested, and which fixes a date for hearing#
The Public Prosecutor and the foreigner are heard, the hearing 
being public, unless it is conducted in chambers on the request 
of the fugitive offender# The court may assign a J^yer to assist 
him in the presentation of his objection. The opinion of the
1. Bedi, ogicit., p.140.
court along with the arguments are submitted within a fortnight 
from the date of the receipt of the documents to the Minister of
i
Justice, who makes the final decision# Under this system,
2
there is no appeal against the advice of the lower court# The
3 4 5same system is adopted in Mexico, in Japan, in Peru, and in
the Netherlands# In the case of the Netherlands, when there
is a question whether the alleged criminal is a Dutch national or
not, the matter is referred for disposal to the Supreme Court
which has jurisdiction over all the problems connected with
nationality, and if it decides that the person concerned is a
n
Dutch national, the accused will not be surrendered. But the 
draft of the new constitution, prepared by the Ministry of the 
Interior assisted by eminent scholars in Constitutional Law, has
O
recommended the extradition even of nationals#
The majority of countries provide for a j'udicial hearing 
and determination, as a prerequisite to extradition, believing 
that this is essential to protect the individual against oppression
1# Belgian Law of Extradition, 1874, Article 8. See Bedi, op#cit#« 
p.140.
2# In're Ludic, decided on 22 November, 1948, A.D; 1948 Case No#
96, and in Re Paradiso, decided on 7 September, 1950: 17 Int# 
Law Reports, 1950, case No# 87#
3# Extradition Law of May, 1897, Articles 19-22#
4# Extradition Law of August 10, 1895, Articles 14-16*
5. Extradition Act of 23 October, 1888, Article 12#
6# Extradition~Law of 6 April^ 1875, as amended in July, 1964, 
Articles 11-15# See Bedi, op*cit* # p#141#
7# Article 16, ibidem*
8* S.D# Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, 5>p# 
140-141*
But different countries have developed different practices with 
regard to the range of judicial inquiry which is essential before 
the person claimed.is surrendered to the requesting State. The 
range of this inquiry is often restricted by the existing 
treaties and national codes in order to facilitate the giving of 
effect to the request. The court in the j'udicial inquiry has 
inter alia to see that the extradition proceedings have the 
sanction of law and are authorised by some positive law of the 
Sfate.1
Apart from that there is no executive discretion to
surrender a fugitive criminal to a foreign Government. Hence,
* it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power
to surrender, it must be found that statute or treaty confers the 
2
power1 ; Instances of extradition of fugitives under a treaty
without giving the latter (outside the United States) a sanction
of municipal law could not make extradition proceedings valid on
3
the mere ground of past practice.
The national laws of Latin American countries have
explicit provisions to make it obligatory on the executive to
refer any request for extradition to the Supreme Court of the
Nation or some other tribunal, as the case may be, so that the
court may decide after hearing the defendant and the prosecuting
4authorities whether or not the request should be granted. There
1. Birina v. St&ter A.I.R. 1951 Raj'asthan 127; Nanka v. Government 
of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Raj*asthan 153.
2. Valentine et al. v. United States ex rel. Neidecker (1936)
299 U .S . 5.
3. Birma v. State. A.I.R. 1951 Raj'asthan 127.
4. See Argentine Cr . P.C. Article 652; Chile Cr. P.C. Article - 
692; Mexico, Extradition Law of 1897, Article 17; Peru Extra­
dition Act of 1888, Article 12; Uruguay, Cedigo Penal of 1889, 
Article 12, Venezuela Cr. P.C. 1915, Article 319; See also Bedi 
op^cit♦« p.139, n.210.
are other: States about which the same can be said, who have incor­
porated the Bill of Rights or Fundamental Rights in their Consti­
tutions to protect individuals against arbitrary action of the 
executive
The Indian Act of 1962 is an admixture of all these 
principles or systems adopted by different countries. In the 
Indian Act the magisterial inquiry has been provided, but so far 
as the order of non-e&radition is concerned, it being in favour 
of the fugitive has been made final, but the orders of the magi­
strate recommending the extradition is subject to the scrutiny of 
of superior courts, while it lies in the discretion of the Govern­
ment to refuse or allow extradition. The provisions of Criminal
Procedure Code have been made applicable. The fugitive has been 
granted a right to move the High Court and in the Indian Consti­
tution, Fundamental Rights under Articles 13, 14, 20(1)(2)(3), 21 
and 22 have been given alike to a citizen and non-citizen. There­
fore, the proceedings may be tested on the anvil of these provi­
sions •
The effect of those guarantees is, broadly, that no 
person can be deprived of his life, liberty and property without 
the authority of law, and therefore, it is the right of a person
(including an alien) not to be handed over to a foreign j'urisdict-
oion unless it is authorised by the Extradition Act. In other 
words, the Indian Extradition Act and the Constitution safeguard 
the interests of citizens and aliens by adopting the multi-method
system mentioned above adopted by various States, and leave no
1. §.g. The Constitution of Ireland, Article 40$ Peaslee ,A.J. • « _<
Constitutions of Rations, Vol.II, The Hague, ,1956; see feedi',' 
op.cit . , p.l39f n.211.
2. Birina v. State. A.I.R. 1951, Raj'asthan 127, and Nanka v. Govern­
ment of Rajasthan. A.I.R. 1951, Raj'asthan 153.
lacuna for the arbitrary executive or magisterial action/ as one
or the other is controlled by the provisions of the Extradition 
Act and above all the highest courts of the country have juris­
diction to correct the errors made by the magistracy and the 
executive and keep them in bounds and examine the legality, pro­
priety and correctness of the orders passed by them for the 
extradition of the fugitive.
1 2  3The laws of Finland, Italy, and Norway dispensed
with judicial inquiry if the person apprehended gives his consent
to be extradited and admits that he is the person claimed. But
in the absence of such consent and admission, there is full-fledged
inquiry as under the Common Law System and the fugitive cannot be
extradited if the Court, like Indiah Law, decides in his favour,
while if the Courts* decision is against him, his extradition
4rests on the discretion of the executive, as under the Indian 
Extradition Act.
It seems that under the Indian law even if the fugitive 
gives his consent and the extradition proceedings are not autho­
rised by some positive law or is against the provisions of the 
Extradition Act or infringes any provisions of the Constitution, 
the extradition will be refused, in spite of waiver or consent by 
the fugitive. No amount of consent can confer jurisdiction
if the Court has none. Fundamental Rights cannot be waived,5 
and Article 21 of the Constitution lays down that *no person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
1) Extradition Law of 1922, Articles 14-16.
2) Cr. P.C. of 1930, Articles 661 and 662.
3) Extradition Law of 1908, Articles 16-20. See also Bedi, op.cit.. 
p.139, notes 212, 213, 214. ----
4) Bedi, op.cit.. p.139.
5 ) Basheskr^ath v. I.T. Commission er f A.I.R.1959 S.C.149paraJVl3.
202.
procedure established by law* and this article is a Lex Scripta
and mandate to the State including its executive, legislative
judicial wings • If the:  ^ . :: procedure established by law to
extradite J js, person, which would include all the details includ­es.
ing substantive and procedural lav/, he cannot be deprived of his 
liberty by illegally extraditing him* The superior courts will
set him free if there is an infringement of Article 21, whatever 
amount of consent he may give*
Under Swiss law  ^if the person apprehended consents to 
extradition or raises no objection based upon the extradition law, 
a treaty or declaration of reciprocity, the Federal Council deals 
with the situation, otherwise the case goes before the Federal 
Tribunal, which decides whether or not there are grounds for exami­
nation as in the common law system. It may be mentioned here 
that there is a difference between an irregularity in procedure 
and its acquiescence, and a total absence of a procedure esta­
blished by law. If there is no procedure established by law 
then the question of consent does not arise* The question of 
consent would only arise in those cases where the fugitive does 
not raise certain objections available to him, e.g. he has a
right under the Indian law to submit objections or a written 
statement as provided under Section 7(4) of the 1962 Act or does 
not raise objections or take the grounds for non-extradition as 
provided under Sections 29 and 31 of the Indian Extradition Act 
of 1962 or does not approach the High Court for his discharge 
under Section 24 of the Act. In such cases, consent or waiver 
may operate against the fugitive - subject to the right of the
1. Extradition Law of 1892, Articles 22-24. See Bedi, op.cit., 
p.139, note 15.
requested State to refuse extradition in spite of consent, pro­
vided the Central Government thinks that the extradition should 
be refused on one or more of the grounds for refusal mentioned 
in Sections 29 and 31. But if there is no law, no treaty given 
the force of law, no notification made under Section 3 or 12, as 
the case may be, the absence of law, and consequently of proced­
ure established by law, would prevent the grant of extradition 
in spite of the consent of the fugitive. Further questions and 
complications would arise as to who is to decide whether there 
was a free consent.*
(°) Nature of judicial inquiry
According to well-established practice, an extradition
hearing is not a trial. It is an inquiry by the magistracy
whether there is a prima facie case of extraditing the fugitive
offender. The magistracy has not to go into the niceties of
the evidence to see whether the accused will be convicted in
trial by the requesting State’s courts; the magistrate has not
to see whether there could be a case proving the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He inquires into the fitness of the case
having prima facie evidence as a case for extradition. The
judicial proceedings, therefore, in cases of extradition cannot
2 3be regarded as penal in nature or as a penal measure, process
4
or a trial, since it does not entail all the niceties and
1. R.C. Hingorani: The Indian Extradition Law, p.58; see also 
Bedi, op.cit.. p.i51, n.279.
2. In re Extradition of Carlos Canuto Lavalle (1923) 138 Fallos 
Sup. Ct. 274 Argentina.
3. In re Extradition of Sali Thalmessiger (1913) 117 Fallos Sup. 
Ct. 137, Argentina.
4. Chariton v. Kelley (1913) 229 U.S. 447.
technicalities of a criminal trial  ^and decides nothing about
the innocence of guilt of the fugitive, whereby any status is
created, or which prevents the re-opening of the petition with 
3
new documents. Its main purpose is to determine whether
there is a prima facie case or reasonable grounds which warrant 
his being sent to the demanding State, where he is alleged to 
have committed the crime. Consequently, the jurisdiction of 
the inquiry by the magistrate while deciding whether extradition 
should be made or not is limited to the formal part of the request 
and does not concern itself with the merits of the case. This 
formal part is understood in the sense that a finding of guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt for the purposes of conviction of the 
fugitive offender is not to be the test for extradition. It is 
to be seen whether there is a prima facie case for extradition 
and whether other formalities, namely the warrant of arrest, other 
documents of equal import issued by the competent authority of the 
requesting State, giving full details of the guilt or the nature 
of the charge and the applicable articles of law of the request­
ing State under which it intends to prosecute the person claimed, 
have been performed or not, which formal requirements are the 
condition precedent for the lodging of a valid request for extra­
dition, The civil law states generally accept this formal part 
of requisition for extradition. Some States insist on the
1, Gluckman v,'Henkels (1911) 221 U,S, 508-512; United States ex
rel KleTn v. Mulligan, 1931-32 A.D, (1931) Case No,173; Re 
Johnston and Shane, 1*959, 27 Int, Law Reports, 1959, p,251,
2, Wright v, Henkel (1903) 190 U,S, 40; Charlton v, Kelly (1913) 
229 U,S, 4^77 Grossberg v, Choquet (Choquette)(19^4) 36 Que, 
K.B. 517; In re Chang (*1947) AJD, 1947, Case No,69,
3, In re Carlos P;M, v, Jeanprost• (1923) 22 Rev, de Der, Jur,’335
Sup, Ct, Chile; Bedi, op;cit,, pp,141, 142, notes 225-230,
identity of the accused as an integral part of the investigation 
and this clause of identity has been included in numerous bi- 
partite as well as multi-partite treaties*
(2) Evidence
(a) Standard of proof
The standard and degree of proof to establish a prima 
facie case against the offender have been laid down differently*
2 ~ Mere suspicion is not enough but the evidence of the guilt be­
yond reasonable doubt leaving no doubt of guilt is not required 
for purposes of commitment and must be such in itd sufficiency 
as would justify a committal for trial if the crime has been con-
4
nitted in the State of asylum* The same standrds would apply 
in cases of India, according to the Supreme Court dictum wherein 
it was observed that the words ’sufficient grounds* to individual 
cases should be read in the light of the facts and circumstances 
disclosed in the case then before the court* The test is laid 
down by the English Court
There should be strong and probable pre­
sumption against the fugitive before the 
court can hold him liable for extradition.
1* See Bedi, op.cit,* p*142, n*231-233*
2. Ex parte Cadby (1886) 26 N.B.R. p*452.
3. Ex parte Feinberg (1901) 4 C.C.C* 270; ' State of New York v*
Wilby (alias Hume) (1944) 3 D.L.R. 693*
4. Re Pennsylvania and Levi (1897) 6 Que Q.B* 151; Ex parte
Feimbercg (l£6l) 4 C,C .C. 270; Re Danilhik (alias Stone) (1944)
3 W.W.R. 281.
5. R.G. Ruia v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 106 para.20.
6. In Re Mourat Mehmet (1962) 1 All E.R.463* ' . -
The circumstances proved must be sufficiently strong in them­
selves to warrant a cautious man in the;be]ief that the person 
accused is probably guilty of the offence with which he is 
charged. Thus, the duty of the extradition judge is merely
to consider whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant the 
committal of the fugitive* He may not go into the niceties 
of the evidence because that is the function and duty of the 
trial judge in the demanding State. But where the evidence is 
glaringly defective, lacking in proof of the ingredients of the 
offence which no reasonable person would believe and is insuffi­
cient to establish probable cause to believe that the fugitive 
is guilty of the offence charged, the extradion magistrate is 
not bound to recommend surrender of the fugitive. The evidence 
required at an extradition hearing, therefore, need not be the 
same in its weight as at the trial of the case in the requested 
State itself, yet it must be strong enough to establish a prima
facie case, even when the judge may think that there may be possi­
bilities of the accused being acquitted. The purpose of the 
inquiry is to acertain whether the fugitive is really involved 
in the offence he is charged with. If he is, he should recommend
his extradition; if not, he should be discharged. This is only
possible when the inquiry magistrate weighs the evidence of the 
prosecution and defence and strikes a reasonable balance to find 
out if there is any competent legal evidence, according to the 
law of the country of the requesting State.^ Any other approach
will be a mere empty formality and sham*
o
The House of Lords has held in a different connection
1. Collins v. Victor Loisel (1922) 259 U.S. 309 at pp.314-315.
2. In Fernandez v. Government of Singapore and Others (1971) 2 All 
E . R 7 W  (H'.L.) ---------------- “ -------------
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that
"The test of balance of probabilities
is not an appropriate one to apply where.....
the court has to determine under Section 
4(1)(c) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 
1967 whether a person accused of an of­
fence in a designated commonwealth country 
might, if returned, be prejudiced at his 
trial or punished, detained of restricted 
in his personal liberty by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality or political 
opinions. In that instance a lesser 
degree of likelihood is sufficient for- 
the court has to bear in mind the rela­
tive gravity of the consequences of its 
expectations being falsified either by 
permitting or refusing to return the 
fugitive. The Court might be justified 
in giving effect to the provisions of 
Section 4(l)(e) if an applicant has showed 
that there was *a reasonable chance^ or 
"substantial grounds'for thinking'or 
’serious possibility’ that he might be 
dealt within one of those ways.” I•
A ’balance of probabilities* will not serve when the 
question is whether the fugitive might be prejudiced in his 
eventual trial; similarly, it can hardly serve when the question 
is whether a case has been made out for his extradition.
The House of Lords said that it leads to confusion 
only to speak of balance of probabilities in the context of 
Section 4(1 )(e) of 1967. It is a convenient and trite phrase 
to indicate the degree of certitude which the evidence might 
have induced in the mind of the court as to the existence of 
facts, so as to entitle the court to treat them as data capable 
of giving rise to legal consequences.
About the ’strong and probable presumption’ Lord 
Parker C*J, observed that the Court (Divisional Bench) would 
look at the evidence before the magistrate to see whether it was
I.
1. In -Re Mourat Mehmat (1962) 1 All E.R. 463at p.466, H,I, 
p"."4bTA.-----------
such as to justify him in finding that a strong and probable 
presumption that the fugitive has committed the offence (which 
presumption would give him jurisdiction to commit the fugitive 
to prison) had been made out; and evidence was such
that no magistrate could find that a strong or probable presump­
tion of guilt had been made out. Regarding the question whether 
in habeas corpus the Divisional Court could look into the evidence 
to see whether any offence was made out for committal, the court
held that the matter was not fully argued in the case of Re Arton 
and it would be wrong to give a final ruling until a case emerges 
in which the matter is fully argued; but Lord Parker observed,
* that there is some power of review in the Court*• He observed
that * the matter was left open so far as Fugitive Offenders Act,
1 2 1881, ms concerned,* but that in a recent case,
**this court has taken on itself the right 
not only to look at the evidence which 
was before the magistrate, but also to 
consider whether any magistrate properly 
applying his mind to the question could 
reasonably come to the conclusion that 
a strong and reasonable presumption has 
been made out.’*
The Court further observed:
**In the present case, I have come clearly 
to the conclusion that on a proper analysis 
of this evidence the matter was left in a 
high degree of doubt, and I do not think 
that any magistrate applying his mind to 
the question could come to the conclusion 
that a strong or probable presumption has 
been made out.”
1. In R. v. Vyner (1903) 68 J.P. 142; and also in R. v. Governor 
of Brixton Prison Ex parte Bidwell (1936) 3 All E.R. 1; (193^)
1 K.B. 305.
He James, Q.B.D. (1961) Nb.4082, Lord Parker C.J., Ashworth 
and Widgery J J. decided on 28 November, $961; The Times. 29 
November, 1961.
In the case of Re James (supra), Lord Parker C.J.
(Ashworth and Widgery JJ. concurring) observed:
11 It is said that at any rate there is some 
evidence before the Magistrate • •• and that 
it is not for this court to weigh the evi­
dence • •« provided that there is evidence 
which a Magistrate could reasonably say 
that a strong or probable presumption had 
been shown, this court would not interfere, 
but on the evidence before the court in 
the present case I am quite unable to say 
that a magistrate should be able to decide 
that a strong or probable presumption has 
been raised* According to my judgment, 
the writ should issue in this case*1* 1
2Earlier Cave, J* had observed:
"The Magistrate has a discretion in each 
case, as to whether the evidence is or is 
not sufficient to j'ustify committal"
q
tho test being in the words of Lord Hfcwart C.J. in Perry*s case:
"whether, if the offence has been com­
mitted in this country, there would have 
been evidence j'ustifying the committal 
for trial*"
4
Lord Russell C.J. observed:
"We are not a court of appeal on a quest­
ion of fact from him (the Magistrate).
We have only to see that he has such — 
evidence before him as gave him autho­
rity and jurisdiction to commit*"
Bigham a. again 5 observed:
1. Re James, Q.B.D. 1961 No*4082 decided on 28 November, 1961;
The Times, 29 November, 1961*
2. In Re Mecpgier(1894) 2 Q.B.D. 415 at p.418.
3. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Perry. 1923 All E.R. 
T82.
4. In Re Arton No.(2) (1896) 1 Q.B. 509 at p.518.
5. In R. v. Governor of Holloway Prison* Re Siletti, 87 L.T. 332
at p.334, followed in R. v* Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte 
Perry (1923) All E.R. 182 at p.183, F, I per Lord Hewart C.J.
"I think the only question that this 
court can entertain is the question 
of jurisdiction ... He (the accused) 
may also say that there was absolutely 
no evidence upon which the Magistrate 
could exercise his discretion as to 
whether he would commit or not.11
In case of no evidence, the Magistrate has no juris­
diction to commit and on a writ petition in India the order of 
committal will certainly be set aside.
i
Even much earlier, the Court of Exchequer held that
(i) it was for the magistrate to decide whether the evidence was 
sufficient and the court was not a Court of Appeal from the magi­
strate^ decision; (ii) (Kelly C.B. dubitante) the depositions 
taken before the first magistrate were receivable in evidence by 
the second magistrate.
As under the Extradition Act, so under the Fugitive 
Offenders Act the sufficiency of the evidence giving the magi-
o
strate jurisdiction to commit may be questioned in habeas corpus.
(b) Evidence on Foreign Law
Esqpert evidence on the laws of colonies will be taken 
in England under Section 5 of the Fugitive Offenders Act. Colon­
ial law is regarded as foreign law by English courts, and must 
be proved by expert evidence.
Regarding expert evidence, it has been held there:
Rules which apply to proof of foreign law in England, apply 
equally to the proof of Colonial statutes which are subject to 
consideration in English Courts, The court is not bound to
1. In Ex parte Huguet (1861-73) All E.R. 770 decided on 7, 8 
June, 1873; 12 Cox C.C. 551, 29 L.T. 41.
2. Collins v. Smith (1909) C.L.R. 490; Re Mourat Mehmet (1962)
nin.R. 353— ------------
accept the affidavit of an expert in law. Its duty is to inter­
pret the relevant statutes itself, with such help as it might 
obtain from experts* testimony or affidavits.
Therefore, it is a settled practice that an expert on
local law should give evidence, either in the form of a deposition
accompanying the warrant of arrest from the Dominion concerned or 
orally before the magistrate.
2In the case of Re Shuter it was held that:
Mthe practice'of receiving a copy of local 
law, statutes, penal laws and ordinances 
in evidence (Colonial Statutes Act 1907) 
was not satisfactory, since no one except 
an expert could be sure that the document 
was the latest version of local law.11
Abo^ ut the proof of foreign law again Lord Parkers C.J., in Sadri* s
3 4case observed, following the earlier cases of Percival and Re
5
Shuter, that it would have been a proper case to remit if the 
matter of defect of affidavit of the Aden Lawyer would have stood 
alone, but as in that case the documents were missing, the case 
was not remitted. But the court observed that, although the 
affidavit of the lawyer of Aden was defective in not saying 
whether or not the offences were punishable on indictment or in­
formation, the consequence would only be that the case could be 
remitted back to the magistrate for hearing further evidence - or 
the Divisional Court itself could take further evidence.
1* R. v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Others, Ex 
parte Egskicel (1941) 2 All E.R. 546.
2. (1959) 2 All E.R. 782 at p.786 A,B,C.
3. In R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte 3jadri (1962) 3 All 
E.R. 747 at p. 749,D.
4. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte PercivalT"’“ —fiwy r-QVBjm'f— ------------
5. Re Shuter(1959) 2 All E.R. 782.
Under the Indian Evidence Act, Section 45, foreign law 
is required to be proved by expert t e s t i m o n y T h e  expert wit­
ness called by the Soviet Union in Tarasov* s case admitted that
he was no expert on Soviet law, and therefore, the magistrate
2
found the evidence unacceptable*
(c) Depositions, Affidavits and Statements
The magistrate hearing cases under the Act may take 
depositions, including affidavits and statements upon affirmation 
or oath under Section 10 [of 1962* This can be done in the ab­
sence of the fugitive and this provision is an exception within 
Section 353 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code* The deposi­
tions when properly authenticated are made admissible in evidence 
in proceedings under the Act, whether they are taken in respect 
of the particular charge or not* Copies of official certifi­
cates, or juridicial documents, stating facts may, if duly 
authenticated, be received in evidence in proceedings under the 
Act, but nothing in the Act is to authorise the reception of such
depositions, copies, certificates or documents in evidence 
against a person upon his trial for an offence. Depositions 
were not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that they
4
did not purport to be taken for the purposes of the Act. These
1. Section 45, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: "when the Court has to 
form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or science, or 
art, or as to identity of handwriting (or finger impressions) 
the opinions upon that f>oint of persons specially skilled in 
such foreign law, science or art or in questions as to identity 
of handwriting (or finger impressions) are relevant facts.
Such persons are called experts***
2* S*K. Agarwala: International Law, Indian Courts and Legisla­
ture , p.219*
3. In R* v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Bidwell (1937)
1 kTb . 305; case under Section 29 of 'the Fugitive Offenders 
Act, 1881.
4. R. v. Secretary of State for Indian in Council & Others Ex 
parte BgffcVe 1 T I W 1 T  ^ AJL1
English rulings seem appropriate to the scheme set up under the 
Indian Extradition Act*
The words indicating the procedure in subsections 1 to 
3 of Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1962, indicate that the 
magistrate will follow the provisions * as nearly as may be* as
if it was an ordinary trial before the magistrate* These words 
are not defined anywhere* They seem to impose limitation on the 
power of the magistrate.
Trials in India for offences committed in India are 
different from a magisterial inquiry in extradition proceedings. 
The magistrate need not hear or examine witnesses but can tage 
their depositions * and admit in evidence statements recorded
in foreign countries on oath as evidence. The power of magi­
strate (as we have seen) to refuse extradition is not limited*
A careful adherence to procedural law is, therefore, highly de­
sirable* The rules of procedure and evidence will »as nearly 
as may be* be derived from Indian Criminal Procedure Code and 
Evidence Act respectively* The powers, limitation, and duties
in extradition proceedings seem to be the same as those of the 
magistrate exercising powers under Criminal Procedure Code* His 
duty is to consider if the case is a fit one for committal accord­
ing to Indian law, and to this end, he is bound to hear the evi­
dence on behalf of the prisoner.
In different State practices there had been a conflict 
of judicial opinion regarding the nature and form of depositions 
and statements admissible in evidence in extradition proceedings.
There are authorities supporting each view and deposi­
tion statements were held admissible whether - they are
1. Section 10 of 1962 Act.
21A-.
depositions or mere affidavits, though in the latbr case of
Re Danilhik, it was held that the admissibility of affidavits
was in the discretion of the trial judge; whether or not they
were taken in the absence of the accused without opportunity for 
~ 2
cross-examination, whether they were taken after or before the
institution of the extradition proceedings, whether or not they
4refer to the charge, whether they take the form of questions
5and answers or of a re-write sworn to by the deponent, or whether
they were taken for the purposes of the proceedings or for some
6 1 other purpose, such as a civil action, and that depositions and
statements should not be rej'ected on merely technical grounds.
The Court should approach extradition proceedings in a 
broad spirit, with the intention to suppress crime and for pro-
7
motion of j'ustice, for betterment of the society, and to promote 
a good understanding between nations. To this end, the extra-
1. Re Hoke (1886) 14 R.L.O.S. 92; Re;O'Neil (1912) 17 B.C.R. 123;
2 W.W.R. 368; 5 D.L.R.*646; Grossberg v, Choquet (Choquette) 
(1924) 36 Que K.B. 517,
2, Re Danilhik (alias Stone) (1944) 3 W.W.R. 281; 82C.C.C. 264;
Re Parker (1890) 19 O.R. 612; R, v, Zossenheim (1903) 20 T.L.R. 
1215 Re Insull (1934) 2 D.L.R.~696,
Grossberg v, Choquet, supra; State of Washington v, Fletcher 
(1926) 3 D.L.R. 423, contra: Re♦ Ockerman (189 &) 2 C.C.C. 262,
4. ReWeir (1887) 14 0,R, 389,
5, Re Kaslov (1950) 97 C.C.C. 150,
6, Re Staggs (No,2) (1912) 22 W.L,R, 853, 8 D.L.R. 284 says they 
are admissible: Auger v, Dhbeau (1952) 21 O.R. 316: 111 C.C.C.
390 hold the contrary: see also R, v. Secretary of State for
India, Ex parte Ezekiel (1941) 2 K.B. 169•
7. Bedi, op^cit,, p,144.
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dition proceedings should not be allowed to be made infructuous 
by not admitting legal evidence against an offender on technical 
grounds
But on the other side, extradition may permijrt serious 
inroads upon the liberty of an individual, where a judge is left 
in real doubt regarding the reliability of a statement, not being 
tested by cross-examination, taken after the institution of extra­
dition proceedings, taken in another case, re-written, sworn to 
by the deponent, which may have a flavour of an adulterated version 
mixed with inaccuracies by default of the person writing not
properly appreciating what the deponent meant, or not referring
2to a charge* In Hugnet*s case, the Court of Exchequer before
which the question was raised in a case of proceedings under the 
Extradition Act, 1873, that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to 
act on a deposition not taken before himself and taken before some 
other magistrate, it was held that the deposition taken before the 
first magistrate was receivable by the second magistrate* In 
this case, Barons Martin and Pollock held that the evidence was 
admissible according to common law, and that it was not a case of 
incompetent evidence, particularly when the evidence before Mr* 
Vaughan was taken in the presence of the accused and the witness,
M* de Monchairville was cross-examined by the applicants counsel* 
On the other hand, Kelly C*B. observed: ’The receiving of such
evidence is certainly almost entirely contrary to practice* *
The Magistrate* s view seems to be correct as the witness may go 
away andjnever return*
1* Gluckman v* Henkel (1911) 221 U.S. 508-512*
2. Ex parte Hugnet (1861-73) All E.R. 770 at p*772, C,D,E* 12 Cox 
C.C. 551, 29 L.T. 41 dated 7, 8, June, 1873.
3. Kelly C.B. dubitante dissenting, at p.771,I.
The rule requiring the production of prima facie evi­
dence is first found in the Jay Treaty of 1794,* between Great 
Britain and the United States of America, and then in the Imperial 
Apprehension of Offenders Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vic* C.34) which, apply­
ing to charges of treason and felony, provided that a prisoner 
could be remanded only ’upon such evidence of criminality as would 
justify his committal if the offence had been committed in that 
part of Her Majesty’s dominions in which he was arrested*’ In 
the Fugitive Offenders Act, it is provided by Section 5 in Part I 
for the rendition of offenders against whom evidence was produced ' 
which raised *a strong or probable presumption that the fugitive 
committed the offence*, whereas in Part II no such requirement 
was made*
Ihe magistrate’s jurisdiction and powers at the hearing
of a request for extradition are the same ’ as nearly as may be*
as if the fugitive had been accused of an indictable offence with-
2
in the ordinary jurisdiction of magistrate* The phrase ’as
nearly as may be* has reference to the sections of the Act which
allow the reception of evidence of the authenticated depositions, 
warrants, certificates and other judicial documents from foreign 
authorities* These documents and depositions are by Section 10- 
of the Act of 1962 allowed to be produced and received in evi­
dence even if they do not satisfy the particular rules of the
Indian Evidence Act or the strict requirments of the Indian law 
relating to oaths*
1. R.C. Hingorani: Ihe Indian Extradition Law* p#62, nj54*
2. Section 7(1) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, Sections 9,
10, 14, 15 of the British Extradition Act of 1870 and Section 
7(2) of the British Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967.
The law in England is similar** The task of a magi­
strate and his powers in considering the evidence adduced before 
him on an application for extradition is precisely the same as 
that in proceedings leading to committal for trial for an offence 
committed within his jurisdiction* The magistrate may commit
for surrender if the evidence is such that, if uncontradicted at
2the trial, a reasonably-minded jury might convict on it; within 
this limit the magistrate has a good deal of discretion, but just 
as in committal proceedings where, if he has a doubt, that doubt 
ought to go in favour of committal and not in favour of discharge, 
so the same rule applies in extradition proceedings* He is in 
no sense deciding the guilt or innocence in advance of the trial 
court, only whether there is a case to be answered. The magi­
strate? s decision may be reviewed by a superior court in habeas 
corpus under Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code or Sections 435
and 439 Criminal Procedure Code, but his decision will be revised 
only if the courts consider that * no magistrate, properly direct­
ing his mind to the question, could reasonably have felt satis-
4
fied that the evidence produced would justify committal** It 
is submitted that the formulation of English law is applicable 
to the Indian situation under Section 7(1) of the Indian Act of 
1962.
1. R. v. Zossenheim (1903) 20 T.L.R. 121, 67 J*P* 616; R. v. 
Bitterlin (19137 48 L.J. 371* "~
2. Re Schtraks (1962) 2 All E.R. 176 at p.186 per Lord Parker C.J. 
Also Schtraks v. Government of Israel (1962) 3 All E.R. 529 at 
p.533 per Lord Reid (H.L.)•
3* Ex parte Peinberg (1901) 4 Can. Crim. Cas* 270.
4. Re Schtraks. ibid.
The law of France and most other countries of the civil 
law system looks only to proof of identify of the accused and
1
conformity of the request to the treaty and statutory requirements, 
and they reject the production of evidence of guilt* The justi­
fication for this is ,that extradition is a measure of international 
judicial assistance in restoring the fugitive to a jurisdiction 
with the best claim to try him, and it is no part of the function 
of the assisting authorities to enter upon questions which are the 
prerogatives of that jurisdiction*
Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act does not re­
quire evidence of proof of guilt and the above may be one of the 
considerations amongst others, for that, viz* •reciprocity* 
amongst Commonwealth countries with extradition arrangements 
having common systems of jurisprudence, neighbourliness and group­
ings in the past due to their geographical nearness* The argu­
ment for the imposition of a requirement of prima facie evidence 
of guilt on the grounds of distance and relative inconvenience 
is ruled out for the reason that it would equally apply to foreign 
States also* The main basis for dispensing with a prima facie 
case under Chapter III seems to be the sharing of common laws and 
institutions of like pattern, the same judicial system, similar 
rules of interpretation of laws, the same parliamentary system, 
similar procedural methods for enacting laws and a common basic 
conception of the law. The conception of crime is similar and 
consequently there is some trust in standards of justice where 
the rules of evidence and trials are similar. There is an added 
factor: the * Principle of Reciprocity1 amongst Commonwealth
countries with extradition arrangements.
1, S.D. Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, p*143
Swiss laws like the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, re­
quire treasonable grounds for belief1 that the person claimed 
has committed the offence. Austrian law stresses a mid-course 
for furnishing promptly or within a reasonable time such proof 
of presumption of guilt of which the accused is not able to clear 
himself on the spot. Some Latin American States require * some
degree of proof of facts raising a presumption of guilt* and
others insist on evidence of guilt sufficient to commit for trial
unless dispensed with by t r e a t y S h e a r e r  suggests that this
uniformity of treaty and municipal law among non-common law
countries, reflects more generally the inquisitorial nature of
criminal proceedings in these countries, as contrasted with the
accusatorial approach employed by the common law, rather than any
degree of confidence placed by them in the standards of justice
2
applying in other countries.
Therefore, it may be in order to put an end to all 
these controversies over statements, depositions and affidavits 
that Section 10 of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962 provided 
the procedure for receipt in evidence of exhibits, depositions 
and other documents and authentication thereof. The above con­
flicting authorities and their applicability have all become a 
matter of mere academic interest.
3
The House of Lords had the occasion to consider the 
provisions of Section 11(1)(a) of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1967, which axe akin in form and substance to Section 10 of the
l.I.A. Shearer: Extradition in International Law, p.157.
2.Shearer, ibid., p.158.
3.Fernandez v. Government of Singapore and others (1971) 2 All 
E7&~69T at p 7 W t n --------- ^ -------------
PL
Indian Extradition Act, 1962* Lord Diplock observed:
’’Section 11 of the Act is dealing with the 
admissibility of documentary evidence on an 
application for the issue of a warrant for 
arrest under section 6 or for an order for 
return of the accused under section 7, 
Documents which fall within the descriptions 
in this section are admissible for these — 
purposes, whether or not they would be ad­
missible in proceedings on committal for 
trial for an indictable offence in England, 
Under section 11(1)(a) the evidence set out 
in th£ document must have been given on 
oath. In English Law there are two ways 
in which this may be done# It may be .* . V****4 
writing in the form of an affidavit by a- 
witness. Here the affidavit itself con­
stitutes the document in which that evi­
dence is set out. Or it may be given 
orally by the witness in proceedings in a 
court or tribunal and what he said or the 
substance of it recorded in writing. Here 
the written record or deposition consti­
tutes the document in which the evidence 
so given is set out,
’’Even if para(a) of Section lKtfstood alone,
I should see no warrant for construing it 
so as to exclude affidavit evidence. But 
the matter is, in my opinion, put beyond 
any possibility of doubt by the express — 
reference in sub-section 2(a) to the*docu-' 
ment containing or recording that evidence.
An affidavit is a document ’containing’ — 
evidence; a deposition is a document 're­
cording* evidence, Both are admissible
under the Section, In this respect the 
Act of 1967 dpes not differ from the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1S81, which it 
repeals and replaces. The admissibility 
of affidavit evidence was achieved in the 
earlier Act by the extended definition of 
’deposition’ so as to include ’any affi­
davit , affirmation or statement made 
upon oath” J^It was also observed 2 
that ’ in order to render an affidavit 
admissible under sub-section <l)(a) it- 
is unnecessary to identify any proceed­
ings in the designated country in which 
the affidavit was sworn, provided that
1, Fernandez, ibid, t at p,694,J! and p,695, a,b,c.
2. Fernandez, ibid,, p,695, e, per Lord Diplock,
it is duly* certified and authenticated 
under sub-section 2(a)."
In other words, the House of Lords held that on the
true construction of Section 11(1)(a) of the Fugitive Offenders 
which
Act, 1967,/provides that a document duly authenticated, which 
purports to set out evidence given on oath in specified countries, 
shall be admissible as evidence, in the United Kingdom, of 
matters stated therein and the word document embraces not only a 
deposition, as a document recording evidenve given on oath, but 
also an affidavit as a document containing evidence given on oath* 
VThereas Section 11(1 )(b) provides for the admission in evidence 
of a duly authenticated document purporting to have been received 
in evidence, or to be a copy of such document in any proceedings 
in a designated country, no reference is made to proceedings in 
Section 11(1)(a)* Accordingly to render an affidavit admissible 
under Section 11(1)(a) it is unnecessary to identify any proceed­
ings in the designated country in which the affidavit was sworn, 
provided it has been duly certified and authenticated under 
Section 11(2)(a)*
But regarding alleged falsified documents in the case
i
of Ex ’ part e rSadr i, Lord Parker C.J. (Gorman and Salmon J,J. 
agreeing with him) held (according to the headnote) that:
!lalthough when requisitioning countries 
are putting the machinery of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, into force, it is~ 
not necessary ^ ofevery exhibit to depo­
sitions taken in the foreign country,'or 
authenticated copies of esvery exhibit, to 
be brought to this country, yet when the 
exhibit in question is the document which 
e.g. it is alleged was falsified, the 
dcoument itself or an authenticated copy 
of it or of the relevant extracts should 
be provided",
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison. Ex parte Sadri (1962) 3
All E.R. 747.
in the absence of the cash book 
itself or of authenticated copies of 
it, there was no admissible evidence 
which could satisfy the magistrate that 
the strong.or probable presumption of 
guilt predicated by section 5 of the '
Act of 1881 was raised and, therefore, 
the case could not be sent back to the 
magistrate,11
Lord Parker C.J., in a case of non-cross-examination 
of prosecution witnesses, Caldough1 s case^  held that it was
not possible’ , in the case where on behalf of the accused, a 
Canadian citizen, on a charge of four counts in Vancouver, wit­
nesses were not allowed to be cross-examined for the purposes of 
extradition proceedings, saying that they were ex parte proceed­
ings, in the absence of evidence of Canadian law, to embark on 
a consideration whether what was done in Canada was proper under 
Canadian Law, It was also held that the provisions of the
2
first sentence of Section 29 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881,
1, R, v, Governor ;of Brixton Prison j ex parte Caldough “ (1961)
1 All E.R, 6o6* See headnote,
2, Section 2 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881:
"A magistrate may take depositions for the purposes of this 
Act in the absence of a person accused of an offence in like 
manner as he might take the same if such persons were present 
and accused of the offence before him. Depositions (whether 
taken in the absence of the fugitive or otherwise) and copies 
thereof, and official certificates of or judicial documents — 
stating facts may, if duly authenticated, be received in evi­
dence in proceedings under this Act, • —
"Provided that nothing in this Act shall authorise the recept­
ion of any depositions, copies, certificates, or documents in 
evidence against a person upon his trial for an offence," 
Section 39:- "In this context, unless otherwise requires ,t , 
the expression deposition* includes any affidavit, affirma­
tion, or statement made upon oath as above defined ,,,"
were independent of the Second sentence, and as the depositions 
were duly authenticated and were within the definition of deposi­
tions in Section 39 of the Act of 1881, they were admissible in 
evidence before the magistrate, who did not have to be satisfied 
that they were taken in accordance with a procedure normal in
English magistrates* courts. This view was based upon Ezekiel*s
1 2 case, supra. In Caldough* s case, a New Zealand judgment
was cited as an authority for the proposition in which a similar 
proposition as in Caldough*^s case arose in connection with depo­
sitions taken in New South Wales, and in which the Chief Justice 
of New Zealand held that the proceedings in New South Wales were 
ex parte and that the fugitive had no right by his counsel to 
cross-examine the witnesses. The Court agreed with the Campbell 
judgment and the views expressed in it. The judgment of the 
Court turned on the question whether the first part of Section 29 
of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was *a part of Law of 
Canada* or not and unless and until it was shown that it is, it 
was not possible to embark on a consideration whether what was 
done in Canada was proper. The coulrt then leaving this matter
open, in this sense, held that sentences one and two of Section 
29 of the 1881 Act were independent and the word * such* before 
the word ’depositions* in the second sentence, having been signi­
ficantly omitted, and therefore, as held in Bzekiel*s case the 
first two sentences are wholly independent provisions. Sentence 
one permits the evidence or depositions to be taken in the ab­
sence of a person accused of an offence in like manner as he 
(Magistrate) might take the same if such person were present and
1, R, v. Secretary of State for India; ex parte Ezekiel (1941) 
2 All E.R. 546.
2. In Re Campbell (1935) N.Z.L.R. 352 . ,6» •
accused of the offence before him. It creates a sort of 
fiction. It may be pointed out that Section 10 of the Fugi­
tive Offenders Act is an exception within Section 353 of the 
Indian Criminal Procedure Code, so that the taking of evidence 
otherwise than in the presence of the accused is (in the circum­
stances) conformable to Indian municipal law, and the Canadian 
problem would be answered unhesitatingly in India, where deposi- 
tiond taken in the absence of the accused in the requesting State 
are shown by Section 10 to be admissible in the Indian magi­
strate’s court in proceedings for the extradition of the accused. 
Lord Parker in Caldough’s case further held that it is impossible 
to say that the proceedings in Canada was contrary#natural 
justice* once one sees that affidavits are included in the defi­
nition of ’depositions’, it is further to be remembered that by 
the proviso to Section 29 it is provided that none of this evi­
dence shall be evidence against a person on his trial for the
offence and the magistrate is only concerned to see that what 
is tendered in evidence consists of depositions as defined, and 
that they are duly authenticated.
In this connection, a very important question arises. 
Before 1950, the cases cited above (p. 219-223 ) w«9f<tgood law,
but after the coming into force of the Constitution, Section 10 
of the present 1962 India Act might be ultra vires because of 
the violation of principles of natural justice. May deposi­
tions taken against the person and behind his back, be used 
against him without cross-examination; can they be the basis 
of the deprivation of his liberty in extradition proceedings in 
infringement of Article 21, and will not all those English 
authorities be inapplicable? The answer seems to be in the 
negative, as extradition proceedings are not a trial of the
accused*
A situation is similar where a warrant is issued behind 
the back of the applicant after recording statements under Sec-* 
tion 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code* Later on he appears, 
and in the trial, the prosecution witnesses are examined in his 
presence and he is given the opportunity to cross-examine them. 
But here, so far as Indian Courts are concerned, if they extra­
dite him on such evidence taken ex parte and do not allow him to 
cross-examine either in the court of the requesting State or in 
India, this procedure would not be contrary to law and prin­
ciples of natural gustice and Article 21 would not be offended,
as extradition proceedings are not his trial , and ^he English 
and Indian authorities would be applicable while interpreting 
Section 10 of the present Act. Further evidence may be pro­
duced before the magistrate*
(d) Fresh evidence
In Re Shalom Schtrak,* after the order of the Divisi­
onal Bench rejecting his application for a writ of habeas corpus 
was upheld by the House of Lords, he made a second application 
to the Division Bench for habeas corpus on the ground that there 
was fresh evidence, and that such new evidence was directed not 
merely to discredit the evidence of witnesses whose evidence was 
before the magistrate, but to show that the magistrate was im­
posed on, by the alleged fraudulent conduct of the Israeli 
Government* In this case, the fresh evidence put forward had 
been available at the time of the hearing before the House of
1 • Re Shalom Setraks (No.2) (1962) 3 All E.R. 849, per Lord 
Parker C.J. at p*851 (Gorman and Salmon, J.J* agreeing with 
him) *
Lords, but had not been looked into. The court held that 
assuming, without deciding, that fresh evidence could be adduced 
to show that the committal order had been obtained from the magi­
strate by fraud or collusion, the evidence sought to be adduced 
fell short of what was necessary for the interference of the 
Court, and the writ was refused again. Lord Parker C.J. ob­
served at p.851:
"It may be that the practice of the prose­
cution in Israel differs from ours; it may 
be that we would not promise that evidence 
would not be used against the person who 
was giving it and matters of that sort.
But for my part, I am quite satisfied that 
no sufficient evidence is to be found here 
of fraud which would justify this court in 
interfering. I confess that I am influ­
enced to some extent by the fact that, as 
I have said, all this evidence was available
before the House of Lords, and the applicant
by his advisers deliberately and for good 
reason refrained from suggesting that this 
evidence disclosed any fraud which would 
justify the Court in interfering."
It j&\ plain that Re Shalom Schtraks (No.2) is not am 
authority for the proposition that fresh evidence will not be ad­
mitted in revision of the magistrates order. It supports the 
position, which will certainly be followed in India, that in 
order to sustain an application for a writ of habeas corpus any
evidence not before the magistrate, or tending to show that the
magistrate was deceived must be of an unambiguously satisfactory 
char a cfcer.
In Perry* s case.* the High Court in habeas corpus re­
fused to take fresh evidence regarding disproving the identity
1. R* v. Governor of Brixton Prison^ ex parte Perry (1924) 1 K.H. 
455 at pp. 459, 4^0 per Lord Hewart C.J.
of the accused, and the argument ivas that the magistrate had 
the necessary jurisdiction to record this evidence* The court 
refused the application on the ground that it had no power to 
review the magistrate’s decision and that it was only the Secre­
tary of State who could do so* It seems it is hardly a proper 
view, for when a supervisory court in habeas corpus can look into 
the evidence to see if there is a prima facie case it can also 
take fresh evidence* If by doing so, the court comes to the 
conclusion that it was established that the evidence on which the 
committal was based was wrong, the accused should be released.
To say that the court is not entitled to hear new evidence, and 
that if it ought to be considered at all, it should be done by 
the Secretary of the State * or corresponding officer of the Exe­
cutive^ is with all the respect to the Court, an abdication of 
responsibility. The Court has adopted the practice that, when 
it considers that there was no evidence before the magistrate 
then it will interfere and release thejprisoner in habeas corpus; 
it may treat an unwarranted remand as a nullity and adjudicate 
on the case; but where the magistrate’s order for remand is to 
enable further evidence to be made available for his considera­
tion, the court, it has been held, cannot treat such remand as
2
a nullity.
But in India under the New Act of 1962 no such diffi­
culties are likely to arise because the Supreme Court has held 
that the scope of the writ under Articles 226 and 32 is much 
wider than the writs issued in England, also the powers of the
1. R. v. Governor of Holloway Prison, ex parte Siletti (1902)
71 L.J.K.B. 935; 18 T.L.R. V7±^L.R. 87 L.T. jj*:. U 9 0 0-3 ) All 
E.R. Rep.£0 9 .
2. United States of America v. Gaynor (1905) A.C. 128 at p.138
---------------------
High Court for revision under Sections 435 and 439 of the Crimi­
nal Procedure Code are much wider. Ihe court may examine the 
legality, propiety, correctness and regularity of the order and 
in such circumstances new evidence may be taken because the mag, 
if he says he is a different person, or that the offence is not 
extraditable, his extradition is against the procedure established 
by law and the matter can be examined with new evidence, affida­
vits, sworn testimonies, etc. as his Fundamental Right of liberty 
is involved.
t
It may be noted that in the case of Ross Munro it was 
held in England that Section 19 of the Extradition Act, 1870,2 
was not directed to procedure or evidence but to jurisdiction; 
accordingly provided the crimes with which the applicant was 
charged were the offences for which he was surrendered and re­
turned, he could be committed for trial in accordance with the 
ordinary procedure and laws of England, and an order for prohibi­
tion to exclude further evidence tendered would be refused.
This case is relevant when an accused is surrendered from a 
foreign country to England,as was done in this case by France 
fot six offences of forgery. This is a case of additional 
evidence from a Banker in Zurich to the effect that the alleged
1. R. v. Aubrey-Fletcher. Ex parte Ross Munro (1968) 1 All E.R.
99.
2. Section 19 of the Extradition Act, 1970:-
"where, in pursuance of any arrangement with a foreign State, 
any person accused or convicted of any crime which, if com­
mitted in England, would be one of the crimes described in 
Sch.l to this Act is surrendered by that foreign State, such 
person shall not, until he has been restored or had an oppor­
tunity of returning to such foreign State, be triable or tried 
for any offence committed prior to the surrender in any part 
of Her Majesty’s dominions other than such of the said crimes 
as may be provided by the facts on which the surrender is 
grounded.*1
forged documents had led to a large sum of money being handed to
the prisoner* It was observed * that Section 19 of the 1870 Act 
does not seek to limit or prescribe the evidence which may be 
called at a criminal trial. Ihe clear object of the section is 
to prevent, for example, a man who has been surrendered on a 
warrant charging him with forgery being tried in this country 
for a murder that he is alleged to have committed before his 
surrender. Lord Parker C.J. interpreting the words ’for such 
of the said crimes as may be provided by the facts on which the 
surrender is grounded’ , observed: ’the words are capable of being 
read and should be read as meaning such of the crimes as may be 
disclosed by the facts alleged in the extradition proceedings’ 
and the additional evidence was sought to be produced in that 
connection*
It may be mentioned that both Lord Alverstone C.J. 
and Darling J. in Percival’s case^ clearly took the view that 
it was possible to remit the case, or alternatively to receive 
further evidence in the High Court. It was true that they did 
not do so there but that was for particular reasons, one of which 
was that the alleged offence had occurred some five or six years 
earlier, and further the prisoner had endeavoured to make repa­
ration and was now carrying an honest life. Thus in all the 
circumstances cf that case, they d^d not exercise what they un­
doubtedly considered to be their inherent powers to remit. Lord 
Parker C.J. observed in connection with evidence on law:
1. Lord Salmon L.J. agreeing with Lord Parker, C.J.
2. R. v. Brixton Prison; (Governor) Ex parte Percival (1907) 1 K.B. £96.
3. In Re Shuter(1959) 2 All E.R. 782 at p.786B. (See above, p.210
on evidence on foreign lawj^ .
**.• • but as counsel for the Governor of 
Brixton Prison quite rightly pointed out, 
no one except an expert can be sure that 
the statute or other document of which 
the printer*s copy is tendered is the 
latest version of the local law. For 
all one knows, it may have been recently 
amended, and, as I am very anxious that 
there should be a settled practice in 
the matter, and a safe practice, it seems 
to me that in this and all cases there 
should be evidence from an expert on 
local law. Accordingly, in this case
I would remit the matter to the chief 
magistrate for him to receive evidence 
as to that local law.**
It was further laid down that this evidence may be either in the 
form of deposition which comes to England with the warrant, or by 
giving evidence before the magistrate in England.
i
Lord Alverston C.J.*s observations on the subject may 
be usefully quoted:
II In my opinion every person who comes and 
asks for an order for the delivery of the 
fugitive offender must be prepared with 
evidence that that condition of the 
statute has been fulfilled. That is a 
very important matter, and having regard 
to the fact that we are dealing with 
criminal law, we must apply the general- 
principles of criminal law, and the pro­
secutor must make out his case. We are 
also dealing with a branch of criminal 
law which affects the liberty of the sub­
ject, and that condition should under the 
ordinary circumstances be fulfilled.”
2Regarding taking fresh evidence, Lord Parker C.J. 
drew a distinction between remittal of cases on the question of 
jurisdiction of the magistrate based on the nature of the offences 
as in the cases of Percival and Re Shuts: where the court had 
jurisdiction to remand the case in those circumstances; and the
1. In Percival* s case, supra, at p.706.
2. In Sadri* s case - R. v. Governor Hrixton Prison Ex parte Sadri 
(19B2J T ATT E.R. 747.
case for sending back to the magistrate to hear evidence of 
guilt when no evidence of guilt had yet been tendered* In the 
latter category, the court had no jurisdiction to remit the
case in habeas corpus and there was no precedent for it* Lord 
Parker seems to be of the view in cases of pure technicalities 
that fresh evidence may be allowed (for example, production of 
authenticated ^ documents, copies already being there) but where 
there is no evidence to prove the fugitive1s guilt, no remittance 
of the case back, should be allowed for fresh evidence* Lord 
Hodson in the judgment of the House of Lords in Schtr&ks* case  ^
observed:
111 am of opinion that fresh evidence as to 
the guilt of the accused cannot properly 
be received*"
The reason for this, apart from the reasoning given by
the House of Lords in Schtraks case seems appropriately to have
2been put earlier by Lord Hewart C *J •: that the court had no
power to review the magistrate’s decision on the ground put 
forward, the matter being one which could be dealt with by the 
Secretary of State under the Extradition Act, 1870, Section 11* 
This was a case where the order of committal of the accused by 
the magistrate for extradition to France on the charge of abscond­
ing in Paris with a diamond broach which had bean entrusted to 
him for a prospective purchaser, there being evidence on which 
the magistrate was entitled to make an order of extradition*
The argument tf&a that the habeas corpus could be accepted on the 
ground that since the committal, fresh evidence, showing that he
1* Schtraks v* Government of Israel (1962) 3 All E.R. 529* 5501 
(H.L.y*
2* In R* v. Governor Brixton Prison Ex parte Perry (1923) All E.R. 
182.
was not the man who had absconded with the bro&ch had been dis-
covered* In this case, Sankey J* held that * if the facts are
in accordance with the contention of the counsel in support of
the rule, the applicant has his remedy with the Home Secretary,
who will decide as to the fugitive1 s ultimate surrender* * In
making such observations, he agreed with the statement of 
2
Hawkins J* in his judgment that:
"what follows afterwards shows that it 
is not the Magistrate who is to deter­
mine these matters, but it is the Home 
Secretary who is to determine.whether 
or not ultimately the prisoner is to be 
sent: abroad*"
This was also observed in the Indian Supreme Court case of Hans 
Muller and was actually done in the case of Zacharia by the Home 
Secretary, who refused his extradition in spite of the habeas 
corpus application having been unsuccessful up to the House of 
Lords|stage*
This is why in the Indian Extradition Act provisions
have been made that in spite of the magistrate’s judgment the
representation can be sent through the magistrate to the Central
Government and obviously to say, amongst other things, that new
evidence has become available since the order of the magistrate
recommending the extradition* Even otherwise courts would,
under Articles 226 and 32, hear it as it is a question of the
breach of Fundamental Rights where the High Courts and Supreme 
I
Court can take fresh evidence*
1* Ex parte Perry, ibid* at p.184*
2. In Re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B* 149 at p*163*
(3) The Prima Facie Case
Insistence on production by the requesting State of a 
prima facie case against the fugitive goes back as far as 1564 
irlpngland, when the Spanish Ambassador asked for the surrender of 
Fleming charged with murder. Ihe Privy Council examined the 
man and when he flatly denied the charge, the Lords thought good 
that he should remain in prison until some authentic matter be 
sent of his fault, and then the Queen is con$en^ed »he shall be 
delivered* A proof of a prima facie case under Sections 8
and 9 of the 1962 Act is a condition precedent before an accused 
is extradited* The depositions and documents and affidavits and 
other evidence received from the foreign requesting State taken 
in the absence of the accused are admissible in evidence though 
ttigy are an exception to the procedure laid down under Section 
353 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that evidence 
shall be taken in the presence of an accused. These are to form 
part of the evidence the magistrate has to consider, and he can 
only consider such evidence as put before him. It has been 
explained that such depositions or statements made on oath and 
forming a part of extradition proceedings, need not have been 
taken in the presence of the accused*
There is no duty imposed on the magistrate to consider 
whether the depositions were taken accofding to the municipal
3
rules of evidence', it was observed:
1. Paul 0*Higgins: * The History of Extradition in British Prac­
tice, 1174-1794*, I;Y;B;I;A.~, vol.13, Part II, 1964, at. pp. 
78-115 at p.98.
2. In the matter of El iso Oounhave, L.R.(1873) 8 Q.B.D. 410.
3.R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Thomson (1911) 2 K.B. 
“382.
"It was not essential to the validity of 
the requsition or of the subsequent pro­
ceedings founded therein that the pro­
cedure before the French Magistrate should 
have been regular, and the absence of sworn 
depositions taken before the Magistrate did 
not entitle the accused person to be dis­
charged #**
*t
In Jugal Kishore More* s case (supra) the Supreme Court of 
India also held that the Indian Courts would not examine the 
validity or regularity of foreign laws# The depositions, how­
ever, must prove that the prisoner committed the offence charged 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the State demanding his 
extradition#
The magistrate is bound to hear evidence on behalf of 
the accused especially such as to show that the offence is of a 
political nature or that the ulterior motive for the demand of 
his extradition is to prosecute him for an offence of a political 
nature or that the prosecution is barred by time, and allied 
matters, whether the prosecution amounts to persecution, for 
offences based in race, caste, colour,creed, freedom of speech 
and the press, political opinions and the like*
2
In the case of Zossenheim it was observed:
"A Magistrate has to consider all the 
defence evidence before he decides the 
question of committal* The prisoner 
can therefore call such evidence as 
will help him to show that the offence 
charged is not an extradition offence 
or even to establish his alibi in addi­
tion to the other charges mentioned 
above but not to challenge the substance 
of the charge, otherwise the extradition 
proceedings will take the place of a 
trial itself#11
1* State of West Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
1171.
2# R* v# Zossenheim (1903) 20 T.L.R. 121#
It has been established by the Privy Council^(but 
not in a case from India) that the order for committal to await 
surrender should be made by the magistrate who actually heard 
the evidence in the case, and decides that the prisoner should 
be surrendered or should be discharged, as he has seen the de­
meanour of the witnesses produced before him, which advantage 
the Central Government or the other magistrate would not havei
It is not enough to prove vague and general charges
against the prisoner, and the warrant of committal must state
the date of the offence or offences charged; the warrant of
committal should make clear the crime in respect of which the
2prisoner is committed, and all these must comply with the term
q
of the offences used in the extraditing State under English 
Law or Indian Law as the case may be* A prima facie case will 
be considered with the reservations provided under Sections 29, 
31, and 32 of the 1962 Act.
There is much to be said for the view that these 
reservations should be used sparingly and that the executive 
should not enter upon the role of the prophet without
evidence - once the prima facie case is established, it must 
be sure of the balance of probabilities before refusing extra-
4
dition. In the House of Lords, in the case of Fernandez, 
interpreting Section 4(1) para.(c) of the Fugitive Offenders 
Act, 1967, Lord Diplock observed:
, 1. Kossekecl&fcko v. Attorney-General for Trinidad, L.R. (1932)
A.C. 78 (P.C.).
2. In Re Arton (1896) 1 Q.B. 509.
3. R. v. Ashforth (1892) 8 T.L.R. 283: 36 Sol.jo 234.
4. Fernandez v. Government of Singapore and others (1971) 2 All 
E.R. 691 at p.697 B,C (H.L.)
"The general policy of the Act, i.e. 
that persons against whom a prima 
facie case is established that they 
have committed a crime in a Common­
wealth country should be returned to 
stand their trial there, is departed 
from if the return of a person who 
will not be detained or restricted for 
any of the reasons specified in para
(c) is refused. But it is departed 
from only in one individual case. On 
the other hand, detention or restrict­
ion in his personal liberty, the con­
sequence^ which the relevant words of 
that paragraph are intended to avert, 
is grave indeed to the individual fugi­
tive concerned."
On a careful consideration of the transcript of the 
evidence including depositions and affidavits and of the pre­
liminary inquiries held before the judicial authority of the 
requested State, the Central Government also should, if,the
magistrate recommends the committal of the accused, determine 
if a prima facie case has been made out justifying the issuance 
of a warrant of surrender for the extradition of the accused 
because the surrender of the fugitive from justice is a political 
act ^ to be performed by the Executive.
In the case of Zacharia, even after the judgment of
the House of Lords the extradition was refused by the Home
Secretary. The Home Secretary’s duty to consider a reqiisition
for extradition is an administrative and not a judicial act or
duty under the Extradition Act. The administrative discretion
vested in him by the section of the Act, to order or not to
order an apprehension of a fugitive, * if he thinks fit* is
exercised subjectively and his decision is not subject to
o
judicial review. In other words, the ultimate decision to
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, (supra) A.I.R. 
1969 S.C. 1171.
2. R* v» Commissioner of Metropolitan Police Ex parte Savundra- 
nayaqan - frhe frimes, 22 March, $> «7 •'M ^  / o
surrender a delinquent is a political or administrative one and 
the courts have nothing to do with that as it belongs exclusively 
to the National Government.* Section 8 in trials under Chapter 
II of the Indian Extradition Act and Section 18 in cases of tri­
als under Chapter III gives this discretion to the Central Govern* 
ment. The executive or the Central Government in India or 
other common law countries seldom disregard the recommendation 
made by the magistrate in extradition proceedings but it may do
so whenever it finds reasons for a different interpretation of 
2
the law.
3The Supreme Court of India in the case of Alamohan Das 
held that the order of commitment passed under Section 207A of 
the Criminal Procedure Code can only be interfered with where a 
substantial question of law arises on which the correctness of 
the commitment order may be effectively challenged. Where, 
for example, there is no evidence on which the order or commit­
ment could be made, where there has been denial of a right to a 
fair trial, where there is reason to think because of failure 
to comply with the rules of procedure or conditions precedent 
to initiation of criminal proceedings, thereby ignoring the 
substantive law which constitutes the offence or misconception 
of evidence on matters of importance, grave injustice has result­
ed. The principles surely apply to warrants for committal 
and surrender in extradition proceedings, and more strongly 
where the responsibility rests finally with the executive than
1. United States v. Rauscher 119 U.S. 407 at pp.412-414. See 
also BedTT"op•cit., p.148, f.n.263.
2. In Re Kilburz and Buchser, 19 Int. Law Reports, 1952, Case 
No.77.
3. Alamohan Das v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 863.
in jurisdictionswhere it rests with the judiciary.
The words used in section 9(1) of the India Extradition
Act, 1962, are substantially the same as those used in Section 10 
of the British Extradition Act, 1870, and the same words find 
place in the predecessor of the Fugitive Offender^ Act, 1881, and 
the Apprehension of Offenders Act, 1943.
The words * strong and probable presumption1 find a 
place in Section 5 of the Act of 1881.*
The words ’strong and probable presumption* for the 
purposes of committal, it seems, in turn, were imported in the 
Act of 1881 from Section 25 of the British Indictable Offences 
Act, 1848, which provides: * If the evidence given raises a strong 
or probable presumption of guilt of such accused party, then such 
justice or justices shall by his or their warrant commit him.*
The Section „. ^ ~ in Bgdwell's case to explain how magistrates
were to arrive at the decision whether or not there was a prima 
facie case on which they should commit for trial in cases heard
3
in their ordinary jurisdiction. The English Court has taken
4
the same view more recently, where the Chief Justice in the 
Schtraks case was prepared to accept that there was no real dif­
ference between the Extradition and the Fugitive Offenders Acts in 
this respect.5
1. 44 and 45 Vic. C-69, Section 5.
2. Bidwell (1937) 1 K.B. 305 per Swift J. at p.314.
3. R.G. Ruia v. State of Bombayf A.I.R. 1958 S.C.106.
4. In.'Ex parte Fre^ttee,(TheTimes, 19 March, 1952); In Ex parte 
Smith (1955) Crim. L.R. 375, and In Re Schtraks (196^) 2 Ail 
E.R. 176 per Lord Parker C.J.
5. In Re Schtraks (1962) 2 All E.R. 176 at p.186.
The analogy with ordinary criminal proceedings can be 
taken further* A magistrate holding an inquiry, \eltherljunderI 
Section 207A or 209 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, prepa­
ratory to commitment is not intended to act merely as a recording 
machine* He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on 
record, to see whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment* 
If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally un­
worthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused; if 
there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be 
based, he must commit him. The magistrate at that stage has no 
power to evaluate the evidence to satisfy himself of the guilt of 
the accused* The question before the magistrate at that stage 
is whether there is some credible evidence which would sustain a 
conviction**
Under Section 7(3), (4) of the Indian Extradition Act, 
1962, the language used is *prima facie* case for committal. If 
a magistrate is satisfied that there is a prima facie case, he may 
commit him.^ ^  The Supreme Court has held that whether the com­
mittal is under Section 207A or 209 of the Indian Criminal 
Procedure Code, where there is a prima facie case for commitment 
the magistrate is not bound to enter into nice questions of pro­
babilities of the case and discharge the accused if, in his 
opinion, on an appreciation of the whole evidence, and other 
material in the case, the charge against him was not proved.
1. Alamohan Das v* State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 863 at 
p.866 (supra).
2. Venkayya v♦ S;H.0; Ong<%Ie, 1972 Cr.L.J. 439 at p.443*
3. Tara Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 441 at p*444: Bipat 
Gope v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1195.
But if the magistrate finds that the evidence against the accused 
is totally unworthy and that there are not sufficient grounds for 
commitment, he is bound to discharge the accused under Section
i
209 of the Criminal Procedure Code* The test is not whether
o
a conviction is probable but whether it is possible* The test 
laid down is when there is no reasonable possibility of the wit­
nesses being believed by any court, the accused must be dis- 
3charged. The analogy with Section 7 of the Act of 1962 is 
clear*
4
In Vyner, it was held that a magistrate hearing a case 
under the Act must act only when there is a strong probable pre­
sumption that the person charged has committed the offence alleged
against him.
In requiring as a condition under the Act, that the 
evidence against a fugitive offender should be such evidence as 
raises a strong probable presumption that the fugitive committed
the offence charged, the Act means such evidence if it remained
uncontroverted, at the trial, would entitle a reasonable jury to 
convict the alleged fugitive upon it*5
1* Madho v* Satya Narain, A.I.R. 1953 All 36; Poosala v* Venkate- 
Swarlu Batchu, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 972; Yashwant Hari' v *SfateA • I - R - 
1956 Bom. 500*
2* Krishnajj Babacharya v* State of Bombay» A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 33; 
Arunchaiastt Swami v* State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1956 Bom* 695;
In re Arungha Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1948 Mad* 357.
3. Ganesh Das Maha Singh v. Kishan Chand and others; A.I.R. 1970 
Punjab & Haryana 272.
4* R. v. Vyner (1904) 68 J.P. 142.
5. R* v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Bidwell, (1937)
r K.B. 305.
From the plethora of the case law the following propo­
sitions are established
(a) The magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry has to be 
satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the 
accused.*
(b) He do^ not act while holding the inquiry merely as a post 
office or recording machine but he is entitled to sift and 
weigh the material on record for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, not 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is sufficient 
evidence for conviction.
(c) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the
offence alleged, in such cases no question of appreciating
evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the
complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether
3
the offence alleged is disclosed or not.
(d) In such cases, it would be legitimate for the High Court 
under its inherent powers to declare that it would be mani­
festly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to
4
be issued against the accused person.
1, Bipat Gope v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1195.
2, Venkayya v. S.H.O. Ongole, 1972 Cr. L.J. 439#
3* R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960, S.C, 866.
4* P»P» Kapur, supra.
(e) Where allegations made against the accused person do consti­
tute an offence alleged, but there is either no legal evi­
dence adduced in support of the case, or evidence adduced 
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge, the magi-
i
strate would not commit the accused*
(f) A distinction has to be borne in mind while committing by 
the magistrate between a case where there is no legal evi­
dence or where there is evidence which is clearly or mani­
festly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where
there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may
' ' 2not support the accusation in question*
(g) The distinction must always be drawn between absence of 
legal evidence and'absence of reliable evidence. If it 
could be said with justification that there was no legal evi­
dence at all in support of the prosecution*s case, it may 
lead to the inference that the commitment was bad in that it 
was not based on any legal evidence at all. But on the
other hand, where circumstances are relied upon to show that 
the evidence may perhaps not be believed, they do not lead
o
to this inference that there is no legal evidence on record*
In a case under Section 209 of the Indian Criminal Pro^ - 
cedure Code the magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry has to 
be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the 
accused by evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree 
of credit and if he is not so satisfied, he is not to commit. 
Where, however, much can be said on both the sides, it would not
*• Kapur, supra*
2. P.P. Kapur, supra.
3. Kushi Ram v. Hashim. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 542.
be for the magistrate to decide which of the conflicting version^ 
will find acceptance# If there is some evidence on which a con­
viction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case* Though 
the language of section 209 differs from that in section 207A 
Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate has no jurisdiction to 
assess and evaluate the evidence before him for the purpose of 
seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction, as he 
is not trying the case himself. Section 209 is an elaborate 
procedure in certain cases, whereas section 207A relates to action 
taken on private complaint. Section 207(6) lays down that the 
committing magistrate shall discharge an accused person if he is 
of opinion that the evidence and documents before him disclose 
1 no grounds for committing him for trial*, whereas section 209 uses
the words * no sufficient grounds for committing the accused per­
son for trial*. The language in . . the sections is different,
but it is well settled that under neither of them has the magi­
strate jurisdiction to assess and evaluate the evidence before 
him for the purposes of seeing whether there is sufficient evi­
dence for a conviction*^
(4) Discharge of a Fugitive under Section 29 of the 1962 Act
This Section confers very wide and overall powers in 
matter of extradition on the Central Government* The Central 
Government will use such powers where it appears that the contem­
plated proceedings will be conducted in a manner contrary to the 
rules of natural justice or where the good faith of the requesting 
Government is doubted, the offence is of a trivial nature, etc.
1. Bipat Gope v. State of Bihar, A.I.R, 1962 S.C. 1195, supra*
CEt will cover cases on the grounds of mala f ides in which a dis-
proprionate sentence will be imposed on the accused*
In Savarkar*s case,* it was held that where a person 
committed to prison to await his return under the Fugitive Offend­
ers Act, 1881, applies unsuccessfully for a writ of habeas corpus 
and the grounds for his habeas corpus application contain matters 
material as grounds for the exercise of the power given by the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, Section 10, the Court of Appeal has
original jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section
o10 of the Act* In Savarkar*s case Vaughan Williams L.J* ob­
served:
"Section 10 is obviously futile and use­
less unless the superior court is to 
review the conclusions of the executive*"
About •triviality* of the offence, he observed:
"A charge of collecting arms and .conspir­
acy to murder is not trivial, and in my 
opinion, inasmuch as the seditious 
speeches incited, or are said to incite 
Indians of British India to make war on 
the King and violent resistance to autho­
rity and such speeches are alleged to 
have been followed by a conspiracy to 
murder, which is not an immaterial or 
improbable Sequence of such speeches,
I cannot say that the case against the 
prisoner even in respect of the speeches 
made so long ago, is trivial*"
Fletcher Moulton J« also observed (at p*610,I):
"To my mind it is impossible to suggest 
that this is a trivial case* We have 
nothing to do with the truth of the 
charges that have been put forward, but 
to say that what the applicant is ac­
cused of is a trivial offence is impos­
sible* It is, in my judgment, a serious 
one."
31* R* v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Savarkar (1910)
2 K.B. 1056 C.A.: 1908-10 All1E.R.603*
2. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Savarkar 1908-10 
Ell E.R. 603 a F p '.bU9.T7 1W1U 2 R'.B.' 1058T  SfrprEu—
Now times are changed and under Section 29 or 31(a) 
as the offences are of a political character, the extradition 
would be refused on this ground* A nationalist would like to 
liberate his country* Savarkar*s was also an attempt to liber­
ate his country, and could have been construed as a political 
offence*
In Savarkar * s case, a question of the venue of the 
trial arose* Prima facie a fugitive should be tried in that 
part of Her Majesty’s Dominions where the crime charged against
him is alleged to have been committed and where Her Majesty’s 
witnesses for the prosecution are, but where a person has resided 
in England for years before a charge is brought against him prima 
facie he should be tried in England.
It is submitted that the latter situation does not seem 
to be different from the first one, because the residence of the 
accused will be immaterial, it is the availability of the wit­
nesses or the place of commission of the crime that is more im­
portant* Further suppose at the time of the Savarkar case, if 
India would have been a free foreigi^tate, Section 31(a) of the 
Indian Act of 1962, and conversely Section 3(1) of the Extradi­
tion Act prohibiting the surrender of political offenders, would 
afford a ground for refusal from either side*
Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, is akin 
and similar, with some addition of grounds, to Section 29 of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962* The High Court under Article 226 
of the Constitution, Sections 491, 435 or 439 of the Indian 
Criminal Procedure Code, and the Supreme Court under Article 32, 
or by special leave under Article 136, may review the order of 
the Central Government* This would amount to a final deter­
mination. If habeas corpus has been dismissed, the court might
in a special leave application still see whether there was a 
violation of Sections 29 and 31, and if there was any, the 
prisoner will be released because his extradition would be^in- 
fringement of Article 21.
The words 'or otherwise' occurring in this Section, i.e. 
29 of the 1962 Act, corresponding to Section 10 of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, leave it to the discretion of the Central 
Government to discharge the fugitive and to make the order in 
any case where, having regard to the distance and the facilities 
for communication and to all the circumstances of the case, it 
appears to the Central Government that too oppressive, or too 
severe a punishment will be inflicted on the return of the fugi- 
tive immediately.* The Waite's case was under Section 10 of 
the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, wherein the Court while inter­
preting punctuation and the words 'or otherwise* gave the dictum 
that the words 'or otherwise' give a very wide discretion to the 
court (under that Act) to refuse extradition if it appeared to the
court to be oppressive or would result in infliction of greater
o
punishment. In Henderson's case, though the English court dis­
missed habeas corpus it observed:
"An order under Section 10 of the Act 
would be made for the release of the 
fugitive only where it appeared that 
the contemplated proceedings although, 
perhaps, lawful by the law of the 
country concerned, would be conducted 
in a way contrary to natural justice, 
or if it appeared that the charges 
were trivial and that the punishment 
entailed in being returned was out of 
proportion to the gravity of the alleged 
offence. The difficulties which the
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Waite. 1921, The 
^imes, 22 February, quoted by Ohefte-Ujan, supra at p.183, and 
in Re Naran*ran Singh (1961) 2 All E.R. 565 at p*567,H.
2. Henderson v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1950) 1 All 
E-.B7 2E37 headhote (i*) and" aVp-.28V I,,1 H .-------
applicant would experience in presenting 
his defence, due to delay involved in the 
case, were matters for the consideration 
of the tribunal dealing with the case, 
and were factors which would be consider­
ed by the tribunal of any civilized country 
when dealing with a criminal matter.1*
This case clearly demonstrates the reluctance of the 
court to exercise its discretionary power under Section 10 of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, to order release of Henderson, 
wanted in India for the offence of cheating committed under Sec-
ofcj)
tion 420Lin 1944, and during pendency of the inquiry having been 
repatriated to England in February, 1948, he was requisitioned.
It was a case of delay in bringing the prosecution or asking for 
his return. Where delay in instituting proceedings results in 
the fugitive being prejudiced in his defence, this is a good 
ground for discharge.*"
2
In Mubarak Ali*s case, he had been detained awaiting 
his return to India, on charges of forgery and fraud in accord­
ance with the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and in habeas corpus 
he invoked Section 10 of the Act on the ground that the charges 
were without substance, and the proceedings were based on politi­
cal considerations only, and he would not get a fair and unbiased 
trial and it would be unjust and oppressive to order his return 
to India to face the charges. The court, rejecting the argument 
held that:3
**it would be am impossible position for 
this Court to take up to say that they 
would not return a person for trial 
to a country which is a member of the
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Campbell, 1956, 
&^ie Times, l£ July, cited by cbenedjan. ~lvLawrence,' supra, 
p.185.
2. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Mubarak Ali Ahmed 
71952) 1 All E.R. 1060.
3. Mubarak Ali Ahmed, ibid. at p.1063, E.f.
Commonwealth and where it is known that 
courts of justice have been presided over 
by Indian judges for very many years, be­
cause we thouglt that the Court would not
give him a fair trial. That would be an 
insult to the courts in India. It seems
to me that the words of Section 10 of the
Act of 1881, wide as they may be, we can­
not say that it would be unjust or oppres­
sive to return this man to India to take 
his trial.**
In the case of Cheyne,*' habeas corpus was q?plied for. 
The fugitive invoked Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1881. He was awaiting return to South Africa under that Act on 
offences of embezzlement of the employer*s money; on his express 
promise to return the money, the employer had assisted him to
come to the United Kingdom where he took a subsidiary job.
Accepting the petition, the court said:
**As his employers had made their intent­
ion known not to proceed against him 
criminally, and as he has consequently 
been allowed to leave South Africa 
openly and travel to England with his 
dependents, and as his being returned 
to South Africa would leave his depend­
ents destitute with consequent recourse 
to public assistance, the case was one 
of the exceptional ones in which the 
Court might properly exercise its juris­
diction under Section 10 of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, and order the of­
fender to be discharged.**2
Several grounds were indicated for the release of the 
offender in that case, viz.
a) willingness or convenience of the employer not to take
criminal action against the accused, allowing him to 
leave the country openly; and
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte McCheyne (1951)
T.L.R. Ii55. referred in Re Naranfan Singh (1^61 V 2 All E.R. 
565.
2. Ex parte McCheyne, ibid. (emphasis supplied)
b) leaving the dependents destitute in case of surrender;
c) consequent recourse to public assistance*
The Court, it seems, while interpreting the words 'or otherwise' 
under Section 10 (which principle would apply equally while
interpreting the same words under Section 29 of the Indian Extra­
dition Act, 1962) in this and following cases took a number of 
circumstances—extraneous matters—into consideration*
1
In Naranjan Singh's case, the accused committed the
offence of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code
in India about 10 years before; he came to England a year after
the commission of the offence, where he lived openly in his true
name, known to the police. He was arrested on 12 February,
1961,and committed to prison to await his return to India to
face the charge. He applied for habeas corpus praying for relief
under Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Ihe court
2
held (according to the headnote), that on the true construction 
of Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, which confers 
on a superior court a discretion where
"by reason of the trivial nature of the 
case or by reason of the application for 
the return of the fugitive not being 
made in good faith in the interest of 
justice or otherwise, it would ... be 
unjust or oppressive or too severe a 
punishment to return the fugitive"
a wide discretion should be given to the words 'or otherwise'
and accordingly apart from cases of a trivial nature, the court's
discretion to discharge a fugitive can be exercised in any case
where the return of the fugitive will be unjust, etc. and is not
confined to cases where the application appears not to have been
1. Re Naranjan Singh (1961) 2 All E.R. 565: (1962) 1 Q.B. 211.
2. Re Naranjan Si_n9h.ibid. headnote.
’made in good faith1• In this case, a delay of 10 years was 
the special circumstance and this gap between the commission of 
offence and prosecution was regarded by the Court as undue delay 
which would prejudice the fugitive in his defence at the trial 
and the Court ordered his discharge under Section 10*
In 2acharia!s case,* the accused applied under Section 
10 of the Fugitive offenders Act, 1881, whereunder he was com­
mitted to prison to await return to Cyprus for charges of murder 
and abduction* He contended that the requisition by the Cyprus 
Government was made for the purpose of revenge due to certain 
acts mentioned in the application for relief, and was not in good 
faith or in the interest of justice. Rejecting the application, 
the Court held the fact of the alleged offence being of a poli­
tical nature is not a ground for discharge of the fugitive under 
Section 10 of the Act, though the Court could take into consider­
ation that an application was made from motives of revenge, 
whether political or not. The House of Lords held that it 
would not be 'unjust or oppressive' to return Zacharia to Cyprus 
as it would be assumed in the absence of sufficient evidence to 
the contrary that proper 'precautions would be taken against his
assassination and the Cyprus Court would be competent to discri-
2minate between fabricated and true evidence. Moreover, the 
gravity of the charges could be put in the balance against the 
danger to the appellant; accordingly, in the circumstances, the 
discretion exercised by the Divisional Bench in withholding re­
lief under Section 10 was upheld. The grave allegation that the 
extradition claimed was not made in good faith and in the interest
1. Zacharia v. Republic of Cyprus and another (1962) 2 All E.R.
438, headnote (I).
2. Lord HPdson at p.456, ibid.
of justice was held not to have been made out.
Lord Goddard C.J. had observed in Mubarak Ali:*
111 am quite sure that in a proper case 
the court would apply the same rule with 
regaxd to applicants under the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, as it does under 
Section 3(1) of the Extradition Act of 
1870. If it appeared that the offence 
with which the prisoner was charged was 
in effect ,a political offence, no doubt 
this Court would refuse to return him."
2
But the House of Lords dissented from the dictum of
Lord Goddard in Mubarak Ali’s case, and’felt that ’political of­
fences* could not be covered under Section 10 of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act.
Professor R.Y. Jennings had pointed out that it might 
be doubted whether that dictum is^good law; it was in any case 
inconsistent with the inclusion of treason as an offence to which 
the Fugitive Offenders Act applies in accordance with Section 9.3
The Indian Extradition Act, therefore, not only adopted 
the provisions of the British Extradition Act, 1870, and of 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, but enacted Sections 29 and 31 and 
made them applicable to trials both under Chapter II and m  by
virtue of Section 32. The controversy regarding Section 10 of
the Fugitive Offenders Act now became academic so far as India 
was concerned. Under the new Act, Sections 29 and 31 apply
S. In Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed, supra (1952) 
1 All E.R. 1066 at p.1063 B, C.
2. In Zacharia v. Republic of Cyprus & another (1962 ) 2 All E.R. 
438, per viscount Simonds at p.444, G-H. Lord Rodcliffe at 
p.446-447, Lord Hodson at p.456F and Lord Devlin at p.460, 
Zacharia. ibid.
3. R.Y. Jennings, **The Commonwealth and International Law”,
B.Y.I.L., vol.30 (1953) 320-351 at p.326.
equally to trials under both Chapters. Chapter III has not 
yet been applied to any Commonwealth country, but it is available 
for application at any time.
In the case of Enahoro,* charged with treason, felony, 
conspiracy, etc. the fugitive applied under Section 10 of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, saying that on sin examination of 
all the circumstances of the case it would appear that the appli­
cation of his return was not being made in good faith or in the 
interest of justice, because the application for his return was 
an attempt to exterminate a political party, The Action Group of 
Nigeria. The Court said that on the evidence it could not be 
said that the application was not made in good faith or it might 
result in the extermination of a political party; and that at
the material time, no conditions existed in Nigeria, which would 
justify the Court in saying that it would be unjust or oppressive 
to return the applicant to Nigeria to stand trial. This deci­
sion was overturned by the House of Lords, on other grounds, but 
it demonstrates clearly that even though an application for the 
return of a fugitive to a Commonwealth country might be made in 
good faith, if conditions for the administration of impartial 
justice do not exist in the country, then the courts would refuse 
to return the fugitive.
Instances of such conditions may be existence of a 
state of emergency in the requesting country or Preventive 
Detention legislation as in India, which make it probable that 
the fugitive when returned might be detained without trial.
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Enahoro, supra 
T1963) 2 All E.R. 47V.
There are strong prospects of success of grounds men­
tioned in Section 29 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962 (Section 
10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881) if there are strong 
extraneous circumstances which militate against the impartial 
administration of justice in the requesting country. The 
accused has to raise all these extraordinary circumstances to 
bring his case within the purview of Section 29 of the 1962 Act 
and should also bear the burden of establishing this to the satis­
faction of the Court; perhaps on the balance of probabilities.
It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise#
The House of Lords * no doubt has recently held that 
the test of balance of probabilities is not an appropriate one 
to apply where the court is called upon to prophesy what will 
happen in future, for example, where the court has to determine 
under Section 4(1)(c) of the Fugitive Offenders ^ct, 1967, whether 
a person accused of an offence in a designated Commonwealth 
country might, if returned, be prejudiced at his trial or punish­
ed, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of 
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions# In that 
instance, a lesser degree of likelihood is sufficient, for the 
court to bear in mind the relative gravity of the consequences 
of its expectation being falsified either by permitting or refus­
ing to return the fugitive. The court would be justified in 
giving effect to the provisions of Section 4(1)(c) if the appli­
cant showed that there was a Reasonable chance' or 'substantial 
grounds for thinking* or 'a serious possibility* that he might 
be dealt with in one of those ways • ( A • *
l#In Fernandez v# Government of Singapore and others (1971) 2 All 
E.R. 691 at p.697 and headnote F,G.
As for the actual allegation in that case (as we have 
seen) regarding ‘political opinions1, ‘trivial nature of the 
offence1 and the ‘passage of time*, the House of Lords observed
i
that there were no merits in these contentions.
2In the judgment of the High Court, which was affirmed 
3
by the House of Lords, Lord Parker, C.J. had while considering
the word ‘might* in para.(c) of Section 4 of the Fugitive Offend­
ers Act, 1967, observed that ‘might* does not mean might as a 
matter of mere possibility but the applicant must satisfy the 
court that there are substantial grounds for thinking that he 
might be treated in one of those ways, viz. ‘that he might, if 
returned, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or 
restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, reli­
gion, nationality or political opinions' • Under Section 29 
such cases will be covered by the words 'or otherwise* read with 
Article 21 and the Fundamental Rights Chapter in the Constitution.
4In the recent case of Teja, regarding the argument
's&k* 4  Ly /lT
about ‘lapse of time‘s held Athat he (Tej a) could not invoke 
Section 8(3) of the 1967 Act,5 because the passage of time since
1. Fernandez v. Government of Singapore (1971) 2 All E.R. 691 at 
p.697, F.
2. In R. v. Governor of Pent on vi lie Prison, Ex parte Fernandez 
(19?1) 2 All E.R. 24.
3. In Fernandez v. Government of Singapore & Others (1971) 2 All 
E.R. 691.
4. In R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Tej a (1971)
2 ATl E.R. 11, Headnote (vi) at p.l3,b. - —
5. See also Section 31(b) of Ihe Extradition Act, 1962: Appendix.
the alleged offences was not the result of any neglect on the 
part of the Indian Government but was mainly caused by Teja's 
conduct; also that there was no evidence that the judiciary was 
going to be prejudiced adversely to the applicant by reason of 
press comment and debates in Parliament there and, in any event, 
it was very doubtful whether the Court, in deciding whether it 
would be ‘unjust or oppressive1 to return him on that ground, was 
entitled to take into account as a part of the circumstances any­
thing which did not flow from or was unconnected with the passage 
of time. The court further observed,* regarding the allegation 
of prosecution for a ‘political opinion1 that although Teja had 
been the centre of acute political controversy in India and 
attacks had been made on hizm in Parliament and elsewhere in com­
plete disregard of the sutjjudice principle, there was no evidence 
that Teja had at any time entered the political arenas and accord­
ingly, it could not be said that Teja was liable to prosecution 
for his political views. Giving the words ‘political opinion'
in Section 4(1)(b) and (c) of the 1967 Act, the widest possible
interpretation those paragraphs had no application to the present
case. About justice in Indian Courts, Lord Parker C.J. ob- 
2
served that in England, occasions must be rare and extreme when 
comments in the press, however strong, could affect the mind of 
a judge sitting without a jury;? something which in this country 
in a criminal case would only arise with the judges in the crimi­
nal division of Court of Appeal. That Court has said on more 
than one occasion that comment prior to the appeal,however
1. R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison. Ex parte Teja (1971)
S’ All E.R. 11, headnote (v .)j at pp.i2, 13.
2. R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Teja (1971)
2 All E.R. 11, headnote (v)^at p.23.
adverse, unless it is an attack on the Court itself, does not 
constitute a contempt} for a judge, by his training, is uninflu­
enced by those matters* Xhe Court strongly indicated that it 
did not think the High Court Judges sitting in Delhi or the 
Supreme Court if the case went on appeal to them, wera going to 
be prejudiced against the applicant by reason of such publicity*
Ihe further argument of the accused that he was a 
diplomatic accredited agent of a Costa Rican Government in 
London was repelled on the ground that he was not a member of 
the diplomatic staff, and it is impossible to say that, even if 
he was duly accredited in El Salvador, he was at the time of his 
arrest in England while proceeding to take up or return to his 
post in El Salvador. Immunity depended on mutual agreement 
between tha countries concerned, and could not be claimed uni­
laterally by a representative of a foreign country who had not 
been accepted or received by the host country. Referring to 
Articles of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 1961, 
set out in Schedule I to the Act, the convention applied only to 
present missions and not to ad hoc missions such as that on which 
Teja was employed; and that in any event, Teja could not be 
said to be on a diplomatic mission since he was merely a commer­
cial agent of the Costa Rican Government for the purpose of con­
cluding a commercial contract and was not representing that Govern 
ment in dealings with other States*
In Atkinson*s case,* Lord Parker distinguished the 
2case of : C m  nelly (see below f.n»2) fully accepting what was 
1* R* v. Brixton Prison Governor Ex parte Atkinson (1969 ) 2 All
e .r. ins:-------------- “ ---- -------------
2, ; Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All E.R.4oT Tir.r.y. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
said in • Connelly he was not satisfied that making those charges 
and that requisition for extradition was oppressive within the 
principle of Connelly. He also observed that it was no part 
of the function of the Court in extradition proceedings to con­
cern itself with the question whether the charges laid were op­
pressive as having been founded on the same facts as a charge on 
which the applicant had previously been tried. Matters of ♦op­
pression1 axe specifically dealt with by the provisions of the- 
Fugitive Offenders Acts, 1881 and 1967. The superior courts
in habeas corpus case do it, but the magistrate will only see if 
a prima facie case has been proved and he is not concerned to 
investigate whether the superior court might view the matter as 
oppressive.
IN Co.meHy* s case,* it has been emphasised that the
Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to protect defendants against
oppression and against any abuse of their functions by the prose-
2
cuting authorities. Lord Devlin summarised his views as follows:
"The result of this will, I think, be as 
follows:- As a general rule a judge 
should stay sin indictment (that is, order 
that it remain on the file not be proceed­
ed with) when he is satisfied that the 
charges therein are founded on the same 
facts as the charges in a previous indict­
ment on which the accused has teen tried, 
or form or are a part of the series of 
offences of the same or similar character 
as the offences charged in the previous 
indictment.”
3
Lord Devlin again went on:
1. -Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All 
E.R. 401: L.R. (1964) A.C. 1254.
2. Lord Devlin at p.446, C, in Connelly, ibid.
3. Lord Devlin at p.446, D, in CoPnelly, ibid.
"He will do this because as a general 
rule it is oppressive to an accused for 
the prosecution not to use rule 3 where 
it can properly be used, but a second 
trial on the same or similar facts is 
not always and necessarily oppressive, 
and there may in a particular case be 
special circumstances which make it 
just and convenient in that case. The 
judge must then, in all circumstances 
of the particular case, exercise his 
discretion as to whether or not he 
applied the general rule."
Section 29 of the Indian Act of 1962 took the idea of 
staying the proceedings on those various grounds from the Fugi­
tive Offenders Act. Section 8(2) of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1967, was based on the dictum of . Connelly* s case and r Connelly 
case enunciates those principles regarding the prosecution being 
oppressive.
Connelly * lays down that the Court has discretion 
(outside the limits of a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict or on issue estoppel) to stay, and in general should stay, 
a subsequent indictment containing charges founded on the same 
facts as those on which a previous indictment was based or form­
ing or being part of a series of offences based on one incident.
A plea of autrefois acquit was rejected, as the essential in­
gredients of offences (murder said robbery - he was formerly 
charged with one and then later charged with another) - were not 
the same, nor would the evidence necessary to sustain a charge 
of robbery suffice to prove a charge of which the appellant 
might have been found guilty on the first indictment, viz. 
murder or man-slaughter.
Under Section 10 of the British Extradition Act, 1870,
1. Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All 
E.R. 401 (H.L.y;
cases may emerge wherein during times of war there may be danger
of the ships or planes being attacked by the enemy, or the 
travelling may be difficult and inconvenient for an old man - 
from troubles and disease - or who may not be able to bear the 
burden of journey in case of acquittal - it seems the applica­
tion can be considered under the phrase ’oppressive*, ’unjust* 
and ’or otherwise’ but whether the offender should be extradited 
or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case*
Before the British Courts in Ezekiel’s case* the quest­
ion came for consideration in the extradition of the fugitive 
alleged to be guilty of offences under^ Sections 120-B and 420 
of the Indian Penal Code whether he should inter alia be dis­
charged or his return to India should be postponed on the grounds 
that the voyage to India would be dangerous* It was held that 
the circumstances of this case, including the existence of a 
State of War did not justify the Court in the exercise of its
discretion under Section 10 of the 187Q Act in refusing to send 
the applicant back to India
2
Humphrey J • observed:
”It is said and it is said truly, that 
conditions at the present time are such 
that there is considerable danger and 
risk to be apprehendec^by any person who 
has to go to India from England* That 
is perfectly true. It applies to all 
such persons as in fact are, and to be 
in the ordinary course of their duties, 
whether military or civil, travelling 
between India and England at the present 
time. It will not apply to the appli­
cant in any greater degree than it will 
apply to those other persons.”
1. R. v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Others Ex 
parte Ezekiel (194l) ^ All E.R, 546, headnote (v).
2. Humphrey J. at p*554,H, 555,A, in Ex parte Ezekiel* ibid.
It seems the argument overlooked the fact that mili­
tary or civil duties are different matters with due protection^
given to those ships* So tinder Section 29 of the Indian Act
such could well be a case of oppressive nature. Singleton J. 
regarding the plea based on danger to the health of the accused 
due to heat between May and November, without further reasoning
passed this judgment on the report of Sir William Willcox, who
said that it would not be dangerous to health provided the 
prisoner takes the usual precautions of a resident in India 
against .the hot climate. The learned judge was not informed
•t
of conditions in gaol. Singleton J. also observed:
nThe risk of going to India, as far as we
know, are no greater than those of going
to Canada, Australia or anywhere else.
It is inconvenient and it is difficult.
Both sides must be considered. For my­
self, I am satisfied that there is no
reason why we should make an order either
discharging the fugitive or ordering that 
he be not returned to India until after 
the expiration of some period.11
If one voluntarily takes a risk, it is a different matter, but 
extradition demands not only custody but safe custody^. Cam a 
man lawfully be taken through a dacoit-infested area at the 
cost of his life? Tucker J. did not express any opinion on 
the above point. An Indian court in similar circumstances 
might well be more humane.
1. Ex parte Ezekiel, ibid. at p.558, C,D.
(5) Discharge of the Fugitive if not Surrendered After Expiry
of 2 Months^^ection 24 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962
i
This Section (’two months*) is akin to Section 7 of 
the Fugitive Offender^Act, 1881 (’one month’)* The question 
relevantly arises what is meant by the words ’sufficient cause* 
and ?;may* occurring in both the Acts, as the Acts are in pari 
materia and the words therein will convey the same meaning*
In Re Shuter * the words came up for consideration*
The circumstances were that on 15 July, 1959, the applicant was 
committed to prison to await his return to Kenya, ~ serious
offences, and he was to be taken to Kenya by two police officers 
then on leave to return, one on the 12th and the other on the 16th 
August. An air passage for the two Kenyan officers was booked 
by B.O.A.C. on 21st July, but were cancelled by B.O.A.C. on 16th 
August and the applicant filed the application for discharge 
under Section 7 of 1881 Act (corresponding to Section 24 of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962) on the ground that he, was not 
conveyed out of the United Kingdom within the time mentioned in 
the Section and the Court held (according to the headnote) that:- 
(i) on the true construction of Section 7 of the Fugitive Offend­
ers Act, 1881, the word *may* in its context should be read as 
* shall’, and therefore, Section 7 prohibited a fugitive being 
detained for more than a month unless ’sufficient cause* was 
shown to the contrary; and (ii) in considering whether ’suffi­
cient cause’ within the meaning of Section 7 was shown the Court 
was entitled to consider the reasonableness of what was being 
done; in the circumstances, the applicant wais held not to have 
been detained unreasonably, particularly having regard to the
1. Re Shuter(No*2) (1959) 3 All E.R. 480.
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provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1881 relating to escort of 
the accused; and the application for discharge was rejected*
1
Interpreting the word *may* , Lord Parker C.J. observed:
**•*• If the discretion is completely at 
large and *may* means ‘may1 , then it 
would be quite unnecessary to have the 
words * unless sufficient cause is shown 
to the contrary* * Secondly, it is a 
case where what is sufficient cause in 
any particular case may well depend upon 
opinion and discretion* I think that 
the natural meaning is * shall*, unless 
sufficient cause is shown to the con­
trary, order the fugitive to be dis­
charged out of custody***
While interpreting the words * sufficient cause shown 
to its contraxy* under Section 7 of the 1881 Act, Lord Parker 
observed:^
**For my part, I think that that inter­
pretation of * sufficient cayse to the 
contrary* is too narrow. It seems to 
me that within those words can be 
brought matters of reasonableness ••• 
one is entitled to take into account 
questions such as reasonableness in 
all the circumstances •**
In this case, offences were serious and the delay
was of a day or 1wo which took time in making escort arrangements* 
Cases of illness of the accused, of the escort officers* illness, 
their death, or non-availability of trains, etc*, for the desti­
nation, delay in signing the warrant by the Home Secretary, 
riots in the requested State making it impossible for the escort 
to take the accused, suspension of services so that the accused 
may not be taken to the port of embarkation for a few days; all 
these may cause a delay which may be * reasonable* *
1. Re Shuter (No*2), supra, p.483, I.
2. Ibid*, at p.484C, F*
The departure of ship in the territorial waters of
the requested State may be delayed for incomplete handling of 
the cargo or repairs* These may be instances of reasonable 
delay which may be 1 sufficient causes to the contrary* within 
the meaning of Section 10 of the British Act, Section 3(1) of 
the 1903 Act, or Section 24 of the 1962 Act.
Again the matter came for consideration in the Bnahoro 
While reiterating the principles laid down in Shuter*s
3
Lord Parker C.J. speaking for the court said:
"So far as is known, there has only been 
one other case under Section 7 of the Act, 
that is Re Shuter {No*2)* The only 
materiality for this purpose of that deci­
sion CShuter*s easel is as to the meaning 
of those words *may, unless sufficient 
cause is shown to the contrary, otder the 
fugitive to be discharged out of custody.*
In the first place, the court came to a 
decision that the word *may* should be 
interpreted as mandatory, so that, in the 
absence of sufficient cause being shown 
to the contrary, there was no further dis­
cretion; the fugitive had to be discharged.
The second matter which is important is 
that it had been argued in that case that 
sufficient cause to the contrary must re­
late to something outside the control of 
the relevant authorities, or some strong 
or serious compelling reasons such as the 
serious illness of the fugitive. The 
Court, however, took the view that th&t 
interpretation was too narrow, and that 
the words 'unless sufficient cause is 
shown to the contrary* brought matters 
of reasonableness under considerat ion•'*
1. R. v. Brixton Prison (Governor) & Another Ex parte Enahoro 
fl963) 2 All E.R. 477 at p.479D.
2. Re Shuter (No *2) ( 1959) 3 All E.R. 481=* (1960) 1 Q.B. 142.
3. E. v. Brixton Prison (Governor) ex parte Enahoro (1963) 2 All 
^77 at p.479D.
case
2case,
Lord Parker, after quoting more from his earlier
1 2j udgment, obs erved:
"Approaching the matter in that way, 
it would seem that the true effect of 
Section 7 is that, when a fugitive is 
found to have been detained for more 
than thirty days from the time of his 
committal, it is for the Secretary of 
State to account for the delay and that, 
unless he satisfies the Court that the 
detention in all the circumstances for 
the period exceeding thirty days is 
reasonable, then this Court should dis­
charge the fugitive*11
3
It was further observed:
"Section 7, as I have already said, is 
dealing with the liberty of the subject, 
and the prevention of his being detained 
for an unduly long period. After thirty 
days he must be discharged unless suffi­
cient cause is shown* Section 6, on the 
ether hand, so fair as time is concerned, 
is not saying that some thing must happen 
after a certain time, but is saying that 
something shall not happen before a cer­
tain time has expired, namely, the person 
is to be allowed 15 days from a committal 
or the termination of habeas corpus pro­
ceedings before the Secretary of State 
can take any steps, and, for my part,
I can see no reason for giving * may* a 
mandatory meaning in that connection*"
Thus in Section 7, the word * may* was given mandatory 
meaning and under Section 6 only a directory meaning.
Section 24 of the 1962 Act makes provisions for the 
discharge of the person apprehended if not surrendered or re­
turned within two months by the High Court, upon application 
made to it by or on behalf of the fugitive criminal, unless
!• In Re Shuter (No*2), supra*
2. R* v# Brixton Prison Governor, Ex parte Enahoro (1963) 2 All 
E.R. 477 at p. 479,H,I.
3. R. v. Brixton Prison Governor, Ex parte JSnahoro (1963) 2 All
E.R. 477 at p. 481,F.
sufficient cause is shown to the contrary by the Central Govern­
ment • If sufficient cause is not shown by the Central Government, 
the word *may* will be interpreted as mandatory and the fugitive 
will be ordered to be discharged, and principles in the English 
cases mentioned above would apply*
(6) Fugitive Convicts
In regard to the procedure for extradition of suspects 
and convicted persons, whether convicted after hearing them or in 
their absence, foreign countries, whether civil-law countries or 
common-law countries generally make some distinctions* The laws 
of the civil law countries do not make any distinction between a 
suspected or convicted fugitive and so the courts of those re­
quested States surrender the fugitive on the mere production of 
the original or an authenticated copy of the sentence or writ of 
condemnation issued by the competent court or judge of the re­
questing State without complaint.
On the contrary, the laws of common-law countries 
normally define fugitive* and * fugitive criminal* as a con­
victed person, e.g* Section 2(f) and also * conviction* and 
* convicted* inSection 2(b) of the Indian Extradition Act,1962, 
corresponding to Section 26 of the Hritish Extradition Act,1870, 
and the pattern in India seems to have been based on the British 
Act.1
A ./fugitive offender* has been defined in Section 26 
of the British Extradition Act of 1870 similarly to Section
1. See also Extradition Act of Canada of 1952, Section 2(a);
Israel Extradition Act of 1952^ Section 3; Tanzania Extra­
dition Act of 1965, section 2(3); Iraq Extradition Act, 1923, 
Section 2.
2(l)(f) of the Indian Act, 1962, which reads:
”(f) •fugitive criminal1 means an indi­
vidual who is accused or convicted of 
an extradition offence committed with­
in the jurisdiction of a foreign State 
or a Commonwealth country and is, or 
is suspected to be, in some part of 
India1* *
Who is a fugitive offender had been a subject matter 
of certain decisions before 1B70.
~ was one
The Jacobi ft Hiller case, / of obtaining goods by false
pretence, made in letters from Amsterdam, from a Mayence firm* • 
Cn extradition being demanded by Germany for the goods received 
by the prisoners at Amsterdam, and sent by them to England, 
whither they went, it was argued in habeas corpus on behalf of 
the petitioners that the offence, if any, was committed in Holland 
and not in Germany* Repelling the argument, the Court held 
that even though the accused was not present in Germany at the 
time of the commission of the offence, they were held to have 
been there constructively; and the grounds for the decision can 
only be called "constructive presence"*
2
The case of Jacobi C< Hillor was followed by Nlllins, a 
case in which letters containing alleged false pretences were 
sent from Southampton to certain persons carrying on business in
Germany, and consequently the goods were delivered, some in 
Germany to the prisoner*s orders and some in England, and the 
prisoner sent to such persons, by post from Southampton, certain 
forged Bills of Exchange in payment for such goods* It was held 
that the offence was committed in Germany and the case fell
1. R. V. Jacobi & Hiller (1881) 46 L.T. 595*
2. In JR, v. Nillins (1834) 53 L*J* M.C. 157.
within Section 26 of the 1870 Act* Sir Edward Clarke/has very 
severely criticised R* v. Nillins in his work,* where he says 
that the case was wrongly decided; how could the prisoner be 
held to be guilty of committing an offence in a place where he 
never had been physically present? But Clarke was wrong, 
because in the modern world, due to the complexity of business 
transactions, the vast extension of credit, the general wide­
spread of paper currency, and other improvements in communica­
tions, it is all too easy for one to commit a crime in a foreign 
country where he was not physically present; and it would be 
idle to argue that when such criminals are apprehended, they
should not be extradited to stand their trial in the country
2
where the offence took its major effect*
3
To the contrary is an American decision, wherein in 
the absence of statutory definition of a ’fugitive offender*, it 
was observed that:
"a person cannot in any sense be deemed 
to have fled from the justice of a State 
in the dominion of whose territorial 
jurisdiction he has never been corpore­
ally present since the commission of a 
crime therein* One who has never fled 
cannot be a fugitive from justice of a 
State in which he is only constructively 
present at the time he commits a crime•**
This American decision can no longer be authority on%
the point as the British and the Indian Extradition Acts contain
the definition of a.'fugitive offender* whereas no such statutory
definition had been given in the American Law of Extradition*
'A
Lord Hewart C.J. in Godfrey's case (at p*24) reiterated the* ’
1. £*,’. Clarke upon Extradition, 3rd ed., p*225, quoted by Sankey,
J. in R. v. Godfrey (1923) 1 K.B. 24 at pp.30, 31.
2. Ohene-Djan, supra, p.58.
3. In State v. Hall* 1884, 44 Am. State Reports, p.501.
4. In R. v. Godfrey (1923) 1 K.B* 24 at pp.27, 28.
principles mentioned above in the two English cases and while 
interpreting Section 26 of the British Extraditon Act, 1870, 
held that physical presence in the country at the time of the 
commission of the offence was not necessary, and escapement and 
fleeing from the penal consequences was the crux of the matter*
He observed (at p.28) that the words are 'who is in' this country, 
not 'who has. fled to this country' ♦ On the lines of these 
English decision, in Mubarak Ali' s case where the man was never 
physically present in India, he obtained goods in Karachi by 
telephone and letters, the Supreme Court of India held he was 
guilty of committing the offence in India.*
A 'fugitive' within the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
Section 2, is a person who is accused of committing an offence 
to which that part of the Act applies and who has left the terri­
tory in which the crime was committed. It is not necessary that
2 3he left to avoid arrest. Humphrey J. observed:
4"the two decisions of this court de­
cided upon the very familiar definition 
of the 'fugitive criminal* to be found 
in the Extradition Act 1870, are in 
point and support the view I have ex­
pressed."
The argument was that the applicant was not a fugitive within the 
meaning of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1870, as it was not shown
1. Mubarak Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 857.
2. R. v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Others, Ex
?""arte Ezekiel (194i) 2 All E.R. i>46; so will be the case under 965 Act of a fugitive who leaves India for a foreign country 
or Commonwealth country.
3. Humphrey J. in Ezekiel's case, ibid. at p.550,B.
4. R. v. Nillins (1884) 53 L.J.M.C. 157 and R. v. Godfrey (1923)
T K.B.“Sn
that he f/Qtyd from India in order to avoid arrest. With the 
above reasoning, his argument was repelled by Humphrey J..
On such an objection, the same interpretation will be 
put on Section 2(f) of the 1962 Act. However, in cases of 
suspects and convicted fugitives, difference in the procedure 
arise and India is not an’exception. In international practice
in the cases of a suspect fugitive, such evidence must be pro­
duced before the magistrate in the extradition hearing, as would 
according to the law of the State of asylum, justify the commit­
tal of the fugitive for trial, if the crime had been committed in 
that State, i.e. a prima facie case must be established at the 
extradition hearing that the fugitive has committed the act 
charged in the foreign country.
In international practice the procedure followed in the 
proceedings relating to convicts are considerably simpler. In 
that case it is not necessary to go into the facts, nor would it 
appear necessary in the ordinary case of a criminal nature to 
show that the act charged is a crime in the State of asylum.*’
Ihe judge must commit the fugitive for extradition if such evi­
dence is produced as would, according to the law of the requested
2State, prove that he was so convicted.
A convicted fugitive includes a person who has merely
3 4been sentenced, one who has served a part of punishment, and
1. Re Pennsylvania and Levi (1897) 6 Que Q.B. 151.
2. British Extradition Act, 1870, Section 26. In Re. Caborn- 
Waterfield (1960) 2 All E.R. 178, affirmed in AthnassiadLs v./^  
Government of Greece (1969) 3 All E.R. 293.  ^ k
3* Re Warner (1864) I C.L.J. 16.
4. R* v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Van der Auwera
7*1907) 2 K.B. 157; R.v. Governor or Brixton Prison, Exparte 
Calberlaf 1907) 2 K.BT 85 1.
one who has been paroled,* but does not include a person sentenced 
par contuioace (’for contumacy* see Section 2(b) of the Act of 
1962), i.e. in default of appearance, in cases of Britain or 
India.2
In the case of Caborn-Waterfield (see above, p. 269 ),
the Court only considered Section 26 of the Extradition Act, dis­
charged the accused on the ground that in the warrant of arrest 
and warrant of committal he was wrongly described as accused at 
the time of larceny whereas by * judgment of the French Court 
Iteratif Defaut* he was a convicted person which was final sen­
tence as after a judgment in his absence called 'jugement par 
defaut*, i.e. judgment par contumace, which are the same - he 
applied for setting aside the judgment and for fresh trial, and 
he again absented himself, tried and was sentenced, and according 
to French Law the judgment became final. Ihe argument was con­
sidered that this judgment itself, *par defaut* is in violation 
of principles of natural justice according to English law.
The judgment was based on a clause, Article VII(C) of 
a treaty between England and France in 1876 providing ’persons 
convicted by judgment in default or arrSt de contumace shall be 
in the matter of extradition considered as persons accused and, 
as such, surrendered.* It was argued that one under a *jugement 
iteratif defaut* was not a person accused but convicted, and 
the person surrendered would go straight to prison to suffer sen­
tence on him, which since such judgments would be a nullity,
1. U.S. v. Allison (1914) 42 D.L.R. 595.
2. Re Coppin (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 47; Re Caborn-Waterf ield 
(I960; 2 All E.R. 178, affirmed in Athnassiadis v. Government 
of Greece (1969) 3 All E.R. 293 (H.L.) per Lord Delhorne
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being in violation of the principles of natural justice, would 
not be in accordance with the criminal laws. The principle be­
hind the Caborn-Waterfie 1 d decision (see above, p£69,279)that a
warrant wrongly describing a fugitive as accused whereas in effect 
he was convicted could not found his extradition is certaily a 
principle which will commend itself to the Indian courts.
The question remains whether the English (and so 
Indian) courts are bound to commit the fugitive offender under 
Section 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870, on proof of a conviction 
or whether they can inquire into the question whether or not the 
conviction was secured by means which offended against English 
(and so Indian) notions of natural <$r substantive justice. In 
India, the answer will be in the negative. Apart from treaty 
agreement, the validity of the surrender can be challenged in 
English Courts also on the basis of natural and substantial 
justice as according to English law, an accused cannot be sen­
tenced. Even the treaties would not make the surrender valid
if they provide for such an eventuality, because
11 The treaty may be prayed in aid to 
limit the scope of the Extradition 
Act (see R. v. Wilson)* but not to 
extend it. Where there is any 
ambiguity in the Act it may be pos­
sible to look at the treaty in order 
to resolve the ambiguity.”
So the treaty cannot extend the scope of the Act and 
cannot legalise a surrender on the simple basis of an ex parte 
judgment merely because French law provides such a procedure and
1. <1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42.
2. Re Caborn-Waterf ield (1960) 2 All E.R. 178 at 183 ,Ci* per 
Salmon, J.
it has been agreed to in the treaty. If the treaty proposes 
to extend the provisions of the Act,that clause is void. In 
India any such unlikely eventuality will offend against Article 
21 of the Constitution, and a judgment in violation of the prin­
ciples of natural justice could not form the basis of a surrender, 
This helped to explain the definitions under Section 2(f) (see 
above) and that in Section 2(b), which runs:
”(b) ’conviction and convicted* do not 
include or refer to a conviction which 
under foreign law is a conviction for 
contumacy but the term ’person accused* 
includes a person so convicted for con­
tumacy.”
As a result, it could scarcely happen that extradition 
would be sought in India of a fugitive who had been convicted 
par contumace without the full procedure applicable to fugitive 
suspects.
In cases falling within Chapter II of the Extradition 
Act, 1962, a prima facie case has to be established, but it is 
not so required in cases of falling within Chapter III, as there 
only the extradibility of the offence, the authenticity of the 
warrant and identity of the accused are to be proved. In any 
case, by virtue of the provisions of Section 32 of the Act, the 
provisions of Sections 29 and 31 have been made applicable to 
every foreign or Commonwealth country without any modification, 
notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in Section 3 
or Section 12 of the Act. Thus, the Central Government while 
notifying under those two sections or entering into treaties
with foreign or Commonwealth countries cannot curtail its powers 
and duties under Sections 29 and 31 which apply equally to in­
quiries under both Chapters.
Thus, in trials under Chapter II in addition to the
prima facie case the inquiring magistratejor the superior courts, 
have to see if the case falls within the reservations set out in 
Section 31, for if so, extradition must be refused. The Central 
Government has power to refuse extradition on any of the grounds 
mentioned in Sections 29 and 31 of the 1962 Act. In our pre­
sent connection, it will be noted that accused persons, entitled 
to have a prima facie case established in front of the magistrate 
may contend that the prosecution is no longer feasible (under 
Section 31(b)),a matter to which we shall return below. As
the powers of the High Court and Supreme Court in India are 
wider under writ petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 32 and 
Article 136 respectively, these courts can interfere if funda­
mental rights are infringed. The Government may in cases 
militating against the Fundamental Rights of the fugitive, refuse 
extradition in its complete discretion, as discussed above.
(7) Evidence on Behalf of the Accused
Though the doctrine of prima facie case is a require­
ment over and above the proof of identity of the accused, extra­
ditable nature of the offence, political character of the offence 
place of committal of the offence, and acquisition of immunity 
for prosecution through lapse of time, or the rule of speciality, 
or doctrine of double criminality or non bis in idem; yet 
Section 31, before the magistrate and Sections 31 and 29 before 
the Central Government, and Section 31 positively and perhaps 
Section 29 in appropriate cases before the High Court and Supreme 
Court, give the accused a right to adduce evidence about his 
identity, the extraditable nature of the offence whether in the 
Second Schedule, or in a treaty or agreement. The court is 
bound to consider the evidence on these matters adduced by the
accused, as also the Central Government while exercising its 
discretion. On the same grounds, the accused is entitled to 
produce evidence of his nationality, where this is relevant, 
according to the treaty, as for example, Indo-Nepalese Treaty, 
Article 2 wherein it is provided Jhat neither Government shall be 
bound in any case to surrender any person who is not a national 
of the country by whom the requisition has been made, except 
where such person is accused of having committed the offence speci­
fied in Clause (10) of Article 3 of the Treaty, i.e. desertion 
from the Armed Forces. The accused will also have a right to 
produce evidence,not to contradict the statements made by the 
prosecution, for that would be appropriate before the trial-judge 
in the requesting State, but to explain the statements of the 
witnesses of the requesting State.* The accused may produce 
evidence to establish that the crime is of a ’political nature’ 
or ’to prove to the satisfaction gf the magistrate or superior 
court or the Central Government that the requistion has in fact,
been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a
2
political character.’ The accused can take advantage, in his
defence, of any statutory or treaty provisions or any constitu­
tional provisions provided in the Indian Constitution, fundamental 
or otherwise, or of any rules having the force of law which place 
a limitation upon the right of the requested State to surrender 
him to a foreign State, e.g. if the offence is against freedom of 
press, speech, religion and the like, or that he has acquired 
exemption by lapse of time either in accordance with the Indian
1. The Extradition of Mert^*, 1931-1932 A.D., Case No.174, de- 
cided on 8 August, 193i.
2. Ramos v. Ziaz; Ramos v. Cruzata, 28 Int. Law Reports, p.351, 
decided on 18 December, 1959. iSee also The Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, Section 31(a), Appendix 1^
Limitation Act or the law of limitation of the requesting State 
or that he has already been tried and acquitted for the same of­
fence by the Courts of the requesting State, requested State or 
any other third State or States. The courts in extradition pro­
ceedings do not go into the merits of the demand, but must and 
will confine themselves to consideration of its formal parts as 
provided in the Act or the treaty and see that the formalities 
are complied with.* They cannot extend their inquiry into the 
existence of the crime, if such existence appears sufficiently 
from documents, nor examine whether the accused committed the
crime for which his surrender is sought, nor into the investiga-
3
tion of an alibi, or the probabilities of justification of the 
act. Evidence, therefore, may riot be led on behalf of the 
fugitive, such as would form part of any defence case based on 
these considerations.
In prima facie cases, the accused is not given an oppor­
tunity for defence! However should it be, e.g. the cases of a 
man in India at the time, is alleged to have committed murder in 
Pakistan, or where he is able to prove that an article allegedly 
stolen by him was, in fact, lawfully received by him as a gift, 
he should (in my submission) be allowed to prove this in addition 
to any relevant factors arising in Sections 29 and 31, on the 
lines of the Austrian Law of 1873 which requires that such evi­
dence or grounds for suspicion be provided by the requesting 
State as cannot immediately be shown by the accused to be false,
1. Hans Muller’s case, supra, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 367.
2. Wright v. Henkel (1903) 190 U.S. 40; Charlton v. Kelley (1913) 
229 U.S. 447; Grossberg v. Choquet (Choquette) (1924) 36 Que 
K.B. 517; In Re Chang (1947) A.D. 1947. Case No.69.
3. Desmond, Sheriff et al. v. Eggers (1927) 18 F (2d) 503, 506.
i.e. the accused should be allowed to adduce exculpatory evi­
dence that would manifestly result in his acquittal, if he were 
returned to the locus delicti for trial. To the same effect are 
Swedish laws, as indicated above (pp.199,202)• This pattern of 
Austrian and Swedish law which is a compromise solution, may be 
taken as a pattern and applied by India in any treaties she may 
enter into.
Indeed, in the effective working of extradition there, 
are hindrances such as the want of sufficient extradition trea­
ties; the rigidity of treaties in not allowing a sufficiently 
wide range of offences and excessive procedural requirements.
But, treaties apart, common sense would allow a fugi­
tive to submit, when the priraa facie case is established against 
him, that either there is no case to answer or that an obvious 
misunderstanding or error vitiates the case, and it is hard to 
suppose that the principle of disallowing the fugitive to present 
a defence before the magistrate would be extended in India so
far as to impose extradition on a person who could easily prove 
an incontestable alibi, for example. In my submission, the 
point is somewhat analogous to the admitted requirement that the
fugitive’s identity must be established and the sufficiency cf 
the warrant. The fugitive can contest both, and it seems 
reasonable that he should be allowed to challenge at least the 
fundamentals of the charge against him. This, in my sub­
mission, is an area of law remaining to be developed.
(8) Conditions to be Imposed upon Requesting State " * "——l ■——■—1 " — ^
i •
(i) Rule of Speciality
International law allows a requested State to impose 
conditions upon the requesting State, in conformity with its 
treaty, national municipal laws and usages, before a fugitive can 
be handed over to it. We have already (pp.108,186 above) dis­
cussed the rule of speciality in reference to Section 31(c) of 
the Indian Extradition Act, 1962. The rule, having a strongly 
mandatory character in that context, may figure more widely in 
the law relating to extradition from India. Under the Act of 
1962 by virtue of Section 3(3)(c), the Central Government has 
been authorised and empowered to lay down conditions, qualifica­
tions and modifications and insert exceptions for implementing a 
treaty. These conditions may be inserted in the treaty or by a 
subsequent order, and thus, the above-mentioned principle of 
international law for imposition of conditions upon the request­
ing State has been given the sanction of municipal law by Section 
3(3)(c).
Apart from this, the Central Government in consequence
and pursuance of territorial supremacy is entitled to place cer­
tain conditions on the requesting State before it determines to 
comply with the request to surrender a fugitive found within the 
territory of India. The Central Government of any requested . 
State, even where no mandatory rule of speciality incorporated 
in its own municipal law, may, before ordering the extradition 
of the fugitive offender, specifically ask the requesting State 
not to prosecute or punish such person for any act committed 
prior to his surrender other than that which motivated his 
extradition and a limitation like this (as seen earlier) is
known as the rule of speciality. In India, Section 31(c) has 
incorporated the rule in the inunicipal law. The reason for this 
incorporation may be that in some cases, the ad hoc undertaking 
given by the requesting State amounts to a mere pious obligation. 
The House of Lords in regard to an assurance pertaining to the 
rule of speciality,recently observed as under
"An assurance such as that contained in 
an affidavit of the Attorney-General of 
the Republic [of Ireland] that the appli­
cant would not be put on trial for 
charges other than those referred to in 
the warrant is properly admissible and 
can properly be taken into account under 
Section 2(2)(b) of the 1965 Act, although 
in view of the uncertainty of future de­
velopments and the possibility of new 
political situations and exigencies aris­
ing, it should not be regarded as con­
clusive."
The House of Lords were not much exercised about the undertakings 
in regard to the rule of speciality. India, therefore, having 
special regard to Section 31(a) (Offences of a Political charact­
er) inserted in 1962, the rule of speciality in Section 31(c), 
and also conversely, enacted Section 21 to bind itself to all 
requesting States in this regard, and this was all in order to 
anticipate uncertainties on the scope of speciality. On the 
basis of reciprocity, India thus has every right to insist
on speciality being a rule of the law of every requesting State 
before extradition is ordered in any case.
3
In Terasov^ case, the court enquired whether in the
1. In Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison (1971) 1 All E.R. 1163, 
1168 (H.L.), headnote (ii)d, see p.1164 J to p.1165 e, per 
Lord Pearson.
2. The Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965.
3. R.C. Hingorani, op.cit., |>«56, n.41; S.K. Agarwala, op.cit., 
p*219; see also 57 I.J.I.L. (1963) vol.3, p.323; Bedi, op. 
cit;, p.150, n.273.
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and
requesting State1s municipal laws such a clause existed,/as the 
reply was in the negative refused extradition; the necessity of 
the existence of this clause in the municipal laws of the request­
ing State is to remove the doubts. In case of changed political 
circumstances, that State will be taken to observe the rule of 
speciality without room for speculation as to its non-observance 
due to any political upheavals.
Explaining the meaning of the words * another offence* 
the House of Lords in Keane* s case/  observed that * another of­
fence means an offence which has been, of was alleged to have been 
already committed, and not an offence or alleged offence likely 
to arise from the appellants future conduct*• In India, there 
is no difficulty about exacting the rule from other States,
India herself being bound by this rule under Section 21. But,
we may add, the principle or rule is generally adopted as implied
2
whdn it is not stated in municipal law, and may be strictly ob-
3
served even in the absence of treaty.
(ii) Re. -Extraditionto a Third State
Another condition which the surrendering State may 
impose upon the requesting State before surrendering the fugitive 
is that, having obtained the extraditionlpf the person sought, the 
requesting State will not re-extradite him to a third State with­
out the consent of the surrendering State, or unless the accused 
has freely and voluntarily consented to being delivered to a
1. Keane v. Governor, Brixton Prison (1971) 1 All E.R. 1163, 
headnote (ii) b.
2. United States v. Rauschur (1889) 119 U.S. 407.
3. In Re Dillaser 18 Int. Law Reports, 1952, Case No.83, decided 
on 30 July, 1952; Extradition (Germany-Czechoslovakia) Case, 
(1921) A.D., 1919-22, Case No.182, decided on 4 April, 1921.
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third State, having been at liberty to leave the country after
acquittal (within the fixed period) of the offence for which he
was extradited, or after fully serving the sentence imposed upon
him or having obtained a pardon.* Many treaties and municipal
laws do not contain this condition. By implication (it might
be argued) Section 31(c) provides it for India. The tendency
2
towards such an inclusion is seen to be growing.
However, these two limitations under international 
practice do not apply if there is an opportunity for the extra­
dited person to quit the country to which he has been surrendered, 
and he fails to avail himself of it within the prescribed period, 
or has returned voluntarily to that territory after leaving it, 
and thus his trial for another offence or his re-extradition to 
a third State is allowed.
The length of this period depends either on the provi­
sions of national codes or on the treaties. It varies from 
48 hours to four months. A few treaties do not specify any 
limit while others have no such provision at all, but generally 
the period of 30 days or one month is incorporated in the various
4
national statutes, treaties and draft comments.
But so far as India is concerned, it faces no diffi­
culties in view of Section 31(c) which makes it a condition pre­
cedent for the return of the fugitive by using the words fshall 
not, until he has been restored or has had an opportunity of
1. Bedi, op.cit.t p.152.
2. Bedi, opicit., p.153, n.285.
3. Bedi, opicit., p.153, n.286.
4. Bedi, op.cit.# p.153, n.287, 288, 290,291.
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returning to India, be detained . ..* This avoids all specula­
tion. But the above-mentioned international practice would 
apply in the case of India if the fugitive 1 has had an opportu­
nity of returning to India* and yet he refuses to do so or does 
not want to avail himself of it.
(iii) Prohibition of Extraordinary or Specially Constituted
Tribunals
In order to prevent the subjection of an extradited 
person to a trial before an extraordinary or specially consti­
tuted tribunal made for that purpose only or before a court 
having special powers in internal practice, the surrendering 
State may ask the requesting State to restrict prosecution of 
the extradited person to the courts and its procedure which nor­
mally have jurisdiction over the crime for which the extradition 
was granted, and also not to inflict any inhumane punishment,* 
£see below, p. 282 ).
In the Indian Extradition Act, there is as yet no man­
datory provision to this effect, but if there are two procedures 
available, to prosecute and punish under a especial law, or to 
proceed under the ordinary criminal procedure code, the first 
would (in the sense we have pursued here) be ultra vires of 
Articles 13, 14 of the Constitution read with Article 21 and 
the prospect of such a procedure before a special tribunal would
be barred (as it would by Article 21 - an article giving a Funda­
mental right of trial by ordinary courts). So an extradition 
opposed to the spirit of these Articles could not be allowed and 
the Indian Courts or Central Government (as the.case may be) will 
refuse extradition^ or (as appropriate) lay down prospectityg(^ , 
a condition in the treaty or by another order under Section 3(3) 
(c) to the effect that no extradited person may be subj'ected to
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.154.
trial by a specially constituted extraordinary tribunal. The 
Central Government may also impose a duty on the requesting State 
not to submit the extradited person to trial by such a court.
Likewise, as in India, no inhumane punishment can be
JU*~ /Lw
inflicted - even flogging abolished (even forced labour isA ^
abolished by the Constitution), the Central Government can im­
pose a condition on the requesting State not to inflict an in­
humane punishment, which brings us to our next section.
(9) The death penalty, mutilation or inhumane 
punishments
In India, death penalties are inflicted in case of 
murders within Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. India, in
cases where the death penalty is imposed ^ abroad for lesser
would surrender the criminal to the 
crimes / requesting State only subject to the general condition
%
that;if the offence for which his extradition is requested is 
punishable by any corporal punishment under the laws of the de­
manding State, while such punishment is not provided for in the 
law of the surrendering State or is not normally carried out, 
that penalty, if imposed, in the relevant case will be changed
into fine or imprisonment, or both.
The reason for this is that under Article 21 no person 
can be deprived of his life and liberty except by the procedure 
established by law. The procedure established by law is the 
Extradition Act of 1962. The Second Schedule provides the 
offences mentioned in it, referring to the original sections.
In none of the sections is the death penalty provided except 
Section 302. Likewise, in all the sections maximum penalty 
is provided with alternative penalties of a fine. No mutila­
tion or corporal punishment is provided - only simple and rigor­
ous imprisonment. Thus, the Second Schedule recognises not
only the doctrine of double criminality, but also that aspect 
which relates to the details of punishments for the crimes.
In other words, no person can be liable to inflictionf^r the 
same offence in a foreign country for a more severe punishment 
than he would suffer in the surrendering country, and if he is 
extradited without observing this limitation, that extradition 
is outside the procedure established by law.
Further, there will be cases wherein as between the 
death penalty for murder and for other offences, there is a 
discretion permitting the infliction of penalties which may be 
rigorous, or simple imprisonment or fine, with some flexibility 
ranging from until the rising of the court up to life imprison­
ment. If there is no such provision in the requesting State, 
the question will arise whether an undertaking should be taken 
that no more severe punishment will be inflicted than would be
applicable in India, and the answer^must De xn the affirmative.
datory there, no extradition will be granted to a foreign State, 
unless they undertake not to inflict a more severe punishment
M
than liable to be inflicted in India.
offences have been mentioned by name, but the punishments differ 
as between the jurisdictions or territories. A treaty (as we 
have seen) can only limit the provisions of the Act. As ob-
limit the scope of the Extradition Act, but not to extend it. 
So in treaties even though the offences may be identified upon
If mutilation is possible, or other corporal are man-
Difficulties may arise in cases of treaties where the
served in Waterfield^ case,* the treaty may be prayed in aid to
1. Re Caborn-Waterf ield (1960) 2 All E.R. 178, 183; see above, 
p. 271.
the basis of the facts proved, with an eye to the possible pun­
ishment the particular section of the Indian Penal Code, and the 
corresponding section in the individual State*s law will be 
looked into, so that the requested State may know in advance if 
for that offence there is more severe punishment and if so, then 
it may require an undertaking not to inflict a more severe pun­
ishment ; in case the requesting State refuses, extradition 
should be refused. This may also happen where mere discretion 
to inflict punishment between a maximum and minimum is provided.
Countries which have abolished death penalties and 
corporal punishments have often enacted their municipal laws 
prohibiting the surrender of fugitives to those countries in 
which death penalties or more severe, corporal and inhumane
punishments are awarded. Extradition should never be granted 
unless they give an undertaking not to inflict more severe in­
humane or corporal punishment on the fugitive. The requesting 
State shall agree to commute all those sentences (if applicable) 
to lesser sentences, not more severe than can be inflicted in 
India.
In my submission, Parliament should insert this pro­
vision as soon as possible in the Indian Extradition Act. The 
Indian Government, on the lines of the Argentine criminal law 
(Code of Criminal Procedure of Argentine, Article 667), should 
make a rule for the refusal of extradition if there is no dis­
cretion to commute a death sentence to imprisonment, or if. the 
penalty is more severe than that laid down in the Indian Penal 
Code. The specific provision in the Indian Extradition Act, 
should (in my submission), be similar to Article 667 of the
285.
Argentine Criminal Code,* and would read:
"When, for the offence which prompts 
the demand of extradition there is a 
lighter punishment in the Republic of 
India, the accused shall not be extra­
dited, save on condition that the Courts 
of the country which claims him shall 
impose on him the lighter punishment.**
As suggested above, there may be offences for which the 
death penalty is provided under foreign laws, whereas it is not 
provided under Indian law. In such a case, the Central Govern­
ment and the Courts of India in compliance with the national 
law, may decline to surrender the person demanded when the 
penalty that might be imposed on the accused may be death 
though the offence is an extraditable offence, or make extrad­
ition subject to the undertaking that the death penalty shall 
not be inflicted.
In international practice, this has received further 
support from various treaties, arrangements and conventions 
which provide that if the offence in respect of which surrender 
of any person is requested may be punished by death under the 
the law of the requesting State, but may not be so punished 
under the law of the requested State, the surrender of that 
person in respect of that offence may be refused unless the re­
questing State gives as assurance that the death penalty shall
2
not be inflicted upon the person extradited. The matter is 
raised specifically in the next section.
Under Section 29, powers have been given to the 
Central Government in India by the act of 1962 that the words
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.155* n.293.
2. Bedi, op.cit., p.155, n.294.
Oppressive1, ’unjust* ,’&not in interest of justice’ or ’other­
wise1 may cover all possible cases, and the same result may be 
achieved and the Central Government can refuse the extradition 
in its discretion. Again Section 3(3)(c) of the Act gener­
ally clothes the Central Government, apart from the powers con­
ferred on it in specific cases under Sections 31 and 29, and 
32 of the Act with an overall power of refusal to surrender, 
even if the cases are not covered by the Section 29, 30 and 31, 
as has been held by the Supreme Court in Hans Muller’s case.
We have repeatedly referred to an instance where even after the 
judgment of the House of Lords upholding the rejection of the 
habeas corpus» on appeal the British Government declined to 
surrender Zacharia. But these conditions, whether applied 
generally under Section 3(3)(c), or arising in individual cases 
under Sections 29, 31 and 32, would not apply to crimes com­
mitted subsequently to the extradition,and if some offence is 
committed by the accused thereafter in the territory of the de­
manding State, the latter is entitled to deal with him as any 
violator of its laws, and this prospect does not figure in the 
judgment of the courts of the surrendering territory.
(10) The Death Penalty in Particular
We have seen that a requested State may place re­
strictions upon the requesting State with regard to the non­
infliction of the death penalty on the fugitive before granting 
his extradition, if such penalty is contrary to the policy of 
the requested State in matters of penal law.
The national laws of the various countries which have 
abolished capital punishment usually provide that extradition 
shall not be granted when the offence forming the subject matter
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of the request is punishable by the death penalty in the request­
ing State, unless such penalty shall not be inflicted or shall 
be commuted to a prison sentence by the requesting State.*
In compliance'^with their national statutes, the courts
of the State of asylum may recommend to reject the application of
the demanding State to surrender a fugitive if he is charged with
a crime that carries a penalty of capital punishment under the
legal system of that State. Relying thereon, the Supreme Federal
Tribunal of Brazil granted extradition to Bolivia of one Cuellar 
2
in 1942, subject to the condition that the death penalty would 
not be inflicted on the person extradited. Similarly, the
3
Supreme Court of Argentine in 1956, affirming the decision of 
the Lower Court to grant extradition of Rosa Candino de Pepe to 
Italy on the charge of felonious homicide, stipulated that extra­
dition would be granted only on condition that in the event of
4her conviction she would not be subjected to capital punishment.
So jealous are some States in the application of this 
principle that they refuse to grant permission for the transit of 
the alleged accused or convict through their territory if the 
action with which he id charged carries the death penalty in the 
State of request. Thus, Rumania rejected the application of 
the United States for the transit of one Nalbandian who was in­
dicted in 1910 for murder in Massachusetts, and who was surrend­
ered by Bulgaria, his native State, on the ground that the
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.155, 194.
2* In re Cuellar, A.D. 1943-1945, Case No.72.
3. Re Candino de Pepe, 23 Int. Law Reports, 1956, pp.412-414.
4. Bedi, op;cit., p.194.
penalty for murder in the United States was death, and that Ru­
mania would have been obliged to require that the United States 
should not impose the death penalty.^
Section 3(3)(c) of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962 
empowers the Central Government to impose exceptions, conditions 
and qualifications by notification upon requesting States for 
implementation of their treaties as it may deem expedient. Under 
these powers, the Central Government may place restrictions upon 
the requesting State with regard to non-inflietion of death pen­
alty on the fugitive before granting the extradition. When a
friendly State has entered into a treaty there is a presumption
2
that there will be no breach of that treaty. If so, the Central 
Government may, before any extradition, in a treaty made and 
given effect to as a municipal legislation, followinphe pro­
cedure laid down in Section 3 of the Act, impose the conditions 
that the death penalty would not be inflicted in case of surrend­
er, where according to Indian Penal Code or any other law in 
force in India, there is no death penalty for a particular of­
fence, whereas it is in the requesting State. In India, seven 
years rigorous imprisonment is provided for rape, whereas in 
some countries, the punishment may be death. In some countries, 
there may btill be the punishment of mutilation, e.g. in Saudi 
Arabia and Afghanistan (there, it is in abeyance), or penalty 
which is in some unpredictable cases, akin to death. The argu­
ment is that for the purpose of extradition, an offence should 
not only be ’extraditable1 and punishable according to law in
1. Bedi, op;cit., p.194, quoting Stowell and Munro, International 
Cases, Peace 9 vol.l, London, 1916, pp.403-408.
2. Athanassiadis v. Government of Greece, 3 All E.R. 293 at p.298 
G, per Lord Dilhorne.
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force on the date of its commission, but the punishment also 
should not be more severe in the requesting State, as we saw in 
the last section of this thesis.
Converse cases can well arise when countries who have 
abolished death penalties and receive requisitions,say from India, 
for offence of murder committed there, those States would refuse 
extradition as, for the offence of murder, the death penalty can 
be imposed in India, unless India undertakes that no such penalty 
shall be inflicted or such penalty shall be commuted to prison
sentence. Since to promise in advance that no higher penalty 
or no lower penalty than normally awarded by the local courts 
will be inflicted, i.e. in a given case or classes of case, is 
an anomalous interference with equality before the law, any such 
promise shall be given in general terms in a treaty, which, in 
turn, must be given effect in the municipal law by whatever 
method is permissible; otherwise, it would not be recognised as 
in the case of Oberbichler, 1938,* where the Court of ctiminal 
cassation in Italy refused to take notice of the condition of 
obligation taken by the executive of the State that no death 
penalty would be inflicted, on the ground that the condition was 
not made part of the municipal law.
The same idea has received expression in certain bi­
partite treaties as well as in some multipartite draft conven­
tions, which definitely provide that, if the offence for which 
extradition is sought is punishable with death under the law of 
the applicant party, the requested party may make extradition 
contingent upon an undertaking that the death penalty will be
1. In Re Oberbichler, 1933-1934, A.D. Case No.150, See below,
P.290.
2. Bedi, op;cit., p.195.
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commuted to another penalty.^-
Under certain legal systems, the executive has power
to conclude a treaty or make informal agreements with another
State or States in its international relations which can bind
that State internationally, but does not necessarily change the
2internal or domestic law of that State. This would hardly be
consonent with the Indian legal system. To make a treaty or
convention effective internally, it is essential under those
laws that it should be implemented into the statutory law of
the country, otherwise the judicial authorities are not expected
to give effect to the obligations arising from that treaty.
Such a problem, with special reference to extradition, arose in
3
the case of Oberbichler, (referred to above) who was extradited 
from Austria on a charge of being implicated in the killing of 
two customs-officers, who caught him smuggling on the Austro- 
Italian frontier. The extradition was granted with the condi­
tion that the death penalty should in no case be inflicted. But 
the court of Criminal Cassation in Italy refused to take ny 
notice of this obligation undertaken by the executive and held 
that;
lfNo limitation upon the application of 
the rule of law, even if derived from 
international relationship can be taken 
into consideration by the Judge unless 
it has been transmitted into a rule of 
municipal law.11
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.195, notes 136, 137.
2. Bedi, op;cit., p.195.
3. In re Oberbichler, 1933-1934 A.D. Case No.150, decided on
9 August, 1934.
4. Bedi,op;cit., p.195.
But this difficulty would not arise in those cases 
where the treaty is entered into by the executive so that it 
binds that State internationally, and the entering of such a 
treaty is treated in the requesting State as binding on it with­
out having been transmitted into a rule of municipal law. Such 
is the case in the United States,as we have already seen.
Hence, the requested State has every right either to 
deny extradition of the fugitive, if he is charged with an 
action punishable with the death penalty under the laws of the 
requesting State, but not under its own legal system, or to grant 
extradition upon the receipt of satisfactory assurances from 
the requesting State that it shall not pronounce the death pen­
alty, and where a sentence of death has already been pronounced
that it shall not be executed, but shall be commuted to imprison-
)
ment.* Such an undertaking was given in the extradition of
2
the Greek National (Germany) Case, where the Greek Government 
gave an undertaking to Germany not to carry out the death sen­
tence pronounced by the Greek Court against one Mr. S., passed 
in his absence, but S. was to be tried as if the previous sent­
ence has not been passed.
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.195.
2. 22 Int. Law Reports, 1955, p.520.
CHAPTER IV
GROUNDS FOR UNCONDITIONAL REFUSAL OP EXTRADITION
(1) A. Political Offences and Extradition
(a*) Extradition of 1 political1 criminals
Non-extradition for political offences is a fairly
recent development in international law. Before the French 
Revolution, the term * political offence* was known in both the 
theory and practice of the Law of Nations.* Stipulations were 
generally found in treaties for the extradition of political of­
fenders. This practice was, furthermore, approved by writers,
who did not recognise the right of subjects to revolt against
2 ~  authority. The modern practice started with the French Revo­
lution, which turned the European Continent against dynastic des­
potism; equality, liberty and fraternity were the ruling slogans 
and Article 120 of the French Constitution, 1793, provided asylum 
to political exiles from foreign countries. But this did not 
stop the extradition of political offenders immediately because, 
prior to that, it was he who was extradited and not the ordinary 
criminal, a practice quite contrary to that now generally accepted,
In 1815, the Governor of Gibraltar surrendered a number of poli-
3tical fugitives to Spain, and this created a storm of indignation 
in Parliament, where Sir James Mackintosh proclaimed the then
1. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol.l, p.704.
2. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol.l, p.704; Garcia Mora:' 
International Law1 and Asylum as a Human Right, Washington,
D.C. 1968, pp.73-75.
3. R.C. Hingoranij The Indian Extradition Law, p.47.
radical principle that no nation ought to refuse asylum to poli­
tical fugitives. In 1816, Lord Castlereagh declared that there 
could be no greater abuse of law than to allow it to be the instru­
ment of inflicting punishment on foreigners committing political 
crimes.
However, with the development of liberal ideas in the
19th century, the right of the individual to revolt against des­
potism came to be recognised in the political thought of Western 
Europe. A necessary corollary to this principle was that, if 
the individual had a right to revolt against tyranny, those who 
were unsuccessful in attempts to liberate people from tyranny 
should be granted asylum in the countries to which they had fled.
It was in recognition of this principle that Napoleon in 1801 
condemned the Senate of Hamburg for having surrendered to the 
British Government three Irishmen accused of political offences. 
•Virtue and courage are the support of a State; servility and 
lowness are their ruin. You have violated the laws of hospital­
ity in such a way that even the wandering tribes of the deserts
2would blush with shame.* In 1833, Austria, Prussia and
Russia made treaties, which remained in force for a generation, 
providing for extraditing or surrendering individuals who had
committed the offences of high treason and lese majeste or had 
conspired against the safety of the throne and the legitimate 
Government or had taken part in revolt. In 1833 on the other 
hand, Belgium enacted an extradition law, prohibiting the sur­
render of political fugitives and in 1834, a treaty with France
1. S.D. Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, 
p.180, n.67.
2. Gar-cia Mora, op.cit., p.74.
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recognised the principle of granting asylum to political of­
fenders France, which until 1927, had no extradition law
has, since 1831, in her extradition treaties with other powers, 
always included the principle of non-extradition of political 
criminals. The other powers followed gradually; even Russia
gave way and since 1867, this principle is to be found in nearly 
all extradition treaties. It is due to the firm attitude of 
Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, France and United States 
that the principle has, as it were, conquered the world.
Non-extradition for political offences is in conform­
ity with the writing of scholars and the practice of states, 
manifested in their treaties, The majority of bilateral 
treaties and all multilateral conventions and drafts, whether in 
mandatory or permissive form, exempt political offences from 
their operations, though the treaties concluded between the 
Eastern European countries among themselves do not make any 
specific provision regarding political offences - probably be- 
cause of their identical ideology. A great number of munici­
pal laws also confirm that persons accused of political offences
3
shall not be extradited. Section 3 of the British Extradition 
Act, 1870, was made applicable to India by Order in Council until 
repealed by the Indian Act of 1962. In sub-section 1 it pro­
vided that, *A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the 
offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded is of a 
political character' . This clause seems to have been deliber­
ately omitted in the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, for the obvious
1. R.C. Hingorani, op.cit.. p.48;- see also, Oppenheim: Inter- 
national Law» 8th ed., pp.704-707.
2. Extradition in International Law and Practice. Bedi, p.180, 
. n.61, 62; p.181.
3. Bedi, op.cit., p.180.
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reason that the law pertained to the rendition of fugitives 
from one Commonwealth country, colony, dependency or possession 
of Her Majesty to another and there could be no question of non­
extradition of a political offender. In fact, Enahora was 
extradited, logically, to Nigeria under the Fugitive Offenders
Act, 1881, notwithstanding the plea of the opposition party in 
the British Parliament that he was charged with a political 
crime, because that Act was still applicable to Nigeria after 
it became independent of the Colonial Office rule.
Strictly, the territorial state does not commit any 
international delinquency if it extradites a political offender. 
Therefore, unless there is a specific ban on the extradition of 
political offenders under municipal legislation, the State may 
extradite a political offender. In practice, however, political 
offenders are not extradited# As far back as 1851, even before 
the Extradition Act of 1870 was enacted, the British Prime Minister 
Palmerston, said that non-extradition of political offenders was 
the one rule which has been uniformly recognised and observed by
all States, whether big or s m a l l T h e  late Judge Lauterpacht
has also said that: 'we are confronted with the impressive fact
that in legislation of modern States, there are no principles so
universally accepted and adopted as that of non-extradition of
2political Offenders.' A great number of municipal laws also 
confirm the proposition that persons accused of political of­
fences shall not be extradited.
1. The Indian;Extradition Law; R.C# Hingorani, p.47, as cited — 
by Neumann, "Neutral States and the Extradition of War Crimi­
nals" (1951) 45 A.J.I.L. 495 at p.505.
2. Lauterpacht:"The Law of Nations and Punishment of War Criminals 
1944 B.Y.I.L. 58 at p.88.
Section 31(a) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, 
prohibits the surrender of a fugitive, if his custody is sought 
on a charge of an offence of a political character. Section 32 
makes the provisions of Section 31 also applicable to the Common­
wealth countries, and so what was not provided under the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881 (cf. Enahorft*s case, supra). has been pro­
vided by section 32.
However, some conventions specifically permit the extra­
dition of fugitives in respect of political offences. The Con­
vention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 1937 
(obviously to stop anarchy, terrorism and anarchism which was 
supposed not to be a political offence), the Genocide Convention 
of 1948 (to give a deterrent effect) and four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 (to all of which India was a party) permit extradition 
for political offences. Extradition with respect to political 
offences is also made permissible by the convention for the 
amelioration of the condition of wounded or sick shipwrecked
members of the armed forces, 1949 (Article 50). The convention 
of the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in 
the armed forces in the field, 1949 (Article 49), the prisoners 
of war convention, 1949 (Article 129), and the convention for 
the protection of civilians during war, 1949 (Article 146), and 
their purpose is obvious, otherwise during war * or otherwise, 
people who commit crimes of these categories, would claim exemp­
tion from extradition on the ground of the offence being a 
political one.
1. R.C« Hingorani, op.cit.» at p.48, n.18.
(b) 1 Political offences1 in general
In the absence of the definition of a political of- 
fence, the  ^ . as to whether the charge against a fugitive re­
lates to a political offence or not rests with the courts* The 
leading case is Re Castioni*^  It arose out of a murder com­
mitted during an attack on the Municipal Palace of the Swiss 
Canton of Ticino in the course of anti-government disturbances* 
Castioni claimed a writ of habeas corpus in reply to the Swiss 
request for his extradition; claiming that he was a political
offender and protected by Section 3 of the Extradition Act of
o
1870* During a debate in the House of Commons, John Stuart 
Mill had defined a political offence as * any offence committed 
in the course of furthering of civil war, insurrection, or poli­
tical commotion*, but Denman J* in the Judgment in Re Castioni, 
which has become a classic, said that this definition would be 
wrong if it s
"really means, which takes place in the 
course of uprising without reference to 
the object and the intention of it, and 
other circumstances connected with it ***
In order to bring the case within the 
words of the Act *.. it must at least -
be shown that the act is done in further­
ance of, done with the intention of 
assistance, as a sort of overt act in 
the course of acting in a political — 
manner, a political rising, or a dis-' 
pute between two parties in the State, 
as to which is to have the Government ' 
in its hands* The question really is, 
whether, upon the facts, it is clear 
that the man was acting as one of a 
number of persons engaged in acts of 
violence of a political character with 
a political object, and part of the
1. (1891) 1 Q.B. 149.
2* 6 August, 1866, 184 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser* Col*12-15*
political movement and rising in which 
he was taking part
The decision in Re Castioni reflects the liberal 
philosophy of the late nineteenth century and is a product of 
the two-party system* The significance of this organised 
party approach to the issue enunciated by Denman J. was made 
clear only three years after Castioni in Re Meunier,* wherein 
the accused was a confessed anarchist and Cave J. upheld the 
extradition, holding that:
"to constitute an offence of a politi­
cal character, there must be two or -- 
more parties in the state, each seek­
ing to impose the Government of their 
own choice on the other and that, if 
the offence is committed by one side 
or the other in pursuance of that ob­
ject, it is a political offence other­
wise not. In the present case, there 
are not two other parties in the State, 
each seeking to impose th^p Government 
of their own choice on the other, for 
the party with whom the accused is 
identified ... namely the party of 
anarchy is the enemy of all Government.11
The tendency to regard anarchists as something apart
from other political offences is sometimes found in national
legislation and not uncommon in treaty practice, particularly in
2Latin American countries. The Pan-American treaty of 1902, 
Article 2, known as the Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals 
and for Protection against Anarchism, expressly states that 
* there shall not be considered as political offences acts which
may be classified as pertaining to anarchism by the legislation
3
of both the countries.1
1. (1894) 2 Q.B. 415.
2. Bedi, op.cit., pp.186, 187.
3. 29 A.J.I.L. at p.280 (1935 Supp. Part I Extradition)!
A similar provision appears in the Central American 
Convention on Extradition, 1 9 3 4 In some jurisdictions the 
refusal to admit anarchists as political offenders is expressed 
so broadly as to permit the inclusion of Communists and other 
partisans of totalitarian views. In the Swiss case of 
Malatesta, 1891, the court pointed out that the association with
which the accused was connected had as its aim,
"the overthrow of the established poli­
tical and social order, and its replace­
ment by another political, and economic 
system, namely, anarchism. While it- 
is true that there was a clearly poli­
tical end, the means by which it was 
sought was not so much peaceful propa­
ganda as by the use of violence, directed 
to overthrowing the existing political 
system and redistributing the political 
wealth. Such an aim involves offences 
against persons and property. Such an 
association is in reality not a politi­
cal organisation, but a band of thieves 
or brigands."
It will not be embarrassing to predict that the Indian 
Supreme Court, should this question come before it, will be as 
much influenced by the political climate of the time in India 
as other courts and authorities have been in the past; and it 
is quite impossible dogmatically to predict that active members 
of subversive movements in, e.g., Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam 
or Northern Ireland will be unable to show that the offences 
alleged or proved against them are ’political offences’, merely 
because the movements to which they belong or belonged are or 
were ’anarchist* in type.
1. Hudson: International Legislation, Art.3 at 835. See
L.C. Green. ’Political Offences’ . J.I.L.I. (1965) 1, 14.
(c) What are political offences?
Although extradition in international law actually 
originated for the purpose of punishing political offenders, 
those accused of political crimes are today exempted from extra­
dition. This principle has been incorporated in Section 31(a) 
of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, which is similar to Section 
3(1) of the British Extradition Act, 1870. In the Irish Extra­
dition Act, of 1965, Section 11, the terminology is different 
from that which has been used in the British and Indian Acts. 
Under the Irish Act of 1965, exemptions from surrender are as 
follows: the crime charged must not be ’a political offence*•
There is no definition in the Irish Act as to what constitutes 
a ’political offence’ - a fact which was much criticised during 
the discussion of the Bill in the Irish Senate - other than the 
provision in Section 3(1) that a ’political offence’ does not 
include the taking of the life of a Head of State or a member 
of his family, (an attentat clause). This represents a depart­
ure from the approach to political offenders under the Extradi­
tion Act, 1870, under which exemption from surrender is granted 
where the crime charged is an offence of a ’political character^. 
It is fairly clear that a ’political offence’ is different from 
•an offence of a political character’ and therefore, the Irish 
Courts, in interpreting this provision, will not be able to 
rely upon Anglo-American decisions (and Indian decisions) in­
volving an application of this concept. Irish cases on the 
point will be no guidance as to the meaning of the words
’offence of political character’ used in the Indian Extradition
2Act, Section 31(a).
1. Section 3(1) of the British Extradition Act, 1870.
2. Paul O’Higgins, I.C.L.Q. Vol*15 at 382.
The British tradition of protection of the individual 
accused of political offences, written into the British Extradi­
tion Act of 1870 is the prototype for references to this aspect 
of extradition to non-Commonwealth States. It is found in the 
laws of Canada,* and is reflected in the prohibition of extra­
dition of poliitical offenders found in the principal treaties 
of the United States of America with Canada and New Zealand of 
1889, and with the United Kingdom of 1931. In United States 
practice^ an equivalent protection is provided, as extradition 
can be granted only in pursuance of a treaty and all United 
States treaties contain a clause exempting the political offender. 
Specific reference is made to the ’political offender* in only 
one section of the American extradition law concerning the sur­
render of a fugitive from a foreign country or territory under
2United States occupation or control.
When it comes to defining ’political offence’ however, 
the treaty of statutory provisions seldom offer any guidance. 
Political activism appears to be the distinguishing character­
istic of the political offence in judicial and administrative
3
treatment of the matter in the United States. In British 
practice, the term may comprehend a political activist involved 
in an uprising against an incumbent government or a political 
dissident who seeks to escape from the control of an oppressive
1. Sec.21, 22j Ghana 2(a), 7(1), 9(1), 23; India, Sec;7(2)
31(a) of Indian Extradition Act, 1962; New Zealand, Sec.5(1) 
(b), 6, 9, 9(1)(a), and Sierra Leone, Sec. 16(b).
2. 18 U *S «C • Section 3185.
!
3. United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic 170 F* Supp. 383 \ 
on remand from Supreme Court 355 U.S. 393 (1958) • In Re. 
Gonzales 217 F. Supp* 717.
regime; it does not comprehend the situation in which the com­
mon crime element is dominant
Although the determination of whether an extradition 
request is political in character is at the discretion of the 
asylum state, the decision does involve some sensitivity as to
relations with the requesting State, which courts do not under-
2 ~~ take to assume lightly* But in India, because of the Funda­
mental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution, courts would 
certainly protect the accused, if any of his Rights are violated 
or if the formalities contained in the extradition laws have not 
been complied with* They would not sacrifice the freedom of 
the offender to political relations between the requesting State 
and the Indian Government.
Australian practice and the importance of executive 
discretion in regard to the non-extradition of poliitical offend­
er was strongly emphasised by the Australian Prime Minister in 
1956, with regard to extradition to Eastern European countries:
"Australia will exercise its discretion 
under the Extradition Acts and will not 
grant extradition unless it is thoroughly 
satisfied that such a move is not being 
sought for political purposes* The —
Australian Government has to be convin­
ced, before agreeing to extradition, - 
that the application from Eastern Euro­
pean countries is bona fide and not a — 
pretext to obtain custody of an indivi­
dual for other purposes."3
1* Re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B* 149; Ex parte Kol'czynskif 1955) 1 
Q.B* 540; R* v* Governor of Brixton Prison, ex fraFte Schtraks 
(1962) 3 AlX J»*R. 529; Tzu-Ts<ai Cheng v* governor of Penton- 
ville Prison (1973) 2 All B.R. 204 (H.L.); R* v* Governor of 
Brixt on Prison* Ex parte Schtraks L *R* (1964*7 A,C. 55&*
2. Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed (1952) 1 All E.R. 
1060. —
3. Shearer: Extradition in International Law* p*583*
This is in line with Section 31(a) and 29 of the
Indian Extradition Act, 1962*
Rendition under the British Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1881, falls somewhere between extradition in international law 
and inter-state rendition, as practices in the United States* 
Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, isi akin to the 
procedure for rendition of offenders to Commonwealth countries 
which was adopted under the British Fugitives Offenders Act, 
1881* In certain of the independent Commonwealth countries, 
the 1881 Act has been superseded by the extradition laws, which 
reflect its terms but attempt to remedy its deficiencies, parti­
cularly with regafd to protection of the political offender*
In regard to Section 31(a) of the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, which is similar to Section 3(1) of the British 
Extradition Act, 1870, two points arise for consideration*
First, when can it be said that an offence is of a political 
character? Secondly, since the provisions about ’political 
offenders* in the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, are divided into
two parts, a dual question emerges.
Under the first part, *a fugitive criminal shall not 
be surrendered* * * * * if the offence in respect of which his 
surrender is sought is of a political character *..* Under 
the second part, the surrender is prohibited if the fugitive 
criminal ’proves to the satisfaction of the magistrate or
court before whom he may be produced or of the Central Govern­
ment that the requisition or warrant for his surrender has, 
in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for an 
offence of a political character* *
So far as the second question is concerned (which 
it is desirable to take up first), the two parts are meant
to deal with different sets of circumstances. Under the first 
part, it may appear from the evidence given in support of the 
requisition by the requesting State, that the offence has a 
political character, and even if the evidence tendered by the 
requesting State indicates that one of the extraditable offences 
has been committed, the offender may show that 1 in fact the of­
fence is of a political character*. Ihus, if State A requests 
the extradition of X on a charge of murder, it may appear at the 
hearing in the asylum State from the evidence adduced by the re­
questing State, that the crime was committed in the course of a 
rebellion. The matter may fall under the first part. Likewise, 
if the evidence merely shows that X lei lied another person by 
shooting him on a particular day, the fugitive criminal may 
still give evidence to show that the shooting took place during 
a rebellion . It is easy to distinguish this from cases en­
visaged in the second part where, even if the evidence tendered 
by the requesting State suffices to obtain his extradition for 
trial or punishment for an extraditable offence, the fugitive 
may prove on his own initiative that the real motive is to try 
or punish him for another offence (whether or not connected with 
or incident to the extraditable offence) which has a political 
character. It is desirable to keep these two contingencies 
apart, for the clear application of each rule. Lord Goddard 
C.J. in Kol^&ynski and others,1 while interpreting the provi­
sions of Section 3(1) of the British Extradition Act, 1870, 
observed:
"If in proving the facts necessary to 
obtain extradition, the evidence adduced 
in support shows that the offence has a 
’political character’ the application
1. (1955) 1 All E.R. 31 at pp.35-36.
must be refused, although the evidence 
in support appears to disclose merely 
one of the scheduled offences, the 
prisoner may show that, in fact, the 
offence is of a political character. —
In other words, the political charact­
er of the offence may emerge either
from the evidence in support of the
requisition or from the evidence ad­
duced in answer."
Regarding the first question emerging from Section 
31(a) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, whether an offence 
is of a political character, this appears to be the most contro­
versial issue in the law of extradition under international law 
as well as under the municipal statutes in India, Britain,
United States of America, and the other Commonwealth countries. 
No definition of a ’political offence’ has yet been formulated
to satisfy all States. The Indian Supreme Court, while inter­
preting Section 5 of the Indian Extradition Act of 1903 in Hans 
1
Muller’s case, without defining an ’offence of a political
character simply observed: l* The Central Government has been
given an unfettered right to refuse extradition, if the offence
is of a political character or even otherwise.*> The House of
Lords in the recent case did not indicate finally the exact
o
scope of offences of political character.
(d) International law and practice on political offencec 
or offences of political character and practice of 
British and American courts
Though the terms ’political offence* and ’offence of 
a political character’ have been widely used in the conventions, 
national constitutions and legislation, no definition has ever 
been given because of lack of agreement among States, on the
1. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
2. Tzu-Tsai Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (1973) 2 
All E.R. 204 (H.L.j;
element which constitute a ’political offence* . Generally
speaking, the term has received a broad interpretation by
1courts - Lord Goddard C.J. in KolCgynski* s case observed:
11 It is necessary, if only for reasons 
of humanity, to give a wider and more 
generous meaning to the expression*1
In the same case, it was also observed that:
"The words ’offence of a political 
character* must always be considered— 
according to the circumstances exist­
ing at the time when they have been 
considered. The present time is 
very different from 1891,when Castioni* s 
case 2 was decided. It was not then 
treason for a citizen to leave his 
country and start a fresh life in an­
other. Countries were not regarded 
as enemy countries when no war was in — 
progress. Now a state of totalitarian­
ism prevails in some parts of the world 
and it is a crime for citizens in such 
places to take steps to leave. In 
this case, the members of the crew of 
a small trawler, Polish neutrals en­
gaged in fishing, were under political 
supervision and they revolted by the 
only means open to them* They com­
mitted an offence of a political 
character and if they were surrendered 
there could be no doublt that they 
would be punished for a political 
crime .**3
Whether or not a particular act is a political of-
~ 4
fence is pre-eminently circumstantial. The political charact­
er of an offence may emerge (as we have seen) from the evidence
in support of the requisition or from the evidence adduced in 
5answer.
1.(1955) 1 Q.B. 540 at p.551.
2. (1891) 1 Q.B. 149.
3. Per Cassels J., (1955) 1 Q.B. 540 at p.549.
4. J.B. Moore: Extradition. Vol.l, p.308.
5. Ex parte Kolceynskr; (1955) 1 Q.B. 540 at p.550, per Lord 
Goddard C.J.
The general classification of what are usually 
called purely political offences, that is, offences, directed 
against the political organisation or Government of a State, 
contains no element of common crime whatsoever. Relative 
political offences, or delit .s complexes» are offences of a 
common character closely connected with political acts or 
events that are regarded as political.*
The concept of a purely political offence is gener­
ally agreed upon and causes no problem. They are offences 
against the security of the State. These are political simply 
because they lack the essential element of the ordinary crime; 
they are directed against the constitution or sovereignty of a
/• 9
political regime. In such cases, the perpetrator of the
alleged offence acts merely as an instrument or an agent of a
political movement or party and he bears no personal ill will,
3
spite or malice against any individual. It was observed:
,falthough the killing of Rossi might ' 
have been a crime and unnecessary act, 
yet inasmuch as the prisoner had no 
private spite against Rossi ... he — 
only affects the political organisa­
tion of the State."
1. Oppenheim: International Lav/, Vol.l, p.707; Garcia Mora;
International LawJand AsyIran as a Human Right, p«76; Fenwick: 
International Law. 3rd ed.t New York. 1948, p.335; Deere,L.Ls 
"Political offences in the Law and Practice of Extradition",
27 A.J.I.L., 1933, pp.247-270 at p.248.
2. In Re Barratini decided by the Court of Appeal of Belgium on
28 May, 1936., A.D. 1938-1940, Case No.159, and In Re Giovanni 
Gatti decided by the Court of Appeal of Grenoble (France) on 
13 January, 1947, case No.70, 1947 A.D. p.146, cited by S.D. 
Bedi in Extradition in International Law and Practice at p.
181, n.72.
3. In Re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B.D. 149*
Publicists, jurists, writers on international law, 
judges and national decision-makers have failed to define ’poli­
tical offence’ or ’offence of a political character’. All 
attempts to define ’political offender* or ’offences of a politi­
cal character’ have been doomed to failure.* Oppenheim says 
that ’ in view of the complexity and variety of the circumstances
in which the political offences can be committed, no attempt
2could be made to give a precise definition of these offences’. 
’Extradition shall not be granted for political offences. The
3
requested State shall determine whether the offence is political.*
J. Menalco Solis R. has remarked that, as historically 
there was no generally accepted definition of a political offence, 
extradition treaties left the task of determining what offences 
fell within that category to the asylum State.^ Some say poli­
tical motive is important; others consider political purpose as 
more important. Some stress both political motive and purpose.
Yet others consider crimes against the State as political, e.g.
5
treason, espionage, subversion and sabotage. Thomas and 
Thomas  ^tries to define vaguely a political offence as one
1. F.M.Some Problems of the Law of Extradition (1959) 109 L.J.198.
2. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol.l, p.707, 8th ed.; see
also (1935) 29 A.J.I.L. supp.113.
3. Art*3 of the Draft on ’’Extradition” proposed at th^JChird Con­
ference, 1960, of the Asian-AfrcxhLegal Consultative Committee.
4. J. Menalco Solis R: Private International Law. Extradition-
Political -Offences (1^59-60) 34 Tulane Law Review, p.847<*tp 
R.C. HingoraniV op.cit., p.46, n.13.
5. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol.l, 8th ed., pp.707-708.
6. Thomas and Thomas: Non-Intervention (1956) at p.392* Cited 
by Hingotani, op^cit., at p.48, n.29.
’against the political organisation or Government of a State, 
injuring only public rights and containing no element of a com­
mon crime whatsoever!• Professor Manheim quotes Article 13(1) 
of the Italian Penal Code defining political crime as ’any crime, 
which injures a political interest of the State or political 
right of a national, is a political crime* An ordinary crime 
determined wholly or in part by political motives, is likewise 
considered to be a political crime* *
Article 5(b) of the Harvard Research Draft does not de­
fine political offences, but enumerates some offences as political,
’’The term ’political offence’ includes 
treason, sedition, espionage, whether 
committed by one or more persons; it 
includes any offence connected with 
the activities of an organised group 
directed against the security of the 
governmental system of the requesting 
State and it does not exclude other ' „ 
offences, having a political objective**’
Difficulty arises only with regard to crimes which are 
ostensibly .common crimes, but are political offences* They are 
neither wholly political nor wholly criminal. They are offences 
against the ordinary law connected with political acts or events. 
Much clarity is needed on the elements which affect the whole 
course of events and thus convert an ordinary crime into delit 
complex or ’relative political offence’. Sometimes even an
ordinary offence assumes the character of a political offence, 
when the aim of the author of the offence is to injure the 
political regime, e.g. the assassination of a public offical in
1. Manheim (1935) Proceedings of the Grotius Society, 109 at
p.110.
2. R.C. Hingorani, op;cit., p.49, n.20.
310.
1 2 the course of political offence. In Castioni* s case (supra)
the British courts while rejecting the application for extradi­
tion observed:
"Crimes otherwise extraditable, become 
political offences, if they were in­
cidental jto and formed part of a poli­
tical disturbance. "3
Difficulties arise before the courts in ascertaining 
the degree of connection existing between the common crime and 
the political act and there is a marked difference in opinion be­
tween courts of different countries. The British courts take
a very liberal view in ascertaining criminality of those charged
4with relative offences. In Kolczynski*s case, Cassels J. 
observed:
"The words 1 offences of a political 
character* must always be considered - 
according to the circumstances exist­
ing at the time when they have to be 
considered.1’
Lord Goddard C.J. at p.36 observed:-
"It is necessary ... to give a wider 
and more generous meaning to the — 
words [i.e. to ’offences of a poli­
tical character*3 which we are now 
considering, which we can do with­
out in any way encouraging the idea 
that ordinary crimes which have 
no political character will be 
thereby excused."
Lord Reid in the House of Lords in Schtrak*scase 5
1. S.D. Bedi, op;cit.» p.182.
2. (1891) 1 Q.B.D. 149.
3. For practices of other countries, see S.D. Bedi, op.cit.a 
p.182, n.75, where the same view has been upheld by the courts 
of other States.
4. (1955) 1 All E.R. 31 at p.35.
5. Schtraks v. Government of Israel (1962) 3 All E.R. 529 (H.L.).
tried to give instances of political offences and offences of
the political character interpreting Section 3(1) of the British 
Extradition Act, 1870, which may be usefully summarised as under:-
" M  A fugitive member of a gang, who com­
mitted an offence in the case of an 
unsuccessful putsch is as much within 
the act as the follower of a Garibaldi; 
but not every person who commits an 
offence in the course of a political 
struggle is entitled to protection.
n[2*\ If a person takes advantage of his posi­
tion as an insurgent to murder a man 
against whom he has a grudge, I would 
not think that that could be called a 
political offence ... the motive and 
purpose of the accused in committing 
the offence must be relevant, and may 
be decisive.
»f3] It is one thing to commit an offence 
for the purpose of promoting a poli­
tical cause, and quite a different 
thing to commit the same offence for 
an ordinary general purpose.
’T4] Moreover I do not think that the appli­
cation of the section can be limited 
to cases of open insurrection. An 
underground resistance movement may - 
be attempting to overthrow a govern­
ment, and it could hardly be that an 
offence, committed the day before open— 
disturbances broke out, would be treat­
ed as non-political, while a precisely 
similar offence committed two days -
later would be of a political character.
The use of force, or it may be other 
means, to compel a sovereign to change 
his advisers, or to compel a government 
to change its policy, may be just as
, political in character as the use of 
force to achieve a revolution. And I 
do not see why it should be necessary 
that the refugee* s party should have 
been trying to achieve power in the 
state. It would be enough if they 
were trying to make the government 
concedetjsome measure of freedom, but 
not attempting to supplou^nt it.**
Referring to border-line cases, Lord Reid observed:*
"With an expression so vague as 1 an 
offence of a political character* there 
must be many border-line cases, for 
example:
[a] actions against a turbulent group — 
trying to seize power which the govern­
ment is too weak to suppress.11
2Lord Reid further observed:
"It was and is still thought that some 
governments treat as political offences, 
and punish more severely, acts which we 
would regard as ordinary crimes, if the 
guilty person is a political opponent 
of the government, or it may for other 
reasons.11
Quoting the last part of Section 3(1) of the British Extra-
3
dition Act, 1870, Lord Reid observed:
"... Ihe requisition for his Surrender 
has in fact been made with a view to 
try or punish him for an offence of a 
political character - [that] may re­
fer to cases of that kind.11
The case of Re Arton (supra) was not followed by 
Lord Reid and Viscount Radcliffe. Viscount Radcliffe in 
his separate judgment at p.538E observed:
"In my mind sub-section (1) envisages 
two alternative ways of identifying 
a political offence - one, a charge 
that on the face of it smacks of the 
political, say, caricaturing the 
head of the state or distributing 
subversive pamphlets, and the other, 
a charge which, ostensibly criminal- 
in the ordinary sense, is neverthe­
less shown to be political in the 
context in which the actual offence 
occurred."
1. Schtraks, ibid; cit; at p.536A.
2. Schtraks, ibid. cit; at p.536C.
3. Schtraks, ibid; cit. at p.536D.
An earlier case in British practice is the decision of 
theEnglish court in Re Castioni. where it was held that fugitive 
criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes, if
those crimes were incidental to, or: formed part of political dis-
oturbances. Three years later in Re Meunier, the court held 
that crimes committed by anarchists were not regarded as political 
offences, on the ground that to constitute a political offence,
there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to 
impose a government of their own choice<on the other, and the act 
done must be committed, not for a personal or private reason, but 
in pursuances of ,that object. The two-party theory was the 
test in this case to show whether the offence was of a political 
character or not. After three decades, the British courts in 
Kolezenski*s case (supra) proposed a more liberal test in ascer­
taining the political criminality of those charged with * relative 
political offences* • Lord Goddard C.J. went to the extent of 
giving a more generous meaning to the words ’offences of politi­
cal character* , and Cassels J. held that those words diould be 
interpreted according to the circumstances existing at the time 
when they have to be considered.
The matter of extradition is (as we saw at the outset)
linked with asylum of political refugees. The history of the
law of extradition bristles with cases where the question was
whether the requisition of the foreigner by his home government
was on genuine grounds or on a criminal charge used as a camouA
3
flage for political motives. Treaties and statutes disclose
1. (1891) 1 Q.B. 149.
2. (1894) 2 Q.B. 415. See also for political offences, Tzu-Tsai 
Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (1973) 2 All E.R. 264 
(H.L.).
3. Oppenheim: International Law, 8th ed., Vol.l, pp.676,693.
an almost universal practice among the States to refuse extradi­
tion of persons to be tried for political or military offences.'*’ 
The problem, as mentioned above, came before the English courts 
and it was held that, to constitute an offence of a political
2character there must be two or more parties in the State, etc. 
Despite the change in judicial opinion related above, the mere 
assertion by the accused that he is a political refugee, unsup­
ported by evidence, is insufficient to entitle the court to make
3
absolute a habeas corpus writ. It is likely that in Re 
Kolczynski and Schtraks we find a point of view agreeable to 
India1s needs, since India herself is fully capable of compre­
hending the difference between (possibly illegal) politicial acti­
vity and ordinary crimes, which are none the less criminal being 
connected, more or less fortuitously, with the criminals1 poli­
tical activities. Had the murderer of Mahatama Gandhi been an 
alien, India would have treated him, had he been successfully 
extradited, exactly as he was in fact, treated. This must have
an influence on the minds of judges in foreign countries, and 
the principle will apply vice-versa. However, it is desirable 
to compare other possible approaches.
The Swiss courts, on the other hand, apply the concept
of ’relative political offence* in a more restricted way. Thus,
4
in the case of V.P. Wassilief in 1908, the Federal Tribunal
1. Oppenheim: International Law, Vol.l, pp.704-10; J.B. Moore: 
Extradition. Vol.1, pp.363-26; L.L. Deere: Political Offences 
In the Law and Practice of Extradition in A.J.I.L. (1933),
Vol.27, pp.274-6; Moore. Digest, Vo~i.IV. pp.332-54; Hackworth 
Digest, vol.IV, pp.45-52.
2. Re. Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415.
3. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Sarno (1961) 2 K.B. 
742.
4. Decided on 10 July, 1908; mentioned by Bedi, supra, at p.182, 
n.77.
unambiguously stated three general principles, which it considered
as determining the predominantly political chracter of an offence* 
Firstly, the offence must have been committed for the purpose of 
helping or ensuring the success of a purely political offence,
i.e. the crimes must be directed against the political or social 
organisation of the State* With respect to this first condi­
tion, Bedi has noted and reproduced observations of the Federal 
Tribunal of Switzerland in Re Ockert, decided on 20 October,
1 9 3 3 wherein it was held that:
"acts which are not related to a general 
movement directed towards the realisation 
of a particular political object in such 
a way that they themselves appear as an 
essential part or incident ... thereof, 
but which serve merely terroristic ends, 
so as to facilitate ••• a future politi­
cal struggle, can raise no claim to 
asylum.11^
Secondly, there must be a direct connection between the
crime committed and the purpose pursued by a party to modify the
political or social organisation of the State* The Federal
3
Court in Re Ragni, decided on 14 July, 1923, refused a request 
for extradition on the ground that "The events in Kagli were not 
of a purely local or personal character. They were an episode 
in a political movement aiming at seizing power within the 
State."3
Thirdly, the political element must predominate over
4
the ordinary criminal element. In Pavan1s case, the Swiss
1. A.D. 1933-34, Case No.157, pp.369-371.
2. S. Bedi: Extradition in International Law and Practice, p.183, 
n.78.
3. A.D. 1923-24, Case No.166, p*286; Bedi, op.cit., p.183, n.79.
4. A.D. 1927-28, Case No.239. pp.347-349, decided on 15 June, 
1928, cited by Bedi, op.cit., p.183, n.80.
Federal Court held that the crime
"is invested with a predominantly poli­
tical character only when the criminal 
action is immediately connected with 
its political object* Such a connect­
ion can only be predicated where the 
act is in itself an effective means 
of attaining this object *** or where 
it is an incident in a general political 
struggle in which similar means are used 
by each side*"
Relying on these principles, the Swiss Courts surren­
dered only those fugitives whose acts were out of proportion to 
the political end sought or whose acts were not closely connected
with purely political ends* It is precisely on these grounds 
that the court in the Wassilief case found that the murder of the 
Chief of Police of Penza gave the act a predominantly common 
criminal character, as it did not prepare the way for popular 
representation and guarantee of individual liberties
Likewise, when in 1928 the French Government requested 
the extradition from Switzerland of an anti-fascist journalist, 
who shot and killed an Italian Fascist irijParis, the Swiss Federal 
Court held that the crime was not a political one* It further 
characterised the prisoner’s act as being *a single act of per­
sonal terrorism, performed in a foreign country and directed
only towards its immediate result* , was not a crime of a politi- 
2
cal character.
German and Belgian courts have made a similar approach
3
to that of the Swiss Courts, and their decisions in Re Fabijan
1* Bedi, op*cit * , p.183. V.P* Wassilief, pp.31^,317, supra.
2* Bedi, op*cit*f p*183, n.81* In re Pavan (1928).A.D.1927-1928.
Case 5Jo: 239, PP. 3^7 -3^9. :
3* A.D. 1933-34, Case No.136, pp.360-369, decided on 9 March,1933.
1 2 and in Re Barratini respectively illustrate the same reasoning#
Between these two extrems, Art#5(2) of the French Law 
dated 10 March, 1927, adopted a mid-course#
"As to acts committed in the course of 
insurrection or a civil war by one of 
the other parties engaged in the con­
flict and in the furtherance of its 
purpose, they may not be grounds for 
extradition, unless they constitute 
acts of odious barbarism and vandalism 
prohibited by the laws of war, and 
only when the civil war has ended."
Thus, Art.5(2) makes it clear that there can be no 
extradition for acts committed in the course of a revolution or 
civil war, though they may have the characteristics of common 
crimes, unless they are prohibited by the laws of war# The 
French Courts have taken a more narrow and restrictive view.
Thus, the Court of Appeal of Grenoble rejecting the application
3
of one Giovanni Gatti in 1947, held, questionably, that:
"The offence does not derive its 
political character from the motive 
of the offender but from the nature 
of the rights it injures."
The Federal Court in the United States has held that:
* to bring an offence within meaning of the words of a "political 
character" it must be incidental to, and form part of a political
4
disturbance#1 This seems too narrow#
The Chilian Supreme Court in Hector Jose Campore and
1. A.D. 1938-1940, Case No.159, decided by Court of Appeal of 
Belgium, on 28 May, 1936.
2. See Bedi, op.cit## p*184, n.82, 83.
3. A.D. 1947, Case No.70, decided on 13 January, 1947. Cited by 
Bedi, op.cit., p.181, note 72.
4. Re Baeta (1894) 62 F.972 at p.999.
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others in the matter of extradition,^ defined * political offence1 :
MGenerally accepted principles are in 
agreement that a political offence is 
that which is directed against the 
political organisation of theState< or 
against the civil rights of its citi­
zens and that the legally protected 
right which the offence damages is the 
constitutional normality of the 
country affected. Also included in 
the concept are acts which have as 
their end the alteration of the esta­
blished political or social order in 
the State.11
Indian Courts have not so far defined the scope of
political offence. They did have some opportunity in the cases
2 3of Ram Babu Saksena, and C;G. Menon. but the cases were dis­
posed of on other points.
As in English law and American law the words used 
are foffences of a political character*, the decisions of the 
British and American courts will supply guidance to interpret 
those words, especially because similar rights and principles 
are recognised in the United States and English practice. The
decisions mentioned above are clearly influenced by the policies 
of the relevant government but in the case of Indian octradition, 
the law, the treaties and the procedure have to be tested by the 
Constitution of India, particularly Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and 
22, and 254 and List 1, entries No. 14, 18. No single defini­
tion can be laid down as good and exhaustive for all situations.
1. (1959) 53 A.J.I.L. p.693, .decided on 24 September, 1957; 
R.C. Hingorani, op.cit., p.50, 51, n.28.
2. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 155.
3. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 51?.
In the words of Cassels J. the words ’must always be considered
accofding to the circumstances existing at the time when they
have to be considered*.1 Moore also says: »xhe question
whether a particular act comes within the category is predomi-
2nantly circumstantial.’
Offences of a political nature may also emerge from
the following:-
1. If any offence is committed in a series of attempts to 
overthrow or influence the government.
2. Any common crime may be treated as political if it was a 
means of expression of disappointment of dissatisfaction
with the policy ojz the policies of the present government.^
3. It may include terrorist activities in watertight countries 
where freedom of expression is frozen and open opposition is 
not tolerated.
4. Predominance of a political motive may make a crime political 
in some cases, although there may have been some personal 
motivation of vengeance also during the course of commission 
of the crime.
5. An abettor may be a political offender, as by hiring the 
main participant to execute his plans, who may be guilty of 
a common crime, and in these circumstances, the hireling 
may not be a political offender, even though he was the main 
participant in the commission of the crime.
1. Ex parte Kolczynski (1955) 1 All E.R. 31 at p.35, supra. .
2. Moore: Extradition. 1891, Vol.l, p.308.
3. Schtrak’s case (1962) 2 W.L.R. 976 at p.997.
B. LIMITATIONS ON * POLITICAL OFFENCES*
(a) The Attentat clause*
(b) Anarchist or terrrorist offences.
(c) War crimes and crimes against peace and humanity.
(d) Acts of collaboration with the enemy during wartime.
(a) The Attentat Clause
Though in the case of S c h t r a k s their Lordships of the 
Hbuse of Lords reached the same conclusion, they expressed differ­
ent grounds for their opinion; they reached the same destination 
but by different roads. Even so, what is a * political offence*
or * offence of a political character* could not be defined. Lord 
2Reid observed: * ... I do not think that it is possible, or that
the Act emyinces any intention, to define the circumstances in 
which an offence can properly be held to be of a political 
character* • The Supreme Court of India in C .G. Menon* s case 
and Ram Babu Saksena* s case had opportunity to consider the 
question as we have seenWidnot use it. English Courts, from 
the cases of Re Castioni and Re Meunier to Kolczynski and Schtraks 
at times gave verdicts with different interpretations and ulti­
mately the House of Lords in Schtrak*s case, attempted to lay 
down certain tests, also gave a few instances but could not lay 
down in precise terms what the words 'offences of a Political 
character* mean* Viscount Radcliffe went so far, in Schtrak*s 
case(at p. 538I-539A), as to say:
%. (1962) 3 W.L.R. 1013; (1962) 3 All E.R. 529.
2. (1962) 3 All E.R. 529, At 5351.
* * , no definition has yet emerged or 
by now is ever likely to, Indeed it 
has come to be regarded as something 
of an advantage that there is to be no 
definition, I am ready to agree in
the advantage so long as it is recog­
nised that the meaning of such words 
as a * political offence* ••• does ,,, 
represent an idea which is capable of 
description and needs description if 
it is to form part of the apparatus of 
a judicial decision,n
This ambivalent difficulty was felt from the beginning 
and in view of these difficulties in determining what a political 
offence means, attempts have been made to limit the scope of the 
delits complexes or 1 relative offences* from time to time.
The first attempt was made in the form of the enactment
of the so-called attentat clause by Belgium in 1856, following 
the case of Jacquiline in 1854, A French manufacturer named 
Jules Jacquiline, domiciled in Belgium, and a foreman of his 
factory, who was also a Frenchman, tried to cause an explosion 
on the railway line between Lille and Calais with the intention 
of murdering the Emperor Napoleon III, France requested the 
extradition of the two criminals, but the Belgian Court of Appeal 
had to refuse the surrender because the Belgian Extradition Law 
interdicted the surrender of political criminals, To provide 
for such a case in future, Belgium enacted in 1856 a law amend­
ing her extradition law and stipulating that the murder of the 
Head of the Foreign Government or a member of his family should 
not be considered a * political crime* for this purpose. Many
European States, not including Great Britain, have adopted that 
1
clause.
1, Oppenheim: International Law, Vol,l, Art,335, p,709; see
also Bedi, op,cit,, p.185; R.C. Hingorani, p,9.
The Indian courts so far had no occasion to consider a 
case of this nature. But the Second Schedule to the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1962, mentions culpable homicide, and attempt to 
murder specifically as extraditable offences; whether the murder 
or attempt to murder would be of an ordinary person or of a Head 
of the State or members of his family, it seems, would make no 
difference; and the contention before an Indian court on behalf 
of the prisoner that murder of an ordinary person is an extradit­
able offence, but murder of a Head of the State is not, would be 
rejected. As will be presently shown, India is a party to 
several conventions to prevent terrorist activities and anarchism 
and as such, no extradition will be refused on this ground.
Further, in some of the treaties, e,g, the Indo-American Extra­
dition Treaty published in the Gazette of India, Part III, 
section 3, sub-section (i), dated 1 February, 1966, which was 
originally entered into in 1931, and 1942, mentions assassina­
tion as being included in murder and the basis is reciprocity. 
Also the Second Schedule lists extraditable offences committed 
in India and punishable under any section of the Indian Penal 
Code or any other law, A jSittzCfv. committing murder or guilty 
of an attempt to murder in a foreign land any person (including 
of course, a Head of a State or member of his family), if found 
in India, could be tried in India according to the Indian Penal 
Code and convicted, if the offence is proved. So the adoption 
of a clause like that is redundant and no occasion for invoking 
it need arise.
The reasonableness of that clause can not be overempha­
sised or seriously questioned in countries like India, Britain, 
United States of America, and other countries with similar 
systems of law. There, various avenues, forms and methods
in approaching a court of law or the executive or other authority 
are available to individuals for redress of their complaints and 
grievances. But it is argued by some that it loses all its 
ethical and legal force when it is applied to those States which 
refuse to recognise the most elementary rights of their citizens 
or which commit such acts of atrocity and barbarity upon their 
subjects as to arouse the indignation of their people and of the 
civilised world at large. There may be extreme cases in which 
only the murder of the Head of the State can lead the people, 
suffering from perpetual tyranny and pjr ^ secution, to happiness 
and change the entire political pattern. This point of view 
occurred, as a historical fact, in Imperial Russia and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, This argument, in such extreme cases, de­
serves consideration and, even in a country like India, if such 
a situation arises, the mere deposition and exceptionally, murder,
of the Head of the State or (still more exceptionally) members of
his family might well be held to be an offence of a political 
character. But it may be further submitted that no breach 
with the general legal position is involved in this respect.
It is relevant to repeat here that the British govern­
ment did not adopt this clause. The British court in the case 
of Re Castionim^  observed: rCrimes otherwise extraditable, be­
come political offences if they were incidental and formed part
of a political disturbance* • The same view has been upheld
2
by courts of other countries. These considerations might
1. (1891) 1 Q.B.D. 149,
2. U.S.A. Hyde, op,cit,, p,573, n,l, Italian practice: In Re
Pavelic Kwaternik, A.D. 1933-1-34, CasaNo.158; Latin American 
practice: Re Peyre, 22 Int, Law Reports (1955) pp ,3.23-527
(Argentine); In re Brenoville, 22 Int. Law Reports (1955) pp, 
527-528 (Supreme Court of Brazil); Re Campo^a et al, 24 Int,
Law Reports, 1957 pp.518-524 (Supreme'TJ6urT' df UVL1&).
have influenced the reasoning of the Court of Appeal of Turin 
in 1934; when applying Article 8 of the Italian Criminal Code, 
it interpreted the contents of that article very liberally and 
finally rejected the application of France for the extradition 
of two persons charged with the assassination of King Alexander 
of Yugoslavia.*
It is also argued that it would be a mockery of law, 
if persons holding banners and revolting against tyrants or 
dictators to liberate people were surrendered, others being de­
feated, under treaty obligations, to be imprisoned by the victor; 
while overthrown dictators are granted political asylum in 
foreign States, in spite of their atrocities. Be that as it 
may, it seems from British practice in the House of Lords in
Schtrak1 s case that the idea that an ordinary crime becomes a
political offence because it has been committed with a political 
objective or motive, has been rejected. In any case, as laid 
down in Kolczynski1 s case, each case will be judged on its own 
merits and circumstances at the time when the offence was com­
mitted. In an extreme case, India may hold an assassination 
of a Head of State as a political offence.
2In any event, one cannot but agree with Hingorani 
in remarking that any exception in favour of Heads of State or 
their families is quite anachronistic now that Prime Ministers 
and other ministers are much more important than Heads of State 
(what to speak of their families?), and if there should be an 
exception it must be extended to every high member of the
1. In Re Pavelic and Kwaternik, Case No.158, decided by Court 
of Appeal o/ Turin on 4 September, 1933; 1933-34 A.D. Case 
No. 158.
2. R.C. Hingorani, op .cit., 9-10.
Executive, which would appear to suggest an impossible breach 
with the * political offence* exception.
(b) Anarchist or terrorist offences
The second limitation is with regard to anarchist or 
terrorist offences. In certain bilateral and multilateral con­
ventions and treaties provisions have been inserted, by which 
anarchist and terrorist offences have been excluded from the 
category of political offences,* and these have been the subject 
matter of decision by courts in different States.
After the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, 
in France in 1934, the Council of the League of Nations, in pur­
suance of a proposal made by France, took steps to establish an 
international convention for the prevention and punishment of 
crimes of a political character described as acts of political 
terrorism. In the convention signed at Geneva on 16 November, 
1937, twenty-three States undertook to treat as criminal of­
fences acts of terrorism, including conspiracy, incitement, and 
participation in such offences. In a supplementary conven­
tion, signed on the same day, ten of the signatories of the 
principal convention agreed to the creation of an International 
Court, to which the parties would be entitled to hand over the
accused, if they decided not to extradite them or to try them
2before their own courts. Apart from India, no member of the
3British Commonwealth of Nations signed either convention.
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.186, n.90, 91.
2. R.C. Hingorani, op;cit.» p.10; Oppenheim: International Law, 
p.710.
3. Oppenheim: Internatj.onal Law, Vol.l , 338-340A.
This step taken by India was in consonance with and
on the same lines as the principle laid down by Lord Russell,
1
C.J. in Re Arton. He said:
"The law of extradition is without doubt 
founded upon the broad principle that i*t 
is to the interest of civilised communi­
ties that crime acknowledged to be such 
should not go unpunished, and it is a 
part r of comity of nations that one 
State should afford every assistance to 
another, towards bringing persons guilty 
of such crimes to justice• But in the
application of this principle, certain 
matters such as the conditions upon 
which, and the class of crimes in respect 
of which extradition is to be granted, 
and the formalities to be observed upon 
application for extradition are primary 
matters for the two political powers- 
concerned to arrange in the first in­
stance by treaty, the next step is by . 
legislative enactment to give them the 
force of law, and to express in an Act 
of Parliament the conditions or limit ­
ations imposed upon the grant of extra­
dition and the class of crimes to which 
extradition applies. It is to the ex­
pression of the legislature in Acts of 
Parliament and to that alone that judi­
cial tribunals can refer."
The same limitations for observing extradition forma­
lities were emphasised by the Supreme Court of India in Hans 
2
Muller’s case. It was observed:
"But a citizen who has committed certain 
kinds of offences abroad can be extra­
dited, if the formalities prescribed 
by the extradition Act are observed."
Emphasising the unfettered power of the government to 
refuse extradition, it was observed further:
1. (1891) 1 Q.B. 108 at p.111.
2. Hans Muller’s case, supra, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 367.
"The law of extradition is quite differ­
ent [from the Foreigners Act]. Because 
of treaty obligations it confers a right 
on certain countries (not all) to ask 
that persons who are alleged to have com­
mitted certain specified offences in their 
territories or who have already been con­
victed of those offences by their courts, 
be handed over to them in custody for 
prosecution and punishment. But, despite 
that, the government of India is not bound 
to comply with the request and has an 
absolute and unfettered discretion to 
refuse ... if the order is one of expul­
sion, then the person esqpelled leaves 
India a free man."
Section 29 and 31 of the 1962 Extradition Act gives 
powers to the courts and to the executive to refuse extradition 
in cases of offences of a political nature. Those offences not 
having been enumerated, India signed several conventions recog­
nising anarchist and terrorist activities as 1 offences not of 
political nature*, and further that the offender must not escape 
punishment. In the words of Lord Russell, it was the duty of 
nations, to bring offenders to justice and India, therefore, 
rightly suggested the establishment of an international criminal 
court for the trial of offenders who either could not ordinarily 
be extradited and could not be tried by the municipal courts and 
such an institution should cover all situations for the trial of 
offenders, giving them no escape. The convention, if acted 
upon, would curtail the liberty of the citizen or alien and would 
have to be enacted as a municipal law, otherwise Articles 14 and 
21 of the Constitution would hit it and the High Court or Supreme 
Court of India would declare such a law ultra vires and conse­
quently, would restrain the Central Government from handing over 
such person for trial before such an international criminal court
Oppenheim, while arguing against such a convention and 
establishment of a court, observes:
328.
"It is doubtful whether States, wedded - 
by their law and tradition to the prin­
ciple of non-extradition of political — 
offenders, will acquiesce in any conven­
tional regulation impairing the asylum 
hitherto granted to political offenders.
Such acquiescence on their part is un­
likely at a time when the suppression 
of individual freedom and the ruthless 
prosecution of opponents in many countries 
tend to provoke violent reaction of a 
criminal character against the government 
concerned."
He may be correct when he thinks in the terms of the 
Eastern bloc, and at the present time these observations may 
apply to the situations between India and Pakistan regarding
such offences the hijacking of an Indian plane by the so-called 
Azad Kashmiris and blowing it up at Lahore Airport. Even 
though it was an act of terrorism and anarchism, the Pakistan 
Government allowed the plane to be blown and subsequently refused 
to extradite the offender. Similar situations may be visualised 
in connection with events in the present Bangla Desh.
Instances of this limitation on * offences of a politi­
cal character* are, however, recognised in the following conven­
tions, wherein extradition with respect to political offences is 
made permissible by:
i) The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism, 1937;
ii) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 1948 j
iii) The Convention for Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949,
(Art.49);
iv) The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick, Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces,
1949, (Art.50);
v) The Prisoners of War .Convention, 1949 (Art. 129);
vi) The Convention for the Protection of Civilians during
War, 1949, (Art. 146).^ "
The question remains whether a signatory of these Con­
ventions is entitled to extradite political offenders when the 
municipal laws do not give effect to them. There is no provi­
sion in Section 31(a) or any other part of the Act of 1962 en­
grafting such an exception upon what read as mandatory provisions.
The leading and first authority is the decision of the
2English court in the case of Re Meunier, involving this problem, 
where Meunier, an avowed anarchist, after causing two explosions 
in Paris, sought asylpm in England. It was pleaded by him, 
inter alia, that the offence for which he was charged was of a 
political character* Repelling the argument, the court observed; 
* In order to constitute a political offence, there must be two 
or more parties in the State, etc.* (see above, p. ^13 ).
Having gone that fat, the court further observed;
"The accused was in fact identified with 
the party of anarchy and inimical to all 
governments, and his efforts, even though 
incidentally ditected against a particu­
lar government, were primarily directed 
against the general body of citizens."
A similar observation of the Swiss Federal Court in
3the Ockert case decided in 1933, funs as follows;
1. R.C. Hingorani, op;cit., p.48, n.18.
2. (1894) 2 Q.B. 415.
3. In're Ockert A.D. 1933-1934, Case No.157, pp.369-371 decided 
on 20 October, 1933, noted by Bedi, op.cit., p.186.
330.
"Acts which are note related to a general 
movement directed to the realisation of 
a particular political object in such a 
way that they themselves appear as an 
essential part or incident ... thereof, 
but which serve merely terroristic ends 
... so as to facilitate ««• a future 
political struggle, can raise no claim 
for asylum."
These two decisions virtually agree that Tpolitical 
offence* does not include acts of terrorism. Would India take 
a similar route in the interpretation of the words * of a political 
character* in Section 31(2) by judicial legislation - a question 
raised above at p. •
A decision of the Supreme Court of Guatemala in 1929^
2repeated the same principle, as noted by Bedi. The court said;
"Universal law qualifies as political 
crimes sedition, rebellion and other 
offences which tend to change the form 
of the government or the persons who 
compose it: but it cannot be admitted
that ordering a man (to be) killed with 
treachery, unexpectedly and in an unin­
habited place, without form of trial or 
authority to do so constitutes a poli­
tical crime."
Exclusion of anarchist and terroristic offences from 
the categories of political offences has been stated in the
following treaties, showing different State practices in addi­
tion to the above-mentioned conventions:-
i) Treaty of 25 February, 1938, between Brazil and Bolivia;
"Criminal acts which constitute an open 
manifestation of anarchy or are designed 
to overthrow the bases of all social
organisation shall not be considered
as political offences.'*
1. In’Re rEckermann; A.D. 1929-30, Case No.189, pp.293-295 at p. 
295, decided on 28 May, 1929.
2. Bedi. ot>;cit.. p.187, n.97.
ii) Treaties entered into between Columbia, Panama and
Nicaragua provide:
"Acts defined as anarchical under 
the laws of both States shall not 
be deemed to be political offences."
Bilateral and multilateral conventions and these two 
treaties have been noted by S. Bedi.^
Anarchist and terrorist offences of a violent nature 
are offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Under item 18 
of the Second Schedule to the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, it 
has been provided that any offence which, if committed in India, 
would be punishable under any other section of the Indian Penal 
Code or any other law, would be an extraditable offence. If a 
wide interpretation is given to item 18, terrorist and anarchist 
offences would be excluded from the category of political offences
apart from convention; and this interpretation would coincide 
with the treaty provision between Columbia, Panama and Nicaragua, 
cited above.
In addition, international law jurists, such as
2 3 4Oppenheim, Garcia Mora, L.L. Deere, substantially agree that
anarchistic and terroristic offences are excluded and do not
fall in the category of political offences or offences of a
political character, and therefore, do not give rise to a claim
for asylum or 'political asylum' .
Art.2 of the Pan-American convention of 1902 provided
1. Bedi, op;cit., p.186, n.90, 91, 92, 93.
2. Oppenheim, op.cit., p.710.
3. Garcia, op.cit., p.86.
4. L.L. Deere, op.cit.» p.255.
that acts which may be classified as pertaining to anarchism 
shall not be considered as political o f f e n c e s T h e  Institute 
of International Law as long ago as 1892, recommended that:
"Crimes directed to uproot the funda­
mental social institutions, irrespective 
of national divisions or any given poli­
tical constitution or form of government 
are not to be considered as political 
crimes .ll2
Not by way of repetition, but in order to show the 
distinction between cases with and without elements of anarchism 
and terrorism, we will consider some cases in which different 
conclusions were reached laying down one principle in one case
and another in another case* The lesson is that each case 
turned out on its own facts.
Before the English courts theproblem came twice in
3 4Ex parte Castioni, and in Re Meunier. In the case of
Castioni, a Swiss who had taken part in a revolutionary movement 
in the Canton of Ticino and had incidentally shot a member of 
the government, the court refused extradition, as the crime was 
considered political. On the other hand, in the case of Meunier 
a French anarchist, who was prosecuted for having caused explos­
ions in France, one of which resulted in the death of two indi­
viduals, the extradition was granted because the crime, an 
anarchist and terrorist act, was not considered to be political.
The decisions came out on the facts of each case.
In Kaphengst, the Swiss Federal Court in 1930 granted
1. Bedi, ., p.187, n.100•
2. Bedi, op.cit., p.187, n.99.
3. (1891) 1 Q.B. 149.
4. (1894) 2 Q.B. 415.
the extradition of a person accused of having committed bomb
outrages of a purely terrorist character. In the Pavan case
the Swiss Federal Court granted extradition (to France) of a
2
person accused of killing an Italian Fascist in France* But 
the same court refused extradition in a case of homicide in
which a member of the National Socialist Party was involved,
and the court held that the alleged offence took place in the
course of a political struggle between two parties approaching 
3
a civil war* During the civil war in East Pakistan, if
Mujibur Rehman or his fellow supporters had fled to India, and
if extradition had been requested by the Pakistan government, the
4defence taken in Ockert* s case (see above, p* 329 ) would
have been available to them, so that their acts, related to a 
general movement, would have qualified being fof a political 
character* •
(c) War crimes and crimes against peace and humanity
The third limitation on »political offences* relates 
to war crimes, crimes against peace and humanity. Lauterpacht
5has described these crimes as crimes against international law.
As the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, has not defined * offence 
of a political character*, it does not impose limitations or 
exceptions so the meaning of * offences of a political character* 
and the limitations thereon will have to be deduced from the
1. A.D. 1929-1930, Case No.188.
2. A.D. 1927-1928, Case No.239.
3. In Re Ockert, A.D. 1933-1934, Case No.157.
4. In Re Ockert, ibid,
5. Lauterpacht: f*The Law of Nations and Punishment of War 
Crimes*’, 21 B.Y.I.L. 1944, p.58.
well-established principles of international law, established 
by practice in the family of nations, and the principles of law, 
both municipal and international, established by a lon£ series 
of Judgments* On this subject, it may be claimed that, unlike 
terrorist activities, established principles are available to 
guide us* As has been seen above, India was a pioneer in 
signing the convention for prevention and punishment of crimes 
described as acts of political terrorism and war crimes. Ob­
viously, therefore, the Indian government will not exempt from 
extradition, war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity, 
and neither courts nor executive will afford asylum in Indian 
territory to persons who have committed war crimes and crimes 
against peace and humanity.
If an accused files a petition for habeas corpus be­
fore the Supreme Court or puts the defence before the magistracy 
or executive that the alleged war crimes and crimes against peace 
and humanity are offences of a * political character* and invokes 
Articles 14, 19, 20, 21, or 22 of the Constitution the defence
will be rejected, because no organ of government would recognise 
as valid such acts of * lawless order* , and would never permit an 
offender, who has committed these offences abroad, to take 
asylum in India under the guise of a political offence. If 
the persons, at present allegedly guilty of genocide in * Bangla 
Desh* are extradited to Pakistan, which decides to prosecute 
and punish them for offences against peace and humanity and they 
take refuge in India and ask for political asylum, the executive 
wing would refuse it, as they would be guilty not of * political 
offences* but of crimes against peace and humanity*
If the Pakistan Government under an extradition treaty
or arrangement or under the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, re­
quests their extradition, they cannot invoke Article 21 of the
Constitution, as the courts would not recognise genocide or 
other offences against peace and humanity as offences of a 
political character under Section 29 and 31 6f the Indian Extra­
dition Act. If any lenient view, for political reasons was 
taken, it would not be ’conducive to the public good* (cf.
Section 29 of the Act).
In the absence of definition of ’war crimes’ and 
’crimes against peace and humanity’ questions may be raised as 
to what they are. The Indian courts will certainly be faced 
with practical difficulties.
International law does not recognise any legal right 
or duty to extradite, apart from treaty obligations, and this 
seems to be the reason why Lord Russell, C.J. in Re Arton,^  
used the expression ’Community of Nations’ and not ’international 
law’. Various writers on international law because of their 
training and background, lay more emphasis on the international 
aspect, rather than the constitutional aspect. In the law of 
extradition, the constitutional aspect is more important, espe­
cially in India, because of the guarantee of Fundamental Rights, 
so that the extradition proceedings can be challenged before 
the magistracy, the executive, the High Courts and the Supreme 
Court in appropriate proceedings at appropriate stages. This 
constitutional aspect must be emphasised, because in internation­
al law no two states follow identical practice in case of extra­
dition. The constitution of a State may prohibit extradition
1. (1891) 1 Q.B. 108 at p.111.
1
of its nationals, and this is why it is edsential to enact a 
special law relating to extradition. A treaty between State A 
and State B may differ from the treaty between State A and State C 
so that State A may have to apply different principles when State 
B demands extradition from the principles applicable when State C
demands extradition. This may be illustrated by two English
2 3cases: R. v. Wilson, and Re Galwey. which reveal the great
difference between extradition lav/ in India, with its detailed
which
written Constitution and the position in countries^look only to 
treaties and specific statutes.
In the first case, the court had to consider the treaty 
between the United Kingdom and Switzerland which provided that,
’No Swiss national should be delivered up by Switzerland to the 
Government of the United Kingdom and no subject of the United 
Kingdom be delivered up by the United Kingdom Government to 
Switzerland.’ In the later case, the treaty between the United 
Kingdom and Belgium provided, ’in no case, nor on any considera­
tion whatsoever, shall the High Contracting parties be bound to 
surrender their own subj'ects, whether by birth or naturalisation’ . 
Despite the similar language in the two treaties, in the former 
case, the court refused to surrender and allowed it in the latter. 
In Wilson* s case (at p.46), the court said: ’It should consider
the Extradition Act as well as the extradition treaty during 
extradition proceedings’. Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., while 
allowing the surrender in the later case, held that the words of 
the treaty (quoted above) mean that, while the States are not
1. Cyprus Constitution Cmd. 1093 (1963).
2. (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42.
3. (1896) 1 Q.B. 230.
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bound, they may, under the treaty and any legal enactment which 
relates to the treaty, make such extradition.
Therefore, it is fair to point out, in order to avoid 
confusion and embarrassment to the Central Government provision 
should be made by Parliament in the Indian Extradition Act, by 
adding a proviso to Section 29 or 31 or otherwise declaring that 
anarchist or terrorist offences, war crimes and crimes against 
peace and humanity and acts of collaboration with the enemy during
war, shall be offences ’not of a political character*. It is 
by no means to be presumed that the extradition of war criminals 
will defeat the ends of justice, even if their crimes were indubi­
tably political offences.
Vafious national laws have incorporated provisions mak­
ing war criminals, and those who commit crimes against peace and 
humanity, punishable under their laws. The Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law, 1950, enacted by the Israeli Parliament, makes 
crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes part of Israeli criminal law. Chapter 10 of the Criminal 
Code of the Hungarian Peoples Republic, 1961, is entitled ’Crimes 
against Peace and Humanity*, and sets out such offences as insti­
gation of war, genocide and cruelty and destruction in time of 
war. Chapter II of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia is concerned 
with crimes against humanity and international law. Art.8 of 
the Dutch Law of 18 May, 1952, provides, inter alia, that 
breaches of the laws of warfare, inhuman treatment, and system­
atic terrorising of civilians in time of war shall be crimes 
visited with various penalties.* The General Assembly of the
1* Bedi, op.cit.. p.188, n.106.
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U.N.Q. by Resolution of 13 February, 1946, recommended the 
surrender of war criminals.*
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 
which sat in Nuremberg, defined war crimes and crimes against 
humanity as specific offences; those offences were declared to 
be inimical to the very concept of civilisation and no sane per­
son would recommend the extermination, enslavement and deporta­
tion of the civil population (as seems to have happened in East 
Pakistan), or prosecution of them on political, racial or reli­
gious grounds (as is reported to have been done in East Pa^istanj^ 
or ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war or hostages, or the plunder 
of private or public property, wanton destruction of towns or 
villages or devastation without justification, as they have no 
connection whatsoever with the successful prosecution of the 
war. All this happened in World War II on a mass scale and 
has happened before and during other wars. Further, the Conven­
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 Decem­
ber, 1948, in Art.7 provides that genocide and other acts enumer­
ated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes 
for the purposes of extradition.
It is desirable, therefore, that India should insert 
in its Extradition Act of 1962 similar provisions taking these 
offences out of the purview of 1 offences of political character1. 
If this amendment is made, the uncertainty prevailing in the 
extradition laws will disappear and the chances of India being
1. Bedi, op^cit., p.188, n.103.
2. Bedi, op.cit., p.188, 189.
misunderstood by other nations and the strain on diplomatic re­
lations in case of refusal of extradition will be minimised.
###*«#**##########*#
In this connection, mention of one thing is necessary: 
the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal involved the en­
actment of ex post facto legislation, as the Charter allowed pro­
secution sifter the termination of war, for new offences covered 
by the Charter. The same principle would apply more vigor­
ously in the case of municipal laws, particularly since the 
Constitution of India came into force and any retrospective 
penal legislation would be void for repugnancy to Article 20(1), 
which provides that no person shall be convicted except for vio­
lation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the 
act charged as an offence. No difficulty would arise if the 
alleged offence was committed after the amendment, but if it 
were committed before the amendment, the High Court or the 
Supreme Court in a habeas corpus petition would be bound to inter* 
fere and declare the extradition proceedings void. Further, 
an1extradition offence* has been defined under Section 2(c) of 
the Extradition Act of 1962, as provided in the Extradition 
Treaty or in the Second Schedule to the Act in the circumstances 
mentioned in sub-clause (i) and (ii) of sub-section (c). The 
Second Schedule to the Act provides that: * The following list of 
extraditable offences is to be construed according to the law 
in force in India on the date of the alleged offence*. This 
provision seems to have been taken and adapted from the British 
extradition provisions. Halsbury * says that extradition
1. Halsbury: Laws of England. Section 1160, p.567, vol.16, 2nd
ed.
crimes must be construed according to the law existing in 
England or in the British possessions (as the case may be) at 
the date of the alleged crime.*
If, therefore, the Indian law is amended and extra­
dition is demanded for an offence committed earlier than the 
amendment, the application of the amended law to the offence 
committed earlier would amount to ex post facto legislation and 
the extradition would be in infringement of Art. 20(1).
Precision and definiteness in connection with a crimi­
nal offence is also necessary, so that the prisoner may know 
whether what he was doing was or was not an offence. For in­
stance, an alleged offender who has fought for his political 
convictions without violating the well-established customs and 
rules of warfare, could claim that what he had done was a poli­
tical offence and therefore, he was entitled to invoke the pro­
tection of Section 31(a) of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962.
(d) Acts of Collaboration with the Enemy during War
According to international law writers, the acts of
collaboration with the enemy during war is regarded as one of
2the exceptions in political offences. These offenders were
3
called Quislings and traitors, traditionally treated as politi­
cal offenders, and therefore, the state of asylum did not order 
their extradition up to 1945. The United Nations General
4
Assembly by resolution of 15 December, 1946, provided that
1. R. v. Dix (1902) 18 T.L.R. 231.
2. Oppenheim, op;cit., Vol.2, para.159, p.422,
3. Morgenstern, op.cit., p.382.
4. Journal of the General Assembly, First Session, II, part,
p.880.
1 handing over for trial of war criminals, quislings and traitors 
is an urgent task and obligation* ; and procedure for demands of 
their surrender was laid down by the Resolution of 31 October, 
1 9 4 5 The principle of inducing asylum States to surrender 
those accused of collaborating with the enemy during war was 
recognised by these resolutions.
In addition to the Resolution of the General Assemblyt 
treaties between nations provide for the extradition of such 
offenders and these agreements did not remain pious hopes or 
solemn agreements; they have been translated into practice and 
in various cases, fugitives have been surrendered to the request­
ing States. The Court of Appeal of Nancy (France) in 1949, on 
the request of the Belgian Government for extradition of Leonard 
Spiessens for collaborating with the enemy, extradited the ac­
cused, repelling his argument that the offence was a political 
one, observing: * Collaboration with the enemy is not considered
by French legislation or judicial decisions to be a political
o
offence*• Earlier, the court of Appeal in Paris in 1947 in 
the case of Colman had observed: * The offences of intelligence
for the enemy and of carrying arms against Belgium were not poli- 
tical offences*. These decisions were the outcome of notes 
exchanged between France and Belgium on 10 January, 1947, cited 
in Colman*s case.
It is desirable that these offences should be mentioned 
specifically in treaties or conventions or municipal legislation
1. Bedi, op.cit. t p.190.
2. 1949 A.D., Case No.89, pp.275-276 at p.276.
3. 1947 A.D *, Case No.67.
and a clear definition of these offences must be given so that 
the courts, or in the case of India, the Central Government may 
not have to face difficulties in deciding whether the offences 
are of a political character or not. Ihe asylum State, under 
international law, has complete discretion to surrender quislings 
and traitors as an act of grace, under treaties or conventions, 
but it is not legally bound to extradite a fugitive, who has 
come to seek shelter within its territories. Such is the view 
of the Supreme Court in Hans Muller* s case that extradition is 
possible only in accordance with *a procedure established under 
law and not otherwise*; and unlike the principles of inter­
national law, it is not * an act of grace* of the Central Govern­
ment to extradite them. Of course, if they are aliens they 
can bd expelled or deported, but that is a separate question.
In the absence of a specific provision in the convention of 15 
August, 1874, between France and Belgium for collaboration 
with the enemy during the war, the extradition of van Bellinghen 
was refused by the Court of Appeal in Paris, in 1950.^ This 
was a case of interpretation of the convention. The Supreme 
Court of Brazil, applying its municipal law, actually refused 
to extradite to; Denmark in 1947, Danes convicted in Denmark of 
collaboration with the German occupation forces, observing:
* The crime of assisting the enemy in the time of war is a poli­
tical one lato sensu, because it is a crime against the State in
its supreme function, namely, its external defence and its 
2 ■
sovereignty* . The Brazilian Supreme Court in 1955 in the
1. In Re Van Bellinghen, 17 Int. Law Reports (1950) Case No.88*
2. Denmark, (Collaboration with the Enemy) Case, 1947, A.D.,
Case No.71, p.146.
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case of In Re Bernonville, rejected the application of France 
for extradition of the accused, who had been sentenced to death 
by a French court on a charge of committing acts against the 
security of the State, or more precisely, of treason consisting 
in participation in acts aimed at the demoralisation of the army, 
or the country in time of war* It observed: * since treason to
country is expressly included amongst political crimes under 
Brazilian law, therefore, the author of that act is not subject 
to extradition*•
By contrast, the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, which,
of course, has been replaced in India by the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, mentioned treason as an offence and thus these of­
fences will not become political offences in India. The Act 
of 1962 unaccountably did not include treason, though it is 
arguable that it is capable of being included by reason of item 
18 which (as we have seen) includes all crimes punishable under 
the Indian Penal Code, if these are notified by the Central 
Government generally or specially. No case of this nature 
has so far arisen in India, but in future,specific provisions 
for these offences with accurate and precise definitions of the 
offences should be made in treaties, conventions, or municipal 
laws, to avoid these difficulties and such criminals should not 
be allowed to go scot-free because of the absence of any pro­
visions in a treaty, like in the case of van Bellinghen, and in 
the two decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court, viz. Denmark 
(Collaboration with the Enemy) case, and the case of In Re 
Bernonville.
In the Indian Extradition Act itself either in the
Second Schedule 1 Treason or collaboration with the enemy during 
war* may be added as an extraditable offence; or a standard
1. 22 Int. Law Reports, (1955) pp.527-528.
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clause on the pattern of the Peace Treaties of Paris with Italy
2 3 4 5with Bulgaria, with Finland, with Hungary, and with Rumania
of 10 February, 1947, which specifically demand surrender of 
national fugitives for ’treason or collaboration with the enemy 
during the war* may be inserted in conventions or treaties with 
different countries entered into or to be entered by India*
That would solve the problem, as Section 3 of the Act would give 
the sanction of municipal law to these amended treaties and con­
ventions when once the required notification has been made* 
Further, notification, as required by Sections 3 and 12 of the 
Act, introducing an amendment in the Second Schedule will make 
these offences extraditable offences in the eye of the municipal 
law, whereunder the amendment procedure for treaties followed 
under Sections 3 and 12 has to be strictly complied with*
1. Art. 45 U.N.T.S. Vol.49, p.3.
2. Attt. 5 U.N.T.S. Vol.41, p.21.
3. Art* 9 U.N.T.S. Vol.48, p.203.
4. Art. 6 U.N.T.S.,Vol.41, p.135.
5. Art. 6 U.N.T.S. Vol.42, p.3.
6. Bedi, op.cit., p*187, n.102.
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(2) ’Prescription1 as a bar to extradition
(a) Whether according to the law of the requesting State 
or requested State or both.
(b^ From when does time run in the fugitive’s favour?
(c) Limitation in cases when penalty has been imposed or 
punishment inflicted in absentia (par contumace).
(a) Whether according to the lav; of the requesting State or 
requested State or both
’Prescription’ (of the offence) is another ground for 
refusal of extradition of a fugitive offender. The exceptions 
are by some called limitations and restrictions, being based on 
considerations of law, humanity, policy and convenience and give 
the right of refusal or discretion to refuse to surrender by the 
extraditing or requested State. This particular restriction is 
generally inserted in conventions, extradition treaties, arrange­
ments or municipal statutes. This clause is for the protection 
and safeguard of the individual person from time-barred and long- 
delayed prosecutions, especially as, under the general law, if the 
aggrieved party has taken no action till the expiration of the 
period of limitation or for an unduly long time, he cannot be 
allowed to do so. The sword of Damocles should not be kept 
hanging over his head.
The Indian Extradition Act, 1962, by Section 31(b) has 
laid down that a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered or 
returned to a foreign State or Commonwealth country, ’if prose­
cution for the offence, in respect of which his surrender is
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.165.
sought, is according to the law of that State or country, barred 
by time1 . This clause, therefore, gives an immunity to the 
fugitive offender from prosecution or punishment if the prosecu­
tion has become time-barred, and this specifically makes the law 
of prescription binding on the demanding State. As in India 
for criminal prosecutions no period of limitation is prescribed, 
so far as India is concerned, there is no question of the appli­
cability of the law of prescription and this is why extradition 
is prohibited, if the immunity has been acquired by the law of 
the requesting State. Art. 5 of the Indo-American Treaty is 
only abundante caut-«Xa and either party may take advantage, if 
any, otherwise for all practical purpose, section 31(b) is enough, 
though the treaty may conceivably cover exceptional cases.
In international law, in the absence of a common period 
of limitation in the two given States, there was no unanimity of 
opinion on the question whether the law of prescription of the 
requesting State would govern the matter or the law of the re­
quested State would apply. In both these cases, unlike India, 
it was assumed that a law of limitation was in force in both 
countries to govern criminal prosecutions, and that the prosecu­
tion was barred by the law of limitation in force. The diffi­
culty arose when the requested State had to determine whether 
acquisition of immunity from prosecution or punishment was govern­
ed by its own law or according to that of the requesting State or 
of both.
Most writers on international law hold that the law of 
the requesting State should determine the period of prescription, 
and India seems to have adopted this pattern basically, but as in 
India, no law of prescription exists for criminal prosecutions 
(with fdw exceptions) obviously India could not enact that the
immunity from prosecution would be governed by its own laws as 
a requested State*
On the other hand, the majority of treaties are to the 
effect that the law of the requested State must decide the issue* 
It is just and equitable in the interest of the requesting State 
that an offender should not be allowed to escape punishment by 
taking asylum in a State where the period of limitation is shorter 
in the requesting State where he committed the offence*
"To hold otherwise and to give the fugi­
tive the benefit of foreign statutes of 
limitation, which are necessarily more 
or less arbitrary is to defeat the end 
for which extradition treaties are made 
namely, to prevent criminals for secur-  ^
ing immunity from punishment by flight."
But this argument would apply only to treaties which
do not mention the applicability of the law of limitation of
either State, in contrast to those treaties which specifically
have a clause stating that the laws of limitation^ of the re-
2quested State would apply. Moore*s opinion would not cover 
bilateral treaties like the Indo-American Extradition Treaty of
3
1 April, 1966, wherein para.5 contains a clause seemingly incon­
sistent with Section 31(b) of the 1962 Act, that extradition shall 
not take place, if, subsequent to the commission of the crime or 
the institution of penal prosecution or the conviction thereon, 
exemption from prosecution or punishment has been acquired by 
lapse of time, according to the laws of the High Contracting party
1. J.B. Moore: Extradition, op.cit*, Vol.l, para,373, p.569.
2. For the later category of States, see Bedi, supra, p.166. n.2.
3. Published in the Extraordinary Gazette of India, part III, 
Section 3, sub-section (i) dated 1 April, 1966.
applying to or applied to, which means that by this bilateral 
treaty the period of prescription should be determined by laws 
of both the countries, viz. India and the United States of America,
There is another aspect of the matter. According to 
the definition of an extradition offence under Section 2(c) of 
the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, the offences may be provided 
in the treaty of a foreign State, being a treaty State; and in 
relation to a foreign State, other than a treaty State, or in
relation to a Commonwealth country, offences are provided in the 
Second Schedule. A foreign .treaty like the Indo-^American Treaty, 
lays down (as we have seen) that the law of prescription govern­
ing the case at hand will be the laws of both the parties. The 
other two cases will be governed by the Second Schedule, and 
according to that schedule, the offences mentioned therein should 
be construed to be offences according to the lav/ in force in India 
on the date of the alleged offence. Smuggling narcotics, of­
fences under the Defence of India Rules and the like, might be 
offences on the date of the commission of the offence, but later 
cease to be offences, by the expiry of such temporary laws which, 
having given them life, died a natural death, and will not re­
vive. But, of course, if a prosecution had been launched already 
Section 6 of the Qeniral Clauses Act will operate for the con­
tinuance of the prosecution already launched, unless the legis­
lature, by implication or necessary intendment, holds and; provides 
otherwise. If by the lav/s of the revested State, the prose­
cution became barred by time, it would stand on the same footing 
as an offence not included in the list of extradition offences in 
theSecond Schedule, because the offence should not only be an 
extraditable offence but should also be an offence ±>r which a
prosecution could be launched in the territory of the requested 
State. This will not be the case, even if the offence was an 
offence in India at the date of its commission, if lapse of time 
put an end to the capacity of the execution in the requesting 
State to institute prosecution, and vice-versa. That being so, 
the doctrine of ’double criminality’ (see below) may stand in the 
way of surrender, if there happen to be a prescriptive law of 
limitation in force in India. Once the prosecution or punish­
ment is barred by lapse of time under the laws of India (in a 
hypothetical case), the situation will not be different from that 
where the act done is not a crime under the territorial lav; and, 
therefore, even if the extradition offence were mentioned in the
Second Schedule, he could not be extradited. But no such even­
tuality would normally arise in India, as no general law of 
limitation bars a criminal prosecution.
Section 31(b) of the Act of 1962 is as it were a proto­
type of clauses in the few codes and treaties in international 
practice, which without referring to the laws of the requested 
States determine the question of prescription, either by the laws 
of the requesting State or by the laws of the place where the 
alleged offence was committed. Consequently, surrender of an 
offender tt^^be refused if prosecution or punishment is barred 
by lapse of time, in accordance with the laws in force in the 
requesting State or according to the law of the State where the 
offence was committed (and in that case, it may either be th.e 
requesting State or a third State).^
1. In Re Weill, decided by the Argentine Federal Supreme Court 
on 4 July, 1939, 1941-42, A.D., Case No.104.
There is no dearth of national statutes which make 
extradition impermissible, if the prosecution or punishment is 
barred under the laws of the requested State,* The reason for 
these provisions seems to be that the requested State, having 
codified laws and limitation for criminal actions, cannot be 
ejected to surrender its rights to examine a request in the 
light of its own laws, including the statute of limitation, 
except when they contain provisions to the contrary. It is 
therefore, necessary that the laws of the requested State, if any, 
should be given due consideration, before the surrender of the 
fugitive. Looking to all these difficulties, permissive language 
has been used in the Draft Convention adopted by the International 
Law Association in 1928 by Art,5, which leaves it to the dis­
cretion of the requested State to refuse extradition, if the 
person has acquired immunity under its own laws. This mid­
way course, though not a final solution of the problem and not 
(necessarily) applicable to India at present, may be gust and 
equitable and may be fruitfully adopted in various state prac­
tices in treaties and municipal laws. This provision is some­
what akin to that adopted in Indo-American Treaty by clause 5,
The importance of the treaty clauses becomes more evi­
dent when questions are raised before the courts about the 1 equal 
protection1 clause in different State treaties and also its
1, See Belgium, Law of Extradition, 1874, Art,7; Germany, Extra­
dition of Law of 23 December, 1929, Art,4 (2); Netherlands, 
Extradition Law of 1875, as amended in July, 1965, Art,5;
Peru, Extradition Act of 23 October, 1888, Art,3(3); Sweden, 
Law Regarding the Extradition of Criminals, 6 December, 1957, 
Art, 10; Art,5(b) of the South American Convention of 1911, 
cited by Bedi, op;cit,, p,167, n.6,
2, Report of 35 th Conference, Warsaw, 1928, London, 1929, pp, 
324-329 at p,326; Bedi, op,cit,, p,167, n,5.
variance from the Extradition Acts* The provisions of extra­
dition acts may be qualified by the terms of the treaty and the 
order of thdpentral Government under Section 3 of the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1962, applying the Act to the treaty. Extra­
dition treaties exist between India and other countries, but the 
terms of the treaty or treaties vary from country to country*
The courts would assume that foreign State with whom the Central 
Government had diplomatic relations would observe the terms of 
the t r e a t y T h e  court would also assume that a foreign govern- 
ment will honour its obligations under any law or arrangement,
3
In R. v* VIiIson, it was observed:
"Extradition treaties with a foreign 
state, in consequence of which the 
Extradition Act is applied by Order 
in Council in the case of that State, 
are narrower in terms, than the Act; 
the operation of the Act is limited 
with what is consistent with the 
treaty and not otherwise•'*
4To the same effect is the case of Gan2 * Therefore, 
if the treaty clauses are narrower than the Extradition Act, the 
fugitive could conceivably get an advantage not available to per­
sons extradited by virtue of the Second Schedule and no question 
arises of challenging the vires on the ground of the * equal pro­
tection* clause* It may be that only in those cases where the 
treaty provisions are wider than the Second Schedule, that
1. See R. v* Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Atkinson (1962)
2 All E*R. il^6; (on appeal) Sub-nom* Atkinson v* United Stated 
Government (1969) 3 All E.R. 1317 (H.L.); Royal Government o£ 
Greece v* Governor of Bri±ton Prison (1969) 3 All E.R. 1337 
(H.L.).
2* Royal Government of Greece v* Governor of Brixton Prison (1969)
3 All E.R. 1337 (H.L.)*
3. (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42.
complaint could be made Of violation of Art*14 of the Constitu­
tion, the fundamental right ofequality before the law* The law 
of extradition, in the words of the Supreme Court in Hans Muller1 s 
case, being a special branch of the criminal law, and different 
treaties having been entered with different States on different 
considerations, Art* 14 cannot be made a ground for challenge, as
different States stand on different footings and cannot be said 
to be similarly situated* Ultimately, whether the law of the 
requesting or requested State applies, the discretion 1d refuse 
extradition lies with the Central Government, as decided by the 
Supreme Court in Hans Muller* s case* But the discretion must 
be objective and must not be arbitrary, as has been observed in
„ r ithe case of R, v* Galw'ey*
"Where an extradition treaty reserves -■ 
an absolute discretion as to the grant­
ing or refusing the surrender of their 
nationals by the contracting parties, the 
discretion of the United Kingdom is exer­
cised by the Secretary of the State* The 
exercise of such discretion is objective 
and not subjective* If the discretion 
is allowed to be exercised subjectively, 
it will lead to abuses in this country* s 
Extradition laws, as far as its admini­
stration is concerned."
Another interpretation of the Extradition Act, 1962, 
is open to us and, caution apart, it might seem to conclude the 
question. Under Sec*32, to which we have often referred, 
nothing contained in Sections 3 or 12 of the Act shall have the 
effect of limiting the provisions of Section 31* Consequently, 
since Section 31(b) * shall apply without any modification to 
every foreign State or Commonwealth country*, no provisions, 
even in the Indo-American Treaty, can vary the position that 
no fugitive criminal may be surrendered if his prosecution is
1. (1896) 1 Q.B. 230.
barred by time according to the law of the requesting State*
The simplicity of this solution is appealing, and as long as 
Indian criminal law remains unchanged in respect of limitation, 
no other solution commands serious attention*
It may be mentioned that the fixation of the period of 
limitation is a procedural matter and nobody has a right to claim 
a longer or shorter period. In such cases 1 equality before 
law* or * equal protection of the law1 could not be invoked* Of 
course, the prisoner may, in a given case, claim a period of 
limitation as it existed at the time of the commission of the 
offence. So far as India is concerned, these arguments on the 
applicability of the prescriptive law§ of India in criminal acts 
are not relevant, as there is no law laying down the period of
limitation for launching a prosecution.
(b) From where does time run in the fugitive*s favour?
There is some divergence between State practices and^ , 
consequently, difference regarding the period in time when, 
prescription takes effect in the various judgments based upon 
different treaties, municipal laws, and divergent rules on the 
subj ect♦
Some treaties provide that immunity must have been 
acquired at the time of the surrender; others provide for ac­
quisition of the immunity before the requisition and a third 
category provide for accrual of the immunity prior to the arrest 
or commitment of the fugitive. Municipal statutes of some
States provide for the refusal of surrender, if immunity has 
accrued under their statutes of limitation, the reverse of the 
provision to Section 31(b) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
The refusal of surrender is, therefore, a foregone conclusion in 
such cases, if the time for taking judicial action or inflicting 
punishment or penalty has expired under the laws of the State of 
asylum. The Belgian Court of Appeal in Re Addis in an advis­
ory opinion given on 19 December, 1931, held that the request 
should not be granted, observing:
"As Article 7 of the two Belgian laws on 
extradition provides, extradition cannot 
take place if, since the alleged commis3 
sion of the act, prosecution or sentence 
has become barred under Belgian law by a 
Belgian Statute of limitations."
The same result was reached in the Supreme Court of
Argentina in the case of similar provisions incorporated in the
treaty giving the requested SUate the right to decide the question
of prescription according to its own laws. The Supreme Court
of Argentina by j’udgement dated 16 May, 1951, refused extradition
2
to the Netherlands in the case of Riphagen, where the terms of 
the Extradition Treaty permitted the application of the law of 
the country which was less rigorous in this matter, and it was 
held that the time which has elapsed between the commission of the 
alleged offences and the submission of the extradition request 
exceed the limits fixed by the Argentina Penal Code. Obviously, 
the j'udgment is correct. If, in India, the Penal Code or any 
other statute or law of limitation prohibited prosecution after
the expiry of a certain time, and if a person was committed for 
extradition after that time, the committal would certainly violate 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On similar grounds, 
the Federal and Cassation Court of Venezuela rej’ected the appli-
1. 1931- * 32 A.D., Case No.166.
2. 18 Int. Law Reports , 1951, n.l, p.334.
cation for extradition in the case of In re Romaguera De Mouza 
on 23 July, 1952. A similar practice is evidenced m  the 
case of Plevani,^  in which France refused to extradite the accused 
to Italy in 1955, as, according to Article 10 of the Franco- 
Italian Treaty of 12 May, 1870, the sentence had become barred 
by the law of the requested State (France). The article speci­
fically provided: * Extradition may be refused, if the sentence
has become time barred according to the law of the country in 
which the extradited person has taken refuge1• The principle 
ignores a danger which may lead to lawlessness and anarchy, viz. 
that it would encourage persons to commit offences and take re­
fuge in a state, the prescription laws of which limit the time 
for prosecution for a shorter period than others.
Section 31(b) of the Indian Extradition Act has not 
given any date of the commencement of the immunity and, it is 
submitted, when the law of requesting State on the subject has 
been made applicable, the date of commencement of immunity will 
be governed by that law. However, in Art.5 of the Indo-American 
Treaty is a clause to the contrary on the subj*ect, the parties 
have not fixed the date but have simply provided that subsequent 
(i) to the commission of crime, and (ii) institution of penal 
prosecution or the conviction thereon exemption from prosecution
has been acquired by lapse of tine, according to the laws of the 
High Contracting parties applying or applied to according to the 
laws of both the countries. So there is an outer limit subse­
quent to (i) commission of crime, (ii) subsequent to the insti­
tution of penal prosecution or conviction.
1. 19 Int. Law Reports, 1952, Case No.84.
2. 22 Int. Law Reports, pp.514-515, decided on 7 January, 1955.
It has been suggested above that Indian courts must 
observe Section 31(b), even in the face of a treaty; inconsistent 
with it, because of Section 32. However, the Indian legisla­
ture should end this controversy and make the position clear as
to when the immunity commences.
(c) Limitation in cases when penalty has been imposed or 
punishment inflicted in absentia (par contumace)
Section 26 of the British Extradition Act of 1870 
provides that 1 conviction and ’convicted* do not include or 
refer to a conviction which, under foreign law, is a conviction 
for contumacy, but the term ’accused person’ includes a person 
so convicted.
A person convicted par contumace in France continues 
(in the common lav/ viev?) to be an accused person, liable to be 
delivered over under the Extradition Acts. In a case where a 
person is accused of an offence in France, and a jugernent par 
contumace has been given against him, many writers argue that 
this will be a sentence as by trial with a jury. But it is 
not so. When that person is arrested, extradited or surrenders 
himself, that jugement against him given par contumace is annul­
led and he is placed in the same position as if no proceedings 
had been taken against him.
1
In Re Coppin on the demand of extradition by the 
French court, the accused inter alia argued that he was not with­
in the Extradition Act at all, as he was not an accused person, 
having been condemned par contumace. Ordering the extradition 
the argument was repelled and the court observed:
1. (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App.47
111 should assume that it has been esta­
blished that the jugement par contumace 
does work some prejudice to the party 
upon trial, either by reducing the 
amount of necessary proof, or by chang­
ing its character by making him liable 
to costs, how could that possibly take 
him out of the category of accused per­
sons? He has ceased to be a person 
condemned, because his condemnation has 
been annulled upon his appearance and 
he is to take his trial for offences 
with which he is charged. What better,
I ought rather to say what other, des­
cription of him could be given than that 
of a 1 person accused’?”
The definition of the ’accused’ in the British Extra­
dition Act, 1870, by Section 26 of that Act adopts the judgment 
in Coppin’s case.
The Indian Extradition Act of 1962, too, has adopted 
the rule in Coppin*s case and has inserted the definition of
’accused person* in the British Exttadition Act of 1870 , verba­
tim in Section 2(b). The definition of ’person accused’ is 
not ’exhaustive but illustrative’. In Section 2(f) the defi­
nition of the words ’fugitive criminal’ includes the ’person 
accused’ and the words ’fugitive criminal’ or ’person accused* 
which occurs in the various sections of the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, includes a person convicted for contumacy. Section
2(b) read with section 2(f) therefore, makes ’fugitive criminal’
mean and include a person convicted for contumacy. Section 
31(b), the Second Schedule of the Indo-American Treaty of 1 April, 
1966, also as far as the law of prescription is concerned applies 
to the person convicted par contumace and the person not so con­
victed.
As we have already seen, much turns on the distinction,
since an accused (but not a convicted) fugitive has the right to
escape extradition if no sufficient prima facie case is esta­
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blished against him.
Now the different practices under international law and 
practice may also be noticed.
The same principles of limitation, as laid down in the 
cases of In re Addis. Riphagen, Plevain (supra) would apply, 
where a penalty is imposed or punishment inflicted in the case 
of a person convicted iri absentia (par contumace) for whose extra­
dition a request has been made. The State applied to has a 
complete discretion and is fully entitled to reject the request 
for extradition if the extradition is made in violation of guaran­
tees afforded by its laws. In Re Ibrahim Moussa C o s t a where
France, on behalf of Syria, had requested in 1935 Argentina for
the extradition of the appellant Ibrahim Moussa Costa, who had 
been sentenced in absentia by the Court of Beirut in 1920 to 20 
years imprisonment with hard labour, the Camera Federal of 
Rosario, Argentina, accepting the plea of the accused, invoking 
the statute of limitation and rejecting the application of 
France for extradition, after hearing the parties on the nature 
of penalty inflicted in absentia and its inapplicability under 
the constitutional guarantees conferred upon the residents under 
the Constitution of Argentina, observed:
ftThe question is of particular import­
ance in view of its bearing on statutes
of limitations since Moussa Costa is 
merely an accused person, the action for 
the crime charged ... is barred seeing 
that between the date of judgment and 
the extradition petition more than 10 
years in action have passed; that being 
the period allowed by Article 481 of the 
Ottoman Penal Code. It should be observed 
that the same result follows if one looks 
at the French legislation, where Article
1. 1935-1937 A.D., case No.179.
637 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
decides the point in the same way and 
the same period as the Ottoman Penal 
Code • •• The same result arises, if 
the matter be referred to Argentina 
law, for the period of 12 years fixed 
by Article 62, para*2 of the Penal Code
has now elapsed, without any act or
proceeding being brought to interrupt
it .
In India, as we have seen, no prescriptive limitation
has been laid down, and the superior courts have power to set
aside an order of a magistrate if he has dismissed a complaint
on the ground that prosecution has been^^^ttaken after a long 
lapse of time having regard to the magnitude and seriousness of 
the offence.
Unlike the case of Ibrahim Moussa Costa, if no period 
is prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, an application for 
extradition may not be open to serious challenge on account of 
long lapse of time and because it is, therefore, inexpedient or 
may be oppressive or not in the interest of justice. In the 
case of Nicolo Liotta,^  the Argentina Federal Supreme Court 
granted extradition of an Italian sentenced in absentia (par 
contumace) in Italy, The judgment of the Federal Supreme Court
turned on the ground of absence of any bar on the prosecution 
both under Italian law and law of Argentina, on account of pre­
scription of time.
The argument about the absence of a prescriptive bar
of time in the asylum State weighed too, with the second circuit
Court of Appeal in the United States of America which allowed
2
extradition of one Caputo, who was condemned to death in absentia
1, A.D, 1935-1937, note p,384, decided on 12 February, 1936,
2, President of the United States ex rel, Caputo v, Kelly, de­
cided" on" 9“ May, 1938’, A”. 1 9 3 H - 1 *T40, Case No,1461---
by the Court of Assizes of Aix on 14 January, 1923, 15 years 
earlier* The Court repelled the argument made on behalf of the 
accused that the offence was barred by the French Statute of 
Limitation /for relying on Art.VIII of the Franco-American treaty, 
it held that the offences with which Caputo was charged were not 
barred by the laws of the place of asylum.
According to the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, such a 
request would be refused, as the offence was barred by the French 
(i.e. requesting State’s) statute, law of limitation. In 
Caputo*s case, if the offence was barred by tine, the extradition 
should not have been allowed after 15 years, whether the offence 
became barred under the law of the asylum State or not, and the 
fact that the sentence was In absentia could make no difference.
In Re Rebeiro,^  the Supreme Court of Colombia held 
that States are free to reject the application for extradition, 
because of the inconclusiveness of the request as to the effective 
date of operation of prescription.
In any case, the objection regarding the accrual of
immunity on account of prescription or limitation must be raised
by the accused, and if he does not do so, the failure to mention '
it in the request or absence of information on the subject in the
request for extradition is irrelevant, as was held in Re Berz by
2the Supreme Court of Argentina in 1944.
!
Cases also arise where a State, after pronouncement of i 
its policy, through its national laws, denounces it when neces-
3
sary. Such a case is in Re Dobalo, 1949, where the Supreme
1. 26 Int. Law Reports, 1958, pp.525-526, decided on 2 July, 1958,
2. In Re Berz, decided on 22 November, 1944, A.D. 1943-1945,note 
239’:
3. Decided on 7 February, 1949, A.D. 1949, Case No.90.
Court of Argentina, instead of applying Article 3(5) of the Extra­
dition Law of 1885 of Spain, the requesting State, which was the 
law of prescription applicable to the case, applied Article 62, 
para.2, of Argentina Statute of Limitations and refused extradi­
tion to Spain.
So far as a demand from India is concerned, the question) 
of par contumace does not arise, because trials are not held in 
India in the absence of the accused and they are never convicted 
or sentenced iri absentia.
(d) Date of commencement of immunity
The provisions of Section 31(b) have been enacted on 
the salutary principle that if a fugitive offender cannot be 
tried in a foreign country owing to lapse of time or the crimes 
being barred by time under the law of limitation of the request­
ing State, it is no use extraditing the accused. In doubtful 
cases only, should a foreign State make a request for surrender 
and the Central Government should consider whether the immunity 
has accrued and if so, on what date. In determining the question, 
the relevant dates could be as under:-
1) Date of request for surrender.
2) Date of receipt of such request by the Central Government.
3) Date on which the magistracy gives its verdict on this parti­
cular preliminary issue or makes an order for committal*
4) Date when the Central Government receives the report of the 
magistrate committing the fugitive to prison for eventual 
extradition,
5) Date when the High Court passes an order under Section 491 
of the Criminal Procedure Code or allows a habeas corpus
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in revision 
under Sections 435, 439 and 561A of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, or rejects the petition of the accused to quash the 
orders of the magistracy or the Central Government.
6) Date when the Supreme Court passes the order under Article 
136 of the Constitution, dismissing the appeal of the accused 
against the order of the High Court or against the order of 
the Central Government or magistracy, dismissing a habeas 
corpus petition.
7) Date of the order of the Central Government accepting the 
recommendation or report of the magistracy and ordering the 
extradition of the accused under Section 8 of the Extradition 
Act, 1962.
Apart from the different State practices in internat­
ional law, under the Indian law the last-mentioned date seems to 
be the decisive date, for on that date the Central Government 
makes up its mind whether the accused should be extradited or 
not. But this, logically, should be the outer limit and the 
earliest and inner limit will be the date of receipt of requisi­
tion, and therefore, the relevant date could be any date between 
the date when the requisition is received and the order of the 
Central Government is made under Section 8 of the Extradition 
Act. If the immunity has accrued on the date of the receipt 
of requisition, the request will be rejected outright by the 
Central Government, without the appointment of a magistrate 
under Section 5 of the Act. If, during the inquiry before the 
magistrate, the time limit passes, the magistrate should not 
make a report for committal but should discharge the accused.
If, while making an order under Section 8 of the Act, the 
Central Government is satisfied that, on that date the prosecu-
tion is barred by lapse of time according to the law of the 
requesting State, it should refuse extradition. So neither 
the date of receipt of requisition, nor the date of making an 
order by the Central Government under Section 8 of the Act, nor 
any other intervening dates are singly final and decisive, but 
these dates will cover a wide range, varying between the dater o£
date of an order under Section 8 of the Act and the former can 
be said to be an inner limit and the latter an outer limit. If 
the prosecution becomes barred at any time between these dates,
under Section 8 is in favour and to the advantage of the accused; 
if the prosectuion was not barred between the date of receipt 
of requisition but it becomes barred on the date of order under 
Section 8, the accused cannot be extradited and in that sense, 
this date is the decisive date.
A subsidiary question in this connection may arise, 
if by virtue of the non-surrender of the fugitive because of the 
circumstances of non-surrender provided under Section 31 (dj,*
whether the prosecution becomes time-barred under Section 31(b) 
and whether the fugitive offender can be exempt from extradition.
1. Section 31 of the Extradition Act: A fugitive criminal shall
not be surrendered or returned to a foreign State or Common­
wealth country -
ld> if he has been accused of some offence in India, not be­
ing the offence for which his surrender or return is sought, 
or is undergoing sentence under any conviction in India until 
after he has been discharged, whether by acquittal or on ex­
piration of his sentence or otherwise.
the receipt of tequest for extradition till the
extradition will be refused. The date of passing the order
(a)
Section 31(d) of the India Act of 1962 is in pari materia with 
Section 3(3) of the British Extradition Act, 1870, and the cases 
decided by the British courts will be relevant in interpreting 
the provisions of Section 31(d) of the Indian Act.
that proceedings upon a claim for extradition by a foreign State 
may be instituted before the sentence has expired and an order 
of committal for extradition made to take effect upon such inquiry 
the prisoner may be surrendered under such order, although at the 
date of the surrender, but not at the date of the extradition 
proceedings, the fugitive had become, by the law of the foreign 
country, exempt from prosecution by reason of lapse of time.
Lord Alverstone C.J. declined to express an opinion as to the 
validity of the proceedings for committal taken after such a 
period has elapsed, as it would prevent the offence being subject 
to punishment in the foreign country.
order of committal has already been passed by the Central Govern­
ment under Section 8 of the 1962 Act before the accrual of the 
immunity or prosecution became time-barred under Section 31(b) 
of the Act, the right of physically surrendering the accused to 
the foreign State, in pursuance of the order under Section 8, re­
mains suspended or is, by virtue of the provisions and the cir­
cumstances mentioned in Section 31(d) kept in abeyance and, when 
the contingencies mentioned in clause (d) of Section 31 are over, 
he may be physically surrendered to the foreign requesting State, 
But if on the other hand, no order of committal has been passed
In the case of ex parte van der Auwera, it was held
Ihe resu nt position, taken literally, i«; that if the
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte van der AuwQfa 
(1907) 2 K.B. 157.
by the Central Government under Section 8 and if the prosecution
becomes barred by lapse of time in the meantime, the bar of Sec­
tion 31(b) would operate and the surrender of the accused to the 
foreign requesting State would be refused. The reason for this 
seems to be that, a mere act of request or the pendency of the pro­
ceedings for extradition before the courts or the Central Govern­
ment in India would not operate to suspend the period of limita­
tion unless the order is finally made by the CentralGovernment 
under Section 8 for committal, and if, until then, the prosecu­
tion has not become barred by time under the law of prescription 
of the requesting State, there is no question of, or occasion 
for a bar to extradition, as provided under Section 31(b) of the 
Act.
The crux of the matter in such a situation is whether 
the prescribed period of foreign limitation laws expires before 
or after the passing of the final order of the Central Government 
ordering his extradition. Therefore, it is a case either of 
suspension of surrender or of a conditional order not to surrend­
er the fugitive, until the termination of contingencies provided 
under Section 31(d) of the 1962 Act. If it is a case of suspen­
sion of the running of the period of limitation, the prescriptive 
period cannot begin during the time the fugitive is undergoing a 
prison sentence in the territory of the requested State, other­
wise the fugitive might intentionally commit a lesser crime and 
invite punishment within the territory of the requested State, in 
order to save himself from being extradited on the plea of lapse 
of time.
Another circumstance may arise in such cases. Suppose 
the order for surrender is made by the Central Government before
the period of foreign limitation has expired and the accused 
seeks his remedies in the High Court or the Supreme Court but 
before the termination of those proceedings, the period expifes 
and the accused is not in gaol, i.e. is on bail, or is in gaol, 
can he still be surrendered?
If we take this view, as we are bound to do, that the 
validity of the Central Government’s view is subject to adjudi­
cation by way of review, the effect of the court’s decision again' 
st the order is to set the fugitive at liberty, and the effect of 
the court’s deciding in favour of the order is to establish its 
validity. We have already submitted that the final date in all 
the limitation questions is the date of that order. Judicial 
review cannot prolong the date, a suggestion which would be 
against reason. Thus, if immunity is alleged to have accrued 
while the review proceedings are pending it cannot be relied upon 
to render the order void.
(3) The principle Non bis in idem
The principle non bis in idem is another ground for 
refusal of extradition. This rule is known as 11 nemo debet 
bis vexari pro uno delicto1 or’pro eadem causa1 and is a rule 
of general application. It bars extradition of fugitive 
criminals upon prosecution for the same offence or pending pro­
secution for the same offence in the State of asylum. It is 
based on considerations of humanity and public policy to safe­
guard the life and liberty of individuals, citizens and aliens 
alike, in India against double prosecution, based upon the prin­
ciples known to criminal law as res judicata, autre^fois acquit , 
or autrefois convict. According to this rule, a requested 
State may decline the surrender of a person claimed, if such 
person has already been prosecuted, sentenced or discharged in 
the requested State or any other State for the same act or acts, 
which form the grounds of his extradition. I-Iowever, this rule 
of non bis in idem would not apply where the requesting State, 
in whose custody he was, has, after trial, prosecuted and con­
victed him, and he has escaped to the requested State, without 
serving his sentence, as under these circumstances he is not 
wanted for a new trial after conviction, but he is wanted only 
to undergo the sentence, or the remaining sentence, as the case 
may be, already pronounced against him.
The rule of non bis in idem is normally applicable to 
interstate offences but it has become a well-recognised prin­
ciple of international law in extradition proceedings^being 
based upon the general principle recognised by all members of 
the international community that a person should not be vexed 
twice for the same offence or sh>uld,iiot be subjected to repeated 
trials for the same act. This is commonly known as the rule
against double jeopardy, enshrined as a fundamental right pro­
vided under Article 20(2) of the Constitution: *'No person shall
be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once11; 
though as early as 1898 it was propounded in Section 403 of the 
Indian Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 403 
is the rule against double jeopardy, and the rest of the sub­
sections are the exceptions of this rule. Though the doctrine 
of double jeopardy was already there, it was given constitutional 
protection when incorporated in Chapter III of the Constitution, 
and that being so, the legislature while enacting the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1962, did not think it necessary to reproduce 
it in the Extradition Act, 1962, as it would be unnecessary or 
redundant. Section 31(d) in fact ddals with offences, ,fnot 
being the offences for which the surrender or return of the fugi­
tive is sought”, i.e. other than the rule of non bis in idem.
One deals with reprosecution for the same offence, whereas the 
other prescribes the non-surrender of the fugitive who is being 
prosecuted or serving sentence for an "offence other than that 
for which the surrender or return is sought". The protection 
of this doctrine has been guaranteed, in addition to the consti­
tutional gurantee under Article 20(2) and the guarantee under 
Section 403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in Article 6
of the Indo-Nepalese Extradition Treaty of 22 February, 1963,*
2
and in Article 4 of the Indo-American Treaty.
A similar provision was made in Article 4 of the Anglo- 
German Treaty which has binding effect so far as India is con­
1. Published in the Gazette Extraordinary of India, Part II, 
Sectaon 3, sub-section (1) of 2£ Feb., 1963. -
2. Published in the Gazette Extraordinary of India, Part III, 
Section 3, sub-section (l) of 1 Apr., 1966.
cerned, by virtue of the definition of an Extradition Treaty 
in Section 2(d) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962. This rule, 
being protected by constitutional guarantee in the chapter of 
Fundamental Rights in India, stands on a higher footing than as 
declared in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, or by the doc­
trine as applied in international practice as a part of inter­
national law, or inserted in treaty provisions. The magistracy 
during extradition proceedings, the superior courts in habeas 
corpus petitions and in revision proceedings, and the Central
Government while passing an order under Section 8 of the 1962
Act, cannot brush aside a plea based upon this doctrine., The
protection of this clause is analagous to that given by Art.14
and the right cannot be waived as was held in Bashe^arnath’s
case.* The court while considering this doctrine should take
into consideration the Extradition Act as well as the extradi-
2tion treaty during extradition proceedings.
As action taken under the Extradition Act involves the 
curtailment and infringement and deprivation of the liberty of 
the individual, the provisions of the Extradition Act should be
3
strictly interpreted, especially because extradition involves 
an individual’s being sent for trial in a foreign land, perhaps 
under unknown laws in an unknown language, perhaps with no or 
few resources to set up his defence and possibly without defence 
evidence. The Allahabad High Court has held:
1. Bashesarnath v. I.T. Commissioner, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149, 
para.13.
2. Queen v. Wilson (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42 at p.46.
3. Ram Pargas v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1948 All., p.129 at pp.130-131.
11 The Extradition Act and the Criminal 
Procedure Code, both being penal enact­
ments, their terms must be strictly con­
strued in favour of the accused persons, 
whenever such construction can be reason­
ably justified.11 1
2At another occasion, the Calcutta High Court has heldl:,
”The right of a citizen not to be sent out to a foreign 
jurisdiction without strict compliance with the extradition
3
law is a valuable right”. The Supreme Court in Hans
3
Muller1s case (supra), has held: "But a citizen who has ,
committed certain kinds of offences abroad can be extradited, 
if the formalities prescribed by the Extradition Act are ob­
served” .
The doctrine of non bis in idem has assumed import­
ance in extradition proceedings when the applying State desires 
extradition, even though the person whose extradition is sought 
has already been prosecuted, convicted or acquitted, either in 
the requested State or a third State, because of the availabil­
ity of better evidence in the State where the offence has been 
committed or in its opinion the other State was not in a posi­
tion to appreciate the gravity of the offence and no adequate
penalty has been inflicted on the fugitive, having regard to 
the nature of the offence. The substantive criminal laws, the 
procedural codes, and the laws of evidence providing for the 
sufficiency of pfoof, punishments for different offences vary
JL ^
1. Ram} Pargas.ibid. A.I.R. 1948 All. 129 at pp. 130-131.
2. Santabir Lama v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Cal.122 at p.12^.
3. Hans Muller, supra, A.I.R. 195i” S.C. 367.
from State to State^ and it does not matter whether the request­
ing State feels adversely towards and frowns upon the criminal 
laws of the third State or the requested State as unsatisfactory.
But if once a fugitive has been tried, punished, convicted or 
acquitted anywhere, he cannot be prosecuted for the same offence; 
hence, the necessity of provisions in municipal laws, of Section 
31(d) of the Indian Extradition Act, and Clause 4 of the Indo- 
American Treaty, Article 4 of the Anglo-German Treaty, Article 6 
of the Indo-Nepalese Treaty and a number of bilateral and multi­
lateral conventions providing this protection and also municipal 
statutes giving mandates in those statutes, prohibiting extradi­
tion if once the accused has been prosecuted, convicted and 
punished or acquitted.
In addition to the provisions regarding conviction 
and acquittal in municipal laws and treaties, provisions are made 
for cases of pending criminal trials for the same offence or of­
fences# One is found in the second part of Article 6 of the 
Indo-Nepalese Treaty (supra) and the second part of Article 4 of 
the Indo-American Treaty, which provides that extradition shall 
not take place if the person, whose extradition is claimed by one 
government, is still under trial in the territory of the other 
government for the crime for which extradition is demanded. The 
first part of this Article incorprates the rule against double 
jeopardy. Section 31(d) of the 1962 Act provides for non­
surrender during the pendency of trial for offences other than 
the offence with which the accused is charged. Normally, 
treaties use imperative language, as in Article 6 of the Indo- 
Nepalese Treaty and Article 4 of the Indo-American Treaty, using 
the words "the Extradition shall not take place if the person is 
going to be tried for a second time" for the same offence for
which he has already been prosecuted, sentenced or discharged", 
with a further additional provision against extradition if the 
fugitive was still under trial for the same offence in the terri­
tory of requesting State. But some treaties make the former 
mandatory and the latter permissive. The treaties of this 
category make this slight but notable distinction that extradi­
tion shall not be granted if the accused has been prosecuted, 
convicted or acquitted for the same offence, whereas ip the case 
of a person whose trial for the same offence is pending in the 
requested State, the latter is given a discretion to extradite 
the fugitive criminal, presumably, on the assumption that the 
competent authorities of the requested State will decide either 
not to prosecute or to terminate pending proceedings, or the 
requested State may think it more proper that the trial should 
take place at the place of commission of the offence^
and the purpose and object of laws where courts will, inter alia,
better assess the circumstances under which the offence was com­
mitted and the adequate punishment to be awarded.
An exception to this doctrine of non bis in idem is 
this: if the municipal laws of the requested State permit a
fresh trial on the discovery of important new material, then a 
prosecution may proceed in spite of acquittal. Consequently, 
provisions are made in certain treaties, where the, laws of the 
requested State allow the trial to be reopened, that "extradition 
shall be granted if, under the laws of the requestedjstate, the 
statutory conditions for retrial for the same offence are met".
In India, no such situation can arise, as there is no provision 
for reopening a trial which haa become final. It amounts to 
criminal res judicata for the purposes of that case or trial, 
except in the cases given in the explanation to Section 403 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, and if the case strictly falls, with­
in this explanation, extradition may be allowed.
The requested State would be well within its obliga­
tions under international law if return of the fugitive criminal 
is declined because he has been prosecuted, convicted or dis­
charged by the courts of the requesting State* Most of the 
treaties in international practice are silent in regard to the 
earlier prosecutions having been taken place in the requesting 
State. Most of the treaties provide for the rule against double 
jeopardy, providing that a request for extradition shall be re­
jected, if the person claimed has already been prosecuted, con­
victed or acquitted, by a court of the requested State and such 
sentence has become final; but there are some treaties - an ad­
mixture of the two categories of the treaties mentioned above - 
which make provisions for "conviction or acquittal" by the courts 
of both the countries, generally inserting the words 1 in either 
the requesting State or requested State1• The Indo-Nepalese and 
Indo-American treaties, Articles 6 and 4 respectively, come with­
in the second category of treaties which mention 'conviction or 
acquittal or pending of proceedings in the territories of the 
requested State1.
There are treaties like the Netherlands-Israel Treaty, 
Article 4(2)(1), which positively provide that extradition shall 
not take place, if the person claimed has already been tried, 
punished or discharged in the requesting, requested or any third 
State for the offence or offences for which his extradition is 
demanded. In the Indian Extradition Act of 1962, no such pro­
visions exist and no treaty made by India with other States con­
tains this provision.
The insertion of such a provision seems •
Extradition is refused, when the fugitive has been prosecuted, 
convicted or acquitted by the Indian courts, by applying the rule 
against double jeopardy, but in a case where a person is prose­
cuted, convicted or acquitted by a third State for the offence 
committed in the requesting State and the fugitive is in India 
and the requesting State wants the extradition of that person for 
prosecution for the same offence for which he has already been 
prosecuted, convicted or acquitted, this rule of double jeopardy, 
non bis in idem, Article 20(2)^ Section 403 of the Criminal Pro­
cedure Code, principles of criminal res judicata, autrefois 
acquit, autrefois convict, or issue estoppel should be extended 
to such cases so as to refuse the extradition. If the fugtive 
has been prosecuted, convicted or acquitted for the same offence 
once, whether by the courts of the requested State, requesting 
State or third State, the principle of non bis in idem should 
come to his rescue.
To test the validity of this argument, the same result 
would follow if the person had not come to India, but remained 
in the territory of the third State where he was prosecuted, con­
victed or acquitted and the requesting State makes a request for 
his extradition for trial of the same offence to the third State, 
would the requested State not refuse the extradition on the grouhc 
of the rule of non bis in idem or double jeopardy? The answer 
will be in an emphatic affirmative. If so, then why should the 
Central Government or any other requested State not refuse extra­
dition on this ground? In India, a provision should soon be 
made to this effect in our municipal legislation and in treaties 
with other States.
Another branch of this argument leading to the same 
conclusion and result may also be noticed. Article 20(2) 
of the Constitution nowhere mentions the conviction or acquittal 
by a court of India. It simply gives a mandate, as mentioned 
above, in the words of the Supreme Court in the case of Bashesar-
1 V
nath (while interpreting the question of waiver of Fundamental 
Rights under Article 14 of the Constitution) to the State, Exe­
cutive, legislature and the judiciary that 1 no person shall be 
prosecuted and punished for the same offences more than once*; 
it does not matter by what courts. Section 403 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code only speaks for the trial by a court of competent 
jurisdiction it does not preclude courts of third States and if 
the judgments of the third States are given by competent courts, 
the extradition should be refused.
Some treaties, without referring to the requesting 
State make mention only of the requested State and third State,"1* 
provide against extradition where the person has been previously 
tried in a third State. This should be the pattern to be 
adopted in India so far as trial by third States are concerned. 
Amongst the multilateral conventions, the Central American Con­
vention of 1934, Art.2(5) provides *Extradition shall not be 
granted if the accused should have served the sentence which may 
have.been imposed upon him for the same crime in any other 
country1. The Montevideo Convention of 1933, Art.3(b) and 
Harvard Research (Extradition) of 1935, Art. 9(b) leave the 
matter to the discretion of the requested State, maybe to see 
if the judgments were given by a court of competent jurisdiction
1. Belgium-Israel, Art. 4(c,d), No.3; Israel-Switzerland, Art.
4(2, 1 and 2). See Bedi, op.cit., p.174, n.37.
to try those offences* Some treaties also make provisions 
leaving the grant of refusal of the extradition in the hands of 
the requested State where conviction or acquittal has been pass­
ed by the third State.'*'
A different problem came before the English court in 
2
Stallman’s case, where Lord Alverstone observed at p.444 that:, 
’a fugitive who has been discharged in extradition proceedings 
cannot be said to have been tried and discharged or punished1.
Ihe extradition proceedings are not in the form of the trial and 
consequently, if an extradition application has been refused 
once, a second application may be brought for the surrender of 
the fugitive, if some further evidence has been made available 
which, in the opinion of the requesting State, may warrant a 
second application. Extradition proceedings as such, do not 
come under the Tube against double jeopardy. The protection 
of the fugitive against double jeopardy is confined to trials 
for the crime attributed to him. But if new evidence is 
forthcoming successive applications may be filed for extradition, 
unless the question has been decided that the man had been 
earlier prosecuted, convicted or acquitted, whereupon the rule 
of double jeopardy will lead to the dismissal of the subsequent 
petition for extradition. Cases of former dismissals of extra­
dition request on grounds of previous prosecution, conviction or 
acquittal will bar successive and subsequent applications, where­
as in cases of refusal of extradition request or discharge on the 
grounds of non-availability of evidence at the time of earlier 
extradition petitions, and subsequent availability of evidence
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.175, n.40, 41.
2. Rex v.Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Stallmanh( 1912}
3 K.B. 424.
will be a good ground for subsequent and successive applica­
tion.
The two situations should not be confused. It is one 
thing to say that extradition shall not be allowed if the fugi­
tive has previously been prosecuted, convicted or acquitted, and 
it is another thing to say that successive applications will be 
allowed if the evidence was not available earlier and the fugi­
tive was discharged. Lord Alverstone’s dictum in StallmamAs 
case would not cover those cases where the extradition has been 
refused on the ground of the accused* s previously having been 
tried in the requested State or a third State, but would apply 
to the other cases. .
(4) Locus delicti within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
requested State or outside the requesting State
The statutory provisions under the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, applying to fugitive criminals defines them as indi­
viduals who are ‘accused or convicted of an extradition offence 
committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign State or a Common­
wealth country1 * for extradition purposes. This includes all
persons who have committed an extradition crime within the juris-
2
diction of a foreign State, whatever their nationality. In
determining the scope of the arrangement for extradition in order
to decide whether a person is within it, reference is made to
3the treaty to construe its terms. Indian Extradition laws
have to be read together with Article 4 of the Indo-Nepalese 
Treaty and Article 1 of the Indo-American Tteaty. In the former 
treaty, the words * in whose territory the offences has alleged 
to have been committed* , and in the latter treaty ‘crimes or of­
fences committed within the jurisdiction of one party* have been 
respectively used and by the place of commission of offence 
would mean the territory of the requesting country. From the 
definition alone of ‘fugitive criminal* in Section 2(f) when 
the words ‘an extradition offence committed within the juris­
diction of a foreign State or a Commonwealth country* have been 
used, a wider proposition could emerge. In other words, extra­
dition would be allowed if the offence is committed within the 
jurisdiction of the territory of a foreign State/; etc., otherwise 
not, so far as Indian Extradition laws are concerned. A foreign 
State under the Extradition Act, 1962, by section 2(e) has been
1. Section 2(f) of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962.
2. R. v. Ganz (1882) 9 Q.B.O. 93.
3. R. v. Ganz, ibid.
defined as fany State outside India, other than a Commonwealth 
country and includes every constituent part, colony or depend­
ency of any Commonwealth country so specified or added*. In 
pursuance of Section 2(a), the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, 
Ceylon, Cyprus, Federation of Malaysia, Ghana, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Tanganyika, and the 
United Kingdom have been notified as the Commonwealth countries.
By virtue of the Extradition Act, 1962, and of treaties with India 
as mentioned above, extradition could only be granted if the of­
fence has been committed in the territory of the foreign State
making an extradition request. The concept of territory has
been well enunciated in the two English cases, i.e. Ex parte
» 1 2Minerv£ni, and Schtraks case. A State territory is not
limited to land or any part of her country where she exercises
de jure sovereignty as well as de facto sovereignty. Terri­
tory means the requesting State exercising effective administra­
tive jurisdiction and that territory is equivalent to jurisdict­
ion. In Minerv$ni*s case, the accused, an Italian seaman, was 
accused of having murdered another seamanon board a Norwegian 
ship. When the ship docked in the United Kingdom, the prisoner 
was arrested to await extradition to Norway. In a habeas corpus 
petition before the English courts, he alleged that he committed 
no crime on Norwegian territory as Article 1 of the Treaty of 
1873 provided ‘accused found within the territory of the other 
party1, and the Norwegian ship was within the territorial waters 
of a third power. Lord Parker C.J. observed:
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Minervt/ni (1959) 1 
Q.B.D. 155. "
2. Schtraks v. Government of Israel (1962) 3 W.L.R. 1013.
3. Schtraks case, ibid.
"If I am right in saying the territory 
in article of the Treaty is equivalent 
to jurisdiction then assuming that the 
ship was at the time of the alleged 
murder in the territorial waters of a 
foreign power, it would only be a matter 
of competing jurisdiction and no one 
suggests it is wrong to legislate to 
provide for competing or concurrent 
jurisdiction."
It was also further observed:
"This treaty is not treating ’terri­
tory* in its strict sense, but in a 
sense which is equivalent to juris­
diction, and it is only in that way 
that one can make sense of the treaty.
Indeed, it is to be observed that in 
many of these treaties reference is 
made not to territory but to juris­
diction and in my view in this treaty, 
territory is equivalent to * jurisdiction*
The accused was held to have committed murder within the terri­
torial jurisdiction of Norway and extradited.
The Lotus case,'*' and Mubarak Ali Ahmed in the Supreme 
2
Court of India, are cases where even if the offence takes place 
in one territory, if the effects or results are produced in an­
other territory, the offence is said to have been committed in 
the latter territory. In the Lotus case, a collision had occur­
red on the open sea between the French Steamship Lotus and the 
Turkish Steamship Boz-Kourt; , resulting in the loss of the latter 
and the death of eight Turkish subjects. When the Lotus arrived 
at Constantine, the Turkish Government instituted joint criminal 
proceedings against the captain of the Turkish vessel and the 
French officers of the watch on board The Lotus and they were 
both sentenced to prison* The French Government protested on
1. P.C.I.J. (1927) series A, No.10, p.18.
2. Mubarak Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 857.
the ground that Turkey had no jurisdiction over an act committed 
on the open sea by a foreigner on board a foreign vessel whose 
flag it had and that State (French) has exclusive jurisdiction 
in such matters or acts; on the dispute on agreement, being re­
ferred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, by a 
casting vote of the President, it was held that Turkey had not 
acted in conflict with the principles of international law in 
instituting the criminal proceedings, because (inter alia) the 
act committed on board The Lotus produced its effects on board 
the Boz-Kourt, under the Turkish flag, and thus, as it were,on 
Turkish territory whereupon Turkey acquired jurisdiction over 
its foreign perpetrator. The cases present, an unusual inter­
pretation of the notion of ’territory* because the act commit­
ted elsewhere produces effects on this ’territory*.
In Mubarak Ali Ahmed*s case (supra) the complainant was 
the business man from Goa, doing business in import and export 
and he came into contact with the accused, who was, at that time, 
in Karachi doing business in the name of Allas Industries and 
Trading Corporation, and in the name of Iftiar Ahmed and Co., 
and by letters, telegrams, telephones, a contract was entered 
into for the purchase by the complainant from the accused of 
l;i200 tons of rice, £51 pounds per ton, to be shipped from 
Karachi to Goa. Money was received but the rice was not sup­
plied. One of the accused’s objections inter alia was that he 
was a Pakistani national who, during the entire period of com­
mission of offence never slipped into India and was only at 
Karachi and consequently he committed no offence punishable 
under the Indian Penal Code, and he could not be tried by an
Indian court. The Supreme Court held that there was no ques-
\
tion that it was a result of the representationsand the state­
ment of the accused made through the phone from Karachi becom-
ing a representation to the complainant when it reached the 
complainant at Bombay, which was not disputed in t his case, and 
as a result of these representations, the complainant parted 
with 5| lacs of rupees and thus, the offences accrued at Bombay 
and in that sense, the entire offence was committed atpombay.
The ratio decidendi of this case is the ’effects and results* 
produced in the territory other than that where offences were 
committed.
The English case of Minervini was followed by the case 
of Schtraks, in which the independent question arose, viz. 
whether the requesting State was sovereign of the territory where 
the offence was committed. In Schtraks, following some civil 
proceedings in Israel, the accused came to live in England with 
a seven-year old boy, without the consent of his parents. The 
Government of Israel asked for extradition, under an agreement 
of 4 April, 1960, between Israel and the United Kingdom, and an 
Order in Council (Israel Extradition Order, 1960) which applied 
the Extradition Acts to the agreement, for perjury and child- 
stealing. When he was committed a point was raised in habeas 
corpus that Jerusalem was not territory of Israel within the 
meaning of the Extradition Agreement, since the United Kingdom 
Government did not recognise Israel Government as de jure 
sovereign in Jerusalem, but only de facto authority so that 
there was no power to order his extradition on a charge of per­
jury committed in Jerusalem.
Territory in the context of the 
argument included any area over which 
a contracting party exercised effect­
ive jurisdiction and that, accordingly, 
since the Israel Government had de facto
1. Schtraks v. Government of Israel (1962) 3 W.L.R. 1013.
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authority and exercised jurisdiction 
over Jerusalem and no other State is 
recognised as having de jure sovereign­
ty, Jerusalem was within the Terri­
tory of Israel and that courts while 
dealing with the Extradition Act are 
concerned with territory in which consti­
tutionally effective territorial juris­
diction is exercised, but no sovereign-, 
ty in the sense of internati6nal law.
CEn determining whether a particular area is within the
’territory1 of a contracting party, the most important consider­
ation is whether the writ of the contracting party runs in that
Territorial competence is a well-established principle
of law, it makes a State competent in general to punish all crimes 
committed in its territory and to exercise full authority over all 
persons present in its territory (cf. The Lotus and the Mubarak
extradition statutes of some States (like India), provide the 
pattern that extradition will be granted if the offence has been 
committed in the territory of the requesting State; others pro­
vide that extradition shall not be granted if the crime has been
extradition shall be refused for offences committed within their
asylum State, this State will try the offence, and extradition 
will be refused. Extradition will also be refused if the offence
2area.
On the principles of territorial competence, the
committed outside the juris dfetion of the requesting State. 
Other States in their municipal laws or statutes provide that
4respective States. If an offence has been committed in the
2 All E.'R. 176.
3. Bedi, op.cit., p.176, n.43; also p.63, n.8.
4. Bedi, op.cit., p.175, n.42.
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Schtraks (1964)
K.C. 556 (H.L.), (1962) 3 All E.R. 529. f
2. R. v. Governor or Brixxon Prison, Ex parte Schtraks (1962) 
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has been committed in the territory of a third State. Most of 
of the treaties are mandatory in application and they make pro­
vision that extradition shall not be granted if the offence was 
committed in the territory of the requested State and the reason 
is that if the offence has been committed in the territory of the 
requested State and the accused is surrendered to the requesting 
State, it means the requested State is surrendering its sovereign­
ty to that State at the cost of its self-effacement. Difficult­
ies do not arise if the offence is committed wholly in the terri­
tory of the requested State, but they arise in cases where the 
offence partly arises in the territory of the requested State 
and partly in the requesting State, or partly in a third State; 
or where acts committed in one State have results or effects in 
another State as in The Lotus and Mubarak Ali’s case, or the of­
fence is committed in a place treated as a territory of the re­
questing State. In some treaties, permissive language is used 
giving the requested State a discretion to reject a request for 
extradition if the offences are committed in its own territory.
As for instance Pakistan makes a dispute over Kashmir, but India 
takes it to be its territory, no extradition can be allowed if 
there is demand arising out of an offence committed in Kashmir' .
In Goa also if Portugal made a request, it will be disallowed.
The question of de jure and de facto territory and control was 
raised before the Goan Court,1 though in a different context but 
the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, predictably held it was a de 
facto Indian Territory.
and ’jurisdiction* are taken to be of equivalent import, and 
treaties also use these words interchangeably, but there is a 
long catena of cases in the Privy Council and of courts of other
1. The Registrar Judicial Co minis s ion erfr Court v. iFrancisco,
2As seen in the case of Minervini, the words ’Territory*
States which demonstrate a distinction between these two terms 
territory1 and 1 jurisdiction1 « Courts of the requested States, 
relying upon the interpretation of a particular treaty, have de­
clined to surrender or return the fugitive offender to the request-
X
ing State* The Privy Council\ while dismissing the request of 
France for surrender of fugitive offenders, held Article 1 of the 
Extradition Treaty with France of 1878 applied only1to crimes com­
mitted within the territory of the Power which is seeking extra­
dition1 , and further observed:
"In their Lordships opinion no one of the 
appellants was liable to be extradited 
under the Treaty, unless the crime of which 
he was convicted was in fact committed with­
in the territory of the French Republic.”
o
The Swiss Federal Court, while rejecting Yugoslavia’s 
request for surrender of criminal fugitives on political grounds 
made the following observations on the question of territoriality 
in relation to the place of the commission of the offence under 
reference,:
"The principle that extradition is not granted 
for offences on Swiss territory is laid down 
in Article 12 of the Extradition Law; it is 
valid even in relation to States with whom 
an extradition treaty is in force which does 
not contain that principle."
So this case is an authority for the proposition that 
even in cases when treaties do not contain the clause providing 
for the principle of territoriality,the-principle will be appli­
cable. The presence or absence of the territoriality clause 
or provision or stipulation makes no difference. The same prin-
1. Kossekechatko and others v. Attorney General of Trinidad, L.R.
(1932) A.C. 78 (P.C.).
2. In Re Kavic Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, decided 30 April, 1952, 
Int. Law Reports, 1952, Case No.80. See also Bedi, op,cit., 
p.177.
ciple is also found in two more cases, viz. of Splessensy^  and 
2
Mertz. The conclusion, therefore, is that it is in the judi­
cial discretion. Decisions may indeed be subject to severe 
criticism by writers, or may, in case of refusal, lead to strained 
diplomatic relations. Again, in a case of illegal grant, the 
municipal courts of the requested State may interfere and nullify 
the order of the Central Government, after taking into considera­
tion all the circumstances of the case. If the offence liias 
wholly or partly committed within its territory or jurisdiction, 
it may grant or decline the extradition of the fugitive criminal 
as it thinks fit.
Situations like The Lotus and Mubarak Ali1 s case may 
arise. Suppose, in the Mubarak Ali’s case, the complainant files 
a complaint before the Pakistan Government and that government 
makes a requisition to the Indian Government for the extradition 
of the accused, on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court 
in that case wherein it has been held that even though the man 
never came to India but because of his representations that 
criminal result was effected in India, the Government of India 
could deny the surrender, as according to Indian law the offence 
was perpetrated in India,and similarly the reverse may be the 
situation where India makes a demand for the surrender of the 
accused to the Pakistan Government which comes to the conclusion 
that the offence was committed in Pakistan.
Now The Lotus and Mubarak Ali’s case may be considered 
for the purpose of Extradition in Reverse. If the accused is 
brought in India, by unlawful seizure even, can the accused say,
1. (1949) A.D., Case No.89, decided on 10 Nov., 1949.
2. (1931-1932) A.D., Case No.174, decided on 8 August, 1931.
that he committed the offence not in India and can he be success­
fully released in habeas corpus (a) on the ground that because of 
unlawful seizure or otherwise as he has been brought to those 
courts and therefore, those courts have no jurisdiction to try 
him, and (b) that as the offence has not been committed in that 
territory, he cannot be tried? For the latter, the reply will 
be found in The Lotus and Mubarak Al^s case; for the former, the 
British practice denying breach of municipal law in bringing the
accused before British courts is in the negative,'1' so also as to
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the breach of principles. The Supreme Court of India in the 
case of Jugal Kishore More, agreeing with the approach of the 
British courts^ held that once the accused was before the courts 
in India, he could be tried for the offence; and the courts 
would not enquire into the irregularity of the laws of the other 
country extraditing him anci the irregularity caused in his bring­
ing before the Indian courts would not be a ground for his dis-
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charge. The U.S. Supreme Court, while citing the cases of 
R. v. Sattler and Ex parte Scott observed:
1. Ex parte Scott (1829) 9 B & C 446. 109 E.R. 166; R. v. Marks,
3 East 137; 102 E.R. 557; Ex parte Krans, 1 B& C 258. 107 E.R. 
96; R. v. Sattler (1858) D & B 539; 169 E.R. 1111; R. v. 
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar I.I.R. 35 Bom. 225; Sinchlafcrv.
H. H Advocate (1890) 17 R. (J .C.) 38; Ex parte Elliott- (1949)
1 All E.R. 373.
2. R. v. Garrat (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 894.
3. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
h t t :—  ----- -----------------
4. Ker v. Illinois (1886) 119 U.S. 436; 30 L.Ed. 421.
"There are authorities of the highest 
respectivity which held that such force- 
able abductions [abduction by a U.S. 
official of a criminal from the terri­
tory of Peru} is no sufficient reason 
why the party should not answer when 
brought within the jurisdiction of the 
court which has the right to try him for 
an offence; and presents no valid ob­
jection to his trial in such court."
This was an extreme case of unlawful seizure by abduct­
ion.
The Canadian court , similarly, in Waltons case,1
observed:
"We do not see any sufficient ground 
that has been made out to entitle the 
prisoner to his discharge. The 
prisoner was before the police magi­
strate on a preliminary investigation.
There were no extradition proceedings 
and we cannot inquire into the circum­
stances under which he was brought in 
to this country ... If. he is found in 
this country charged with an offence 
against its laws it is the duty of our 
y courts to take care that he should be 
amenable to justice."
In cases of offences committed outside the jurisdiction 
or territory of the requesting State, the requested State may 
refuse extradition. Mostly the conventions and treaties of the 
common-law countries mentioned that extradition will be granted 
only in case of commission of offences within the jurisdiction of 
the requesting State. Some treaties and statutes in accordance 
with the relevant national legislation provide that extradition 
may be granted for offences committed outside the territory of 
either of the contracting parties, on the condition, however, 
that the laws of the State applied to authorise prosecution for
1. R. v. Waltoh (1905) 10 Canadian Cr. Cases, 269 at p.275.
offences even if committed abroad. On the basis of the Extra­
territorial Jurisdiction Act such a thing is possible in India 
and provisions in Indian treaties may be made to that effect.
Some of the treaties provide that surrender must be made by the 
laws of both the States, and this is what the doctrine of dobble 
criminality also provides and requires.
In any case the locus delicti can certainly be challen­
ged by a fugitive under the provisions of Articles 13 and 21 of 
the Constitution of India and the other provisions of law of the 
Constitution as was done in Hans Muller1s case, and the cases of 
Extradition in Reverse in Jugal Kishore More and Mubarak Ali Ahmed 
decided by the Supreme Court, as mentioned above.
It is suggested that clear-cut provisions should be 
inserted and enacted in the Extradition Act or in the treaties to 
be entered into with different nations to meet all these situa­
tions discussed above, to make the law of extradition simpler, 
and more certain so the Indian courts and the Central Government 
may not be lost in the labyrinth of different practices of differ­
ent nations and their courts while deciding extradition cases.
(5) Refusal of Extradition on other grounds
Additional grounds on which the dxtradition may be
refused need special mention,
1) When-the requesting State is an enemy or potential enemy 
state,1
2) When the Government of the requested State is not recognised,2 
for example, when the U.S.A. did not recognise the Chinese 
Government, the latter would refuse the request of the former. 
This principle would also extend to the cases where the 
Government of the requesting State is also not recognised.
But the State can surrender if it recognises the de facto
authority of the requesting Government,3 particularly taking 
into consideration reciprocal rights and obligations arising 
under an agreement,
3, Where the requisition for extradition is not in accordance
with Section 4 of the Extradition Act, 1962, or is not in
accordance with the treaty arrangements,^
4, Where the formalities required to be completed under the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, are not followed,3
1. Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski 
(1955) 1 All E.R. 31.
2. GiH.Hackworth, op.cit,, p.37.
3. Schtralcs' v. Government of ^ Israel ’(l962-)'3 All'E.R, 529;'
(1962) 3 V.L/R. 1013 (H.L.)
4. Valentine et al. v. United States Ex rel Neidecker (1936) 299 
U.S. 5. In re Talbot, A.D. 1947. Case No.68. p. 142: Re 
Chacur, 26 Int. Law Reposts, p >525} Re Mar sal Marcel STT Int.
Law Reports, pp.324-326.
5. Hans Mullets case, supra, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
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5. Where the magistrate has not been properly nominated as re­
quired by Section 5 of 1962 Act.
6. Where the documents submitted do not establish the identity 
of the person sought.’*'
7. Where evidence presented does not make out a prima facie case
2
against the alleged offender in trials under Chapter II.
8. Where supplementary information has not been furnished within 
the prescribed period of time, or such time mentioned in the 
treaty, or evidence sufficient to justify extradition has not 
been supplied within two months or within any further period
4
allowed.
9. Where the requesting State withdraws its request. Under 
international law, extradition may be refused where the crime 
cannot be prosecuted, ex officio by the State but needs the 
intervention of a complainant This latter category of 
case will Arise where the requesting State, after requisition, 
does not withdraw the request but does not prosecute it.
In India by virtue of Section 9 of the 1962 Act the com­
plaint, private party, is intended to help the court, and 
in that case, the request will not automatically lapse.
10. Where the penalty imposed in par contumace cases is less 
than the minimum prescribed or only a fine, which implies
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.207, n.197.
2. Bedi, op.cit., p.207, n.198.
3. Bedi, op.cit., p.207, n.199.
4. Art.9 of the Indo-Nepalese Treaty; Article 11 of the Indo- 
American Treaty.
5. Bedi, op.cit., p.207, n.200.
6. Bedi, op.cit., p.207, n.202.
the offence may be of a trivial nature.
11. Where the person committed for extradition has not been re­
moved within the agreed time limit from the territory of the 
requested State.^
o
12. The extradition may be refused on humane considerations.
Thus, a requested State may refuse extradition of the person 
claimed where the courts find that too long time has elapsed 
since the charges were first made or when it thinks that 
action in pressing for extradition is oppressive, and 
would result in undue hardship to the person concerned.
13. Where the offence is of a trivial nature.
14. The application for surrender is not made in good faith.
15. The surrender is not in interests of justice, or
16. xtoe surrender is for political reasons.
17. Or is unjust.
18. Or is inexpedient.
19. It would be a sufficient cause to refuse extradition if the 
accused is not surrendered within two months from India after 
the order of extradition has been passed by the Central 
Government.5
20. Request may be also refused in cases of: racial or - religiois
discrimination where the accused is not required to stand his
1. Sec.24 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, and Art. 11 of 
Indo-American Treaty.
2. Re Henderson (1950) 1 All E.R. 283; Regina v. Governor of 
Brixton Prison, Ex parte Naranjansingh (1962) 1 Q.B.D. 211.
3. Re Naran.jan Singh (1961) 2 All E.R.5 6 5 *
4. Sec.29 of the 1962 Act.
5. Sec.24 of Indian Extradition Act, 1962. See also:Re Shuter 
(1960) 1 Q.B.D. 142; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex 
parte Enahoro (1963) 2 VJ.L. R. 1260; The King v. Governor of 
Brixton Prison. Ex parte Percival (1907; I k 7b . 69o.
trial in the requesting State before the ordinary criminal 
courts, but before an extraordinary tribunal;as firstly it 
may be against a treaty, if any, secondly the requested 
States does not presume such a situation and extradition in 
such circumstances may amount to infringement of Article 21 
and 14 of the Constitution. The fugitive can challenge his 
extradition in the Indian court on the ground that he should 
not be subjected to the extraordinary procedure.
Powers under Section 31 can be exercised concurrently 
by the magistrate and by the Central Government, whereas powers 
under Section 29 of the Act can be exercised by the Central 
Government only. The matters mentioned in Section 31 and 29
can be examined by the superior courts in habeas corpus and by 
the Supreme Court in habeas corpus and on a special leave peti­
tion under Art. 136 of the Constitution.'*'
The Indian Consitution gives a freedom of religion.
So also on racial basis,discrimination is prohibited and made an 
offence. Therefore, no extradition can be granted when the 
charge, for which a person is demanded, is of a religious nature 
or where the crime is against a form of religious worship. As 
a reaction to the Nazi regime in Germany, responsible for the 
gas chambers, various countries have provided in their treaties 
that extradition will not be allowed if the requesting State is 
going to prosecute the accused on account of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion. Some of the treaties even go 
further, contemplating refusal if the surrender may ’prejudice
1. Dharama Teja’s case (1971) 2 All E.R. 11; .Fernandez v. 
Government of Singapore and others (1971) 2 All E.R. 691 
(H.L.y, affirming (1971) 2 All E.R. 24.1 R. v. Governor of 
Pentonville Prison Bx parte Fernandez.
the position of that person*. ^
But religious liberty has its limitations. Like 
other constitutional guarantees, it is subject to certain condi­
tions for the maintenance of public order, morality and health. 
Thus, in a mixed society of secular state like India, the United 
States of America and others, an act performed in accordance with 
the tenets of a particular religion, faith or sect, creed or de­
nomination may endanger public order as, e.g. preaching commun - 
al hatred. Religion may allow polygamy, but if it disrupts
morality or freedom of conscience, it can be prohibited by 
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legislation. If the performance of a religion is against
health, the State may enforce regulations such as vaccination, 
compulsory medical examination for the admission of students to 
public schools, isolation for contagious diseases and the like, 
even against the will^such as believe, e.g. in faith-healing.^
In such cases, the Central Government can order the extradition 
if other conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, no claim of 
asylum can stand in cases where the religious act (alleged 
against the fugitive as a crime) is not directed to the realisa­
tion of a particular religious object recognisable by the Court 
as an essential part of the religion.
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.204, n.176, 177.
2. R. v. Majid, 1949 F.L.J. 133 (F.C.); Noor Mohd v. Rex,
£.I.R. 1949 All 120.
3. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; Reynolds v. U.S. (1879) 98 
U.S. 145.
4. People v. Pierson (1903) 176 N.Y. 201.
5. s > £ C ^  / I** ex')
(6) Freedom of Expression, opinion and the Press
Freedom of expression like freedom of religion is the 
backbone of a modern democratic society. Freedom of expression 
is guaranteed under Art.l9(l)(a) of the Constitution of India. 
This freedom is not limited to speech only but includes the right 
to express oneself through any medium, such as writing, or draw­
ing, or painting, or by publication in newspapers, books, pamph­
lets, advertisements, or in any other manner addressed to the eye 
and ear, and by any visible representation such as gestures and 
the like, by carrying banners and signs or by legally operated 
visual or auditory devices, like loudspeakers, tape recorders, 
television, radio, cinematograph, the gramophone and the like.*
The importance of the right of freedom of expression has been
2
recognised by Indian courts in several decisions.
But this freedom of speech or expression of opinion 
is not uncontrolled but are subject to ’reasonable restrictions’. 
In exercise of its ’police power’, the freedom of speech and ex­
pression including the freedom of the press, may be subject to 
reasonable restrictions on the grounds of security of the State
from internal and external disorder, and for the prevention of
1. Bedi, op.cit., p.205.
2. Ramesh Thapper v. State of Madras, 1950 S.C.R. 594; Sakai
Newspapers v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305; Bennett 
Coleman v. Union oi: India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 106; Ram Narayan 
v. M.P., A.I.R. 1970 M.P. 102.
Schen ck v. U.S. (1919) 249 U.S. 47; Cox v. New Hampshire, 
(1941) 312 U.S. 569; Chap1insky v. New Hampshire (1942) 315 
U.S. 56$; Dennis v. U.S. (l95l) 341 U.S. 494; Harisiadas v. 
ShaUghnessy (1952) 34£ U.S. 580.
obsenity*^ If the fugitive committed such an offence, he
could not seek the protection of freedom of expression or press, 
nor claim asylum in the requested State. But he could claim the 
protection of the guarantee in other circumstances.
The reason for refusal on ground that the offence is a 
T racial1 or Religious* offence or it is inconsistent with the 
freedom of opinion and speech or the press is that these free­
doms (subject to their exceptions) are constitutionally guaran­
teed in India. Obviously, none of them would be punishable in 
accordance with the laws in force in India. Therefore, an 
accused demanded for prosecution and punishment for these of­
fences cannot be extradited. Suppose Mujibur Rahman would 
have taken asylum in India, could he have been extradited on the 
request of the Pakistan Government, for expression of political 
opinions against the then ruling party or regime in Pakistan?
The answer is 'NO' .
1. Reynolds v. U,.S. (1897) 98 U.S. 145; W:ihters v. N.Y. (1948) 
33^ U.S . 507 \5li-518 .) J Libel and Slander-Near v. Minnesota 
(1931) 2833 U.S. 697; Incitement of Crime-Dejonge v. Oregon 
(1937) 299 U.S. 353, and Contempt of Court-Bridges v. Cali­
fornia (1941) 314 U.S. 252; Bennett Coleman '<St! Co. v. Union 
of India. A.I.R. 1 9 7 3 S.C. 106.
Shanker & Co. v. Madras, I.L.R. (1956) Mad. 161; Gopalvinayak 
Godse v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 Bom. 56 (S,B. j ; Eedar 
Nath Singh v• Bihar, A . I. R. 1962 S.C. 955.
(7) Pardon or Amnesty
Extradition on the grounds that the fugitive has been 
pardoned or an amnesty applicable to him has been declared may 
be refused, though it is not specifically mentioned aiftongst the 
grounds for refusal under Sections 29 and 31 of the Act. The 
question whether to grant the request for extradition is in the 
discretion of the Central Government. If the court dismisses 
an application for habeas corpus, the Central Government may re­
fuse extradition. The converse is not true, for if the couJrt 
discharges the offender, the Central Government has no power to 
extradite.
A sovereign state is fully competent to grant amnesty 
or pardon to persons who have been sentenced or accused, or 
against whom a judicial investigation is going on. There may 
be another situation where the accused has been granted pardon 
by the court under the criminal Procedure Code in connection 
with the prosecution of another accused but connected with the 
same offence, e.g. when he becomes an approver. This situation 
of having been pardoned or an amnesty granted by the courts of 
the requested State is akin to the situation where the accused is 
not punishable under the laws of the requested State. The 
declaration of pardon or amnesty, therefore, creates a bar to the 
proceedings and it destroys the jus puniendi to the same extent 
as the maxim of non bis in idem (see above pp. 3 6 7-7$ and pre­
scription (see above,pp.345~3 6 6 ) create bars to prosecution.
In cases of amnesty or pardon, the doctdLne of double 
criminality comes in and in conformity with that doctrine, the 
requested State may refuse surrender of the accused. The de­
claration of amnesty puts an end to certain actions which are 
not described as offences thereafter, and the people indicted
on those charges are free from imputations attached to their 
reputations thereby.
But although the States as sovereign entities are free 
to refuse to surrender a person in principle, their conduct is 
in general controlled by treaty provisions which serve as limit­
ations on their sovereignty. Therefore, it is the duty of the 
requested State to see whether in the absence of a clause in 
treaty provisions to that effect, it is going to surrender the 
person, relying basically on its own law of pardon or amnesty 
or on the law of the requesting State whose legal social and 
political order has been violated by the accused.
In international practice, there is no settled deci­
sion on this problem. But where a pardon or amnesty, whether 
by the laws of the requesting State or of the requested State, 
has exonerated the accused from prosecution or punishment the 
situation is analogous to that where the act done is not a crime 
under the laws of either of the two States, and one of the con­
ditions to extradition will be lacking and this will be a ground 
for refusal to surrender. Further, the requested State would 
not abdicate its right to determine according to its own laws, 
including the statute providing for its law of pardon or amnesty, 
whether conditions under which extradition may or should be 
granted are present, except when there is a treaty contrary to 
that.
Most of these treaties . . mandatorily provide for 
the bar of extradition if pardon or amnesty have been granted
or a person is entitled to that under the laws of the requested 
State. But the later situation is not contemplated under the 
laws of India, unless actually pardon has been granted by the
courts or the executive. The Executive Government under the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and Constitution has 
powers even to remit sentences. The question has not so far 
been decided by the Indian courts and no international practice 
binds India,
Would the requested State resolve this problem of 
amnesty or pardon in accordance with the laws of the requesting 
or requested State or of both? Obviously, if the fugitive has
already been granted amnesty (pardon )in accordance with the laws 
of the requesting State, the latter would not make requisition 
for him. Conceivably, a new Government of a former opposition 
leader may be formed, and in spite of amnesty or pardon, they 
may express their revenge alleging the former pardon or amnesty 
to have been irregular, whereupon such requests could arise.
There are treaties and international conventions which are 
utterly silent on the point of the grant of pardon. The proper 
view seems to be it can be in accordance with the laws of either 
State as this will lead to the same result, viz, the offence will 
not be punishable in accordance with the laws of both the States,
A further question arises sometimes about precedence 
of amnesty law passed subsequently over treaties entered into 
earlier. International law prevails over municipal law and 
international agreements or conventions cannot be abrogated en­
tirely by the subsequent enactment of municipal legislation.^
But the opposite view found'..a place in Re Zanini, where the 
German Supreme Court (in criminal matters) in 1936 refused to 
enforce international agreements on the ground that unless the 
international conventions are transmitted into municipal law, it
1. In Re Brooks, 1931-1932, A.D., Case No.5, decision of the 
Supreme Court of Panama on 21 May, 1931.
has no effect and force of law,'1' This would arise where
treaties are not enforced as municipal law, but require legis­
lation for their enforcement.
The Supreme Court of Federal Germany in 1951 reiter- 
2
ated the same principles:
"Extradition must not be granted if, on 
the assumption of a reversal of the factual 
position, a prosecution could not, accord­
ing to the provisions of the German law of 
amnesty, be launched or a sentence executed 
in respect of the offence which is intended 
to form the basis of extradition. In this 
context it is immaterial whether there is 
an independent German right to inflict 
punishment which exists side by side with 
a similar right of a foreign State,11
In India also a provision in the Extradition Act 
should (I submit) be inserted about refusal of surrender on 
the grounds of amnesty being granted or having been granted 
under and by the laws of either, or conceivably both the States,
1, (1935-1937) A.D., Case No,173, decided on 13 January, 1936,
2. Cited in 18 Int. Law Reports, 1951, Case No.103, p.331n; 
Bedi, op.cit., p.203, n.172.
(8) Military Offences
A person can be extradited only for an extraditable 
offence, mentioned in the treaty, convention or the Second 
Schedule of the Indian Extradition Act. 1 It should be punish­
able under the laws of India. Obviously,military offences of
other countries would not be punishable in India, unless either 
identical acts are made offences or a treaty includes such of­
fences. This is why in the Second Schedule no military offence 
as such is made extraditable.
In the Indo-Nepalese treaty, item 10, of Article 3 
lists * desertion from Armed forces'. The Indo-American Treaty 
does not make mention of any military offence. Consequently, no 
military offence is made extraditable under the Indian Act. 
Therefore, if the Indian Government in conformity with the
i
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, or the treaty provisions (except
with the exception of 'desertion from Armed forces' in Indo- 
Nepalese treaty) rejects the application of the requesting State 
for extradition of a person claimed charged with an offence 
which constitutes a military offence punishable under military 
law or regulation of the requesting State it violates none of the 
rules or principles of international law or of municipal law.
This argument may be fortified with the j'udgment of the Camera 
Federal de la Plata (Argentina) in Re Girardin,'1' wherein the 
accused having violated provisions of Law 4707 regulating con­
scription and compulsory,military service, had fled to Uruguay, 
and the Argentine Government asked the Court to approve the
1. (1933-1934) A.D., Case No.153, decided on 4 Sept. 1933.
request to be made to the Uruguay Government for the extradition 
of Girardin, the Court rejecting the application, held that the 
crime was a military one and therefore, extradition should not 
be -asked for.
In India, the practice adopted is by way of enumeration 
of the extraditable offences in the Second Schedule o r the Treaty 
and if no offence is mentioned in either, it is not an extradit­
able offence. Other States, on the other hand, probably to be 
positive or expressive, expressly exclude extradition of fugit­
ives, if charged with an act or omission punishable only under 
the military laws of the requesting State. There are, in fact,
inconsistent practices in this matter. The latter method is 
not of much significance, because the same result could be 
achieved by mention of list of extraditable offences in the 
treaties or municipal statutes, as in India.
The treaties which expressly make the military of­
fences non-extraditable, demonstrate considerable variety of 
expression in the use of terms, e.g. prohibiting extradition for 
'purely', 'solely', 'strictly* or 'essentially' military offences 
without defining what they mean, as in the case of the words 
'political offences' or 'offences of a political character'.
Other treaties give the expression providing that no extradition 
will be allowed if the offence 'consists solely of violation of 
a military obligation' or which is an offence punishable only 
under military law without necessarily applying the above epi­
thets and thus leave the courts and the requested and requesting 
Government to guess what these terms mean and avenujjs are opened 
to evolve the formula of interpretation as and when occasions 
arise. But with the Indian Extradition Law, this point is im­
material because India has not adopted such a pattern.
403.
Some treaties provide for extradition of fugitives 
for military offences committed by persons not subject to mili­
tary law. It seems that to be a military offence it must be 
solely and exclusively a military offence or related acts punish­
able under special legislation applicable to the members of the 
Armed forces, the object of which is to maintain order and dis­
cipline in the forces, as contradistinguished with the ordinary 
criminal offences unconnected with the military offences.
Item 18 of the Second Schedule leaves a possibility of 
any such offences to be included in the list as an extraditable 
offence, provided the formalities laid .down therein are com­
pleted. Item 10 of Art.3 of the Indo-Nepalese Treaty is one of 
such example, and this is based upon the principle of reciprocity 
as provided in Article 1 of the Treaty and this is so because 
the contiguity of the territory of the two countries where 
chances of army personnel escaping into the territory of the 
other are more frequent. Desertion from any of the units of 
the Armed forces declared by the Central Government by notifica­
tion in the Official Gazette was made an extraditable offence in 
the First Schedule of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903. Desert­
ion has not been included in the Second Schedule of this Act of 
1962.
(9) Fiscal Offences
These offences are generally directed against the
internal revenue or the customs and excise laws as well as the
exchange control laws of a State.
On the theory of the doctrine of Good moral'\s9 i.e.
a national ought not to encourage the violation of the revenue
laws of another, even if such acts are not prohibited by its own
laws, India has gone a step further and has made violations of 
certain revenue laws in requesting State also punishable under 
its laws as an extraditable offence under the Second Schedule, 
Item 18, e.g. smuggling of gold, gold manufactures, diamonds, 
and other precious stones, narcotic-drugs. Powers under the 
Second Schedule, item 18, are given to the Central Government 
read with Section 2(d) and 3(3)(c) for adding a list of more 
revenue offences committed in the requesting State or the list 
can be added in treaties between India and other States.
Very old treaties allowed extradition for Smuggling
or for violation of revenue laws of the requesting State, but
/
later on this practice was dropped and only more serious offences 
were included in the extradition list called 'grand crimes'.
Reasons for non-surrender of persons claimed for violation of 
customs regulations in British and United States practice, seems 
to be due to the acceptance of the concept of international eco­
nomic warfare as a normal condition of existence. In British 
practice, as nearly as 1734 violation of a Portuguese revenue 
law was held not to be an extraditable offence.'1’ Lord Mansfield
/. C a. ? /LJ. / • f  M  3 S’)
&. Boucher v. Lawson: A.N. Sack, Non-Enforcement of Foreign '
Revenue Laws, in "international Law and Practice, 8l University 
oi: Pennsylvania Law Review. 1^33, pp.559-560.
in 1775 observed: *No country ever takes notice of the revenue
laws of a n o t h e r * T o  the same effect, is the decision in
2
Planchek English fease*The Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1869
3
observed: * where a contract which violates the revenue laws of
the country where it was made, comes before the courts of an­
other country, those courts will not take notice of the foreign 
revenue laws*• France also adopted the same practice and in 
certain cases allowed and upheld the validity of certain foreign 
contraband contracts, whose main objective was the violation of 
foreign revenue laws,4 European countries, in accordance with 
the theory of good morals, allowed extradition for contravention 
of revenue laws and various international law writers have sup­
ported this practice as the right one,5 Social changes in the 
modern complex life brought about a tendency in States not to 
encourage any more violation of foreign revenue laws like 
smuggling gold, diamonds, precious stones, narcotics, hassish, 
etc. In 1939, the Italian Court^ Cassation granted to Turkey 
the extradition of one Nessim on the ground that the term
1 common crimes* in the treaty between these two States was not 
held to be restricted to general criminal laws, but included
fL
offences under special laws like revenue laws of Turkey,
India also, therefore, held the revenue laws extradit­
able according to the exingencies of needs. Much is heard
!■* Holman et al, v. Johnson, 98 E.R. (K.15.) p.1120.
2, Planche v. Fletcher (1779) K.B. 99 E.R. p.164.
3, I^ey v. Lalland, 42 Mississippi Law Reports, p.444.
4 ~* A.N. Sack, op.cit., at p*564.
5. Bedi, op.cit., p.199, n.154, 155, 156,
6. (1938-1940) A.D., Case No. 151.,decided on 10. Feb. 1939.
about the smuggling of hashis from India into Nepal, the 
bordering State, and then to the United States of America 
and other European countries, so the revenue laws have been 
made extraditable.
Many States even now, except the fiscal offences 
from their treaties; of course, nations should, in the 
modern conditions, move in their interest further and should 
willingly offer to extradite for offences relating to fiscal 
or revenue laws to the requesting State and also should get 
the same benefit from the other State in reciprocity.
(1°) Rule of Speciality and the Doctrine of Double 
Criminality
Doctrine of double criminality, and rule of 
2speciality, are also other grounds for refusal for the, 
request of extradition.
1. For a> detailed discussion, see Ch.II, ppJLl8-123, Ch. Ill, 185-6.
2. For a detailed discussion, see Ch.II, pp. 108-112. 
and also Ch.Ill, p • 1 8 6 .
CHAPTER V
THE CONSTITUTION AND EXTRADITION
(I) The Ex Post Facto Legislation and Extradition 
(Art.20(1))
Section 2(c) of the Extradition Act, 1962, contains 
an exhaustive definition of an "extradition offence*• It is 
an. offence provided for in the extradition treaties or in the 
Second Schedule of the Act. Extradition treaties have been 
defined (sec.2(d)) as treaties or agreements made by India with 
a foreign State relating to the extradition of fugitive crimi­
nals and include pre-constitution treaties* The offences 
mentioned both in the pre-constitution and post-constitution 
treaties will be the extradition crimes,thbugh an additional 
list of crimes may be added to them, but a person would not 
be extradited for the offence which does not find place or 
has not been enumerated in the treaty on the day on which 
the offence has been committed, e*g* Articles 3 of the Indo- 
American Treaty,j 1,4,66 of Indo-Nepalese Extradition Treaty 
of 2 February, 1963, provide and enumerate the offences for 
which extradition could be granted*
Similarly, the Second Schedule to the Extradition 
Act, 1962, provides: "The following list of Extradition
offences is to be construed according to the law in force 
in India on the date of the alleged offence" • This meets 
the requirements of Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitu­
tion which prohibits ex-post facto criminal laws* The 
corresponding provision in Schedule I of the Extradition
Act of 1870 was in similar t e r m s T h e  Second Schedule 
enumerates the extraditable offences and also the sections 
of relevant Acts, and it has been further provided that 
"whenever the names of the relevant Act are not given, the 
sections referred to are the sections of the Indian Penal 
Code"; and the sections of the Indian Penal Code give the 
quantum of punishment provided for those extraditable of­
fences*
In view of the acceptance in Indian law of the 
principle that offences cannot be created Ex post facto* 
it is very possible that India may insist that the request­
ing State too observed this rule and may refuse extradition 
altogether if the fugitive is sought to be punished in the
requesting State in contravention of it. In that event
> *
'Nulla Poena Nullum Cr£men s£ne lege* as a maxim of inter­
national law may help India's stand.
An Eajpost facto law is a law which not only imposes 
penalties retrospectively upon acts already done, but which
2
can also increase the penalty retrospectively for such acts. 
Article 20(1) has two parts; under the first part, no person
is to be convicted of an offence except for violation of a 
'Law in force' at the time of the commission of the act 
charged as an offence, which means a law must be 'factually' 
in existence at the time the offence is committed; and a 
law not 'factually' in existence at the time, enacted subse­
quently and by a legal fiction regarded as operative from 
an earlier date, cannot be considered to be a law in fact
1. Tzu-TsaiCheng.v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (1973) 2 All 
E.R. 204 at p.208, per Lord Diplock (H.L.)
2. In Re. Sant Ram. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 932.
in force earlier than the date of its enactment. The
wordings of this Article are intended to cover only Crimi-
1
nal Proceedings, and have no applicability where the law
merely authorises the restriction of Fundamental Rights
with retrospective effect, but does not create an offence
2nor imposes a punishment. The Union Parliament and the 
State legislatures have power of legislation on the respect­
ive subjects within their jurisdiction and make laws which 
are retrospective in their effect. This Article prohibits 
any conviction or imposition of any penalty by an ex post 
facto law as from the date of theConstitution, whether the
4
law in question was pre-constitutional or post-Constitution.
The immunity under Art.20(1) extends only to 
punishment by Courts.for a criminal offence under an ex post 
facto law, and does not apply to a law of preventive deten­
tion,5 or to the demanding of security from the owner of a 
press under a press law,6 or to any ex post facto law creating 
only civil liability not amounting to an offence such as im­
position of liability on the employer to pay compensation
7
to the employee under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947;
1* Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay. A.I.R. 1953 :$.C. 325.
2. State of Bihar v. Shailbala Devi. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 329.
3. H.S. Doabia, Supreme Court on Constitution of India, p.274.
4. Kanhiya Lai v. Indumati, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 444.
5. Prahlad v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1952 Bom.l.
6. State of Bihar v. Shailbala. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 329.
7. Hathi Singh Mfg. Co. v. Union of India. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 923.
or to a case of a Statute imposing tax retroactively,1 nor
2
does it apply to trials or change of procedure*
But an ex post facto law which only mollifies the 
rigour of a criminal law does not fall within the said pro­
hibition. If a particular law makes a provision to that 
effect, though retrospective in operation, it will be valid.
The question whether such a law is retrospective and if so, 
to what extent depends upon the interpretation of a parti­
cular statute, having regard to the well-settled rules of 
3
construction. Maxwell summarises the relevant rule
of construction thus:
"The tendency of the modern decisions, 
upon the whole, is to narrow materially 
the difference between what is called a 
strict and a beneficial construction.
All statutes are now construed with a 
more attentive regard to the language, 
and criminal statutes with a more 
rational regard to the aim and intention 
of the legislature, than formerly. It 
is unquestionably right that the distinc­
tion should not altogether be erasedfrom 
the judicial mind, for it is required by 
the spirit of over free institutions that 
the interpretation of all statutes should 
be favourable to personal liberty and this 
tendency is still evidenced in a certain 
reluctance to supply the defects of the 
language, or to eke out the meaning of 
an obscure passage by strained and doubt­
ful influences. The effect of the rule 
of strict construction might almost be 
summed up in the remarks that, where an 
equivocal word or ambiguous sentence 
leaves a reasonable doubt of its mean­
ing which the canons of interpretation 
fail to solve, the benefit of doubt 
should be given to the subject and
1. Sundara^a Mier & Co. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. A.I.R. 
i.958 S.C. 468.
2. Shiva Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953 
S.C. 394.
3. Rattan Lai v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 444.
against the legislature which has failed 
to explain itself. But it yields to the 
paramount rule that every statute is to 
be expounded according to its expressed 
or manifest intention and that all cases 
withih the mischiefs aimed at are, if the 
language permits to be held to fall with­
in its remedial influences." %
The prohibition of ex post facto law would apply 
to a case where an Act, which was not an offence before the 
Act was passed, is made an offence under the Act, where 
under the Act a higher punishment is imposed for an offence 
committed before the Act was passed. Where the offence and 
the punishment it carries are mentioned in the Second Schedule 
to thdjkct or in a treaty, and it is sought to extend the of­
fence to an area by notification under Section 3 or 12 of 
the Indian Extradition Act, from a certain date, it will 
amount to an ex post facto legislation. It does not matter 
that the provision is made to help the reformation of the 
offenders, through the agency of courts. In considering 
the scope of such provision in municipal law, the rule of 
beneficial construction is adopted as indicated by Maxwell 
above, but whether such an interpretation would be applicable 
or not while interpreting the provisions of the Indian Extra­
dition, 1962, its schedule and the treaties made thereunder, 
is a ticklish problem.
The Second Part of Art.20(1) immunizes a person 
from a penalty greater than that which he might have been 
subjected to at the time of his committing the offence.
1. Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed., pp.274-275, 
followed in Rattan Lai v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1965 s.c. 
444 at p.446~it>id.
2. Rattan Lai, ibid. at p.447.
It has already been noted that a person cannot be made to 
suffer more and greater penalty by ex post facto law than 
he would be subjected to at the time he committed the crime 
or the offence. Again, this clause, like cl.(l) of Art.
20 applies only to punishments for criminal offences, which 
would h£reinclude such cases As a provision of ex post facto 
law, made in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949, enhanc­
ing the prescribed punishment by a further fine to be equiva­
lent to the amount of money found to have been procured by 
the offender in committing the offence. It was held by the 
Supreme Court that the enhanced punishment prescribed in 
the 1949 Act for an offence committed in 1947 was hit by 
Art.20(1) of the Constitution and that provision was 
ultra vires,^  But Art.20(1) would not apply to cases 
where already 1he offence has provided for imposition of 
unlimited fine and ' a subsequent ex post facto law pre-
o   , _ ,
scribed a minimum fine. Nor JArt.20(l)|wlllj .apply to
cases where in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947,
only the maximum and no greater penalty than might have
been imposed under the old section, has been prescribed i
3
by new section 23(1)(a) substituted by the amending Act.
•Extradition offence* under Section 2(c) of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, has been defined as offences 
contained in the Second Schedule and in the treaties or 
arrangements by India with foreign or Commonwealth States 
as the case may be. Schedule II, which applies under
1. Kedarnath v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 404.
2. Satwant Singh v. TheState of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 266.
-
3. Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1206.
section 2(c)(ii) to foreign States or Commonwealth countries 
with no treaties, provides that the list of extradition of­
fences mentioned in that schedule is to be construed accord­
ing to the law in force in India on the date of the alleged 
offence; and on such a construction, it follows that no 
extradition will be allowed in case ex post facto legisla­
tion is sought to be applied to the fugitive in the request­
ing State, as otherwise, Art,20(1) of the Constitution would 
be violated. Further, the same schedule provides that when­
ever the names of the relevant Acts are not given, the sec­
tions referred to are the sections of the Indian Penal Code. 
The sections of the Indian Penal Code also provide the pen­
alties, in which case the presence ofArt.20(l) would prevent 
the penalty being increased for.the offence committed before 
the passing of the relevant law. Therefore, in both cases 
the question of infringement of the Fundamental Right of the 
fugitive will enable such a law to be declared ultra vires 
and the request for requisition of the fugitive for such 
an offence made by ex post facto legislation will be refused. 
The fugitive would be entitled to invoke the immunity of Art.
20 since the Article applies to all persons, and not only 
citizens, for the time being in Indian territory.
Furthermore, 'extradition offence' has been defined 
in section 20(c)(i) in relation to a foreign State, being a 
treaty State provided for in the extradition treaty with 
that State. Treaties are, generally, not retroactive and 
come into operation only after ratification byboth the 
parties as provided therein. On this basis, the Anglo- 
American, including Indian, law does not allow the surrender
of the fugitive on demand for an ext^jditable offence anterior 
to an extradition treaty, because if the treaty were given 
retroactive effect, it would result in the infringement of 
Art*20(1) of the Constitution of India.*
Therefore, whether it is an offence mentioned in 
a treaty or in foe'Second Schedule to the Extradition Act, 
1962, mentioned as an extraditable offence, request for sur­
render will be refused on the ground of ex post facto law 
giving retrospective effect to it or imposition of greater 
penalty, whether by the law of India or of the requesting 
State.
1* Valentine et al. v. United States Ex rel, Neidecker (1936) 
299 U • S• £>s see also Bedi, op.cit,, p.3fr.
(2) Art*20(2) Extradition and Guarantee Against Doable Jeopardy
'No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the 
same offence more than once' is the version of the rules
against double jeopardy contained in Art,20(2) of the Consti­
tution of India* Ihe-provision appeared in the Draft Consti­
tution as Art* 14(2) as under: 'No person shall be punished 
more than once' « But T.T.Krishnamachari suggested an amend­
ment in the Constituent Assembly, which was adopted and in­
cluded in the Constitution, resulting in the present form of 
Art* 2 0 ( 2 ) The reasons for adopting the present form of 
words were, 'no person would be punished /_ more than once' , 
might probably result in the position that a Government offi­
cial dealt with departmentally and punished, could not be pro­
secuted and punished by a law court if he had committed a 
criminal offence, and conversely, if he has been prosecuted 
and sentenced to imprisonment or fined by the court it might
preclude the Government from taking disciplinary action 
2
against him*
The root of the principle of Double Jeopardy is 
to be found in the well-established rule of English Common 
law, expressed in the maximum 'Nemo debet bis V&c&ri' » that 
a man should not be put twice in peril for the same offence*
Where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court 
of competent jurisdiction, the conviction is a bar to all
1. C*A* Deb*, vol.VII, pp*795-7 and 840-842* B. Shiva Raid,
The Framing of India's Constitution* pp*230-231*
2. Ibid,* pp*230-231*
3. M.P* Jain, Indian Constitutional Law* Second Ed. (1970),p.583.
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further criminal proceedings for the same offence*1
The fundamental right guaranteed in Art*20(2) 
enunciates the principle of ’autrefois convict* or ’autre­
fois acquit’ ’double jeopardy’* The roots of that prin­
ciple are to be found in ’the well-established rule of common 
law that where a person has been convicted of an offence by 
a Court of competent jurisdiction, the conviction is a bar 
to all further criminal proceedings for the same offence*’
To the same effect is the ancient Latin maxim ’nemo debet 
bis puniri pro uno delicto’, that is to say that no one 
ought to be twice punished for one offence or as it is 
sometimes written ’pro eadem causa* , that is for the same 
cause* The two Latin maxims 'nemo debet bis puniri pro 
uno delicto’ and 'nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa'
have been considered by the House of Lords in Connelly’s 
4case* The classic statement of the principle is to be
5found in Hawkins Pleas of The Crown;
"that a man shall not be brought into 
danger of life for one and the same 
offence more than once •••”
1* M.P. Jain, ibid* * p.583*
2. Per Charles J. in Reg* v. Miles* L.R. (1890) 24 Q.B.O. 423
at p*438*
3* Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay* 1953 S.C.J. 456 at p*459* 
See Halsbury’s Laws of England* Vol.9* p.152-153, para*212, 
3rd ed*
4* Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All E.R. 
40l at pp.416E, 420H, 4251 to 42 aA., per Lord Morris, at p*428C
per Lord Hodson, at p*436B per Lord Devlin* See also B.K.
MuKherjea J* in S.A. Venkataraman v* Union of India, A.I.R. 
1954 S.C. 355.
5. Hawkins Pleas of theCrown (8th ed., 1824), vol.2 at p.515, 
followed in Connelly* Ibid.* at p*428C, D, per Lord Hodson*
The same principle has been enacted under General Clauses
1 2 Act, and Code of Criminal Procedure; Fifth Amendment
3 4of the American Constitution, and stated by Willis, but
circumscribed it by a prosecution and punishment for the
5
same offence in the previous trial, before a court of law
6or judicial tribunal required by law to decide the matters 
in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must 
be authorised by law to administer and not before a tribunal, 
which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry 
even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed 
on legal evidence given on oath* The words ‘convicted*, 
‘Commission of the act charged as an offence', ‘be subjected 
to penalty*, ‘commission of the offence', 'prosecuted and 
punished1, 'accused of any offence' used in Article 20, would 
indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of 
the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law 
or judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context 
would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a
1. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
2. Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1898.
3. Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution. ' .... nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb*.
4. Willis, Constitutional Law, at p.528.
5. Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, 1953 S.C.J. 456 at p.460.
6. Cooper v. Wilson. L.R. (1937) 2 K.B. 309 at p#340, followed 
m  Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. 
Delhi, 1950 S.C.R. 459 and in Maqbool Hussain v. State of 
Bombay. 1953 S.C.J. 456 at p.461.
criminal nature before a court of law or judicial tribunal 
in accordance with the procedure in the Statute which cre-
l
ates the offence and regulates the procedure*
The word * offence* in Article 20(2) has not been 
defined in the Constitution, but has been defined in section 
3(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897* Article 367 pro­
vides that the General Clauses Act applies for the inter­
pretation of the Constitution* Therefore, the word ’offence* 
in Article 20(2) must be taken to mean ’any act or oiQ.ssion 
made punishable by any law' as defined in section 3(38} of 
the General Clauses Act* The words 'punishable by any law* 
in the context of the Extradition Act of 1962 would mean 
offence under that Act or under the Indian Penal Code or 
under any other Indian Act or a Foreign Act*
Similarly, the words 'before a court of law or 
judicial tribunal* are not found in Article 20(2)* But 
the various expressions used in Article 20(2) such as 'con­
victed* , 'commission of offence', 'penalty', 'prosecuted 
and punished', etc* all indicate that this Article contem­
plates criminal proceedings before a court of law or judi­
cial tribunal, and further contemplates that there was a 
judicial decision in the previous proceedings under which 
punishment was awarded for the commission of an offence*
The following pre-conditions are necessary before 
invoking Article 20(2) in proceedings under the Extradition 
Act, namely:-
1# Maqbool Hussain v* State of Bombay, 1953 S.C.J* 456 at p*461* 
See* ch.v(&){c) infra, for a discussion whiher a magistrate 
acting under the Extradition Act, 1962, is a 'judicial tri­
bunal' •
(1) That there has been previous proceedings before a court 
of law or judicial tribunal;1
(2) That the previous proceeding was of a criminal nature 
and in respect of the commission of an 'offence' that 
is, act or omission which is punishable under any law;
(3) That there was a judicial decision in the previous pro-
2ceedmg by a 'court of competent jurisdiction' ;
(4) That under the decision a punishment was awarded; and
(5) lhat the offence of which the offender now being tried
3
is the 'same offence', or has the same ingredients as 
the previous offence or is based on the same facts
4
which constituted the previous offence*
Provisions of section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, 
are based upon general principles of 'autrefois acquit' 
recognised by English courts, i.e. a man-maynot be put twice 
in jeopardyJSbr the same offence.^ But where the accused 
person was not liable lawfully to be convicted at the first 
trial because of lack of competence of the court, the de- 
fence of 'autrefois acquit' has no application* Trial
1. V;Qnkataraman v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 375 at p*377* 
See Ch.V, infra*
2* Assistant Collector of Customs Bombay v* L.R. Motwani, A.I.R. 
1970 S.C. 962 at p.^64; Baijnath Prasad Tripathi v.State of 
Bhopal* A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 494 at p.496.
3. State of Bombay v* S.L. Apte, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 578 at p*583; 
Bhagwan Swaroop lal Bishan lal v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 
1965 S.C. 682.
4. Maqbool Hussain v* State of Bombay* A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325; 
W-nkatrraman v*"Union of India, A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 375.
5. Mudholker J. in Mohd.Safi v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 69 at p.71.
6. Mohd.Safi v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 69. Thomas 
kwartSlower v. k. 40 Cr.app. P ;.182 at p. 193. —  — -■
by a court of competent jurisdiction and acquittal of the 
alleged offence are the prerequisites for the applicability 
of the plea of1autrefois acquit1 provided under section 
403(1) Criminal Procedure Code* Identity of the offence 
in both the trials is a condition precedent for attracting 
Art*20(2), section 26 of the General Clauses Act or section 
403 Criminal Procedure Code* It is necessary to analyse 
and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but 
the ingredients of the two offences and see whether they 
are proved identical*^ It is a general principle recog­
nised by all. members of the international community that a 
person should not be subjected to repeated trials for the 
same act* States normally refuse to extradite the fugitive 
if he has been tried once or he is undergoing trial in the 
territory of the requested State for the same act for which
2 this surrender is demanded* Ihe principle of restiudicata 
or issue-estoppel would come in, if the matter had already
3
been raised and decided between the same parties* If a 
man is prosecuted or indicted once, and a demand of surrender 
with a view to extradition is made for the same offence, he 
can plead as a complete defence, his formal acquittal or 
conviction* This is technically expressed as the plea 
of ’autrefois acquit* or ’autrefois convict’ (Section 403)
1. Bhagwan Swarup lal Bishan lal v* State of Maharashtra* A.I.R. 
1965 S.C. 682; Manipur Admn* v* Thokchom Bira S i n g h A.I.R. 
1965 S.C. 87 at p.90; State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, A.I.R.
1961 S.C. 578 at p.583*
2* Article 9 of the Harvard Research Draft (1935) A.J.I.L. (Supp*) 
p*145.
3. Piara Singh v. State of Punjiab, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 961; Mohar 
Rai v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1281.
Criminal Procedure Code, and Article 20(2).^
Mudholkar J. speaking for the Court in Md.Shaf i
observed:2
11 The provisions contained in Section 403 
Criminal Procedure Code are based upon 
the general principle of autrefois acquit 
recognised by the English courts. The 
principle on which the plea autrefois 
acquit depends, is that a man may not 
be put twice in Double Jeopardy for the 
same offence. This principle has now 
been incorporated in Article 20 of the 
Constitution.11
The fundamental principle of the plea of ’autrefois 
acquit’ as laid down by the judges in England in 1796,2 and 
as stated by writers earlier than that date, has been consist-
4
ently followed. It was thus stated in 1848 in Broom’s
Legal Maxims:5
11 and this plea is clearly founded on 
the principle that no man shall be 
placed in peril of legal penalities 
more than once upon the same accusa­
tion - nemo debet bis puniri pro uno 
delicto.”
1. Indian Constitutional Law. M.P. Jain, p.442.
4-
2. Mohammed Safi v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 69 at 
p.7X. See contra: \®Lnkataraman S.A. v. Union of India, ,A.I.R 
1954 S.C. 375.
7«sr
3. In R. v. Vandercomb and Abbott (1796) 2 LeachAat p.720, follow­
ed ~in Cormelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 
All E.R. 401 at p.416 per Lord Morris (H.L.)
4. Cooielly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All E.R. 
401 at p.4l6E per Lord Morris (H.L.).
5. Brooms Legal Maxims, 2nd ed., p.257, followed in Connelly, ibid 
at p.416E, per Lord Morris.
The defence of 'autrefois acquit1, however, has no applica­
tion where the accused person was not liable lawfully to be 
convicted at the first trial by the court's lack of juris­
diction. This is what has been pointed out by the court of 
criminal appeal.*^  From the language used in Section 403(1)
of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, it is clear that the 
following can be successfully pleaded as a bar to a subse­
quent trial for the same offence or for an offence based on 
the same f a c t t h a t  the accused has been (a) tried by a 
court, (b) of competent jurisdiction, and (c) acquitted of 
the offence alleged to have been committed by him or for
which he might have been convicted under Section 237 of the 
2
Code. On these being proved, the extradition of the fugi­
tive will be refused.
While considering the scope of the 'same offence' ,
3
the Supreme Court observed:
"To operate as a bar, the second prose­
cution and consequential punishment 
thereunder, must be for the 'same of­
fence' . The Article is that the of­
fences are the same, i.e. they should 
be identical. If, however, the two 
offences are distinct, then notwith­
standing that the allegations of the 
fact in the two complaints might be 
substantially similar, the benefit 
of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, 
therefore, necessary to analyse and 
compare not the allegations in the
1. Thomas Ewart Flower, 'V.R. (1957) 40 Cr. App. P. 182 at p. 193.
2. Hidayat^Ullah J. in Kliaadc* -,Sifc&tiv. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1965
S.C. 83^at p.86. t I
3. Rajagopala Ayyangar J• in State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, A.I.R.
1961, S.C. 578 at p.581.
two complaints but the ingredients 
of the two offences and see whether 
their identity is made out*1'
In Connelly, Lord Morris observed:*
"The test is, therefore, whether such 
proof as is necessary to convict of 
the second offence would establish 
guilt of the first offence or of an 
offence for which on the first charge 
there could be a conviction,”
o
Subbarao C.J. in another later case, observed:
"The two conspiracies are distinct 
offences and it would not even be 
said that some of the ingredients 
of bo$h the conspiracies were the 
same and the ingredients of both 
the offences being totally different, 
they did not form the 1 same offence* 
within the meaning of Article 20(2) 
of the Constitution"*
- Two offences were
held to be distinct when spaced slightly by time and place,
o
even though they formed part of the transaction. But in 
cases when a trial for some reason has become abortive, 
either because the trial court had no jurisdiction to try 
or because of some inherent defect or illegality affecting 
the validity of the trial itself, a second trial is not
4
barred by Article 20(2). In the absence of a valid prior 
sanction for prosecution of an offence under Section 161 
Indian Penal Code, the proceedings that took place were 
held to be null and void ab initio. Under those circum­
stances, a second trial was not barred for the same offence,
1. Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions (196,^ ) 2 All E.R. 
401 at p.415A.
2. Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1965 S.C.682,
3. Hidayatullah J. in Khark > Singh vy state of U.p..'a.'i.R. 
1'965 .S.C.'83 at p.86 ihz. ----------
4. Upendra v. State, A.I.R. 1954 Assam 106.
aa the accused has not been prosecuted and punished for the 
same offenceand as there has been no acquittal on merits, 
Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code or the plea of 
•autrefois acquit* or re^jjudicata, or issue-estoppel could 
not be an answer to the request for extradition in those 
proceedings•
One and the same act of a person may constitute 
two or more offences and punishment or acquittal for one 
does not bar prosecution for the other, e.g. conspiracy 
for a crime is different from the offence itself and punish-
oment for the crime is no bar for prosecution for conspiracy. 
Though some of the ingredients in offences under Section 
161 Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention 
of Corruption Act are common but punishment in one does not 
bar punishment for the other, though they arise from the
3
•same fact*• The offence of criminal misconduct has 
been held tp be different from Section 409 Indian Penal 
Code, and so there may be a separate trial one after an-
4
other for these offences. In cases of different defal­
cations committed at different times, according to the other 
view, it has been held that it is not desirable that in such 
cases the accused should be tried as many times, when he 
could have been tried for all of them at one trial. In 
the interest of justice, applying Section 561A Criminal
1. Baij Nath v. State of Bhopal. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 494.
2. Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent Jail, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 119.
3. M.M. Gandhi v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960 Mys.lll. Also 
see Kunji Lal v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 149; 
Ihirunav ukkarusu v. State, "5.1.R. 1959 Mad. 339.
4. State of M.P. v. Veerdshwar, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 592.
' A
Procedure Code^ it was held that second trial in such circum­
stances is not proper and would amount to an abuse of the 
process of the court; the reasoning being that the purpose 
behind such prosecution is not vindication of justice but 
retribution.’1' In other words, where the second prosecu­
tion is different from the previous prosecution in that the
nature of the charge itself is different and the plea that 
in the interest of justice or in order to avoid the abuse 
of the process of the Court, the High Court should inter­
vene is not available, because it could not be said that 
the present prosecution amounted to retribution or satis­
faction of public indignation, then Art.20(2) will not be 
available. But in cases of convictions for criminal 
breach of trust, subsequent prosecutions for different 
sums embezzled during different periods in the part are 
permissible, but the High Court can disallow such repeated
prosecutions under Section 561A, Criminal Procedure Code,
2if the interest of justice so requires. Similarly, in 
extradition proceedings in applying the above principle
of Kerala and Bombay High Courts, the Magistrate may refuse 
extradition under Section 403 Criminal Procedure Code, and 
the Central Government may refuse to extradite the fugitive 
on the basis that the request was not made in good faith, 
or was unjust, or it would be inexpedient to grant it in 
the interest of justice under Section 29 of the Indian 
Ext radit ion Act, 1962.
1. K. Sadashivan J. in Pillai v. State of Kerala (1971) K.L.T. 
818.
2. Ghudaman Narayan v. State, A.I.R. 1969 Bom* 1.
Some High Courts have also held that a person can 
be prosecuted and punished for an offence for which he has 
been previously prosecuted but acquitted*'*' But it seems 
this principle in extradition cases would not apply for the 
reason that it overlooks the provisions of Section 403,
Criminal Procedure Code, and the maxim 'autrefois acquit'*
The Criminal Procedure Code does not contain provisions 
similar to Sections 29 and 31 of the Extradition Act* In 
the ultimate anlysis, it is the discretion of thcjCentral 
Government which is final whether a fugitive should be 
surrendered or not.
In cases of continuing offences, like conspiracy,
particularly of smuggling gold, narcotics, precious stones,
and other substantive offences, an offence is committed every
day and the act of oil ission continues every day and each
2
offence can be punished separately*
Appeal against an acquittal is in substance a 
continuation of the prosecution, and when the accused has 
not been punished as a result of the prosectuion, this 
Article does not bar the State from preferring an appeal
3
against acquittal* So also enhancement of sentence or 
punishment by the appellate or revisional court does not
4
amount to a second punishment*
1. M* Dev* v. State of Tripura* A.I.R.1959 Tripura 1; In re* 
Darla Rama das s* A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 707*
2. In Re M. Daveed, A.I.R. 1959 A.P.137; G.D. Bhattar v* State, 
A.I.R. 1957 Cal.483.
3. Kalawati v. Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 131.
4. D.A. Kelshikar y* Bombay* A.I.R. 1960 Bom*225*
On these principles, therefore, an accused fugi­
tive may in extradition proceedings successfully raise the 
plea of Double jeopardy contained in Article 20(2) and 
Section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, i.e. ’autrefois con­
vict* and ’autrefois acquit’ including the plea of criminal 
res judicata, issue-estoppel, i.e. in substance the prin­
ciples contained in the legal maxim ’nemo debet bis vsxari’.
But preventive detention is not ’prosecution and 
punishment* and it does not bar a prosecution of the person 
concerned,*' and therefore, the detention of a person cannot 
be pleaded as a bar in extradition proceedings which gener­
ally happens in the case of Nationals of Pakistan who are 
sometimes held in preventive detention for deportation, 
as well as for extradition. In such cases, detention can­
not be a bar for extradition as it is neither prosecution 
nor punishment within the meaning of Article 20(2). Section 
403, Criminal Procedure Code, would not be attracted as the 
detention or release from detention under orders of the 
Court or executive are neither ’autrefois acquit* nor ’autre­
fois convict'. So also^incases of prosecution and punish­
ment for breach of permit rules under the Influx from Paki­
stan (Control) Act, 1949; the Central Government could direct 
the removal of such persons (foreigners) from India, and 
Article 20(2)would not be attracted as there is no question
3
of a second prosecution for the same offence. So also in
1. Tilok v. Sindhi,A.I.R. 1954 Ajmer 19; Ghulam Ahmed v. State, 
A.I.R. 1954 J & K 59.
2. Anwar v. State, J & K, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337 at p.339.
3. Bbrahim Vazir v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 229.
$he case of a foreigner arrested and convicted for smuggling 
himself into India and who is subsequently deported from 
India, it has been held by the Supreme Court that in such 
circumstances the restraint on his ’personal liberty’ for 
the purposes of taking him to the border in order to expel 
him from India in accordance with the statutory provision 
could by no means be considered to be an illegal custody 
justifying an order of release. Section 3(l)(b) of the 
J & K Detention Act clearly empowered a ’foreigner’ to be 
detained with a view, inter alia, of making arrangements 
for his expulsion from the State of J & K.*"
In extradition proceedings, the burden of proof 
is on the fugitive to show that Art.20(2) or Section 403, 
Criminal Procedure Code, or issue-estoppel would cover his 
case and provide him a defence.
Ihe word 'prosecution' in Article 20(2) has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean a proceeding either 
by way of indictment or information in criminal courts in 
order to put the offender to trial. An action before a
q
'Judicial Tribunal’ is also a bar to a second trial, but 
it seems in view of Thomas Danals case, the previous trial 
would not include trials by quasi-judicial bodies or tri­
bunals. The constitutional right guaranteed by Article 
20£2) against double jeopardy can be successfully invoked 
only where the prior proceedings were of a criminal nature
1. Anwar v. State of J & K , A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337 at p.342.
2. Thomas Pasa v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 375.
3. I&qbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325.
instituted or continued before a »court of law* or a ’judi­
cial tribunal* in accordance with the procedure prescribed 
in the Statute which creates the offence and regulates the 
procedure
An inquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries)
2 3Act, 1850, proceedings in departmental inquiry, infliction
of punishment by a Jail Superintendent on a detenu for breach
4
of disciplinary rules, Levy of Penalty for default in pay-
5
ment of sales-tax, and confiscation of gold by customs autho­
rities under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act,6 have 
been held not to be trials that would bar a subsequent pro­
secution in a criminal court.
None of these authorities including the Sea Customs 
Authorities are criminal courts and proceedings before them 
do not constitute prosecution, and therefore, Article 20(2) 
does not bar a subsequent action in a criminal court for an 
offence under the Sea Customs Act or Foreign Exchange Regu­
lations even though the Customs authorities may have imposed 
penalties of fine and confiscated the goods of the accused. 
Customs authorities, it has been held, act as quasi-judicial
1. Narayan Lal Bansi Lal v. Naneck Phiroz, A.I.R. 1961 S.C.29.
2. S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1954 S.C.375.
3. Panduranga Swamy v. State, A.I.R. 1961 A.P.234; D.A.Kelshikar 
v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 225.
4. MaqbooB: Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325.
5. M. Sutharamaswami v. Commissioner, Taxes Officer, A.I.R. 1960 
A.P. 451.
6. Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325.
bodies#'1
The scope, thus, of Article 20(2) in spite of the 
wide language in which it is couched, has been very much re- 
stricted by a process of judicial interpretation#
There is no specific provision of Double Jeopardy 
in the Indian Extradition Act of 1962# But the rule against 
double jeopardy as mentioned above, is incorporated in Article 
20j[2) of the Constitution and section 403, Criminal Procedure 
Code, and the use of the word ‘person* in Article 20(2) signi­
fies that the guarantee is available to citizens and foreigners 
alike. The fugitive, therefore, in addition to the provisions 
of section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, which has been made 
applicable before the magisterial inquiry by virtue of section 
7(1) of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962, can invoke the 
provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution# Protection 
against double jeopardy may be guaranteed under a treaty#
The plea of the fugitive offender against double jeopardy 
will have to be examined by the magistrate or the superior 
courts# The protection of the fugitive against double 
jeopardy is confined to a trial for the crime attributed
1. F.N. Roy v# Collector of Customs# A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 648:L60 fi°y 
Frey v. Superintendent Jail# A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 119; Sftwapujan 
Rai v. Collector of Customs# A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 845; Gaurang 
Chandra Deb# v# Collector of Central Excise and Land Revenue 
A.I.R. 1968 Tri. 39#
2. Indian Constitutional Law, 2nd ed# (1970), M.P.Jain, p.585.
See Ch.V. infra, on whether a magistrate acting under the 
Extradition Act, 1962, is a judicial tribunal#
3. Article 6 of Indo-Nepalese Treaty of 1953 published in the 
Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated 22 February, 1963; and 
Article 4 of the Indo-American Treaty, published in Gazette 
of India Extraordinary, dated 1 April, 1966#
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to him, and if he has been in the earlier proceedings tried, 
convicted, discharged or acquitted, then the bar., of Article 
20(2), section 403 Criminal Procedure Code, would apply.
It does not apply to extradition proceedings which are not 
in the form of a trial. Lord Alverstone in Stallmann1s 
case, observed that a fugitive who has been discharged in 
extradition proceedings cannot be said to have been tried 
and discharged or convicted.'*' Consequently, if an extra­
dition application has been refused once, second application 
may be brought for surrender of the fugitive if some further
evidence is made available, which in the opinion of the re-
■ ■ 2 
questing State, may warrant a second application, as extra­
dition proceedings do not come under the rule against double 
jeopardy.^
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Stallmann (1912)
3 K.B. 424 at p.444.
2. R«C• Hingorani, The Indian Extradition Law, p.67.
3. Executive Discretion in Extradition, 1962 Colmnbia Law Review, 
p.1314. Also see, R.C, Hingorani, ibid., p.67,n.67. —
(3) Article 20(2) of the Constitution: Issue-Estoppel and
Res Judicata in Extradition Proceedings
The principle of issue-estoppel is different from 
the principle of double jeopardy or 'autrefois acquit* as 
embodied in S.403 Criminal Procedure Code. The principle 
of issue-estoppel applies where an issue of fact has been 
tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a find­
ing has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding 
would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the pro­
secution not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the 
accused for a different or distincdb offence, but as pre­
cluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding 
of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a differ­
ent offence which might be permitted by the terms of Section 
403(2), Indian Criminal Procedure Code. For issue-estoppel 
to arise, there must have been distinctly raised and inevi­
tably decided the same issue in the earlier proceedings be­
tween the same parties. An issue, as between the State and 
one of the accused persons, in the same litigation cannot 
operate as binding upon the State with regard to another 
accused.^
Issue-estoppel also should not be confused with 
res judicata which in criminal proceedings are expressed in 
the pleas of * autrefois acquit* and 'autrefois convict*.
They are pleas which are concerned with the judicial deter­
mination of an alleged criminal liability and in the case of 
conviction with the substitution of new liability. Issue-
1. Rama^Swami J. in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1969
S.C .^961 supra.
estoppel is concerned with the judicial establishment of a 
proposition of law or fact between parties* The principle 
has its roots in well-known doctrines which control the re­
litigation of issues which are settled by prior litigation.***
The determination of a factual point in favour of a prisoner
in a previous criminal trial when brought to the view of the
court in a second criminal trial of the same prisoner attracts
2
the principle of issue-estoppel. But the law, giving effect 
to issue-estoppel is not concerned with the correctness or 
incorrectness of the finding which amounts to issue-estoppel, 
nor with the processes of reasoning b# which the finding was 
reached in fact. It is enough that an issue or issues have 
been directly raised and found, and so long as the finding 
stands in any subsequent litigation between the same parties, 
no allegations can be made that would be legally inconsistent 
with that previous finding. Res judicata pro veritate
i ■ 3
accipjtur ... applies in pleas > of^Crown. Therefore, before 
issue-estoppel can succeed in a case there must be a prior
proceeding, determined against the Crown, necessarily involv­
ing an issue which again arises in a subsequent proceeding 
taken by the Crown against the same prisoner. It depends
upon an issue or issues having been distinctly raised and
4
found in the former proceedings.
1. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 961 at p.964.
2. Dixon J. in King v. Wilkes, 77 C.L.R.511 at pp.518-519.
3. Dixon C.J. in Marz v. The Queen (1956) 96 C.L.R. 62*
4. Herron & Maguire JJ. in Brown v. Robinson (1960) S.R. (N.S.W.) 
297, approved by the Supreme Court in Piara Singh v. State of 
Punjab, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 961 at p.964. See also, Manipur Ad- 
minlsfrat ion v. Thakchom Bira Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S .c. 87 & Britan 
Slngh v. State of Puniab. A.I.R. 1956 S.C.415 approved in 
Piara Singh*s case, supra.
In order to get the benefit of Section 403, Indian Criminal 
Procedure Code or Article 20{2) of the Constitution of India, 
it is necessary for an accused person to establish that he 
had been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an 
offence and the said conviction or acquittal is in force.
If that much is established then only the accused is not 
liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the 
same facts for any other offence for which a different 
charge from the one made against him might have been made 
under Section 236 Criminal Procedure Code or for which he 
might have been convicted under Section 273 Criminal Pro­
cedure Code.^
In ssveral judgments of the Indian Supreme Court,
2the rule of estoppel got its approval. CCn American courts 
also the rule of issue-estoppel has received approval.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 4 observed:
"The effect of verdict of acquittal 
pronounced by a competent court on a 
lawful charge after lawful trial is 
not completely stated by saying that 
the person acquitted cannot be tried 
again for the same offence. To that 
it must be added that the verdict is 
binding and conclusive in all subse­
quent proceedings between the parties 
to the adjudication. The Maxim * res 
judicata, pro veritate accipitur*-1 is
1. Assistant Collector of Custcms Bombay v. L.R. Motwani, A.I.R. 
1970 S.C. 962.
2. Banwari Godara v. The State of U.P., (1969)2 S.C. W.R.109; 
Assistant Collector’"of Customs v.~"L.R. Motwani. A.I.R. 1970
S.C. 96^. See also Karjam Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1969 orissa 
23.
3. Sealfon v. United States (1947) 68 S.Ct. 237.
4. Sambaswami v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of F.N. Malaya,L.R. 
ri95&')_S.C. &Z-.--------------  ---------------  ---
no less applicable to criminal than to 
civil proceedings. Here, the appel­
lant having been acquitted at the first 
trial on the charge of having ammunition 
in his possession, the prosecution was 
bound to accept the correctness of that 
verdict and was precluded from taking 
any step to challenge it at the second 
trial."
This statement of law was accepted as correct by the Supreme
1 2 Court in Pritam Singh and Mohar Rai*s cases, supra.
The doctrine of issue-estoppel is concerned with 
the admissibility of evidence in a subsequent trial, des­
igned to upset a finding, recorded by a competent court in 
a previous trial. A judgment of a criminal court acquit­
ting the accused, is no bar to disciplinary proceedings, as 
a criminal prosecution is intended mainly for breaking the 
»King*s peace* and this shows the indignation felt by the 
community towards criminals, whereas disciplinary proceed­
ings are intended to maintain purity and efficacy of public 
service. In criminal proceedings, evidence can be admis­
sible only in accordance with the Evidence Act. In quasi­
judicial criminal proceedings, strict rules of evidence are 
not followed^evidence inadmissible in criminal cases will 
be admitted^and any material which has a logically probative 
value to prove or disprove the facts in issue is relevant 
and admissible. In criminal cases a high standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt is required for convicting the accused,
1. Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415.
2. Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1281 at p. 1284.
3. Spadigam v. State of Kerala (1970) K.L.T. 1047, per K.K.
Mathew J .
whereas in quasi-criminal judicial proceedings such a stan­
dard of proof is not required and preponderance of probabi­
lities to prove the guilt is enough,1 But the rule has 
been extended to departmental trials where omdepartment 
punishes, the other department cannot proceed against the 
man for the same offence in order to give him a more deter­
rent punishment; it is opposed to Article 20(2) of the 
2
Constitution, But the Patna High Court went a step further 
in the application of this rule and held that sometimes both 
criminal trial and departmental inquiry go on and there is 
no bar to it, but if a departmental inquiry is withheld till 
the decision of the criminal trial which ended in the acquit­
tal of the employee, the departmental inquiry on charges of 
an identical nature as in the criminal trial is not justi­
fied.^
A departmental proceeding is not a prosecution
within the meaning of Section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, 
nor can it fall within the ambit of Article 20(2), The 
words 'prosecution* and 'punishment' have no fixed canno- 
tation and they are susceptible of both a wider and a 
narrower meaning, but in Article 20(2) both words have been 
used with reference to an 'offence' and the word 'offence'
has to be taken in the sense in which it is used in General
o
Clauses Act, 1897, as meaning 'an act or omi’ission made
1. Spadigam v. State of Kerala, ibid. (1970) K.L.T. 1047.
2. Anantnarayanan K. v. State of Madras (1968) 2 M.L. J.443.
3. Bant a Singh v. National Coal Development Corporation, A.I.R. 
1968 Patna 300.
punishable by any law for the time being in force1 • It 
follows that the prosecution must be with reference to the 
law which creates the offence and the punishment must also 
be in accordance with what the law prescribes. In a de­
partmental inquiry there ms neither a question of investi­
gating an offence punishable in law for the time being in 
force nor is there any question of imposing punishment 
prescribed by law. Hence, Article 20(2) has no applica­
tion.1 Therefore, if a fugitive has been punished in
departmental proceedings in the requested State, thh requi­
sition for trial for a criminal offence is no bar to extra­
dition. If the fugitive has already been tried on the same 
or identical facts and has been convicted or acquitted, the
extradition ___ ' 7 \ ' . for subsequent trial. In cases
where the plea of the accused failed in the previous trial, 
the Supreme Court per obiter has doubted whether the rule 
in question - issue-estoppel - could be pressed against the 
accused. The reason being that while the prosecution
cannot succeed unless it proves its case beyond reasonable 
doubt, the nature of the proof required of the accused is
that his defence must amount to a reasonable plea. In
o
that event, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In
3the case of Manipur Admin is t rat ion, this aspect was noticed 
by the Supreme Court, but they preferred not to express any
1. The State of Andhra Paradesh v. K.H. Khan (1967) 2 A N.W.R.
m n ------------------- ;—  --------
2. Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1281 at p.1285.
3. Manipur AdministrationvXhakchom Bira Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C.
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final opinion on this question, as it did not arise for direct 
consideration. So in extradition proceedings, if the fugi­
tive took a plea in the previous proceedings in a previous 
trial and if it failed or was not accepted by the court, 
then according to the Supreme Court's obiter dicta in Mohar 
Rai and Manipur Administration, that finding could not be 
pressed against the fugitive. This, it is submitted, is 
the better view.
(4) Double Jeopardy and International Practice in 
Extradition Proceedings
Procedural rules in extradition may emanate from 
(a) treaties, (b) extradition legislation or (c) other 
municipal law applicable to criminal proceedings generally 
or to extradition proceedings by analogy, (Sections 7 and 
25 of the Extradition Act, 1962), or by implication or neces­
sary intendment.^
By the laws of some countries (see below), a request
for extradition once rejected on account of procedural defect
or for any other reason, may not be so presented or re-sub-
mitted in relation to the same offence* The Montevideo
Convention, 1933, provides that: »once extradition has been
refused, an application may not be made again for the same
2alleged act* * In re* Diaz, this same rule has bean imported 
by analogy from the principle of non bis in idem in proceed­
ings not governed by express treaty stipulation. But as the 
discharge of the accused is based on the procedural law of 
the requested State, discharge in Anglo-American and Indian 
system of law does not give rise to a subsequent plea of 
* autrefois acquit*. In cases of procedural requirements 
under the treaty no problems arise, each State has access to
i
the treaty clauses in its own language and may from it make
the request suitably. The difficulties arise in cases of
.ed
procedural requirements contain/in Municipal laws of the
1. I.A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law, p.146*
2. Re Diaz. 22 Int. Law Reports 517 (Fd.Ct* Venezuela (1954).
3* U.S. v. Ford and Frjjy. 29 D.L.R. 80 (1916); J.B. Moore, 
Extradition Vol4 «457 at p.461.
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requested State.
As for international practice, a request has been 
refused by Brazilian Courts on the ground that the copy of 
the applicable penal law of the requesting State did not 
accompany the requisition;*** also by Columbia on the ground 
for failure to state in a supporting document that prescript­
ion has not been against the offence for which surrender has 
o
been requested. Extradition has been refused as the datej^
commission of the offence was not specified in the request 
3
for extradition* Warrants must be sufficiently specific 
also as to identity of the fugitive; if the name of the 
fugitive is not known, a description such as would clear 
all reasonable doubts as to the identity is Justifiably ex- 
pected. A requistion must state the offence with suffi­
cient particularity as to appraise the accused of the charge; 
it is not sufficient that the foreign warrant be sworn out
for * a crime of fraud* when fraud simplicter was not a treaty 
5crime*
But under the Extradition Act, 1962, though the 
request must be accompanied by documents (Section 10), the 
request would not be rejected ' outright on technical grounds 
and time may be allowed*
1. Re Gomes* 1929-30 A.D. 281.
2* Re Ribeiro, 26 Int. Law Reports (Columbia ,' 1958 ) 4>p.5 2 5-526 .
3* Re Fonseca, 18 Int. Law Reports , (Argentina,1951J, Case «
No.107.
4. Rossi and Blythe v* Bell (1957) I.R. 281.
5. Re Wise, 168 F* Supp. 366 (S.D. Tex. 1957)4 26 Int. Law Re­
ports, pp.518-525, decided on 31 October, 1957*
(5) Art.20(3) and Extradition
At the time of framing the Constitution in Art.20 
providing for protection/^respect of conviction for offences, 
the principle of guaranteeing to every person, citizen or 
alien, protection against 1 ex post facto* laws, double 
jeopardy and self-incrimination were provided for i'uK.M.
Munshi's draft. Ambedkar*s draft also contained a provi­
sion: *No bill of attainer or * ex post facto* law shall be 
passed* . The draft of Munshi accepted by the Sub-Committee 
on Fundamental Rights contained two clauses, and Art.20(2) 
and (3) were combined in one as clause (2); and later on, 
the drafting committee split up sub-clause (2) into two 
independent clauses, the former dealing with Double jeo­
pardy and the latter with * self-incrimination*. The
drafting committee later on rePUnbered the *self-incrimi- 
nation* clause as Art.20(3) of the Constitution, and it 
was included in the Constitution.^
The privilege under Art.20(3) applies to *testi-
2
monial compulsion* both oral and documentary, that are 
likely to support a prosecution against him.
Before Art.20(3) is brought into play, three con­
ditions must be satisfied: viz. (1) that at the time when
the person made the statements there was a formal accusa­
tion of commission of an offence against him; (2) that he 
was compelled to make those statements, and (3) that the
1. C.A. Deb., Vol.VII, pp.795-7 and 840-2; B. Shiva Rao, The 
Framing of the Constitution, pp.229-31.
2. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 300 at pp. 
303-4.
statements in question would be used against him at the
trial and would prove to be incriminatory in nature.^
This clause confers a privilege upon an accused person
that he shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself; it confers immunity upon an accused person
2
against testimonial compulsion.
In an inquiry under the Sea Customs Act by the 
Customs Officer, any statement made by a person is not 
hit by Art.20(3) of the Constitution.3 The reason is 
the person against whom an inquiry is made by the Customs 
officer is not an 'accused' and the statement made is not 
by a person accused of an offence.
A person accused of an offence may, if he chooses, 
appear as a witness in penalty proceedings. The neces­
sity to enter the witness box for substantiating his defence 
is not compulsion under Art.20(3). In criminal trial under 
section 342 A ; C r i m i n a l  Procedure Code, the accused is 
a competent witness to give evidence on oath in disproof of 
the charges against him, but if he voluntarily gives evidence,
1. Ambalal Chiman lal Chokshi v. State, A. I .P. 1966 Bom. 243.
2. Ambalal, ibid.
3. Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
940=f Ilhas v. Collector of Customs, Madras, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
1965, followed m  Percy Rustonrji Basta v. Ihe State of Mahar- 
ahstra, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1087 at p. 1091.
4. Percy Rustonrji Basta v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1971, 
S.C. 1087 at p.l09l.
5. Sec.342Aof the Indian Criminal Procedure Code.
Art.20(3) is not attracted. Compulsion under Art.20(3)
1
must precede from another person or authority. But the 
Supreme Court left the matter open whether it would be 
compulsion or not if the authorities summoned him to give 
evidence, as the question did not arise in that case.
Under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, all persons 
are competent to testify, unless the court considers that 
they axe incapable of understanding the questions put to them 
for reasons indicated in that section. Under Section 132, a 
witness shall not be excused from answering any questions as 
to anything relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal 
proceedings (among others) upon the ground that the answer 
to such question will incriminate or may, tend directly or 
indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any 
kind. The safeguard to this compulsion is that no such 
answer which the witness is compelled to give exposes him 
to any axxest or prosecution, nor can it be proved against 
him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for 
giving false evidence by such answer. The protection is 
further fortified by Art.20(3) which says that no person 
accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness 
against himself. This Article protects a person who is 
accused of an offence and not those questioned as witnesses.
A person who voluntarily answers questions from the witness 
box waives the privilege which is against being compelled 
to be a witness against himself because then he is not a 
witness against himself but against others.
1. T.G. Goakarv. R.N. Shukla, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1050 at p.1053 
per Bachawat J •
Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act sufficiently 
protects him since his testimony does not go against himself*
Oj
In this respect, the witness is in worsexposition than the 
accused who volunteers to give evidence on his own behalf 
or on behalf of the co-accused* There, too, the accused 
waives the privilege conferred on him by the Article since 
he is subjected to cross-examination and may be, asked ques­
tions, incriminating him.**-
Compulsion may take many forms* A person accused 
of an offence may be subject to physical or mental torture*
He may be starved or beaten and a confession may be extorted 
from him* By deceitful means he may be induced to believe 
that his son is being tortured in the adjoining room and by 
such inducement he may be compelled to make an incriminating 
statement* Element of duress, coercion or compulsion, use 
of force against the person, use of oppressive ways in ex­
tracting confession are the prerequsities of applicability
2
of Article 20(3) to prove compulsion* In this case, the 
Supreme Cpurt did not lend its approval to the police prac­
tice of tapping telephone wires and setting up hidden micro­
phones for the purpose of tape-recording* Asking the accused 
to give thumb impressions or specimen handwriting does not 
amount to testimonial compulsion which is violative of Art*
3
20(3)* In a later case, the Supreme Court held that the
tape-recorded conversation was admissible in evidence and
1* Hidayatullah J* in Laxmipat Chorasia v* State of Mahrasthra, 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 938 at p.942.
2. Per Bachawat J* in Yussufali v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 
1968 S.C. 147*
3* Mahadeva Reddy J. in Rama Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 
(1971) 2 An. W.R. 94;— (TaVVSTflfflfent of MAb'IbTff V. niUkulium — 
Tomba Singh. A.I.R. 1969, Mahipur 22.
there was no violation of either Article 20(3) or Article 20 
of the Constitution, as the conversation recorded on the tape 
has a mechnical contrivance to play the role of an eaves­
dropper and the conversation not being extracted under duress 
or compulsion was not hit by Art.20(3).* Even if dtiidence 
is illegally obtained it is admissible, as long as it is 
not tainted by an inadmissible confession of guilt.
But tape-recording evidence should be genuine and 
free from tampering or mutilation and the court may also 
secure scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the
3
police officer in recording such evidence.
In extradition proceedings, the fugitive may invoke 
Art.20(3) before the Magistracy, the Central Government or 
the Superior Courts. Ihis article is a privilege against 
self-incrimination, one of the fundamental canons of common 
law system of criminal jurisprudence in America, embodied 
in 5th Amendment. This salutary privilege is based upon 
the principle that an accused is presumed to be innocent 
throughout the trial and that it is for the prosecution to 
prove and establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and 
the accused need not make any statement if he dods not want 
to. Compulsory examination of the accused has a danger of 
use of force and torture against him to entrap him into 
fatal contradictions and confusions and admissions. This
1. R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1973 S.C.157.
2. R. v. Let ham (1861) 8 Cox C.C. 1^ 98.
3. R.M. Malkani, ibid.; Reid on June v. Owen, 34 J.P. 759; R. v. 
Maqsud All* (1965) 2 All E.R. 464; Magraj Patodia v. R.K. Birla, 
A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1295; Yusufali v. State o£ Maharashtra, A .I.R. 
1968 S.C. 147; Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964
S.C. 72.
privilege enables the maintenance of human privacy and obser­
vance of civilised standards in the enforcement of purity of 
criminal justice* This clause is an immunity against testi­
monial compulsion and is a right pertaining to a person tfaccused 
of an offence* and it is a protection against the ’person 
accused* against * compulsion to ba a witness', resulting in 
his giving evidence against himself* Testimonial compulsion
is not only intended in the court-room but it may extend to
2
compelled testimony previously obtained from him* But con­
fessions obtained by coercion may not technically amount to 
compelling the 'person accused' to incriminate himself though 
the use of coercion is obnoxious to all fundamental principles 
of criminal justice* The prohibition in this clause equally 
applies to pre- and post-constitution cases alike. Avail­
ability of the protection under this clause pre-supposes a
5 6formal accusation with regard to an offence punishable
and extraditable under the Extradition Act; and the proceed-
7
ings must be before a Court of law or judicial tribunal*
This Constitutional immunity can be invoked in extradition
8proceedings before a magistrate, but not in proceedings such
1* Section 2(b) of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962*
2. Sharma v. Satish, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 300.
3* Kalawati v. State of H.P.. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 131.
v \   • -  -  .  . •  f  *
4. Shiva Bahadur Singh v. State of TElndhya Pradesh. A.X.R* 1953
S.C. 39^.
5. Section 2(b) of the 1962 Act.
6 . Second Schedule or treaty provision sec.2(c)(ii) of the Extra­
dition Act.
7. Narayanlal v. Naneck, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 29.
8 . Under Section 7 and 9 of the 1962 Act.
as under Section 240 of the Companies Act, 1956,^ or in pro-
2
ceedings under the Insurance Act, or in proceedings under 
the Banking Companies Act, 1949. The possibility of any 
disclosures made in these later categories of proceedings 
(other than extradition proceedings) leading to the starting 
of some criminal prosecution at some future date will not be 
a sufficient ground for invoking Art.20(3) of the Consti­
tution.4
1. Narayan lal v. Naneck, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 29, supra.
2. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1821.
3. Joseph v. Narayanant A.I.R. 1964, S.C. 1552.
4. Narayan lal v. Naneck, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 29, supra.
(6) Article 21 and Extradition
*■ 1 The Supreme Court of India m  Khafltr...^ Singh* s case
held: * Article 21 is largely modelled on the lines of the 'due
process* clause*• It also bears a similarity to Art.31 of
2
the Japanese Constitution, 1946. The due process clause
3
i$ to be traced to Magna Carta, 1215, clause 39 and 40. The 
phrase *due process of law* did not occur in the Magna Carta, 
but in later statutes of English law that phrase was used
synonymously with the phrase * law of the land* . The Petition
4
of Rights, 1628, prayed that 'freeman to be imprisoned or 
detained only by * law of the land* or by due process of law 
and not by the Kings special command without any charge'•
Due process of law was thus understood as a limitation upon 
the arbitrary power of the king or executive.
The framers of the American Constitution did not 
put the 'Due process' clause into that instrument. The 
clause was included later in the bill of rights and appears
5
in the Fifth Amendment adopted in 1791 as a limitation
1. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R, 1963 S.C. 1295.
2. Mukherjea J. in A.K. G opalan's case, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, 
supra. , . . ~ . ~ ; • *
3. For historical development of Qoncept of personal liberty in 
Magna Carta, 1215, see A. Ghaffar: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
1971, London University, pp.27-28.
4. For history of the Petition of Rights and the Bill of Rights, 
see A. Ghaffar, ibid. t pp.31-34. For the Virginia Declaration, 
1776 and the French Declaration of Rights, 1789, see Ghaffar, 
ibid., pp.34-37.
5. For history of the American Bill of Rights, 1791, see A.Ghaffar 
ibid.. pp.37-39.
upon the Federal power. A similar limitation upon the States
was introduced by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868.^ " Before 1850, due process was generally assumed to be
a procedural rather than a substantive restriction upon govern-
2
mental authority. About 1850, the protection of vested
rights, i.e. Fundamental Rights became associated with the due
3
process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Dred Scott Case,
4
and Hepbterk case, represented a radical departure in the 
historic meaning of 'due process', and the words have been 
interpreted by the American Judges to give a substantive 
content so as to make it a guarantee against unreasonable 
legislative interference with private property and a consti­
tutional limitation upon legislative capacity to interfere 
with vested rights; and the nature of the liberty protected 
by the 'due process* clause was held to include: I'not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical 
restrinat of his personastby incarceration; but the term 
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free 
in the enjoyment of his faculties; to be free to use them 
in all lawful ways; live and work where he will; to earn 
his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any liveli­
hood or avocation etci5 The words 'due process' have been 
interpreted by the American judges to cover both substantive 
and procedural law. The word * law* has been interpreted to
1. : A.Ghaffar, ibid*, p.43.
2. B. Shiva Rao, ibid*, p.233; Alladi Krishna-Swami*s Speech.
3* Dred Scott Case: (1857) 19 How-393-15.Law Ed*~*691.
Hepb^r^ v* Griswold (1870) 8 Wall 603-19.Uy m
  0X9-&1- ^
5. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 J?.S.578^ »41-Law Ed*f?32, ^
d j U j i d J u L  jr. S t J e
mean 'reasonable law', and the word 'due' interpreted as 
'just and proper1 according to judicial interpretation; and 
what is 'just and proper' depends upon the circumstances of 
a particular case and what may be regarded as reasonable in 
one set of circumstances in a given case may not be so in a 
different set of circumstances. This clause in America 
imposes a limitation upon all the powers of the Government, 
legislative as well as executive and judicial. Applied in 
England only as a protection against executive protection 
and Royal tyranny, in America it became a bulwark against 
arbitrary l e g i s l a t i o n I t  is for the courts to pronounce 
whether a particular law affecting a person's life, liberty
or property is reasonable or not. The words 'liberty' and 
'property* have wide connotations; most of the legislation 
affects the individual's liberty or property in some way and 
therefore, the court can review almost any law, and the due 
process clause thus assumes the character of a general re­
striction on all legislative power giving a veto thereon to 
the courts. On the procedural side, due process clause en­
visages the observance of principles of natural justice.
In substance, the due process clause insisted .not only on 
a reasonable procedure but even on substantive law being 
reasonable, i.e. what squared with the notions of justice 
and fair play of the judiciary.
In India, the Constituent Assembly had originally 
used the words 'due process of law* in the draft constitu­
tion, but later on changed the words and adopted the present
1. Hurtado v. People of California, 110 U.S. 516 at p.532
terminology 1procedure established by l a w * T h e  main reason 
for adopting the present terminology *procedure established by 
law* instead of 'due process* clause was that in America there 
was no uniformity in judicial decisions as to what was reason­
able; and the concept of reasonableness varied from judge to 
judge, Act to Act, time to time and subject matter to subject 
matter and the framers of the Constitution of India wanted.*0
eliminate the elements of uncertainty, vagueness and change­
ability that had grown around the American concept of due 
process; they also did not want to give a power of veto to
the judiciary over the legislative powers of Parliament or
2
the State Legislatures* The expression 'procedure esta­
blished by law* has been borrowed from Article 31 of the
3Japanese Constitution, 1946* Like the Belgian Constitu-
4
tion, and unlike English Constitution, the right of Personal 
liberty flows from the Constitution itself*
5
In Gopalan's case, the Supreme Court of India 
pointed out several points of contrast and distinction be­
tween the American and Indian concepts viz* in U.S.A. the 
word 'liberty' is used simpliciter* while in India it is 
restricted in Article 21 to 'personal liberty* which is
comparatively a narrower concept; in the U.S.A. the same
1* B. Shiva Rao, Ihe Framing of the Constitution* pp.231-237*
2. See B. Shiva Rao, ibid* * p.237, Alladi Rrishna^Swami Ayyar's 
Speech * ^
3* Mukherjea J* in A.K. Gopalan's case, supra, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 
27.
4. Wade & Phillips, Constitutional Law, p.488« ^th Ed.
5. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
protection has been given to property also, whereas in India 
there are separate Constitutional provisions for the same; 
such as Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31. In India/ the word 
'due* has been omitted and this deliberate omission is very
significant, for much of the efficacy of the American doc­
trine depends on the presence of this word. The Supreme 
Court also pointed out that the American doctrine of 1 due 
process' generated the countervailing doctrine of 'police 
powers' , i.e. the power of the Government to regulate 
private rights in public interest, which was another compli­
cated concept evolved judicially to contain the concept of 
'due process', and to say that the doctrine of 'due process' 
has been imported into India would imply that the doctrine 
of police power was also so imported, in which case it 
would amount to a great deal of complications. In Gopalan*s 
case, Fazal Ali J. disagreed with the majority in interpret­
ing 'procedure established by law' • He held that it meant
'procedural due process' meaning thereby that no person can 
be condemned without a hearing for that is a principle well 
recognised in all modern civilised legal systems. In 
Gopalan's case, the whole argument centred around procedure 
and it was not argued that substantive due process should 
be imported. Professor Alan Gledhill is of the view that 
the interpretation of Article 21 in Gopalan's case is ex­
tremely literal.^
The expression 'procedure established by law' de­
notes an enacted law and not law in the abstract or principles
1. Alan Gledhill, Life & Liberty in Republican India, 2 j.I.L.rt 
p.241 (1960).
of natural justice.*- It does not denote law in the abstract
2
sense of Jus but it means enacted law or lex. The express­
ion refers to the procedure prescribed by any law which is 
duly made - such as the Indian Extradition Act. This express­
ion is not confined to the procedure contained in the Civil 
Procedure Code or Criminal Procedure Code. It is open to 
the Parliament or State Legislatures to alter the prescribed 
procedure - as Parliament in exercise of its powers under 
Articles 246 and 253 and entry 18 of List I of the Seventh 
Schedule replaced the Extradition Act of 1903 and Fugitive 
Offenders Act of 1881, by the Extradition Act of 1962, pro­
vided lot of different procedures in them and such amended
procedure (Extradition Act, 1962) will also be the ’proced- 
ure established by law* within the meaning of Article 21.
The word ’procedure* as used in Article 21 is not confined 
solely to the procedural provisions. Process of procedure 
in this respect refers to both the Act and the manner of 
proceedings to take away the personal liberty or life of 
the citizen as in extradition proceedings. Therefore, pro­
cedure means * manner and form* of enforcing the law and if 
the ’manner and form' results in non-compliance of the 
formalities of extradition procedure provided in the Act,
the proceedings can be quashed by Superior Court being
4contrary to Article 21. ’Procedure’ must be taken to
1. Kani.aC.J. in Gopalan’s case, supra, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
2. A.K. Gopalan, supra, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
3. S. Krishna and Others v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 
35T.---------------  -----------------
4. Hans Muller’s case, supra, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
signify some step or method of manner of proceedings which may 
lead to the deprivation of life or personal liberty of the 
fugitive, e.g. a request for extradition is not made to and 
by the proper authority in a proper mode, completing all the 
formalities (Section 4 of 1962 Act) or that the Central 
Government does not properly nominate a magistrate of compe­
tent jurisdiction (Section 5) or that the Magistrate does not 
issue a proper warrant, containing all the necessary pre­
requisites of a warrant or that the trial is not in accordance 
with the provisions of Sections 7 to 10 of the 1962 Act or that 
where Chapter III is applicable, Chapter II is applied or that 
there are no proper notifications under Section 3 & 12 of the 
Act or that the matters mentioned in Sections 21, 29, 31 and 
32 are ignored by the Courts and the executive, then the wrong 
steps, forms and manners of proceedings would be challenged as 
not being in accordance with the ’procedure established by law’ 
under Article 21. Ihis Article confers only protection 
against the executive authority and not against legislature. 
This Article, in substance, is akin to Article 7 of the Belgian 
Constitution of 1831, which provides that ’no man shall be 
prosecuted, except in cases provided by the law and in accord­
ance with the procedure laid down by it*.
A necessary corollary follows that the courts while 
dealing with extradition proceedings must see that the law, - 
The Extradition Act of 1962, or any rules framed, if ever, 
by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under 
Section 36 of the Act of 1962 - under which action is being 
taken is a valid piece of legislation, passed by a legis­
lature competent to do so and does not violate any provi­
sion provided in Part III of the Constitution otherwise
such law or provision and rules or notification under Section
3 or 12 of the Act will be declared ultra vires*  ^ Thus,
liberty of a person cannot be taken away without having re-
2course to *procedure established by law*. Similarly, if
the offence is not found in the Second Schedule to the 1962 
Act or in a treaty or even if found in a treaty, no Notifi­
cation has been made under Section 3 or 12, as the case may 
be, it would not amount to a procedure established by law 
under which extradition proceedings can be arranged* United 
Kingdom and United States of America entered into a treaty 
on 9 June, 1972, making hijacking of planes an extraditable 
offence* It is hoped that similar provisions will soon 
be made by India in the Extradition Act, especially after 
the Lahore hijacking incident*
The Indian Extradition Act of 1962 is the ’pro­
cedure established by law’ within the meaning of Article 21 
of the Constitution* This act has been, enacted by Parlia­
ment in exercise nf*the powers conferred upon it bytvArticl-es 
246 and 253 of the Constitution read with entries 10, 14 
and 18 of List I of the Seventh Schedule* Article 246(1) 
gives exclusive power to Parliament to legislate with respect 
to any matter given in List I of the Seventh Schedule*
Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law in order to 
implement any international agreements like extradition 
treaties and arrangements which the Government of India
1. Collector of Malabar v* Ereminal Bbhrahim Hajee, A.I.R. 1957
S.C. 688; Vishvanath v* State of U.P. , A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 67; 
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I."r . 1950 S.C. 27; K.Kathi 
Ran m g  Rawat v. State of Saurashtra* A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 1^3.
2. Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab (1952) S.C.R. 368: 
A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 27*
may have entered into with foreign countries. Entry 10 of 
the Union list makes 1 foreign affairs* the monopoly of the 
Centraiv Government. * Foreign affairs* are interpreted to 
include *all matters which bring the Union in relation with 
any foreign country*, Entry 14 empowers the Union Govern­
ment to enter into treaties with foreign countries and to 
implement the same. Entry 18 specifically empowers the 
Parliament to make extradition laws.'1’
Article 21 gives a right to a citizen of India to
lead a free life subject to social control imposed by valid 
law. The use of the word ‘personal liberty* in Article 21 
is a comprehensive one and the ‘right to move freely* used 
in Article 19(d) is an attribute to personal liberty. Both 
are independent fundamental rights though there is some over­
lapping. One is not carved out of the other. The funda­
mental right of * life and personal liberty* has many attri-
o
butes and some of them are under Article 19. The express­
ion ‘life* used in Article 21 is not only confined to the 
taking away of life, i.e. causing death but in the words of
3
Field J. in Munn*s case, and approved by the Indian Supreme 
Court, defines it as:
**Something more than mere animal exist­
ence. The inhibition against its depri­
vation extends to all those limbs and 
faculties by which life is enjoyed. The 
provision equally prohibits the mutilation
1. Hans Muller*s case, supra, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
2. KharkeSingh v. State of U.P., A.I.R.1963 S.C.1295 at p.1305.
3. Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U.S. 113, approved by the Supreme 
Court of India In Khaxk, Singh v. State Of U.P., A.I.R. 1963
S.C. 1295 at p. 1305, per Subba Rao J., and in Sat want Singh v. 
A.P.O. New Delhi, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836 at p.1844.
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of the body by the amputation of an arm 
or leg, of the putting of an eye, or the 
destruction of any other organ of the 
body through which the soul^ communicates 
with the outer world11,
and in this case it was stated that the word »life* in Article
21 bears the same significance.* The expression ‘liberty*
in America is given a very wide meaning and takes in all
o
freedoms. The U.S. Supreme Court in Balling*s case ob­
served:
**The expression was not confined to 
mere freedom from bodily restraint and 
that liberty under law extended to the 
full range of conduct which the indi­
vidual was free to pursue. But this 
absolute right to liberty was regu­
lated to protect other social inter­
ests by the State exercising its power 
such as police power, the power of 
eminent domain, the power of taxa­
tion, etc."
The proper exercise of the power which is called the *due 
process of law* is controlled by the American Supreme Court.
In Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the word 
•liberty* has been qualified by the word ‘personal* indica­
ting thereby that it is confined only to the liberty of the 
person. This would not include the liberties included in 
Art.19.
Diecy explains concept of personal liberty thus:
**The right not to be subjected to im­
prisonment, arrest or other physical 
coercion in any manner that does not 
admit of legal justification.** 3
1. Khaf&I -iSingh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295 at p. 1305.
2. Balling v. Sharpe (1954) 347 U.S. 497 at p.499, followed in 
KhaJk( -Singh, ibid. at p. 1305. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262^u.s.390.
3. Di^ey, Constitutional Law, 9th Ed., pp.207-208. Quoted with 
approval in ~Khafek\ Singh, ibid. at p.1305.
Blackstone about ‘personal liberty* observes: ‘Personal
Liberty* includes,
“the power to locomotion of changing 
situation, or removing one's person, 
to whatsoever, place one's inclina­
tion may direct, without imprisonment 
or restraint, unless by due course of 
law.**^
In Gopalan's case, personal liberty was described to mean 
liberty relating to or concerning the person or body of the 
individual and personal liberty was in this sense, the ante- 
thesis of physical restraint or coercion. The Supreme Court 
in Kha&; -Singh* s case, defined the right of ‘personal lib­
erty* in Article 21 as a right of an individual to be free 
from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether 
those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed 
or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. Re­
ferring to ‘coercion and physical restraints', the Supreme 
Court in Khark -Singh's case observed:
“The expression is wide enough to take 
in a right to be free from restrictions 
placed on his movements. The expres­
sion 'coercion* in the modern age can 
not be construed in a narrow sense.
In an uncivilized society, where there 
are no inhibitions, only physical re­
straints may detract from personal 
liberty, but as civilization advances 
the psychological restraints are more 
effective than physical ones. The 
scientific methods used to condition 
a man* s mind are in a real sense phy­
sical restraints, for they engender
1. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1,^ 
p.134. Quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Khark * 
Singh, supra, at p. 1305. See also for 'Liberty' : American 
Jurisprudence, Vol.II, Para.329 at p.1135.
2. KhaaSb A.Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1295 at p.1306.
3. Khaik* ^Singh, ibid. at p. 1305.
physical fear channelling one’s 
actions through anticipated and 
expected grooves. So also crea­
tion of conditions which neces­
sarily engender inhibitions and 
fear complexes can be described 
as physical restraints.”
This doctrine of * personal liberty* was extended by the Supreme
Court placing reliance upon the dictum of Frankfurter J. in
Wolf’s case  ^to encroachment on a person* s private life even
though the Indian Constitution does not expressly declare a
right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right
was held to be an essential ingredient of personal liberty.
o
The Supreme Court in Satwant Singh*s case, after
(*■'' X  o
quoting^passage from Kharfo Singh* s case, held that that 
decision is clear authority for the position that ’liberty* 
in our constitution bears the same comprehensive meaning as 
is given to the expression 1 liberty* by the 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the express­
ion ’personal liberty* in Article 21 excludes only the ingred­
ients of ’liberty* enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution. 
Lord Atkin observed:
**It is one of the pillars of liberty 
that in English law, every imprison­
ment is prima facie unlawful and that 
it is for the person directing im­
prisonment to justify his act.** 4
As for extradition, Moore says:
it
^In the absence of a conventional 
or a legislative provision, there 
ds no authority vested in any de­
partment of the Government to
1. Wolf v. Colorado (1948) 338 U.S.25: 93 Law Ed.1782
2. Satwant Singh v. A.P. Q,« New Delhi, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836 at 
p.1844.
3. KharJ££- iSingh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1295i
4. Liversidge v. Anderson, L.R. (1942) A.C.206.
seize a fugitive criminal and surrender 
him to a foreign power."!
The Uhif£d States Supreme Court has observed:
"Applying, as we must, our law in de­
termining the authority of the Presi­
dent, we are cons trained to hold that 
his power, in the absence of statute 
conferring an independent power, must 
be found in the treaty".2
In England, in the absence of legal authority, the Government 
cannot send a fugitive out of the country to be tried for an 
offence committed abroad. In India, the question pointedly
arose before the Rajasthan High Court in Birma 4 and Nanakas’5 
case that in the absence of treaties having been given the 
force of Municipal law, the fugitive could not be extradited 
and that would be against ’procedure established by law * 
within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
reason is that the Constitution creates no executive pre­
rogative to restrict the liberty of the individual. Conse­
quently, no one can be arrested or detained and deprived of 
his personal liberty except under the provisions of the 
Indian Extradition Act and before extradition is ordered 
or the fugitive surrendered, all the formalities provided 
under the Extradition Act should be complied with, as has 
been held by the Supreme Court of India in Hans Muller’s
1. J.B. Moore, Extradition, op.cit.. p.21.
2. Valentine et al. v. United States ex. rel Neidecker, op.cit..
p.18; Also see United States v. Rauscher (1886) 119 U.S. 407
at pp.411-412.
3. S.D. Bedi, op.cit., p.42; See also Cases cited by Bedi at 
p.42, n.77.
4. Birma v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Raj.127.
5. Nanka v. of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 153.
1 2 case. , Apart from Hams Muller’s case, Lord Russell C.J.
in the leading English case Re Arton No.2 , points out as 
under:
11 The conditions of extradition ... 
are following: (1) the impugned crime
must be within the treaty; (2) it must 
be a crime against the law of the de­
manding country; (3) it must be a 
crime within the English Extradition 
Act, 1870 and 1873; and (4) there 
must be such evidence before the com­
mitting magistrate as would warrant 
him in sending for trial, if it were 
an ordinary case in this country."
In Australia, too, this is the law* There, it has beert held 
that in modern times at least the power of arrest of fugi­
tive offenders is subject not only to treaty but also to
3the Statute law* A similar statement of law would be
4found in the leading Canadian cases, and other cases cited 
by Bedi.^
The conclusion, therefore, is that if the extra­
dition proceedings are not in accordance with the Extradition 
Act of 1962, or are against Chapters II and III of the Con­
stitution, and the procedure not being ’procedure established 
by law*, the extradition will be hit by Article 21 and the 
request for extradition will be refused.
fL
In Gopalan’s case, the Supreme Court judges
1. Hans Muller v* Superintendent Presidency Jails_ Calcutta, A.I.R. 
I5S3 S .C .367 *
2. Re Arton No*2 (1896) 1 Q.B. 509 at p*513, per Lord Russell,CJ.
3* Brown v. Lizards (1905) 2 C.L.R. 837, Griffith, C.J., Barnton 
and O’Cofynor, JJ.
4. Re Collins (No*3) (1905) 10 C.C.C. 80.
5. Bedi, op.cit., at p.42, n.77.
6. A.K. G op a lan v. State of Madras. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, supra.
were unanimous on the question that if there was no enacted 
law at all, the freedom guaranteed under Article 21 would 
be violated if an attempt is made to deprive any one of his
’personal liberty’; though the learned judges differed as
(
to whether any and every enacted law satis^ed the descrip­
tion or requirements of ’a procedure established by law’.
If the words ’due process’ would \have been used 
in this Article, then the courts could have examined both 
the substantive and procedural aspects of the Indian Extra­
dition Act, 1962, the treaties entered by India with other 
countries, the ’reciprocity’ clauses and also the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, and might have looked into the reason­
ableness of the law and would have seen if such law is ’just 
and proper* and the ’reasonableness* of the ’procedural law’ 
and ’substantive law' both would have been examined by the 
courts; and the courts would have seen whether the extra­
dition law or treaties in force in India squared with the 
notions of justice and fairplay of the judiciary. But in 
the words of Mukherjea J. in Gopalan’s case ’the constitu­
tion makers of India deliberately decided to place these 
powers in the hands of the legislature.*
The courts in India can examine whether the 
Extradition Act, 1962, and the treaties having been given 
the force of Municipal Law have been enacted by a compe­
tent legislature, keeping in view the scheme of distri­
bution of powers to the respective legislatures under the 
Constitution and that the law or any part of it is not 
repugnant and does not contravene any of the fundamental 
rights of the fugitive - whether a citizen or alien - like 
Article 14, 20, 21 and 22, etc. Before a person is de-
463.
prived of his life or personal liberty, three conditions are 
to be fulfilled, viz. (i) there should be a law conferring 
authority to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty; 
(ii) the law should provide a modeof procedure for such depri­
vation; and (iii) the law should be enacted by the competent 
legislature. If these conditions are fulfilled, the reason­
ableness of* the substantive law or of the procedure laid down 
by the Extradition Act is not a justiciable matter and thus, 
Article 21 provides no protection or immunity against compe­
tent legislative action. The extradition law as mentioned 
above, has been duly enacted by the Parliament in exercise 
of its powers conferred upon it b^Articles 246 and 253 of 
the Constitution read with entries 10, 14 and 18 of the 
Union List as given in the Seventh Schedule. The Extra­
dition Act of 1962 is a law enacted by the competent legis­
lature and it is a valid law-conferring authority to deprive 
the person of his life and personal liberty. Chapters II 
and III of the Act of 1962 provide the mode of procedure 
for such deprivation, together with the safeguards provided 
in section 21, 29, 31 and 32 of that Act. These are the 
checks and counter-checks in the form of grounds for refusal 
to surrender the fugitive. As the above three conditions 
of Article 21 are fulfilled by the Extradition Act, Article 
21 provides no protection or immunity against competent 
legislative action and the law or its reasonableness not 
being made justiceable by courts by virtue of Article 21, 
the Parliament has the final say in its sagacity to have 
laid down the procedure in Chapters II and III of the Act 
and to] provide the grounds of refusal to surrender and 
also enact other ancillary provisions, with powers of
treaties entered to give the force of law under Section 3 
and 12 by notification.
'Administration of Justice' forms part of 
Entry 3 of the State List as given in the Seventh Schedule.
Entry 18 of the Union List empowers Parliament to make extra­
dition laws. Since extradition also forms part of the 'ad­
ministration of justice* cases may arise, when the same per­
son is being tried for an offence in India and also a request 
has been made by a foreign State or Commonwealth country or 
countries for his extradition. For extradition purpose, 
the Centre has to deal with the matter and for trial in 
India, it is the sphere of the internal administration of 
justice and an apparent conflict between the Centre and the 
States seem to arise in the matter. Obviously, in cases 
of conflict between the Central legislature and the State 
legislature, the latter must give way to the former on the 
basis of the doctrine of 'pith and substance* as described 
by the Privy Council in Profulla Kumar's case,^  and by the 
Federal Court in Subrahmanyan and by the Supreme Court in 
Atiabari, and in Chambarbangwala cases.
In 'pith and substance * jfche matter could be re­
garded as one related to extradition and the Union Government, 
therefore, could claim full jurisdiction to act.
1. Profulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, 74 I.C. 23.
2. Subrahmanyan v. Muthu Swami, 1940 F.C.R 188.
3. Atiabari Tea Co. v. S;tate of Assam? A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 232.
4. State of Bombay v. R.M•D. Chambarbangwala, 1957 S.C.R.874.
Parliament has provided in Section 31(d) of the 
Act of 1962 that if the fugitive is accused by a foreign 
State of an offence other than the one he is charged with 
in India, for Which he may be undergoing a sentence, his 
extradition may be refused until after he has been discharged 
in India whether by an acquittal or expiration of his sentence. 
Ihus, a possible difficulty arising out of two different acti­
vities unddr two different legislative entries* Entry 18 :of 
the Union List and Entry 3 of the State List, is avoided.
Whether or not there is distinct and rigid sepa­
ration of powers under the Indian Constitution, it has en-
*
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trusted to the Judicature the task of construing the provsi-
A
sions of the Constitution and of safeguarding "the Fundamental 
Rights. When a statue, is challenged on the ground that 
it has been passed by the legislature without authority, or 
has otherwise unconstitutionally trespassed on Fundamental 
Rights, it is for the courts to determine the dispute and 
decide whether the law passed by the legislature is valid 
or not* Just as/the legislature are conferred legislative 
powers and their functions are normally confined to legis­
lative functions, and the functions and authority of the 
executive lie within the domain of the executive authority, 
so the jurisdiction and authority of the judicature in this 
country lie within the domain of adjudication. If the 
validity of any law, and in any case of any provision of 
extradition or a treaty given the force of law, or any 
rules that may be framed under section 36 of the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1962, is challenged before the courts, 
the adjudication of such a dispute is entrusted solely
and exclusively to the judicature in this country
The legislatures in India have undoubtedly 
plenary powers but these powers are controlled by the basic 
concepts of the written constitution itself and can be 
exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their 
jurisdiction by the three lists in the 7th Schedule.
1. In r* under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, A.I.R.' 
1965 SJC. 745 at p.763 per Gajendragadkar C.J. A
(7) Extradition and Article 22.
(a) Brief History of Article 22
Preventive detention came to India officially with 
the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation III of 1818, the oldest 
statute dealing with preventive detention in India,'1’ and it 
was extended in 1819 and 1827 to Madras and Bombay Presiden­
cies* These three regulations were permanent, and the Bengal 
Regulation was extended to other parts of India during the 
period from 1879 to 1929* Preventive detention was also 
authorised in other ways* Provincial Assemblies passed 
such Acts* Detention was either authorised, or power was 
provided to authorise it, by Defence of India Acts of 1915 
and 1939, by the Government of India Act, 1919, by the in­
famous Rowla t Act, and by such other measures as the Re-
2
striction and Detention Ordinance III of 1944. The Con-' >,
gress Ministries in office between 1937 to 1939 had done"* 
away with some of these laws but between 1947-5©, there was 
a rush of Public Order and Public Safety Acts throughout 
the country. No less than 12 provinces adopted such Acts.
The Bengal Regulation of 1818 itself was brought up to date 
by the Bengal State Prisoners Regulations (Adaptation) Order,
promulgated in 1947 by the Governor-General under the Indian
3
Independence Act. But the rigors and protection of
1. A. Gledhill, The Republic of India, The development of its 
laws and constitutions, p.173.
2. Mohammed Iqbal, The Law of Preventive Detention in England, 
India and Pakistan, p. 137; Glanville Austin, The Indian Con­
stitution, p.107.
3. Sec.9, Iqbal, op.cit., p.126.
these laws were different in different provinces• The acts 
allowed detention from 15 days to six months; with exten­
sions permitted by some provinces. Acts in all provinces, 
except U.P., required that the detenue should be informed of 
grounds of detention; though in U.P. if he was to be de­
tained after six months, then the matter was to be referred 
to a special tribunal. All these Acts, excepting that of 
Bombay, granted the detenu the right to make representation 
against his arrest and detention, but some laws provided
that attention need be paid to such representation as the 
Governor desired. Few of the provincial laws allowed the
detenu a counsel. Of course, the West Bengal Act III of
1948 made a provision for placing the case before the 
Calcutta High Court if the detention was to exceed 3 months, 
and the High Court could release him in case of insufficient 
grounds. In case the detention was upheld, the person 
could be detained for 6 months before the case could go to 
the High Court again.^
In the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar intro­
duced Article 15A to qualify and limit the powers of preven­
tive detention conferred by Article 15 of the draft consti­
tution. Together these articles of the draft constitution 
now constitute Article 22 of the Constitution. It puts a
check on unlawful arrest by the executive, gives the accused 
a right to be produced before the ^ nearest Magistrate within 
24 hours, and a right not to be detained further without 
the authority of the Magistrate and right to consult and
1. Iqbal, ibid., pp.161-3.
to be defended by a Coun^ fcl of his c h o i c e A f t e r  the 
coming into force of the Constitution, some of the Preven­
tive Detention laws came to be questioned in the courts on 
the ground of their incompatibility with Fundamental Rights.
To avoid the ensuing confusion, and to provide for the pro­
tection of the country against violent activity organised 
in secrecy and intended to produce chaos, Parliament enacted 
the Preventive Detention Act in 1950,*citing labour troubles, 
the Telengana uprising, and pointing to the Communists in 
justification of such executive powers. Patel explained 
to Parliament that it would be used against those whose 
avowed object is to create disruption, dislocation and 
tamper with communications, to suborn loyalty and to make 
it impossible for normal Government based on law to function. 
The original Act has been extended from time to time and 
though the authority given to the Central Government is a 
potential danger to individual liberty, it has been used 
with restraint.
Enacted purely as a temporary measure for nearly
a year in the first instance, its life was extended from time
2
to time till it lapsed on 31 December, 1969. With the 
lapse of the Preventive Detention Act enacted by Parliament, 
a few States have enacted necessary legislation for the pur­
pose in exercise of their powers under Entry 3, List III of
3
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
A law for preventive detention can be made by
1. B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of the Constitution, pp.238-249.
2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 2nd Ed. (1970) p.596.
3. M.P. Jain, ibid., pp.595, 605.
Parliament exclusively under Entry 9, List 1, of the Seventh 
Schedule of the Constitution of India, for reasons connected 
with defence, foreign affairs, or the security of India, and 
by Parliament and State legislatures concurrently under Entry 
3, List III, for reasons connected with the security of a 
State, maintenance of public order or maintenance of supplies 
and services essential to the Community.'1'
(b) Article 22 and Deportation Proceedings
Coming to the applicability of the Preventive 
Detention Act relating to the deportation or expulsion of 
Foreigners as an alternative to extradition, the competence 
of the Central legislature to enact a law dealing with this 
use of preventive detention is derived from Entry 9 of the 
Union list read with Entry 10. The scope of Entry 9 is in 
regard to ’Preventive Detention for reasons connected there­
with ... Foreign Affairs* and the scope of Foreign affairs 
is indicated in Entry 10: * Foreign affairs; all matters 
which bring the Union in relation with any foreign country*• 
Given these entries their widest range, it follows that the 
legislation for keeping foreigners under preventive deten­
tion without trial brings the Union into relation with a 
foreign country. The legislative competence of the Indian 
Parliament covers not only section 3(1)(b) of the Preven­
tive Detention Act, 1950, but also the Foreigners Act, 1946, 
for deporting or expelling aliens from India, and restrict­
ing their right of movement and prescribing the place of 
their residence as an alternative to extradition, and it
1. M.P. Jain, ibid., pp.276, 290, 595.
is in the discretion of the Central Government whether to 
expel them or to extradite them,’1’ and in such cases, the 
detenu cannot challenge his detention* But if one is a 
citizen, clauses (1) and (2 ) of Article 22 ensure four safe­
guards for a person who is arrested: (1 ) no such person is
to be detained in custody without being informed, as soon
o
as may be of the grounds of his arrest; (2 ) he shall not 
be denied the right to consult and to be defended by, a 
legal practitioner of his choice; (3) a person arrested 
and detained in custody is to be produced before the nearest 
magistrate within a period of 24 hours of his arrest, exclu­
ding the time necessary for the journey from the place of
4
arrest to the magistrates court (same provision as in 
Section 61, Indian Criminal Procedure Code), and (4) no 
such person is to be detained in custody beyond this period
5
without the authority of a magistrate* Ihese provisions - 
safeguards - do not, however, apply to an enemy alien or a 
person detained under a law of preventive detention.^
Article 19 prohibits the expulsion, as contra­
distinguished with extradition, of an Indian citizen in the 
absence of a specific law!* In India, there is none* In 
cases of detention, a citizen can invoke Article 2 2 , Article 
19 does not apply to foreigners. Articles 14, 2 0 , 2 1 , 22
1. Hans Muller v. Superitendent Presidency Jail, Calcutta, A.I.R. 
W55'S.^7'367.-----------------------
2. Art.22(1) of the Constitution of India*
3. Art*22(l), ibid*
4. Art .22(2), ibid;
5. Art.22(2), ibid*
6 * Art*22(3), ibid*^
£ V, S . fl f R  / g V  ? . Aa.t’tn * *
apply equally to foreigners and aliens alike* Whether 
one is a citizen or sin alien, if he is to be extradited, 
then all the formalities under the Extradition Act should 
be followed* If not, the accused can take the protection 
of Articles 2 1 and 2 2 .^
(c) Article 22 and Extradition Proceedings
Article 2 2 (1 ) and (2 ) apply to a person accused 
of an offence and arrested without warrant; and the protect­
ion is designed against the powers of the executive or a non-
2
judicial authority. A court*s warrant ex facie sets out 
the reason for arrest and the person arrested is to be pro­
duced before the court issuing the warrant. In such a case,
the judicial mind has been applied at the time of issuing
the warrant. It is in the case of arrest without a court’s 
warrant that the application of a judicial mind is needed.
In the Extradition Act, 1962, under Section 5, 
the Central Government issues an order to any magistrate, 
who would have jurisdiction to inquire into the offence, 
if it had been an offence committed within the local limits 
of his jurisdiction, directing him to inquire into the case, 
and the magistrate on receipt of the order, issues the warrant 
for the arrest, and then an inquiry starts. Though the magi­
strate does not apply his mind to the facts of the case at 
the time of issuing the warrant of arrest of the fugitive, 
and up to that stage there is no application of a judicial 
mind, « later on the inquiry is made and the procedure
1. Hans Muller* ibid., A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
2. State of Punjab v. Ajaih Singh, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10.
3. State of Punjab v. Aiaib Singh. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10, supra.
laid down is followdd for extradition and therefdre, the 
fugitive could not successfully take the plea for quashing 
the warrant or extradition proceedings on the ground that 
it was the Central Government who applied its mind, and not 
the magistrate - and that his detention was illegal and hit 
by Article 2 2 .
Brett L.J. in The Reverend Thomas Pelham Dales1
case, observed:
"It is a general rule, which has always 
been acted upon by the Courts of England, 
that if any person procures the imprison­
ment of another, he must take care to do 
so by steps, all of which are entirely 
regular, and that if he fails to follow 
every step in the process with extreme 
regularity the court will not allow the 
imprisonment to continue.
Cotton L.J. expressed his agreement with Brett L.J. 
and added that,
"the person imprisoned may be dis­
charged, although the particulars in 
which they have failed to follow 
those powers might be matters of 
form." 2
The authorities charged with the duty of maintaining public 
order or performing any other governmental duties cannot do 
anything to the prejudice of individual rights, unless they
canshow that they were authorised to do that act by some
‘ . 3rule of common law or some provision made by the statute.
1. The Reverend Thomas Pelham Dales' Case (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 376 at 
p.461.
2. The Reverend Thomas Pelham Dales' Case (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 376 at 
pp.469, 470, ibid.
3. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1030.
A comprehensive procedure for extadition under 
Chapters II and III of the Extradition Act, 1962, is pro­
vided for extradition of a fugitive offender to and from 
India under a valid law, and the fugitive can hardly take 
the plea that the proceedings are hit by Article 22 of the 
Constitution. But if the procedure laid down in the Extra­
dition Act, 1962, is not followed and strictly complied with, 
then the fugitive offender can challenge the proceedings for 
his extradition being in contravention of Articles 21 and 22
of the Constitution.
(8 ) Extradition Proceedings Whether Executive, judicial 
or quasi-judicial
(a) Nature of Extradition Proceedings
In Hari Sankar Prosed * it has been laid down that
a magistrate acting under Section 7 of the Extradition Act
o
is a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 227 of the 
Constitution, That being so, it is doubtful whether the 
magistrate is a court in the strict sense of the term, or 
whether he is a persona designata working as a quasi-judicial 
body performing judicial acts. Therefore, it can be argued, 
that the warrant issued by a magistrate is not by a ’court of 
law*. Secondly, before issuing a warrant there should be 
an application of the judicial mind of the magistrate based 
upon such information and ’such evidence’ as would justify 
the issue of a warrant in the opinion of the magistrate.
This provision is to be found under Section 9(1) of the 
Extradition Act, 1962, so far as it goes, but the warrant 
can be issued contrary to it under Section 6 on the dis­
cretion of the Central Government which appoints the magi­
strate under Section 5 to inquire into the offence; and 
after the warrant is issued, evidence of prima facie case 
is taken under Section 7, It can well be said that the 
warrant issued by the magistrate under Section 6 of the 
Act has been issued without application of his judicial
1. Hari Sankar Prosad v. District Magistrate Darjeeling (1971) 
75 C.W.N. 470.(
2. Article 227 of the Indian Constitution:
”(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all 
Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation 
to which it exercises jurisdiction.”
mind and was a direct result of the commands from the exe­
cutive issued under Section 5 of the Act, and this contra­
venes Articles 2 1# ' Further, the combined
effect of Sections 7(4) and 8 of the Act places no limit of 
time as to how long Ihe^wili be kept in custody awaiting the 
orders of the Central Government. Section 9(3) puts a 
limit of 3 months. It seems that indefinite detention of 
the accused may be challenged as a contravention of Article 
22. Similarly, Section 17(2) also specifies no limit as 
to the period of detention. Section 22 of the Act is 
retrospective and being ex post facto legislation, it contra­
venes Article 20(1). The arrest under that Section can be 
challenged under Article 22. The arguments about issue of 
warrants, arrest and detention of the fugitive mentioned 
above, would equally apply to .fugitive apprehended under 
Section 23 of the Act also.
The question of availability of Article 22 depends 
on firstly whether the order of the magistrate passed under 
Sections 7(4), 9(2), 17(1) (2), 23, resulting in the issue 
of a warrant for the arrest of the fugitive is an ’execu­
tive* or ’judicial* order and secondly, whether the magi­
strate is a ’court’ within the meaning of Section 6 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. There is a divergence of opinion
in the High Courts in India on both these points. The
1 2  3Bombay, Calcutta, and Allahabad High Courts held the
1. The Emperor v. Hasim Ali (1905) 7 Bom.L.R.463; Bai Aisha v. 
State of Bombay. A.I.R. 1929 Bom.81.
2. Giuli Shahu v. The Emperor (1914) 19 C.W.N; 221.A.I.R. 1915 Cal 
426. R.N. Dutta J. in Hari Sankar Prosad v.D.M.Darjeeling & 
Others (1971) 75 C.W.N. 470.
3. H.K. Lodhi v. Shyam Lai, A.I.R. 1950 A11.100.
magistrates orders in extradition proceedings are judicial 
orders and that the execution of warrant was not an executive 
act. The Madras High Court,'1' sifter considering the judg­
ments of the different High Courts held that the magistrate
enquiring under the Extradition Act is a 1 criminal court*•
2R.N. Dutta J. in Hari Sankar Prosad*s case, relying upon
the word * courts* used by J.C. Shah J. in Jugal Kishore 
3
More*s case, drew the conclusion that obviously the Supreme
Court considered the magistrate making inquiry under Section 
7 of the Extradition Act of 1962 as * courts* of the country, 
and held that the magistrate making the inquiry under the 
Act functions judicially and acts judicially. The quota­
tion relied upon by Dutta J. from the judgment of the Supreme
4
Court in More* s case may be usefully reproduced:-
**Though extradition is granted in imple­
mentation of the international commit­
ments of the State, the procedure to be 
followed by the * Courts* in deciding 
whether extradition should be granted 
and on what terms, is determined by the 
Municipal law.1*
ThejfSupreme Court did not pronounce upon any of the above 
two points. Dutta J. himself at the end of the judgment, 
observed that the magistrate while acting under Section 
7(4) acts as a * tribunal* within the meaning of Article 
227 of the Constitution.
1. Re: Sankaranarayana Rengan Reddiar (1962) C.L.J. 697, followed 
by R.N. DuttaJ. m  Hari Sankar Prosad, ibid. at p.473.
2. Hari Sankar Prosad v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1971)
75 C.W.N. 470 at p.473.
3. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171 at p.1175.
4. Jugal Kishore More, ibid. at p.1175.
The other view is taken by some of the judgments
1 2 in Calcutta High Court, and Allahabad High Court. In
3
Thakur Sahdal Singh*s case, it was held that where the 
magistrate orders the execution of the warrant, it cannot 
be said that he is acting in his judicial capacity or that 
he is for the time being a court of inferior criminal juris­
diction. Sarma Sarkar J. of the Calcutta High Court in the
4
case of Hari Sankar, held that the other view taken in the 
cases of Mohan Debdas, the two cases of Stallmann and Gulli 
Shahu meant that the High Court refused to interfere under 
section 439 Criminal Procedure Code in proceedings under the 
Extradition Act of 1903; in almost similar terms like the 
Extradition Act of 1962. He further held that the court 
can interfere under Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code 
since the power can be exercised by the High Court not only 
for judicial acts, but even for executive acts, when a per­
son is detained illegally by whatever authority. Sarma J. 
further held that the limited purpose for which the High 
Court has been specifically empowered in Section 24 and 
25 of the Extradition Act, 1962, was to release a person 
from illegal detention. Therefore, when the magistrate, 
at the request of the Central Government,makes an,inquiry 
(i) he is not an inferior criminal court, and (ii) under
1. In Mohant Debdas, 15 C.W.N. 735; Rudolf Stallman v. King 
Emperor, 15 C.W.N. 1053 (F.B.).
2. In Thakur Satodal Singh v. District Magistrate Dehradun, A.I.R. 
1934 All 148 - 35 Cr.L.J. 1296 .
3. Thakur SaWial Singh v. District Magistrate Dehradun, ibid.
4. Hari Sankar Prosad v. District Magistrate Darjeeling (1971)
75 C.W.N. 470.
Section 7(4) the submission of the report does not amount to 
a final or definite orders on the basis of the inquiry and 
when it is not a final or definitive order, it is not an 
order of a court; (iii) extradition is not merely an exe­
cutive but a political act (Shah J. in More1s case,^  supra) 
depending upon the final decision of the Central Government; 
(iv) the inquiry by the magistrate is on the orders of the 
Central Government under the provisions of the Extradition 
Act and not under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, and (v) he has to submit a report if there is any 
prima facie case to the Central Government under Section 
7(4) and 9(2) - and it is for the Central Government under 
Section 29 and/or 31 of the Act - to decide not only on 
judicial considerations but on political and other consider­
ations whether the fugitive should be surrendered or not. 
Sarma J. further held that it was clear from the scheme of 
the Act that it was, more or less, a political or executive 
action rather than judicial*
Regarding the applicability of provisions of 
Criminal Procedure Code or procedure to be followed as 
mentioned in Section 7(1), he observed:.
"Merely because a statute lays down a 
particular mode of procedure under 
which inquiry is to be madejby refer­
ence to another code (Criminal Pro­
cedure Code) it does not generally 
and necessarily follow that the magi­
strate holding the inquiry under the 
provisions of section 7(1) was work­
ing as a court as contemplated by 
the Criminal Procedure Code - Section 
6 of the Criminal Procedure Code -
1* State of West Bengal v* Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171. supra at p.l"I75.
which lays down for the courts recog 
nised under the code.1*
In further support of the second point, it was stated by 
S arma J . at p.477 of the Report that the District Magi­
strate could not be held to be a court as his order is not 
final or definite; 1 one of the main characteristics of a 
court is that the order must be final and definitive one 
and must not await the order of some other body* . On 
this consideration, the Industrial tribunals appointed 
under Commissions Act have been held not to be
courts.^ The inquiry under Section 7(4), 8(2) is an 
inquiry by a tribunal, as the word 1 tribunal1 under Art.
227 of the Constitution means a person or a body other 
than a court set up by the State in deciding the rights 
between the contending parties in accordance with rules 
having the force of law and doing so does not amount to
taking an executive action but is the determination of a 
2
question. Interference under Article 227 will be both
in judicial and administrative matters in cases of grave 
injustice by reason of mistake committed by inferior judi­
cial or quasi-judicial body and where the Municipal law 
provides no adequate remedy. Apart from Article 227, 
it is the duty of the High Court to see if the prisoner 
was detained in accordance with procedure established by 
law under Article 21# Considering Section 491 Criminal 
Procedure Code, where there was no prima facie case in 
support of the requisition for the offence of murder, the
•- * - - 1956 S.C. 6 6 , and Bharat
2. Hari Padda Dutta v. Ananta Mondal, A.I.R. 1952 Cal.528.
1950 S.C. 188.
Court held that there was no meaning in detaining the peti­
tioner in custody for being sent to Sikkim under the orders 
of the Central Government.^  The Supreme Court has not de­
cided do far as to which of the two views stated are correct. 
However, the latter view seems to be more in keeping with the 
scheme of the Act and in that case, the fugitive may invoke 
the provisions of Articles 21, 22(1) and (2) of the Consti­
tution before the Superior courts, except in a case of a
o
foreigner whose entry into India was illegal (knwa^s case ) 
or whom the Central Government is deporting out of India and 
who has been detained for such deportation by the Central 
Government or by the State Government (Hans Muller ).
It may be stated that if the proceedings are exe­
cutive throughout, from the time of the issue of the warrant 
by the magistrate or from the time the appointment of the 
magistrate was ordered by the Central Government until the 
final order of the Central Government to surrender the fugi­
tive to the requested State, then Articles 21 and 22 will 
come to his rescue. But if they are judicial proceedings 
and if the warrant of arrest has been issued by the magi­
strate in exercise of his judicial powers, then Article 22
would not apply except in one case. That is the right to
f
consult and to be defended by a counsel of one* s own choice:^  
will certainly be enforced by virtue of this article whether 
the proceedings are executive, political, quasi-judicial or
1. Sarma Sarkar J. in Hari Sankar Prosad. supra.
2. Anwar v. State of J & R., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337.
3. Hans Muller v. Superintendent Presidency Jail, Calcutta,
A.I. R. 1955 S.C. 367 at p.3i%\ Anwar v. State of J & K.
A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337 at p.339.
judicial ; in nature.
The better view seems to be that on the whole the 
extradition proceedings are political and executive in 
nature; and the order of appointment of magistrate by the 
Central Government is executive in nature; the inquiry by 
the magistrate discharging the fugitive is purely of a judi­
cial nature, because this is his final order and needs no 
approval of the Central Government. If the inquiry before 
the magistrate results in finding a prima facie case, and he 
recommends extradition, then it is a quasi-judicial function 
and the order of the Central Government ordering extradition
or refusing extradition is an executive and political func­
tion, because it is in the discretion of the Central Govern­
ment to extradite or not (Hans Muller).^
(b) Functions of the Central Government under the Indian 
Extradition Act.
Whether the functions of the Central Government are
executive or judicial, Lord Russell of Killowen emphasised
the distinction between what he called the political aspect
oand the strictly judicial aspect of extradition. Lord 
Russell observed:
11 The question bears on the political 
aspect of extradition; and it must 
be determined, upon a consideration 
of matters into which this court is 
not competent and has no authority 
to enter. Such consideration, if 
they exist at all, must be address 
sed to the executive of this country t
1. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 at p.374.
2* In Re Arton (1895) 1 Q.B. 108.
•^ hey cannot enter and ought not to 
enter into the judicial consider­
ation of this questionj which in 
this case, turns solely upon the 
construction of the Extradition Act 
and the treaty.”
These observations were made, where the fugitive charged with 
the offence of embezzlement by the French Government resisted
the demand for his extradition that it was not made in good 
faith and the charges were merely a pretext to prosecute him 
for his political activities, and there the surrender was not 
in the interest of justice*
The right of a citizen not to be sent out to foreign
jurisdiction without strict compliance with the extradition
law is a valuable right.^ Following the dictum of Lord
2Russell (in Re Arton) , Shearer J* m  proceedings under the 
Extradition Act of 1903, regarding functions of the Court 
and the Executive, observed:
"In this country, as in every other 
country, the legislature has imposed 
restrictions on the power of the exe­
cutive to send persons abroad to 
answer charges before a foreign tri­
bunal. For instance, the offence with 
which they are charged must be an extra­
ditable offence and there must be in 
existence a warrant which is ex facie 
a valid warrant. If the executive ex­
ceeds its powers, the judiciary, and 
this court in particular, will restrain 
it but when the conditions laid down 
by the legislature as a prerequisite 
to extradition are fulfilled, and the 
judiciary has no power to intervene, 
the executive, nevertheless, is under 
no legal compulsion to surrender the
1. Santbir Lama v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Cal.122.
2. In Re Arton (1895) 1 Q.B.108.
prisoners. It retains a discretion 
in the matter, and may, for reasons 
which appear to be valid reasons, 
cancel any warrant which has been 
issued.” 1
2The Supreme Court has also taken the same view. Surrender 
of a person within the State to another State, whether a citi­
zen or an alien, is a political act done in pursuance of a
3
treaty or an arrangement ad hoc. Though extradition is 
granted in implementation of the international commitments 
of the State procedure to be followed by the courts in de­
ciding whether extradition should be granted and on what 
terms is determined! by the municipal law. The Extradi­
tion of a fugitive offender is an act of sovereignty on the 
part of the State who surrenders him.5
Chapter II of the Extradition Act, 1903, like 
Chapter II of the present Extradition Act of 1962, deals 
with the surrender of fugitive criminals to foreign states.
Where a requisition is made for such surrender, the Govern­
ment may issue an order to a magistrate to inquire into 
the case. The method of inquiry is described, and a power 
to commit the fugitive criminal to prison to await the orders 
of thdpovernment or to release him on bail (under Section 25
1. Hadibandhu Prodhan v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1946 Patna 196 at p.198. 
Compare with Section 29 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
2. Hans Muller v. State of West Bengal. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
3. Jugal Kishore More v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1969
S.C. ll71 at p.ll75.
4. Jugal Kishore More, ibid. at p.1175.
5. Lord Maclara in Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate (1890) A.D. 1941- 
1942, Case No.97. See also Paul O 1 Higgins. Unlawful Seizure 
and Irregular Extradition (1960) B.Y.I.L., Vol.16 at p.317.
of the present 1962 Act) is vested in the magistrate. The 
result of the inquiry, unless the magistrate discharges the 
accused, when there was no prima facie case against him, is 
reported to the Central Government and under the 1903 - not 
under the 1962 Act - a power was given to the Government to 
refer to the High Court any important question of law.
Under the 1962 Act, the accused can take the matter to the 
High Court or Supreme Court by writs under Articles 226 and
136 of the Constitution, and Sections 491, 435, 439 and 561A
of the Criminal Procedure Code, as discussed elsewhere.1
But it rests with th^pentral Government to decide as to the
surrender of the fugitive criminal. Section 15 of the 1903
Act empowered the Government to stay proceedings under the
chapter and to direct any warrant issued under it to be
o
cancelled and the accused to be discharged, and similar 
powers have been given to the Central Government under 
Section 29 of the 1962 Act.
(c) Proceedings before Magistrate whether judicial or 
quasi-judicial or executive
Chapter III of the Extradition Act of 1903, on the 
other hand, deals with the surrender of fugitive criminals 
in case of States other than foreign States - like Nepal -
or other erstwhile princely States in India - and in cases 
falling under this Chapter a similar procedure was prescribed 
where proceedings are initiated by a political agent. In
1. Chapter VI, infra.
2. Gu, ,li Sahu v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1915 Cal.426 = (1914) 19 C.W.N. 
22l -
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that case no inquiry was directed and the determination of the
political agent or such a State was regarded as sufficient,
subject to the Governments powers of interference under
Section 15 of the Act of 1903. A warrant issued by the
Political Agent and its execution has been held to be an
executive Act.*1- So also it was held that the legality of
a warrant issued under Section 7 of the 1903 Act by the Poli-
tical Agent of British India, could not be inquired into,
and it is no part of the duty of the High Court or other
authorities to ascertain whether a prima facie case existed
or not and that the responsibility rests with the officer by
3
whom the warrant has been issued.
Section 4(m) of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code 
defines j’udicial proceedings as including any proceeding in 
the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on 
oath. The converse is not true. Not all proceedings in 
which evidence is taken on oath necessarily amount to j*udi-
4
cial proceedings. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, 
three modes of initiation of proceedings are envisaged 
embodied in Section 190, viz. (1) an aggrieved person set­
ting the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint before
1. Gu^li Shahu v♦ Emperor» A.I.R. 1915 Cal.426 at pp.426-427 =
(19l4) 19 C.W.N. 221. See also S.K. Agarwala, op.cit. ,p.253.
2. Hansraj v. The Crown, A.I.R. 1926 Lahore 411. See also S.K. 
Agarwala, op.cit., p.253.
3. Giyan Chand v. King Emperor (1909 ) 3 P.R. 1909 Cr. See also
Daddiprasad v. District Magistrate Yoetmal, A.I.R. 1924 Nagpur
3l3 .
4. P.Rajangam. Sub Inspector of Police & Others v. State of Madras 
by Commissioner of Police, Madras & Others (1959) 1 M.L.J. 71 
at p.l04; In Re Sankarnarayana Rengan Reddiar (1962) 2 M.L.J. 
256 at p.257. :
a magistrate; (2) by information to police in cognizable 
offences; and (3) between an aggrieved party on the one 
hand, and accused on the other, viz* those cases where the 
magistrate cannot take cognizance except on the complaint 
of some person aggrieved, e*g. in the case of adultery on 
the complaint by the husband, or in the case of offences 
against public justice on the complaint of a public servant 
or with the previous sanction of the Government, as in cases 
of Indian Arms Act.
In Chapter II of the Indian Extradition Act,1962, 
the mode of making inquiry is provided in Section 7 and 9 
of the Act and in Chapter III, the magistrate has to see 
that the ’backed warrant* is a proper and valid one and 
whether the offence is an extraditable one and whether the 
identity of the accused has been established. The question 
arises whether the magistrate works as a Court and whether 
his function is judicial or executive and his decision is 
judicial or not.
(1) Magistrate whether a court
Under the Act of 1962, it is only a magistrate 
(nominated by the Central Government under Section 5 of the 
Act), who would have jurisdiction to inquire into a crime 
if it is an offence committed within the local limits of 
his jurisdiction, who could be directed to inquire into an 
extradition case. Such a magistrate should inquire and 
decide whether a prima facie case is made out in support
of the requistion for extradition of the fugitive criminal.
In conducting the extradition proceedings, the 
magistrate shall inquire into the case in the same manner
and with the same jurisdiction and powers,as nearly as may be, 
as the case were one triable by a court of sessions or High 
Court Thus,he should follow the procedure laid down in
Chapter XVIII, Criminal Procedure Code as regards inquiry 
into cases triable by the Court of Sessions or High Court,
It has been held that an inquiry under Section 7 of the 
Extradition Act by a magistrate is an inquiry by a criminal 
court.^
3
According to Halsbury*s Laws of England, origin­
ally the term ‘court* meant among other meanings, the 
sovereignls place where justice is administered and further, 
has come to mean the person who exercises judicial functions 
under authority derived from the sovereign. All tribunals, 
however, are not courts in the sense in which the term is 
here employed, namely to denote such tribunals, as exercised 
jurisdiction over persons by reason of sanction of the law 
and not merely by reason of voluntarily submission to their 
jurisdiction. The question is whether the tribunal is a 
court; not whether it is a court of justice, for there are 
courts which are not courts of justice. In determining 
whether a tribunal is a judicial body, the facts that it 
has now been appointed by a non-judicial authority, that 
it had no power to administer an oath, that the Chairman 
has got a casting vote, and that a third party has a power
1. Section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
2. In re Sankarnarayana, ibid. at p.257; See also Mabel Ferris 
alias Bai Aisha v. Emperor (1929) I.L.R. 53 Bom. 149; Lodhi""v. 
Shyam Lai, A.I.R. 1950 All 100; In Re. Chockalingam, A.I.R. 
1960 Madras 548 (cases under the 1903 Act) .
3. Halsbury*s Law of England, 3rd ed., Vol.IX at p.342.
to intervene are immaterial The elements to be considered
are:
1) the requirement of a public hearing, subject to a power 
to exclude the public in a proper case and
2) a provision that a member of the tribunal shall not take 
part in any decision in which he is personally interested, 
or unless he has been present throughout the proceedings.
From this it follows that the magistrate making inquiry under
Section 7 and 9 of the Act is a Criminal Court clothed with
judicial powers.
What is a judicial power? The Privy Council ob­
served in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioners:^
"What is judicial power? Their Lordships 
are of opinion that one of the best defi­
nitions is that given by Griffith C.J. 
in Huddart Parker & Co. v. Moorehead 2
where he says: ? I am of opinion that the
words ’judicial power* as used in Section 
71 of the Constitution mean the power 
which every sovereign authority must of 
necessity have to decide controversies 
between its subject", or between itself 
and its subjects; whether rights relate 
to life, liberty or property. The 
exercise of this power does not begin 
until some tribunal which has power to 
give a binding and authoritative deci­
sion (whether subject to appeal or not) 
is called upon to take action."
Mere expression of opinion based upon legal evidence, 
taken on oath, having power to summon witnesses and compelling 
them to produce documents by a tribunal, having some of the 
trappings of a judicial tribunal, but lacking both finality
1. Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioners L.R. (1931)
A.C. 275 at p.295, followed in Brajnanda^. Sinha v. Jyoti Narain 
A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 66 at p.70.
2. Huddartparker & Co. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330 at 
P.357.
and authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial 
prounouncements, does not render the tribunal a court.’1 A 
clear distinction must be drawn between a decision which by 
itself has no force and penal effect and a decision which be­
comes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable
by some action being taken, and which can be enforced proprio 
2
vigore.
A true judicial decision presupposes an existing 
dispute between two or more parties and then involves four 
requisites:-
1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case 
by the parties to the dispute;
2) If dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascer­
tainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the 
parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of 
argument by or on behalf of the parties bn the evidence;
3) If the dispute between them is a question of law, the sub­
mission of legal argument by the parties, and
4) A decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding
upon facts in dispute and application of the law of the
land to the facts so found, including where required, a
1. S.A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and Another, A.I.R. 
1954 S.C. 375; Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 
1953 S.C. 325; Bara j nan dan Siriha v. Jyoti Naram, A.I.R. 1956
S.C. 66 at p.70; Jugal KishoreiuSita Marathi Central Co»op. 
Bank. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1494 at p.1499.
3. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and Others v. Justice T€ndolkar, 1959
S.C.J. 147.
ruling upon any disputed question of law."1
Coke on Littleton and Stroud, defined the ’court*
2as the place where justice is judicially administered.
Stephen has been quoted with approval by the Supreme
3Court in Brajnandan Sinha* s case, as under:
11 In every court, there must at least 
be three constiituent parts - the actor. 
reus and judex; the actor or plaintiff, 
who complaints of an injury done, the 
reus, or the defendant; who is called 
upon to make satisfaction for it; and 
the judex, or judicial power, which is 
to examine the truth of the fact; and 
to determine the law arising upon that 
fact, and if any injury appears to have 
been done, to ascertain, and by its 
officers to apply, the remedy.**
4
The definition in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, is not ex-
5
haustive. By definition of the words * court* and the ’court
of justice* ^ in the Indian Penal Code of 1 8 6 0^He pronounce-
1. Cooper v. Wilson L.R. (1937) 2 K.B. 309 at p.340, quoted with 
approval by Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ. in Bharat Bank Ltd.Delhi 
v# Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.
188 at pp. 195 and 207 respectively, and followed also in 
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953, S.C.325 at p. 
329, and Braja*nandan Sinha, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 66 at p.70.
2. Brajanandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, A.I.R.1956 S.C. 66 at p.69.
3. Brajanandan Sinha, ibid. at p#69.
4. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, defines a ’court* 
as including all judges and magistrates, and all persons, ex­
cept arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. ’
5. Section 119 of the Indian Penal Code,1860: The word ’judge* de­
notes not only every person who is officially designated as a 
judge, but also every person who is empowered by law to give, 
in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judg­
ment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against would be 
definite or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other autho­
rity would be definite, or, who is one of a body of persons,
which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judg­
ment •
6. Section 20) of the Indian Penal Code,1860: The words ’court of
justice* denotes a judge who is empowered by law to act,judi­
cially alone, or a body of judges which is empowered by law to 
act judicially as a body, when such judge or body of judges
is acting judicially#
ment of a definitive judgment is considered the sine qua non 
of a court and unless and until a binding and authoritative 
judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons, 
it cannot be predicated that he or they constitutea * court*.^
In order to constitute a * court* in the strict sense of the 
term an essential condition is that the court should have, 
apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tri­
bunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment
which has finality and authoritativeness which are the
2
essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
3
In Shell Co. of Australia, the Privy Council enu­
merated certain negative propositions in relation to the subject:-
••(i) A tribunal is not necessarily a court 
in this strict sense because it gives 
final decision;
(2) Nor because it hears witnesses on oath;
(3) Nor because 2 or more contending parties 
appear before it between whom it has to 
dec ide;
(4) Nor because it gives decision which af­
fects the right of subjects;
(5) Nor because there is an appeal to a 
court;
(6) Nor because it is a body to which a 
matter is referred by another body.'1
It was observed by the Privy Council that:
**An administrative tribunal may act judi­
cially but still remain an administrative 
tribunal as distinguished from a Court, 
strictly so called. Mere externals do 
not make a direction to an Administrative 
Officer by an ad hoc tribunal on exercise 
by a court of judicial power.*’
1. Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain. A.I.R. 1956 S.C.66 at p.69.
2. Br&jnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, A.I.R. 1956vS.C.66 at pp*69, 
70.
3. Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
L.R. (1931) A.C. 275 at p.297.
The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court ^
where a test of judicial tribunal as laid down in a passage
2 3from Cooper v, Wilson was adapted by the Supreme Court.
So far as trial under Section 20 of the Extradition Act, 1962, 
is concerned, the magistrate trying is a court as he would
rfw —
finally pronounce the judgment whether the accused is guilty 
of the offence charged or not.
In case of inquiry before a magistrate under Sections 
7 and 9, the inquiry is also by a court because the magistrate 
can finally discharge the fugitive. In the case of recommend­
ation of surrender of fugitive the proceedings made under the 
Criminal Procedure Code are also judicial and the fact that 
the matter has to be reported to the Central Government does 
not .-o-t the magistrate from being a court. If the 
Sessions Court accepts the revision under Section 435 Crimi­
nal fo^c^ u^ JL4L~Code in criminal cases against the orders 
passed by a magistrate p. reference has to be made under Section 
439, Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court and it cannot 
be said that ' . the order of the Sessions Judge is subject
to references and is not final and therefore, not a judicial 
order by a court. Further, in £ases where death penalty is 
imposed by the Sessions Judge, a reference is made to the High
1. Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., A.I.R.
1950 S.C. 1 8 8 ; Maqbool Hussain v. State o^ Bombay, A.I.R.
1953 S.C. 325.
2. Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 K.B. 309 at p.340.
3. Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C.325; S.A. 
Venkataraman v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 375; Braj- 
nandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain/"A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 66 at p.70; 
Jugal Kishore _ v. Sita Marathi Central Co-op,- Bank, 
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1494 at pp.1499, 1500.
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Court for confirmation of the sentence by the High Court 
and the order of the Sessions Judge awarding death pen­
alties is not a final one, but the Sessions Judge trying 
the case is a court and his order is a 1 judicial order* and 
the proceedings are judicial in nature.
Shearer is of the opinion  ^that committal pro­
ceedings before a magistrate and trial before a judge and 
jury are conducted against a returned fugitive in all re­
spects as though he has been found and arrested in Australia 
(like Section 20 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962). The 
returned fugitive in Australia may not seek habeas corpus on 
the ground of any irregularity in the foreign proceedings 
leading to his extradition. The only benefit which he may
claim from his status as an extraditee is that he may not 
be tried for offences other than those ’proved on facts* 
(compare Sections 21 and 31(c) of 1962 Act) upon which 
surrender was grounded until he has been given an opportu­
nity of returning to the country from which he was extra­
dited. This stipulation does not, of course, apply to 
offences committed subsequent to the surrender, nor does it
apply where the fugitive waives his rights abroad and returns
2
voluntarily to Australia, having been formally extradited. 
Such a case of voluntary return would obviously not attract 
the provisions of any of theConstitutional Articles in India.
1. Shearer, op.cit., p.568.
2. R. Vo Corrigan, 1931 (1) K.B. 527; R. v. Gagnon (1956) 117 
Canadian Criminal cases, 61.
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(9) Extradition and Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution
(a) Origin and History of Power of Pardon
Historically, in England, the King as the auto­
cratic head of the Government always had the power to pardon. 
This was a part ’of that special pre-eminence which the King 
hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary 
course of the common law, in the right of his royal dignity.* ^
A pardon is said by Lord Coke to be a 1 work of 
mercy, whereby the King, either before attainer, sentence or 
conviction or after forgiveth ^title, debt or duty Temporal 
or Ecclesiastical. *2
The Common law is thus stated in Hale’s pleas of 
A *3
the Crown:
’’Reprieves or stays of judgments, or exe­
cution are of three kinds: viz. (1) Ex, 
mandate regis; (2) Ex. arbitrio judicis.
Sometimes the judge reprieves before 
judgment, or where he is not satisfied 
with the-verdict, or the evidence is un­
certain; or the indictment insufficient 
or doubtful whether within clergy or in 
order to pardon or transportation; and 
these arbitrary reprieves may be granted 
or taken off by the justices of gaol 
delivery, also their sessions be adjourned 
or finished, and this by reason of some 
common usage. (3) Ex necessitate legis. 
which is in case of pregnancy, where a 
woman is convicted of felony or treason.”
Blackstone thus expresses this prerogative:
1. Blackstone: Commentaries (i) 239*
2. 3 Inst. 233.
3. Vol.2, Chapter 58, p.412.
4. 2 Dyer, 205-a, 73 Eng. Rep.452.
"The only other remaining ways of avoid­
ing the execution of the judgment are a 
reprieve or a pardon; whereof the former 
is temporary only, the latter permanent*
1. A reprieve (from rependre, to take back)
is the withdrawing of a sentence for an 
interval of time; whereby the execution 
is suspended. This may be, first ex^ 
arbitrio judicis; either before or after — 
judgment; as where the judge is not satis­
fied with the verdict, or the evidence is 
suspicious, or the indictment is insuffi­
cient , or he is doubtful whether the of­
fence be within clergy or sometimes if it 
be a small felony, or any favourable cir­
cumstances ; appear in the criminal's 
character, in order to give room to apply 
to the Grown for either an absolute or 
conditional pardon. These arbitrary 
reprieves may be granted or taken off 
by the justices of the goal delivery, 
although their session be finished and 
their commission expired, but this ratheir 
by common usage, than of strict right.
Reprieve may also be ex necessitate'legis, 
as, where a woman is capitally convieted 
and pleads her pregnancy, though this is 
no cause to stay the judgment, yet it is- 
to respite the execution till she be de­
livered* This is a mercy dictated by - 
the law of nature in favo ,rem prolix.”
After imposition of sentence, execution of the sen­
tence may be suspended for a time which is known as respite,
2and may be granted by the King or by the Court.
As the possessions of the Kings of England expanded 
and several new colonies came under their sway, the power of 
pardon which the Kings exercised came to be exercised by their 
representatives in the colonies and in America from them it 
went to the State Governors and to the President for Federal 
Offences. The same process was followed in India by various
1. Blackstone: Book 4, Chapter XXXI, pp.394-395.
2. Orfields* Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, p.529.
enactments from time to time*’*' Both the power of pardon
and power of reprieve which is a part of all comprehensive
power of pardon are executive acts * and can be exercised at
anytime and in any circumstances untrammelled and without
control and in the absolute freedom except that prescribed
2
by the Constitution*
The history of the prerogative of pardons and re­
prieves shows that the power of the executive in the matter 
of pardons and reprieves is of the widest amplitude and is 
plenary in nature and can be exercised at any time after the 
commission of the offence* The power of the executive is 
an act of grace and clem&ncyi It is a sovereign or Govern­
mental power which in a monarchy is inherent in the King and in
a Republic in the State or the People and which may, by the
4Constitution, be conferred on an officer or a department*
The power of pardon is not subject to legislative 
control,5 nor is it open to the legislature to change the 
effect of the pardon* The executive may grant pardon for 
good reasons or bad or for no reason at all; its act is final
1* Sections 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861, (Act XXV 
of 1861), Section 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872
(Act X of 1872), Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code
of 1882 (Act X of 1882), Section 401(1) and (5), Criminal — 
Procedure Code of 1898; Section 295(1) and (2) of the Govern­
ment of India Act 1935, Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution 
of India*
2* Kapur J* in Nanavati v* State of Bombay* (1961) 2 S.C*J. 100 
at pp*1 2 1-1 2 2 .
3* Ex parte Wells, 15 Law Ed* 640 at pp*643,644; IS Hu- 3 07 ('Srr}
4* Kapur J* in Nanavati»s’case* ibidj at p*124*
5* Ex parte Garland* 18 Law Ed. 366 at pp*370-371; k
6 . united States v. Klein* 20 Law Ed. 519; &O&70
and irrevocable* The courts have no concern with the
reason which actuated the executive* This power is beyond
1 2 the control of the judiciary; Holmes, J. observed:
"Pardon is not a private act of grace 
from an individual happening to possess 
power* It is a part ot/the Constitutional
scheme* When granted it is the determin­
ation of the ultimate authority that public 
welfare will be better served by inflicting 
less than what the judgment fixed*11
3
Following Holmes J* it was observed in Sorrell1 s case that 
clemency is the function of the executive and it is the func­
tion of the courts to construe the statute and not to defeat 
it as construed. Field J. in Garland* s case held that the
4
President’s power: was not subject to legislative control.
The powers of pardon under Articles 72 and 161 
are also not subject to legislative or judicial control*
The power of the executive can be exdrcised at any 
time in England, United States of America and India. The 
King, said Lord Coke, ’can forgive any crime, offence, punish­
ment or execution either before or after attainer, sentence
5
or conviction or after*’ According to Willoughby:
’’The power of pardon includes the right 
to remit part of the penalty as well as 
the whole and in‘either case it may be 
made conditional* The power may be 
exercised at any time after the offence 
is committed, that is, either before,
1. 39 Am. Jur. 545, Section 43, Horwitz v. Connor, 6 Com. L.R* 
1497.
Biddle v* Perovich, 71 Law Ed. 1161 at p.1163; *-7^  u.s. Li%<>,
3. Sorrells v* United States, 77 Law Ed* 413 at p*441*b-*_c4l*u-F*~
4m Ex parte Garland, 18 Law Ed* 366 at p.370-371; 31,1 (t %u)
5. 3 Inst. 233, Hawkin’s Pleas of the Crown. Bk.2, Chapter 37.
during or after legal proceedings for 
punishment •111
2 — Field J, in Garland1 s case also observed: 1 The law thus con­
ferred is unlimited. ... it extends to every offence known to 
the law and may be exercised at any time after its commission.*
In Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code, the words used are 
»at any time*. This power before trial can be exercised by 
entering nolle Prosequi. Under Section 494, Criminal Proc­
edure Code, Public Prosecutor with the consent of the Court in 
trials in courts other than the High Court and under Section 
333, Criminal Procedure Code in cases tried before High Court 
the Advocate General can enter a no!le prosequi and this power 
is absolute and not subject to the control of court.
In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the 
power of pardon and reprieve whether conditional or uncondi­
tional may be exercised at any time after the commission of 
the offence either before legal proceedings are taken or 
during their pendency or after an appeal is filed and while 
the case is pending in the appellate court. So the same4 »
4
law is applicable to reprieves as in pardons.
(b) Constitutional Development of Power of;Pardon. _ 
Amnesty or Pardon; Articles 72 and 161. and Extra­
dition.
Power of amnesty and pardon is given to the 
Governor under Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code and 
Article 161 of the Constitution and to the President under
1. Willoughby* s Constitution 'of "America. Vol. H L »  p. 1492.
2. Ex parte Garland. 18 Law Ed., 366 at pp.370-371, s u p r a 2 ^
'(<%“ ) . ' ‘ ’  ’
3. Ex parte Grossman. 69 Law Ed. 527 at pp.5 3 0 ,5 3 2 ,5 3 5 ; 3-67 u ^
4. Rogers v. Peck. 50 Law Ed., 256*£\°\*$) / 7 ? lc.j ^
Article 72* On 11 March, 1960, the power under Article 161
was used by the Governor of Bombay when he suspended the sen­
tence passed by the Bombay High Court on Commander Nanawati 
of the Indian Navy* The suspension was until the appeal 
was filed in the Supreme Court against his conviction* Ulti­
mately, reprieve was granted to him though his conviction was 
upheld by the Supreme CourtJ In the Chambers Twentieth 
Century Dictionary, the following meaning is given for the 
word Tamnesty* $ *A general pardon of political prisoners; 
an act of oblivion* * As understood in common parlance, the 
word * amnesty* is appropriate only where political prisoners 
are released and not in cases ^  those who have committed
felonies or murders* But in the case of Re Channugadu* it 
was observed:
"But it is clear from the G*0. that the 
intention of the Government is to pardon 
not only political prisoners but those 
convicted and sentenced to the extreme 
penalty of law as well as for-^various 
terms of imprisonment for non-political 
crimes involving moral turpitude* How­
ever, that be, we are not concerned 
with the impropriety of the terra used*
The fact remains that the intention 
was to release the prisoners convicted 
and sentenced to death/transportation 
for life or other terms of imprisonment ***
Marshal C.J. in the case of Wilson* traced the 
history of the subject of pardon in the Royal prerogative of 
the sovereign in Great Britain and stated that the United 
States has adopted the same privileges when Article II,
1. Nanawati v. State of Bombay (1961) 2 S*C.J* 1 0 0 ; / J / R Sc in 
2* Re Channagadu* A.I.R* 19*54 Mad. 911*
3* United States v. Wilson (1863) 8 Law Ed. 640 at pp*643,644*
Section 2 of their Constitution invests the President with
such power, and is in essence an executive function to be 
exercised by the Head of the State after taking into consider­
ation natters which may not be germane for consideration be­
fore a court of law inquiring into the offence* At page 643, 
it was observed:
11 The constitution gives the President 
in general terms the power to grant 
reprieves and pardons for offences 
against United States of America.
This power had been exercised from 
time immemorial by the executive of 
that nation whose language is oMfc- — 
language, and to whose judicial insti­
tutions otlflfr bears a close resemblance; 
we adopt their principles respecting the 
operation and effect of a pardon and 
look into their books for the rules pre­
scribing the manner in which it is to be 
used by the person who would avail him­
self of it ***
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding— 
from the power entrusted with the execu­
tion of the laws which exempt the indi­
vidual on whom it is bestowed from the 
punishment the law inflicts for a crime 
he has committed.*1
Relating to the exercise of powers of pardon by the 
United States President Taft C.J. has given an illuminating' J
exposition of the law on the subject, and he is of the opinion
that the extent of the power of pardon extends even to crimi-
1 2nal contempts of courts. Burdick is an authority for 
the proposition that a pardon should be accepted by the person 
to whom it is tendered and then it would become effective.
He is not bound to accept it, he can waive it in order to 
vindicate his innocence*
1. Ex parte Grossman (1924) 69 Law Ed. 527; +*
2. Burdick v. United States (1914) 59 Law Ed. 476.' ~j f
j  |<f / <T.
C.J, Taft in the case of Grossman,^  has observed 
that in tendering pardon, the executive authority would act 
reasonably in order to afford relief from undue harshness or 
evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of criminal 
law.
As seen above, the practice of pardon in monarchical 
England was the same as is clear from Coke* s reports and what
o
has been stated in Halsbury*s Laws of England,
The framers of the Indian Constitution having before 
them the earlier precedent and practice under the British rule, 
as well as what obtained in monarchical Great Britain and in 
the republican United States intended to vest in the President, 
or the Governor the same power of * ■- pardon, mercy or
reprieve as has been understood to inhere in the English 
Sovereign or statutorily invested in the United states Presi­
dent,3
The position previously obtaining in India was that 
this power was for the most part regulated by provisions of 
law, particularly the Criminal Procedure Code, Accepting 
the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee of 1933-34, 
the Government of India Act, 1935, had by Section 295 of the 
Act, conferred on the Governor General acting in his dis­
cretionary power to suspend, remit or commute sentences of
1, Ex parte Grossman (1924) 69 Law Ed, 527; -S.8 /
2, Halsbury* s Laws of England; 2nd Ed,, p,477,
3, Re’Channaqadu.A.I.R* 1954 Madras 911 at p,915. Followed in 
State v, K,M, Nanawati, A.I.R. I960 Bombay 502 at pp,506-8* 
See also Nanawati v. State of Bombay (1961) 2 S.C.J, 100,
4, Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898,
death. But apart from these statutory powers, the prero­
gative of the Crown was also delegated to the Governor 
General by the letters patent creating his office, empowering 
him to grant to any person convicted of any criminal offence 
in British India, a pardon either free or subject to such 
conditions as he thought fit. After discussions in the
Constituent Assembly on 17 September, 1949, on the amendments 
moved by Ananthasayanam Aiyangar, Gopala Swami Ayangar,
Ainbedkar and T.T. Krishnamachari, the Law of Pardon and re­
prieve was inserted in Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitu-
2
tion in its present form. Thus, under Article 72 the
President is given the power to grant pardons. According 
to this, in all Court martial cases, as well as cases in­
volving the breach of a Union law where a punishment or 
sentence is inflicted on any person, the President may grant 
pardon or any other appropriate mercy such as reprieve, 
respite, remission or suspension car commutation of the 
sentence.3
Under.the Constitution, the functions assigned to 
the Central and the State Executives are very broad, varied 
and miscellaneous. They exercise not only what may be termed 
as * executive* functions but also in a limited sense, even 
judicial - as well as legislative functions, such as ordinance -
4
making, rule-making powers. Constitutional provisions
confer powers and functions on the President and the Governors
1. Letters Patent issued to the Governor General, 1937 - ' 
Rajagopola Ayangar - The Government of India Act, 1935,p.(IV).
2. See B.—Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, Vol.V, 
pp.367-371.
3 . M.V. Pylee, Indian Constitution. p. 165.
4. M.P. Jain: Indian Constitutional Law, Second Ed., (1970), pp. 
128, 224, 225, V53.
but as they act on the advice of Ministers, the words 
’Presidents* and ’Governors* should be treated as synonymous 
with’Council of Ministers* or the ’Central Executive* or the 
’State Executive* respectively# ” _
Articles 72 and 161 confer one of the judicial 
powers upon the President (or Central Executive) and the 
Governor (or the State Executive) in the sense that they 
are empowered to grant pardons, reprieves, or remissions
of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence 
of any person convicted of offences. The President is 
empowered to exercise his powers in all cases, (a) where 
the punishment or sentence is by a Court martial; (b) 
where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against 
a law relating to a matter to which the Union’s executive 
power extends, which would include matters relating to extra­
dition also; and (c) of death sentence. This, however, 
does not affect any power conferred by law on any officer 
of the Union’s armed forces to suspend,remit or commute a 
sentence passed by a Court martial, or the power exercisable
by the State Executive to suspend, remit or commute a death
1
sentence, or imprisonment for life in murder cases.
Article 161 confers these judicial powers on the 
Governor or State Executive in offences against any law re­
lating to a matter to which the Executive power of the State 
extends. The Governor’s power, under any law in force, to 
suspend, remit or commute a death sentence has been saved by
1. sfate of Bombay v. Nanawati, A.I.R* I960 Bom.502, and Nanawati
v. State of Bombay (1961) 2 S.C.J. 100;fll?L (Ji-.
Article 72(3). Such a power is conferred on the State 
Governments by Sections 401 and 402 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. The power to grant pardon in a death sentence lies 
solely with the President, while power to grant a reprieve, 
respite or remission of a death sentence is available to both
the President as well as the Governor, and the power in one 
does not exclude the power in the other.
Reprieve means stay of execution of sentence; 
respite denotes postponement of execution of sentence; 
pardon means to forgive, to excuse; remission reduces the 
amount of a sentence without changing its character, and 
commutation is changing the sentence to a lighter penalty 
of a different form.
As said above, a pardon is an act of grace which 
releases a person from punishment for some offence. A pardon 
may be either full, limited or conditional. A full pardon 
wipes out the offence in the eyes of law; a limited pardon
relieves the offender from some but not all consequences of 
the guilt, and a conditional pardon imposes some condition 
for the pardon to be effective.
1
The Bombay High Court in Nanawati* s case, held 
that the power of pardon unddr Articles 72 and 161 can be 
exercised before, during or after trial, that if pardon can 
be granted during pendency of a judicial trial or proceeding, 
the other allied but lesser powers of reprieve, suspension 
of sentence, etc. can also be so exeraised. The words in
1. State of Bombay v. Nanawati. A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 502.
Article 161 are very wide and do not contain any limitation as 
to the time at which, the occasion on which, or the circum­
stances in which, the powers conferred by these Articles, 72 
and 161, may be exercised; and that the powers having been 
conferred by the Constitution itself and being unqualified in 
terms, the court cannot put any fetters or restrictions on 
them; and that the power to suspend a sentence includes power 
to attach lawful conditions to it.
The Supreme Court, also in Nanawati»s case/  held 
that Articles 72 and 161, which are very general in terms, 
deal with pardons, reprieves, respites and remissions of 
punishment for criminal offences* The power of the Governor 
to grant pardon, etg* to some extent overlaps the same power 
of the President, particularly in the case of a death sentence* 
It was further observed that the Governor may grant a full 
pardon at any time even during the pendency of the case in 
the Supreme Court in exercise of the ’mercy jurisdiction* *
Such a pardon sifter conviction has the effect of completely 
absolving the accused from all punishment or disqualifica­
tion attaching to a conviction for a criminal offence* That 
power is essentially vested in the Head of the Executive, 
because the judiciary has no such * mercy jurisdiction* *
A combined reading of provisions of Articles 
72(1)(a)(c)(3), 73(i)(a), 161, 162, 246(2) of the Constitu­
tion read with Section 401, 402 and 402A of the Criminal 
Procedure Code indicates that the State Government continues
1. Nanawati v* State of Bombay (1961) 2 S*C*J. 100* 6i ^  £/ sc. a
2* Nanawati v* State of Bombay (1961) 2 S*C.J. 100 i QjK n 6/ fc /, ^
to enjoy the power of commuting a sentence of death* Since 
the expression ‘State Government* means the Governor under 
the General Clauses Act under Section 4p2, Criminal Procedure
Code, the Governor can commute a sentence of death under 
Section 402, Criminal Procedure Code* This power is kept
in^tact by Clause (3) of Article 72**^
(c) Powers of Prerogatives of Mercy after Constitution in
Extradition Proceedings by the Ex-Rulers of the Princely 
States
The Constitution specifically provided for the pre­
rogative of mercy in respect of sentences of death in Articles 
72^ 161 and 238. Article 72 provides for the power of the 
President, Article 161 for the power of the Governor in a part 
A state, and Article 238(1) taken with Article 161 for the 
power of the Raj Pramukh of a B State* Prerogatives of the
Maharajas of the old Princely States would be inconsistent 
with Articles 72, 161 and 238 of the Constitution* By the
Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1951 (Central Act 1
of 1951), Sections 4<£>1,402 and 402A are made applicable £0:
all parts of India (except Jammu and Kashmir)* In view of
this, the prerogative of mercy in the old Princely States
must be deemed to have been repealed or abrogated* Article
372 could not give continuance to those prerogatives as the
continuance is only until altered or repealed or amended by
2a competent legislature*
1* Dwivedi J* in Parkasho v. State*of U.P; & Others, A*I«R* 1962 
All 151 at p*l52,' 1S"37
2. Jagannadha Das J* in Thaivalappil Kunju Varu Vareed v. State 
of Tra-Cochin. A*I.R."T55'6M S.C. T42 at p V  145 Cl.
(d) Effect of Pardon granted in Extradition Proceedings 
by the President and Governors
It follows that under Articles 72 and 161 the Heads 
of the State is given statutory authority by means of an exe­
cutive act to tender pardons and reprieves and these functions 
can be exercised before or after conviction* In many respects, 
the power of pardon and reprieves conferred under the Indian 
Constitution by Article 72 on the President and by Article 
161 on the Governor of the State is very similar to the power 
of the President of the United States of America in granting 
pardons and reprieves. Apart from this, the wordings of 
the corresponding articles are also similar and such being 
the case, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
are useful in the decision of questions with respect to the 
power of pardon and reprieves conferred under Articles 72
and 161*1
The power of amnesty if used in a case in regard 
to an extradition offence, pardon being granted by applying 
the above-mentioned principle, the result will be that the 
request will be refused as the man is no more guilty of any 
offence, and he has a position of an innocent person in the 
words of Field J* in Garland*s case, supra*
The power to grant pardon is purely an executive
2
function * The P *C • obs erved:
1. Re Channugadu, supra*
2* Balmukand v. King Emperor, A*I*R* 1915 P.C. 29*
"The tendering of advice to His .Majesty 
sis to the exercise of the prerogative 
of pardon is a matter for the executive 
Government* *** and is outside their 
Lordships1 province*"
In India, the celebrated trial of Commander Nanawati for murder 
ended when Nanawati, after conviction, was granted pardon*’*'
This is why in Zacharia»s case* supra* even sifter the judgments 
of the courts being against him, the Home Secretary refused 
extradition*
Finally, regarding validity and effectiveness of the 
power of pardon and reprieve, C *J. Taft in Grossmanrs case* 
observed:^
"Executive clemency exists to afford 
relief from undue harshness or evident 
mistake in the operation or enforce­
ment of criminal law* The admini­
stration of justice by the courts is 
not necessarily always wise or cer­
tainly considerate of circumstances 
which may properly mitigate guilt*
To afford a remedy, it has always 
been thought essential in popular 
Governments, as well as in monarchies, 
to vest in some other authority than 
the Courts, power to ameliorate or 
avoid particular judgments* It is 
a check entrusted to the Executive 
for special cases* To exercise it 
to the extent of destroying the de­
terrent effect of judicial punishment 
would be to pervert it; but whoever 
is to make use of it must have full 
discretion to exercise it* Our 
constitution confers this discretion 
on the highest officer in the nation 
in confidence that he will not abuse 
it*"
Directly or indirectly, the same results are 
achieved, by virtue of Section 29 of the Indian Extradition
1. Nanawati v* Bombay (1961) 2 S*C*J. 100; State v* Nanawati* 
A.I.R. 1960 Bombay 502.
2. Ex parte Grossman (1924) 69 Law Ed* 527*
Act by another road leading to the same path, in case of 
grant of pardon to the fugitive in extradition proceedings. 
Section 31 of the Act of 1962 is also relevant. Ultimately, 
the Central Government has the discretion to refuse to extra­
dite the fugitive offender.^"
Applying the above principles of amnesty or pardon, 
it follows that once prosectuion or punishment is barred by 
the law of amnesty or pardon, under Articles 72 and 161 of 
the Constitution or Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code, 
the situation is analogous to that where the act done is 
not a crime under the Indian legal system, and unless the 
offence is an offence under the Indian Law, then according 
to the ‘principle of mutuality* or doctrine of ‘double 
criminality* or * non bis idem* , one of the most essential 
ingredients in the proceedings of extradition is lacking.
Even if there is a clause contrary to the power of amnesty 
or pardon in a treaty, then unlike the practice in some 
states, the treaty provisions cannot override Articles 72 
and 161 of the Constitution of India.
There is a divergence of opinion in different 
courts in regard to international practice on the question 
whether the amnesty law passed by one State subsequent to 
the treaty of extradition with other States takes prece­
dence over the treaty or leaves it unaffected. According 
to one view, it is recognised beyond doubt that, in the 
community of States, international law prevails over muni­
cipal law and so international agreement or conventions
1. Hans Muller, supra; A.I.R. 195r5 S.C. 367.
cannot be altered or abrogated by unilateral legislative action 
of one of the contracting parties.* But the other view is 
that (in criminal matters), the judicial authorities of a State 
. , bound to give judgment according to the municipal law alone
and that no limitation, upon the application of the legal rule,
even if derived from an international relationship, can be
taken into consideration by the judge unless it has been trans-
2
mitted into a rule of municipal law* The same view was
upheld by the Supreme Court of Federal Germany in 1951, and 
it was observed:
"Esrtradition must not be granted if, on 
the assumption of a reversal of the 
factual position, a prosecution could 
not, according to the provisions of a 
German law of amnesty, be launched, or 
a sentence executed, in respect of the 
offence which is intended to form the 
basis of extradition."3
Therefore, if the pre-Constitution treaties which are continued 
in India by virtue of Section 2(d) of the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1962, have a clause in those treaties contrary to the 
... the pardoning power, that clause would not be
enforced by the courts in view of the cases of Ram Baboo
4 5 6Saksena, Birma, and Nanka. In post- and pre-Constitution
1. In ~Re Brooks, decided by the Supreme Court of Panama on 21-Mfiy, 
1931, A.D. 1931-1932, Case No.5* See also Bedi, op^cit.,
p. 203, fn.170.
2. In Re Zanini, German Supreme Court, decided on 13 January,1936, 
A.D. 1935-1937, Case No. 173. See also Bedi, opicit., pp.202- 
203.
3. 18 Int. Law Reports 1951, Case No.103, p.331. See also Bedi, 
opicit., p.203, n^l72.
4. Dr. RamcBabu Saksena v. The State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 155.
5. Birma v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 127.
6. Nanka v. Government of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Raj.153.
treaties, the law of pardon and the actual pardon having 
been granted under Article 72 or 161 will prevail over the 
treaty clause.
CHAPTER VI
EXTRADITION ORDER BY MAGISTRATE OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT *
REVIEW BY SUPERIOR COURTS
(1) By Writ of Habeas Corpus 
(a) General Principles
Every act done by the government or its officers
must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person be
supported by some legislative authority,1 as the liberty of
a person, an individual, is not something which can be dis-
posed of indiscriminately in the absence of positive law*
The Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose
of the liberty of the individual* Consequently, proceedings
against him must be authorised by some positive law of the 
3State* It is not enough that statute or treaty does not 
deny the power to surrender, it must be Tound that
4
statute or treaty conferthe power*
Where a person is arrested and detained in custody 
under the law relating to extradition, he is entitled to apply 
for a writ of habeas corpus if his detention is not in accord­
1* Bennett Coleman & Co* Ltd* v* Union of India* A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 
106, Para.27, per Ray J.; per Lord Atkin in Eshingbayi Eleko 
v* Officer Administering the Government of•Nigeria, L.R.(1931) 
A.C. 662 at p.670, followed by Kania C.J. in A.K. G, opalan v* 
State of Madras * A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 at p*40*
2* United States ex rgl Karad\zole v. ATtukovic, 28 Int. Law 
Reports, p*326*
3. Birma v* State, A.I.R. 1951 Raj* 127, and Nanka v.Government of 
Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 153.
4. Valentine et al. v. United States ex rel Neidecker (1936) 299 
U.S. 5. 1
ance with law. The legislature has laid restrictions on the 
power of the executive to apprehend and send persons abroad to 
answer charges before foreign tribunal or court. After the 
coming into force of the Indian Constitution, in addition to 
the earlier safeguards, fundamental guarantees are provided 
by Chapter III of the Constitution.
The Extradition Act and the Criminal Procedure Code 
both being penal enactments, their terms must be strictly con­
strued in favour of the accused persons whenever such con­
structions can be reasonably justified.^ Therefore, a 
citizen who has committed certain kinds of offences, mentioned 
in the Treaty concerned with the requesting State or in the 
Second Schedule (including a supplementary schedule) to the 
Extradition Act, 1962, abroad, can be extradited, if the
formalities prescribed by the Extradition Act are observed
2
and complied with. The right of a citizen not to be sent
out to a foreign jurisdiction without strict compliance with
3the extradition law is a valuable right.
- A foreigner has no such right and he can be expelled 
without any formality beyond making of an order by the Central 
Government. But if he is extradited instead of being expelled, 
the formalities of the Act of 1962 must be complied with* Under 
the Act of 1962, warrants must be issued; there must be a 
magisterial inquiry and when there is an arrest, it is penal 
in nature, and when he leaves India, he does not leave as a
1. Ram Pargas v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1948 All 129 at pp. 130-131.
2. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta,A.I.R. 
1955 S.C. 367, supra.
3. Santabir Lama v. Emperor, supra, A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 122.
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free man; the police in India hand him over to the police of 
the requesting State and he remains in custody throughout.
In that event, therefore, the formalities of extradition must 
be complied with. There must be a magisterial inquiry with
a regular hearing and the person sought to be extradited must 
be afforded the right and opportunity to submit a written 
statement to the Central Government and to ask, if he so 
chooses, for political asylum; also, he has the right to de­
fend himself and the right to consult, and to be defended by 
a legal practitioner of his own choice.'1' As against the 
rights of citizens, a foreigner or alien, not being a citizen, 
is not entitled to any Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article 
19 of the Constitution, though he has the fundamental rights 
contained in Articles 20 to 22 of the Constitution. In 
extradition proceedings, if he is deprived of his personal 
liberty otherwise than by the 'procedure established by law' ,
he can approach the High Court or the Supreme Court for his
2 3immediate release. But in cases, such as Anwar's, the
Supreme Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus though
a writ of right, is not a writ of course and its scope has
grown to achieve its purpose of protecting individuals against
erosion of the right to be free from wrongful restraint on
their rightful liberty. But a prerequisite to entry into
the country must have a proper legal sanction behind it and
if a Pakistani enters Indian territory illegally, and if he
is expelled, but not extradited, he cannot remain in India
1. Art.22(l): Hans Muller, supra.
2. Anwar v. State of J & K, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337.
3. Anwar v. State of J & K, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337, ibid.
against the wishes of the Government and cannot enjoy any of
l
the fundamental rights*
A superior court in hearing a habeas corpus petition, 
is not a court of appeal and cannot go into the questions of 
fact arising from the order of the magistrate or Central 
Government* It can only determine whether there was such 
evidence as to give authority and jurisdiction to commit and 
whether the offence came within the purview of the treaty con­
cerned or the Second Schedule to the Indian Extradition Act, 
1962, and whether the procedure prescribed by the Extradition 
Act, 1962, was followed and whether the order of extradition 
was hit by the provisions of Sections 29, 31 and 32 of the 
Act* If the magistrate or Central Government had no juris­
diction to commit, if they wrongly assumed jurisdiction by
ignoring the above-mentioned provisions, the superior courts
2
will grant habeas corpus * The court will not review the
decision of the magistrate or the Central Government if there 
was evidence before them to justify commitment* A reasonable 
person's satisfaction is the test of evidence in the Supreme 
Court* The sufficiency of such evidence is a question for 
the magistrate to decide* But to see if the offence is a
political offence, the courts, as in a preventive detention 
case, will examine the real nature of the evidence* If they 
reach the conclusion that the provisions of Sections 29 and 31 
of the Extradition Act are violated, the court may set aside
3
the order of commitment* The Court will also review the
1* Anwar v* State of J & K , ibid*
n
2* R. v. Governor of Brixtion Prison* Ex parte Kolczynski (1955)
1 All E.R. 31. ^
3. R. vi ,. Maurer (1883) Q.B.D. 513 and cases cited in Halsbury's 
Lava:of England, Vol. 16, p.576*
evidence given before the magistrate as to the nationality of 
the accused in cases when there is a treaty clause, like the 
Attentat clause; where the high contracting parties agree 
not to extradite nationals, as in the Indo-Nepalese Extradi­
tion Treaty, for the nationality of the accused L..\ as a 
matter of fact is essential to the existence of the magi­
strates' jurisdiction** The court will inquire into 
whether the crime charged is within the scope of the Extra­
dition Act or the treaty or whether the crime is of a poli­
tical character or whether there was evidence before the
magistrate, upon which he could have exercised his discretion 
2
to commit* Other instances in which the Courts would inter­
fere may be enumerated: the offence must be extraditable and
there must be a warrant in existence which ex facie is a valid 
warrant* If the executive exceeds its powers, the judiciary
will restrain it, but otherwise the judiciary cannot interfere.
4
In Hadi Bandhu's case, Shearer J. emphasised the desirability 
of the Government carefully considering the matter and cancel­
ling the warrant of the Political Agent, if necessary* In
5
Santabir's case, it was held that a valid warrant was essen­
tial* But this does not mean that the Executive is under 
any legal compulsion to surrender the prisoner to the foreign
1* Re Guerin (1888) 58 L.J. (M.C.) 42; (1889) 5 T.L.R. .J.88,
R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Guerin (1907) Sol. 
Jo. 571.
2* Re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B. 149; R* v. Governor of Holloway 
PrisonRe Slletti (1902) 71 L.J. (K.B.) 935; R. v* Governor 
of Brixton Prison, Ex parteKolczynski (1955) 1~Q.B. 546 = 
(1955) 1 Ail E.R. 31.
3. Hadi Bandhu Prodhan v. Emperor, A.I.R* 1946 Patna 196 at p*198; 
Santabir Lama v. femperor, A.I*R. 1935 Cal. 122 at p*124.
• Hadi Bandhu Prodhan v. Emperort A.I.R* 1946 Patna 196 at p.198.
5. Santabir Lama v. Emperor. A.I.R. 1935 Cal*122 at p*124*
State in such a case# It retains a discretion in the matter
and may for reasons, which may appear to it valid, cancel any
warrant which has been issued.1 The Supreme Court in Hans 
2
Muller1 s case, has held that, even if there is a requisition
and good case for extradition, the Government is not bound to 
accede to the request and it is given an unfettered right to 
refuse# While interpreting the words ’The Central Govern­
ment may if it thinks fit', found in Section 3(1) of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1903, the Supreme Court held that,3 
if the Central Government chooses not to comply with the re­
quest for extradition made by a (Foreign State or a Common­
wealth Country) requesting State, the person against whom the 
request is made, cannot insist that it should comply with the 
request, because the right is not his, and the fact that a 
request has been made does not fetter the discretion of the 
Government, to choose the less cumbersome procedure to expel 
a foreigner under the Foreigners Act, 1946# Where the 
Court finds that the offence is not extraditable, the
4
prisoner must be discharged. Though the High Court should
not ordinarily interfere in extradition proceedings, it is 
fully authorised to see whether there is a patent and palpable 
defect visible in the authority by which the person having 
custody detains a person# If the authority under which a
1# Hadi Bandhu Prodbanv# Emperor, A.I.E. 1946 Patna 1196 at p.
T 9Q (In a case under the Extradition Act, 1903^  )#
2. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, A.1.1 
1955 S.C# 367 at p.3^4.
3. Hans Muller, ibid., A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 at pp.374,376.
4. R# v# Wilson (1877) 3 Q.B.O. 42 at p#45#
person is being detained is on the face of it illegal and
invalid, the High Court can certainly take notice of it and 
release the accused*^ In a case of a person arrested and 
kept in custody for more than two months (under Sectdbon 10(3) 
of The Extradition Act of 1903, or Section 2 h^ of the present 
Act, 1962), the detention of the prisoner is illegal, if no 
sufficient cause is shown to the contrary by the Central 
Government, the only order under the circumstances which the 
High Court could pass would be that the prisoner should be 
discharged from custody* The Privy Council in Mathew>s
3 . . . . .
case, held that the question whether a warrant issued by a 
political agent under Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1903, 
complied with the rules made under the Act, cannot properly 
be made the subject of an enquiry by the court, but should 
be stated to the magistrate on an application to him to report
4 5the matter to the local Government under Section 8A* For
1. Roshanlal v. Superintendent Central Jail, Lashkar, A.I.R,
1950 M.B. 83 Parai
2. Sura j narain v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 419 at p*420*
3. Mathew v. District Magistrate; Trivendrum* A.I.R. 1939 P.C.
213 at p .218 . ^
4. Section 19 of (The Indian) Extradition Act, 1903: "For the 
purpose of applying and carrying into effect in British India 
the provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, the fol­
lowing provisions are hereby made:
(a) the powers conferred on 1Governors' of British posessions 
shall be powers of the Central Government: ♦*."
5. Section 8A of (The Indian) Extradition Act, 1903, runs as 
under:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, sub­
section (2), or in Section 8, when an accused person arrested 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 is produced be­
fore the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate, 
as the case may be, and the statement (if any) of such accused 
person has been recorded, such Magistrate may, if he thinks 
fit, before proceeding further report the case to the Central 
Government and pending the receipt or orders on such report, 
may detain such accused person in custody or release him on his 
executing a bond with sufficient sureties for his attend*
ance when required."
instance, one of the rules provided that the political agent 
shall in all cases before issuing a warrant under Section 7 
of the Act, satisfy himself by preliminary inquiry or other­
wise that there is a prima facie case against the accused 
person* If a suggestion were to be made that the political 
agent did not satisfy himself, it would not properly be a 
subject of an enquiry by the court on an application for 
habeas corpus, but should be stated to the magistrate on an 
application to report to the local Government under Section 
8A of the Extradition Act, 1903.^
2
In Baijnath*s case, so also in Israr Hussain1s
3case, because there was no material before the British 
Indian Court regarding the procedure on which the political 
agent acted in issuing the extradition warrant, it was held 
that it did not follow that his act of issuing the warrant
4
was illegal. But in Ram Parga*s case, it was held that, 
in a case where warrants were issued under Section 7 of the 
Extradition Act, 1903, by a subordinate court under the 
general orders of the political agent and the political agent 
had not applied his mind to the particular warrant, the war­
rant was illegal.
In the case of Re Arton,5 it was held that the 
court had no jurisdiction to enquire whether the demand of 
surrender was made in good faith and in the interest of
1. Mathew v. District Magistrate, Triyendrum, A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 
213 at p.2lin
2. Baijnath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 394*
3. Israr Hussain v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 All 730.
4. Ram Pargas v. Emperor. A.I.R. 1948 All 129.
5. Re Arton (1896) 1 Q.B. 108 at p.115.
justice. This is a discretionary matter in the magistracy 
or the Central Government in India* in the present Act under 
Section 29 of the 1962 Act.
But the Government could! interfere if the offence was
of a political nature. In the case of Re Castioni,'1, the
English Court held that the order of the magistrate, whether
the offence for which he is making) an order of commitment is
an offence of a political character, is subject to review by
the court on an application of hafoeas corpus. So also in
o
the case of Re Meunier, the Britrsh Court gave a similar 
dictum.
In habeas corpus proceedlings arising out of orders 
for the extradition or rendition cf fugitive offenders, the 
courts have now abandoned the presence that the grounds for 
the award of the writ are exclusively confined to 'jurisdict* 
ional errors' • If the magistrate before whom the alleged 
offender is brought, decides to commit him to custody or the 
Central Government decides to extrradite him, the prisoner may 
apply for habeas corpus. Although the High Court or the 
Supreme Court under Articles 226 aind 227 and Article 32 of 
the Constitution respectively is ruot entitled like the divi­
sional court in England to review the magistrate's decision 
on its general merits, or to receLve additional evidence,
3
designed to show that it was wrongj; it may award the writ 
on the ground that the magistrate applied a 'wrong legal
1. Re Castioni (1899) 1 Q.B. 149 ait p.160.
2. Re Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415 at; p.419.
3. R. v. Brixton Prison Governor, Ex parte Schtraks, L.R.(1964) 
A.C. 556.
test’ in determining the burden of proof to be discharged or 
arrived at a conclusion on the facts which 'no reasonable 
person could have arrived at as a conclusion on the facts' 
notwithstanding that such mistakes do not go to jurisdiction.^* 
Complicated court proceedings concerning the former Ghanian 
Minister, Mr. Armah, took place in Britain in 1966,2 and this 
case has been referred to and approved by the Indian Supreme 
Court in the case of Jugal Kishore More*2
In habeas corpus proceedings under the Extradition
Act, 1962, and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, the Court
reviews the proceedings before the magistrate, including the
formal instruments for committal. Where, for example,
there is no legal evidence or wheie the only evidence to
show the accused's criminality was contained in a deposition
made by his wife which im a privileged statement made between
husband and wife and is inadmissible in evidence, under the
Indian Evidence Act. A husband or wife is not competent
to give evidence in support of the charge for which extra-
4dition is sought.
Habeas corpus may be awarded on various other 
grounds such as when the offence is of a political character, 
absence of the rule of speciality in the laws of the requesting
1. R. v* Brixton Prison Governor j Ex parte Armah (1966) 3 W.L.R. 
§i28 (H.L.) per Lord Reid at pp.838-842.
2. R. v. Brixton Prison Governor, Ex parte Armah (No.2) (1966) 
TlO, Sol .Jo. 9^6.
3. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969, S.C.
11717" :
4. Ex parte Robichattd (1926) 39 Que.K.B. 359.
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State,^ lapse of time, want of good faith and the trivial
nature of the offence, etc. enumerated in Sections 29 and
31 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, which are more
readily classifiable as jurisdictional. So also under the
Indian Act of 1962 and the English Fugitive Offenders Act, 
o
1967, habeas corpus may be granted on a number of grounds, 
e.g. that the offence is of a political character, that the 
request for the offender* s return is in fact made in order 
to punish him because of hie race, religion, nationality or 
political opinions, that the offence is not one specified in 
the Act or that it would be unjust or oppressive to return 
him because of the triviality of the offence or the lapse of 
time or because the accusation made against him is not made 
in good faith. Some of these issues go to the merits but 
the court may receive additional evidence for considering 
whether the magistrate was wrong in finding a prima facie 
case of guilt.
In India, Ihe Extradition Act of 1962 contains the 
above-mentioned grounds as in the recent British Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1967. Ihe latter Act was the outcome of a 
white paper presented to the British Parliament by the Home 
Secretary on 24 May, 1966, which was the resulted agreement 
between Commonwealth Law Officers and Ministers to bring 
into effect the new extradition arrangements within the 
Commonwealth to supersede the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881,
1. SEn Re Millet, decided on 13 January, 1937, A.D. 1938-1940, 
Case No.148; In Re Korn; decided on 25 March, 1935, A.D. 
1935-1937, Case No.166; Fiscal v. Samper, decided on 22 June, 
1934, A.D., 1938-1940, Case No.152.
2. The Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967 (Sections 4,8 and Schedule I)
and this was a scheme relating to rendition of fugitive offend­
ers within the Commonwealth.^ Under the scheme, a fugitive 
offender will be returned only if charged with a returnable 
offence listed in an annexe to the white paper and then only 
if the facts on which the request for his return were founded 
constitute an offence under the law of the country or terri­
tory in which he was found. The scheme includes a provision 
relating to an optional and conditional '.discretion in regard to 
the return of an offender likely to suffer the death penalty 
in the requesting country in which he was found. In the 
United Kingdom, the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, has been 
passed to give effect to the new agreements. In Ghana,
a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered, if the offence 
he is charged with is of a political character and a criminal 
surrendered by another country is not triable for previous 
crimes, except with the consent of the Government of the 
country surrendering him; or if the criminal stays in Ghana 
despite an opportunity to leave.
It should be noted that these grounds for refusing 
extradition found in the British Act of 1967 had already been 
codified in the Indian Extradition Act of 1962. The result 
is that grounds justifying the issue of a writ- of habeas 
corpus are common to both countries. The decisions of 
British Courts bearing on these provisions will have a
1. Commd. 3008.
2. See also the Extradition Act (Commonwealth countries) 1966, the 
Extradition (Foreign States) Act, 1966, Australia Acts Nos.75 & 
76 of 1966, the Extradition Act, 1965, New Zealand Act, 1965, 
No.44.
3. The Extradition Act, I960 (Amendment) Decree, 1966, N.L.C.D.65.
profoundly persuasive value in India.
Another case from Hong Kong may be mentioned. In 
the case it was alleged that the extradition proceedings were 
defective because the 'requesting Government was not represented' 
and that someone who had merely departed on some temporary busi­
ness from the jurisdiction to which his return was requested 
is 'not a fugitive offender'. Both allegations were rejected 
in a judgment, which contains a full citation of authorities 
and makes the point that, in the exceptional circumstances such 
as those prevailing in the instant case, on account of the 
fact that the applicant was a solicitor, it was not essential 
for someone seeking habeas corpus to be represented by counsel.^
In some respects, the case merits comparison with ex parte 
2Hammond, in which the English Divisional Court held that 
there must be an element of escape to justify the backing of 
an Irish warrant under Section 12 of the Indictable Offences 
Act, 1948. Ihe effect of the decision seems to have been 
reversed by a recent legislation, Ihe Backing of Warrants 
(Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965.3
Ihe principles of double criminality can be illu­
strated by a decision of a superior court in England, which
interpreted the provisions of Section 3(1)(c) of the new
4British Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, Ihe applicant had
1. Re Kenneth Alfred Evans, 1962 H.K. L.R. 266.
2. Ex parte Hammond (1964) 2 Q.B. 385.
3. Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1965, p.211.
4. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Gardner (1968) 1 
All E.R. 636.
been charged in New Zealand with obtaining money by falsely 
representing that a company would supply persons with goods, 
contrary to the New Zealand law, and he was arrested in 
England. As the alleged representation related to the 
future, it would not have constituted an offence against the 
law of England, and accordingly, the requirement under 
Section 3(1)(c) of the British Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, 
that the returnable offence must be an offence under the laws 
of both New Zealand and United Kingdom was not satisfied and 
on this ground, the habeas corpus application succeeded. In 
India, the extradition offence has been defined as an offence 
mentioned in the treaty or in the Second Schedule to the Act 
and by necessary implication or intendment the doctrine of 
double criminality is adopted. Though the doctrine of 
double criminality has not been specifically mentioned as 
one of the grounds for refusal of extradition either under 
Section 29 or Section 31 of the 1962 Act, on this ground 
habeas corpus would be successful in India by virtue of 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Mysore Chief Court 
observed:^
"The act complained of must be a 
crime according to the criminal law 
of both countries; and no person 
should be extradited whose deed is 
not a crime according to the Crimi­
nal law of the State which is asked 
to extradite, as well as of the State 
which demanded extradition."
1. Venkatarangiengar v. Government of^Mysore, 12 Mys.L.J. 328
See also Section 2(c) and 2(f) of The Indian Extradition Act, 1W) 
1962, and the Second Schedule* See also S.K. Agarwala: 
International Law; Indian Courts and Legislation, p.215, fn. 
1>^>3,4.
However, in a habeas corpus petition, the court
would be reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the 
Central Government under Section 29 of the Indian Extradition 
Act of 1962. The House of Lords in Atkinson*s case.'*' held 
that there is a complete discretion in extradition cases in 
the Secretary of State. In India, the counterpart will be 
the Central Government and it will be for the Central Govern­
ment to decide whether in all the circumstances, the appellant 
should or should not be surrendered.
A habeas corpus petition failed in Australia on the 
ground that it is not unjust or oppressive to return an appre­
hended person to another State to answer a charge, merely be­
cause there is a reasonably arguable gueation of law as to his
2 3guilt. But in the Armah case dealt with above, the new
regime in Ghana sought the rendition of the former High Com­
missioner in London on a charge of corruption. In the habeas 
corpus petition, the Divisional Court held that inasmuch as the 
British Government had recognised Ghana’s continued membership 
of the Commonwealth, after the coup d’etat and had despatched 
a High Commissioner to Accra, the provisions of the Act of 1881 
governed rendition to Ghana, due to the Ghana (Consequential 
Provisions) Act. On the merits of the case, it was held that 
it would not be ’unjust and oppressive’ to return the applicant 
and that the strong and probable presumption of guilt, which 
has to be established before the magistrate, meant only a 
prima facie case of guilt. On the last point, the House of
1. Atkinson v. United States Government (1969) 3 All E.R.1317 at 
p.l327,Hf per Lord Morris (H.L.).
2. Ex parte Khemper (1967) 1 N.S.W.R. 161.
3. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Armah (1966) 3 
V/.L.R.“S3l
Lords subsequently disagreed with the interpretation of the 
Divisional Court, allowed the appeal and discharged the 
accused.^*
The Supreme Court of India in the case of Jugal
Kishore More, held that the extradition was valid only on the
basis of * reciprocity1 and that the British Divisional Court 
in the case of Demetrious had recognised the principle of 
rendition of the fugitive offender on the basis of ’recipro­
city* , holding that the protected State of Qatar, although 
not a British possession, ms to be treated as such a possess­
ion for the purpose of operation of the Act to the extent that 
the Crown has jurisdiction there and the Act had been effect­
ively extended to Qatar by an Order in Council, made under the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, so as to authorise rendition to and 
from Qatar *on the basis of reciprocity* •
Some matters are, however, so important that the
Minister - the Indian Central Government acts through a 
Minister, or Deputy Minister, to whom powers have been dele­
gated in accordance with the business rules of the Secre­
tariat made under Article 166 of the Constitution - must 
address himself to them personally, under Sections 8, 9(2) 
and 18 of the Indian Extradition Act, before an order of 
extradition is made against a fugitive criminal. Prin­
ciples of natural justice must be observed; the Minister 
must consider the representations made by the accused (if 
any). If necessary, the Minister would hear the accused
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Parte Armah. (1966) 3 W.L.R. 
828 (H.L.), Head Note 2 at p.830A.
2. R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex parte Demet rious
1 9 6 6) 2' W.L'.K. IU6b AT pp‘.luVu, A, h9 per i^ ord
Parker C.J.
or his counsel orally* This course is necessary because the 
orders drastically affect the liberty of the person,* and dis­
cretionary orders extraditing fugitive criminals fall within 
this category* The order must not be arbitrary but should 
be considered to be quasi-judicial in nature, and as such 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the superior court to be re­
viewed.2
Two interesting decisions of British Courts on ren­
dition, may also be mentioned. In R. v. Aubrey Fletcher, it 
was held that the sole office of Section 19 of the Extradition 
Act, 1870, is to ensure that an accused will not be tried after 
his surrender for a crime other than that for which he hasbeen 
extradited. It does not inhibit the prosecution from proving 
facts additional to those contained in the depositions filed 
for the purpose of extradition* Seemingly, the depositions 
are only admissible for the limited purpose of determining 
whether the crime for which he is being tried, while normally 
different from that named in the warrant, appeared on the 
facts before the court which ordered extradition. Salmon
4
L. J * referred to Corrigans case, where extradition was 
sought on charges of false pretences, but the indictment 
ultimately charged thirteen counts of fradulent conversion*
This was held to be valid though, as in fact, the accused
1. R* v. Chiswick Police Station Superintendent Ex parte Sackas- 
teder (1918) 1 K.B. 578 at pp.585, 586 and 591,592*
2. R* v* Brixton Prison Ex parte Enahoro (1963) 2 Q.B. 455 at 
p.466.
3. R. v. Aubrey Fletcher Ex parte Ross Munro (1968) 1 All E.R.99.
4. Rex v. Corrigan (1931) 1 K.B. 527.
surrendered himself voluntarily; th<e judgment seems to be a 
dictum only*
In the second decision, R. v. Governor , of Brixton 
Prison Ex parte Gardner, it was held that the principle of 
mutuality applied under the British Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1967. It must be shown, not only "that the general descrip­
tion of the offence falls within Schedule I to the Act, but 
also that the act or omission consti"tuting the offence would, 
if it took place in the United Kingdom constitute an offence.*
Ihe corresponding 1 rule of speciality* in the Indian 
Extradition Act has been very specifically mentioned in Sec­
tions 21 and 31(c) and in both the sections, the words * extra­
dition offence proved by the facts on which his surrender or 
return is based* have been used. In spite of the enumera-
tive method used in the Second Schedxule to the Act, facts 
will be taken into consideration to see whether the offences 
in question are the same or similar :in terms of their ingred­
ients, though bearing different names under the laws of the 
requesting State. In the United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Canada and Australia, the courts would examine the 
nature and ingredients of the offenc<e and would not go by the 
name of the offence used in the Extradition Act or treaty, 
and if on the facts the ingredients are found to be the same, 
a habeas corpus application would be dismissed.
Section 2(c) of the Indian Extradition Act of 1962, 
read with the Second Schedule contaiins the law on the doctrine
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Gardner (1968) 1 
All E.R. 636.
of *mutuality* or ’double criminality*, applied and inter­
preted in the second case. The first essential of the doc­
trine of ’mutuality* is fulfilled by Section 2(c)(i) and (ii) 
of the Act and the second essential by the opening lines of 
the Second Schedule. According to Section 2(c)(i)(ii) it 
would be evident that the general description of the offences 
fall within the Second Schedule to the Act. The words ’The 
following list of extradition offences is to be construed 
according to the law in force in India on the date of the 
alleged offences* used in the Second Schedule, and the enu­
meration of the offences in the Schedule which are offences 
under the Indian Penal Code and other laws therein mentioned, 
would show that the offences mentioned in the Second Schedule 
would constitute offences in India and the test laid down by
the English case in Gardner would be satisfied. There axe 
two aspects to the question whether the offence for which a 
requisition has been made, is an offence in the requesting 
State or not. It is but natural that the Indian Govern­
ment as well as the treaty State will agree for extradition 
of such offences as are punishable in both the territories, 
although they may be called by different names and may have 
varying punishments and modes of punishment. Similarly, 
enumeration of extradition offences in the Second Schedule 
would enable the non-treaty foreign States, including the 
Commonwealth countries, to be forewarned as to the crimes 
for which the Government of India will permit extradition. 
Such States obviously ask for the extradition of only such 
fugitives as have been accused of one of the enumerated 
crimes. The requesting State will make a requisition
only when the fugitive criminal has committed a crime accord- 
ing to its municipal law, otherwise the necessity of requisi­
tion for surrender would not arise#* Habeas eorpuss may 
obviously be filed on the grounds of doctrine of mutuality 
or double criminality or rule of speciality.
A question may arise in interpreting the provisions 
of Section 2(c)(1) and (ii) of the Extradition Act, 1962, 
whether the enumeration of offences in these two clauses viz* 
in treaty under Section 2(c)(1) and Second Schedule under 
Section 2(c)(ii), and their application to the two classes 
of people similarly situated infringe Article 14 of the Con­
stitution, the ’equal protection’ or ’the equality before law’ 
clause* This point may obviously be raised in a habeas 
gofpus petition, because the jurisdictional question would 
be affected. Ultimately, if the answers were in the affirm­
ative, then the extradition would not be in accordance with 
’procedure established by law’ and the extradition could be 
challenged as an infringement of Article 21 of the Consti­
tution.
Under Section 2(c), there are two categories of 
offences, one fixed by treaty or the 1962 Act. The list 
of new extraditable offences may be enlarged and, added to 
and supplemented both in the treaty and the Second Schedule 
hy subsequent notifications, as required by Sections 3 and 
12 of the Act of 1962. Extraditions can be requested by, 
and made to the treaty States in regard to the offences 
mentioned in the treaty and to the non-treaty States, which
1* R.C. Hingorani: The Indian Extradition Law, p.34.
would include Commonwealth countries, in regard to the of­
fences mentioned in the Second Schedule, the treaty and 
supplementary additions, if any. The Second Schedule 
would include additional offences added to the Second 
Schedule. The discrimination arises from the vagueness 
in the language of Section 2(c)(ii) in regard to a Common­
wealth country, with extradition arrangement and one with 
no extradition arrangement. In the former case, Chapter 
III with a more favourable procedure would be applicable, 
and in the latter case, the procedure prescribed in Chapter 
II would be applicable, a less favourable and more stringent 
provision requiring the establishment of a prima facie case. 
Grouping by Order in Council made under the Fugitive Offenders 
Act, 1881, in regard to contiguous Commonwealth countries has
not been adopted wholly under the new Act, and the case of
1 2 Jugal Kishore More, or C,G. Menon would not be helpful in
resolving this question. The Madras High Court in C.G.
a
Menon had held that the two procedures provided under the 
Fugitive Offenders Act under Chapter I and II were contrary 
to Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution; the Supreme Court 
in appeal did not think it necessary to decide this question 
and upheld the judgment on another point, but that judgment 
was dissented from indirectly, in Jugal Kishore More’s case, 
but the two procedures were, however, upheld.
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
11717" supra.
2. State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 517.
3* In re C.G. Menon and Another, A.I.R. 1953 Madras 729 at pp.
73 ,^ fW.
In the case of a Commonwealth country that has 
extradition arrangements with India, the possibility of 
enumeration of new extraditable offences cannot be ruled 
out and generally a list will be appended to the extradi­
tion arrangement, which will be given the force of law by 
a notification under the appropriate section of the Extra- 
dition Act * Otherwise the proceedings may be set aside
corpus proceedings as being an infringement of 
Article 21 of the Constitution.
Under English law, it is almost certain that the 
following statutory provisions will be held wholly to exclude 
judicial review, viz. Section 5 of the Extradition Act, 1870, 
relating to Orders in Council that apply the provisions of 
the Act to any Foreign State. This section provides that 
an Order in Council applying the Act to a Foreign State 
* shall be conclusive evidence that arrangements referred to 
comply with the requirements of this Act ...» and the valid­
ity of such an order shall not be questioned in any legal 
proceedings whatsoever.^  Similarly, by virtue of the pro­
visions of the Indian General Clauses Act, 1897, the pro­
duction of a copy of the Government of India Gazette in 
which the not if icat ions under Sections 3 and 12 have been 
made will be dug proved. Non-compliance in the provi­
sions of Sections 3 and 12 may be a valid ground to set 
aside the order of extradition in habeas corpus proceedings.
1. S.A. de Smith: Judicial Review of Administrative Action. 2nd
ed., p.350.
The arbitrary power may be challenged by the af­
fected fugitive on the ground that the Central Government 
can discriminate between a fugitive under Section 3(1)(a)(b) 
and Section 3(2) and pick and choose and abuse its powers in 
regard to one class of fugitives with another situated in 
similar circumstances; and also may complain about the 
Central Government applying the Act to one country and not 
to another on its whims and thus differentiate between a 
fugitive from one country and the fugitive of another country 
under Section 3(1) and 3(2), and lastly the Central Govern­
ment may make modifications, exceptions, conditions, and 
qualificat ions and favour one country and not another in 
the implementation of treaties and thus may discriminate 
between a country and a country and ultimately, affecting 
the rights of a national of India, or a national of the 
requesting State or a national of a third country.
So fapg the Central Government in exercise of its power 
under Section 36 of the Act, has not framed rules to carry 
out the purpose of this Act. A petition for habeas corpus 
brought on the ground that, unless the rules are framed with 
adequate details for the purposes of Section 36(2), the Act 
cannot be applied for extradition of fugitive offenders, may 
fail, because even if no rules are framed, the provisions 
of the Act would apply. The Extradition Act, 1962, is a 
self-contained code and certain provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1898, have been made applicable to it.
In habeas corpus proceedings, a question could be 
raised as to whether a law under which ext rad it ion proceed** 
ings are being taken or an extradition order is passed, is
valid law or not?*
A habeas corpus petition has succeeded on the ground
of undue delay in extradition, which resulted in the discharge
2of the fugitive# Unless sufficient cause could be shown to 
the contrary under Section 24 of the Indian Extradition Act,
1962, a habeas corpus petition would succeed if the accused 
is not surrendered within two months.
Extradition proceedings would be invalid if taken 
under a law infringing the ’equal protection clause* or 
1 equality before law1, or on the ground of a rule being in­
consistent with the Act or enlarging the scope of the Act, 
or the powers given to the Central Government under rules 
without any guidance, conferring arbitrary, unbridled and 
uncontrolled discretion, in infringement of Article 14 of 
the Constitution# It would be seen that, while the extra­
dition court is still considering the question whether the 
extradition proceedings disclose an extraditable crime, m: 
writ for habeas corpus on the ground that no extraditable
offence is disclosed will not issue, as that is a quest ion
3
primarily for the extradition court to decide# Where a 
prisoner is brought before a competent t ribunal, charged 
with an extradit ion offence and remanded for the express 
purpose of bringing forward further evidence by which that 
accusation is to be supported, it is not competent for the 
Court on a habeas corpus motion to treat the remand warrant 
as a nullity and to proceed to adjudicate upon the case,
In re C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1953 Madras 729.
2. R# v# Governor of Brixton Prison, ex Parte Cairofeell, 1956, 
lit** Tima^. 12 July# Also. He Nar&njan Singh (x961) 2 All E.R. 
16"^ .
3. United States v. Gaynor, (1905) A.C. 128 (P.C.)#
as though the whole evidence were before it.*
(b) Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions
Formerly, there was a controversy 2 between the 
different High Courts in India whether successive applica­
tions would lie for the issue of habeas corpus or not. The 
Calcutta High Court was of the view that they do lie, but 
the High Courts of A1 lahabad, Bombay, Madras, Nagpur and 
Patna and East Punjab were of the view that they did not. 
there was also a controversy as to whether criminal res
fudlcata applied to such petitions. In the case of Ghulam
3 #  ^ .
Sarwar , Chief Justice Subba Rao, speaking for the Court,
held that the writ of habeas corpus was a great constitu- 
tional privilege and there was no higher duty than to main­
tain it unimpaired. It has been described as a magna carta 
of British liberty. It is now incorporated in Articles 32 
and 226 of the Const itut ion. Whether successive pet it ions 
lie or not, the Court analysed the decisions of English
4 5Courts and American Courts and observed that so far as
the High Courts in India were concerned, the division bench 
of a High Court could not set aside an order of another
*• Hnited States v. Gaynorf ibid.
2. Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335 at o* 
1337:---------  ----------------
3. Ghulam Sarwar, ibid. at p. 1337.
4. Re Hastings No.2 (1958) 3 All E.R, 625, and Re Hastings No.3 
(1959) X All E.R. 698.
5. Edward M. Fau v. Charles No la, 9 Law Ed. 859; Frank v. Mangum. 
237 U.S. 306; Wong Doo v. U.S., 68 Law Ed. 999; Harmon Metz 
Waleu v# James A. Johnston, 68 Law Ed. 1302; Salinger v* Loisel 
11923) 265 U.S. 224; U.S. v. Shaughnessy and Others *( 1954') ' 
347 U.S. 260.
Division bench.
But unlike England, in India the person detained 
can file an original petition for enforcement of his funda­
mental right to liberty before the Supreme Court (under 
Article 32 of the Constitution), and that the order of the 
High Court in the said writ is not res judicata as held by 
the English and American courts either because it is not a 
judgment or because the principles of res judicata are not 
applicable to a fundamentally lawless order and the Supreme 
Court has to dec ide the petit ion on merits.^-
the Supreme Court has also held that in proceedings
under Article 32 of the Const itut ion of India in habeas corpus
writ before the Supreme Court, the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply so the principle of constructive res judicata
2too does not apply. It was observed:
„If .£1^  doctrine of res judicata is 
attracted to an applicatlonfora writ 
of habeas corpus, there is no reason 
why 'the principle of constructive res 
judicata cannot also govern the said 
application for the rule of construct­
ive res judicata is only a part of the 
general principles of the law of res
judicata, and if that be applied the
scope of the liberty of an individual 
will be considerably narrowed. ... If 
the doctrine of res judicata be applied, 
the Court, though is enjoined by the 
Const itut ion to protect the right of 
a person illegally detained, will be­
come powerless to do so. Ihat would 
be whittling down the sweep of the 
Constitutionalpi*© feet ion."
1. Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335 at pp. 
1337,1336.
2. Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, A .I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335 at pp.
1337, 1338.
1However, Bachawat J • in a separate judgment observed that 
the previous dismissal of a habeas corpus petition by the 
High Court may be taken into consideration under Order 35 
RR 3 and 4 of the Supreme Court Rules before issuing a rule 
nisi and that the pet it ioner would not have a right to move 
the Supreme Court under Article 32 more than once on the same 
facts.
The resultant position is that the person to be 
extradited can move the High Court only once under Article 
226 and also can come to the Supreme Court in original habeas 
corpus petition after the judgment of the High Court and that 
judgment would not be res judicata, but in the Supreme Court 
no successive petitions will be allowed.
As for the British view on this question, the deci- 
2sion in Stallmann in extradition proceedings may be referred 
to. The pet it ioner had earlier been discharged in extra­
dition proceedings taken against him by an Indian court
3
(High Court of Calcutta), when it found that he was not 
given adequate opportunities by the magistrate to produce 
evidence in his defence. The British court held that this 
discharge in extradition proceedings by the Calcutta High 
Court did not amount to the accused having been 1 tried, 
punished or discharged* .
1. Ghulam Sarwar, ibid. at p. 1341.
2. Rex v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Stallmann (1912) 
3 K.B. 424.
3. Rudolf Stallmann, I.L.R. 38 Cai.547, and In re Stallmann,
I.L.R. 39 Cal.lo4.
(2) Review of Extradition Orders by Superior Courts tinder 
Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code
Before the Constitution of India came into force, 
the petit ion for habeas corpus lay to the High Court under 
Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. Even after the coming 
into force of the Constitution, High Courts in India have 
continued to exercise their powers under this section.
In an application under Section 491 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, filed by a person detained under the Extra­
dition Act, 1903, the Judicial Commissioner of Sind held 
that the court had no power to investigate into the proceed­
ings of the political agent (Resident, Western Rajputana 
States), who issued the warrant under which the applicant
had been arrested.'*' In dealing with the question of the
scope of Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, the court 
2observed, as follows:
"The proceedings by way of habeas 
corpus are proceedings calling upon 
a person having custody of a prisoner 
to produce him and demonstrate under
what authority he holds him in custody.
If the authority be a legitimate autho­
rity binding on the officer complying 
with it, he is bound to obey the order 
of that authority, and the court can­
not int erfere• All this court can 
do is to see that there is no patent 
defect visible in the authority by 
which the person having custody de­
tains a person. Had it, for instance, 
been the case that the warrant was not 
issued over the name of the Res ident, 
but over that of some inferior agent 
or had the warrant not been duly 
sealed, or had it been directed to 
a wrong officer, then, no doubt the
1« Jamna v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1926 Sind/at p. 127 (D.B.)
2. Jamna v. Emperor, ibid. at p.127.
warrant being informal, would not 
justify the detent ion of the peti­
tioner. Again, if the warrant had 
directed the ar rest of a European 
British subject, and such a person 
were so detained, that again will be 
an error which we will be entitled to 
correct# Or again, if a warrant
mentions an offence which is not an 
extraditable offence within the mean­
ing of the Act, there again the war­
rant would have been invalid, and 
this court would have directed that 
the person detained should be set at 
liberty. But further than that we 
do not think that the aid of this 
court can be invoked."
The above case shows that the order of detention 
can be scrutinised by the court for the purpose of seeing 
whether the detention is legal. The case also shows that, 
in regard to the arrest and detention under the Extradit ion 
Act, 1903, the court cannot go further than examine the regu­
larity of the proceedings on the face of the record. The 
case also contains general observations about the power o3f 
the court in habeas corpus proceedings to go beyond the order 
of detention in considering whether the detention is illegal. 
It seems doubtful whether these last general observations in 
the Sind case represents the correct legal position. They 
express the position under English common law with reference 
to habeas corpus. But the Judicial Commissioner's court 
in the above case was dealing with an application under 
Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. Since the decision 
of the Privy Council,1 it is settled that prior to the coming 
into force of the present Constitution of India, the High 
Courts in India had no powers to issue the common law writs 
of habeas corpus, but their power arose solely under the
1. Mathew v. District Magistrate, Trivendram, A.I• R. 1939 P*C 
STFaf p.2T77
provisions of Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code.1 The 
wordsjbf the section do not justify any limitation, as men­
tioned by the Sind Judicial Court in the Jamna* s case, on 
the power of the High Court in deciding whether the deten­
tion was legal or not • Further, even assuming that the 
court was entitled to apply principles of English law to 
applicants under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, the 
courts seem to have overlooked the fact that even in England, 
the old principle was found to be unsatisfactory and under 
the Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, the return of writ cannot be 
in dispute except in some specific categories of cases.
The question then arises whether the old common 
law rule, of treating the return to the writ as indisputable 
is applicable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas 
corpus under Article 226 and 32 of the Const itut ion. In
a long catena of decided cases on the law of extradition,
2 3
beginning with the cases of C.G. Menon, Hans Muller,
4 .5 6J.K. More, and Anwar All, and Ghulam Sarwar, neither the 
Supreme Court nor the High Court seem to regard themselves 
as bound by any such rule that precludes them from disputing
1. Regarding difference of opinion in High Courts in India, 
whether revision lies in extradition proceedings, see S.K. 
Agarwala, op.cit., pp.253-257. Also, see Hari Sankar Prasad
v. District Magistrate, Par j eel ing JJL971) &.W.i^ . 470.
2. State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 517.
3. Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 
A.I.R. IMs S.C. 36/.
4. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
il7i. :1,im 1
5. Anwar v. State of J & K, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337.
6. GhuTft™ Sarwar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335.
the return to the writ of habeas corpus. The old common law 
rule seems to be a technical one* As the rule operates to 
restrict the power of the court to do complete Justice, there 
seems very little reason for its importation into India.
Ihe Supreme Court or the High Court would go to the 
extent of examining the true nature and character of the order 
under which the offender is under arrest *
In exercise of its Jurisdiction under Section 491, 
Criminal Procedure Code, the Rajasthan High Court interfered 
in two extradition cases and set aside the orders of extra­
dition* In the case of Birma,  ^the question before the High
Court was whether a treaty entered into between the Dholpur 
State Government, an erstwhile native State in India;and the 
British Government but which was not incorporated in the 
municipal law of Dholpur State regarding extradit ion of fugi­
tive offenders, could be regarded as having the force of law 
within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution and 
whether in view of the provisions relating to Fundamental 
Rights provided in the Constitut ion of India, the arrest 
and detention of Birma could be considered legal. Placing
2reliance upon Halsbury * s Laws of England, and other cases, 
the Divisional Court held that:3
1* Birma v« State, A.I.R* 1951 Raj * 127*
2- Vo1*6. Part v. at oaras. 678, 679; Parliament Beige (1879)
4 p!d! 1291 Walker v. Baird (1892) A Z T W T ^ T l f j . F X .  92j 
Mangilai v. SarkarJudgment in court of Final Appeal, Udipur 
(referred in thi s case and in the case of Nanka), and Re Art on 
(1896) 1 Q.B. (No.l) 108.
3. Birma v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 127, Head Note A and B, para.
IT.
"Treaties which are part of inter­
national law do not form part of the 
law of the land, unless expressly 
made so by the Legislative authority 
••• The Extradition treaty made be­
tween the former Dholpur State and 
the British Government not having 
been (incorporated into the laws of that 
State by legislative enactment, cannot 
be regarded as a part of the municipal 
law of Dholpur State and the detention 
of a person under the provisions of 
such treaty cannot be said to be accord­
ing to the procedure established by law 
within the meaning of Article 21 of the 
Constitution and, as such, is invalid.
The practice of surrendering fugitive 
criminals, in accordance with the treaty 
followed by the Dholpur State till the 
time of the merger, cannot be deemed 
to be a law that can be continued under 
Article 21 of the Constitution.”
Following this decision of Birma, another Divi­
sional bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Nanka,* (decided 
on 9 August, 1950, after coming into force of the Constitu­
tion) accepted the pet it ion filed under Section 491, Criminal 
Procedure Code, on the same grounds as in the earlier case 
and held that as the treaty between Dholpur State and the 
British Government remained a treaty only and was never in­
corporated in the municipal law of that State, it was merely 
an executive Act of the Maharaja and was not the 'procedure 
established by law* within the meaning of Article 21 of the 
Constitut ion, and therefore, the petitioner could not be 
deprived of his personal liberty and he was entitled to be 
released unconditionally. The Court also held that the 
fact that the Maharaja, who executed the treaty>was also 
the legislative authority, will not make it binding on the 
subject and the subject cannot be bound by a mere treaty of
1 . Nanka v. Gfment of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 153 at p.155*
extradition, not incorporated in the municipal law of his 
State simply because it has been incorporated into the 
municipal law of another State or because there is a statu— 
tory law regarding extradition in the latter state. , The 
necessary corollary from the judgment is that a treaty, even 
if incorporated as a municipal law of another State or be— 
cause there is law of extradition in another State (request-
ing State), would not bind the subject of the requestJM
S '
State. In Ram Babu jtaksena*s case.1 it was held by the
Supreme Court that a detention in accordance with the provi­
sions of the Extradition Act, 1903, cannot be questioned al­
though it may not be covered by the extradition treaty.
The quest ion of law and powers of interference by 
superior courts have now been well settled by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Anwar v. State of j & K.2 The peti­
tioner was a Pakistani infiltrator, who entered the terri­
tory of India illegally. While dismissing his habeas 
corpus petition, the Court observed:3
"Habeas corgus, though a writ of right 
is not a writ of course. Its scope 
has grown to achieve its purpose of 
protecting individuals against erosion 
of the right to be free from wrongful 
restraint on their rightful liberty."
An alien cannot have a right to move about freely in India
without a proper legal sanction and if a foreigner is to be
expelled by the Central Government, the courts would not, on
the authority of Hans Muller* s case and Anwarf s case, interfere.
1* Ram Babu Saksena v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 155 at p. 157, 
para.8, per Patanjali Sastri J.
2. Anwar v. State of J & K. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337.
3. Anwar v. State of J & K, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337 at p .342, per 
Oua. J.
If the foreigner, however, is to be extradited, then he can 
claim the protection under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court refused to interfere 
against the order of expulsion in Anwar*s case, on the ground 
that his entry into India was illegal, as he had no funda­
mental right under Article 19 of the Constitution, and he 
could not avail himself of Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the 
Const itut ion. As he had illegally entered the terri­
tory of India, and India as a sovereign State, was at 
liberty to expel a foreigner, these articles were not 
available to him.*1
1* Anwar v. State of J & K, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 337.
(3) Power of the High Court to Review Orders of the Magi­
stracy under Sections 435 and 439 Criminal Procedure 
Code in its Revisional Jurisdiction
Orders passed under Section 3 of the Indian Extradi­
tion Act, 1903, are revisable under Section 439 Criminal Pro­
cedure Code. The earlier dictum of the Calcutta High Court 
in Rudolph Stallmann*s case.1 holding that a magisterial 
inquiry regarding extradit ion is not subject to appellate 
or revisional jurisdiction, is no longer an accepted prin­
ciple of law. Appeal does not lie but revision does•
The Punjab High Court in the case of the Russian sailor
2Tarasov, interfered in revision. The revision may be 
available to the offender and to the demanding State also, 
on the grounds of jurisdiction and the court can examine the 
matter in regard to correctness, legality and propriety of 
►the orders, on which grounds a revision petition under 
Sections 435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code can be 
brought before the High Court. The basic reason for 
the applicability and availability of the revisional juris­
diction of the High Court is that since the nominated magi­
strate, under Section 5 read with the other sections of the 
1962 Act, functions as a committing magistrate and while 
acting under Section 25, dealing with bail application is 
exercising the same powers and jurisdiction as a Sessions 
Judge, it is but natural that the relevant provisions of 
Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Constitution should be
1. Rudolph Stallmann v. Emperor, I*L.R. ,38 Cal.547; See
also S.K. Agarwala, op.cit., pp.253-257 for conflicting opin­
ions of High Courts regarding powers of revision in extradi­
tion proceedings under Act of 1903.
2. J.N. Saxena: Extradition of a Soviet Sailor (notes and comments 
(1963 ) 57 A.J.I.L., pp.883-888. S.K. Agarwala: International 
Law, Indian Courts and Legislature, pp.219,242, K.L.Hingorani,
The Indian Extradition Law, p.43, f.n.8 ; p.55, f.n.39,p.56.
applicable to extradition proceedings.1
If the accused is dissatisfied with the magistrate* s 
order made under Section 7, sub-section 4, Section 9 and 
Section 17(i)f he can move the High Court under Articles 226 
and 227 of the Constitution, or can move the High Court in 
its revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439 Crimi­
nal Procedure Code. The accused can also move the Supreme 
Court under Article 32 of the Const itut ion directly, without 
going to the High Court first. The High Court considers 
the fugitive* s ground for challenging the committal order, 
or order of detention or remand or refusal of bail. The 
grounds mentioned in Section 31 of the Act of 1962 can be 
taken and the High Court will pass such orders as it * deems 
fit* • The words 1 deem fit* give the High Court very wide 
and extensive powers for exercising a supervisory or revi­
sional jurisdiction. If the fugitive is dissatisfied with 
the order of the High Court he may go in special appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution, if leave is granted by the 
Supreme Court• But whether the case is under examination 
before the High Court or before the Supreme Court, the 
question of Fundamental Rights of the petitioner will be 
thoroughly examined, including Article 21 to see if the 
extradition is made under the * procedure established by 
law* and not otherwise.
In case the fugitive is discharged, there is no 
appeal provided under the Extradition Act, but the demanding
1. See Sec.8(1) and 25 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
2. Haris!Anker Prosad v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1971)
73 (S.w.N. 4W.
State may petition for revision of the magistrate1 s order 
under Sections, 435, 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
and for writs of certiorari and mandamus under Article 226 
of the Constitution for quashing the order of discharge and 
for a mandamus or direction to the magistrate or the Central 
Government for extraditing the fugitive in accordance with 
law. Ihe Punjab High Court entertained a Soviet pet it ion 
under Article 226 and Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code 
against the order of a Delhi Magistrate, discharging a Russian 
fugitive for want of Soviet Law regarding the rule of special* 
ity. Chief Justice Falshaw ordered the production of the 
relevant Soviet law in fulfilment of Section 31(c) of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962 (Chief Just ice Falshaw* s order 
dated 7 March, 1963) This is based on the principle that
a person extradited for one offence cannot be tried for an­
other, so long as he is not freed from the restraint involved
.. ..... 2 Vh Lrm  the extradition process. r f
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1. J.N. Saxena: Extradition of a Soviet Sailor (1963) 57 A.J.I.L. 
883; S.K. Agarwala. ibi<£.Y pp.219, 242; R.C. Hingoranis Ihe 
Indian Ext rad! it ion Law, p.76, f*n*96.
2. United States v. Rauschur (1886) 119 U.S. 407. ,1
3.  ^ suizj 6 - V r C^i^) 3 m  Q.i.nrj**'#
[331 F( K W
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Procedure Code in Extradition Proceedings
It is well settled that if accepting the allega­
tion in the complaint or first information report no case 
is made out the proceedings can be quashed by the High 
Court under Section 561 A, Criminal Procedure Code.*- Ihe 
High Court1 s general power of review, revision, or recon­
sideration of orders made in criminal appeals or criminal 
revision petitions can be exercised under Section 561 A to
(i) give effect those orders; (ii) to prevent any abuse of
the process of court j or (iii) to secure the ends of
2justice.
3
Ihe Supreme Court observed in regard to the 
exercise of powers by a High Court under Section 561 A,
Criminal Procedure Code:
«Ihe inherent power of the High Court 
saved by Section 561 A of the Criminal 
Procedure Code could be exercised to 
quash proceedings in a proper case 
either to prevent the abuse of the pro­
cess of the Court or otherwise to secure 
the ends of justice. The following 
were some of the cases where the pro­
ceedings could and should be quashed:
(a) where the allegations in the first 
information report or the complaint 
did not make out the offence aLleged;
(b) where there was no legal evidence 
adduced in support of the charge or the 
evidence adduced clearly or manifestly 
failed to prove the charge.”
The High Court under Section 561 A, Criminal Procedure Code
1. R.P. Kapur v. State of Panjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866; 
Narainlal~v. Shiva Prakash (1971) Cr.L.J. 96.
2. Mahesh v. State, 1971, A.L.J. 668.
3. Per G.K. Mittar and A.N. Grover JJ. in Unji c m y ,.*. 
Col. G.K. Ante and The State of Assam v. Major/H.lS^ 1^1 waf,
A.t.R.avorx. 1533 at v .LS3yr.
can go into the question as to whether there is any legal 
evidence* The finding of the High Court that the evidence 
came from tainted sources and is not reliable, means what 
can be described as * no case to go to the jury* And
this is exactly the position in cases of extradition, and 
therefore, if the High Court finds that there was * no case 
to go to the jury* or fit for committal, and there was no 
legal evidence or evidence was tainted, then in exercise 
of the inherent powers under Section 561 A, Criminal Pro­
cedure Code, the High Court will set aside the order of 
the magistrate.
1. Raiendra Nath Mahato v. Deputy Superintendent of Police* 
Ea'renla, A.i.U. I't/VS S.cT^f.
(5) Revision of the Orders of the Magistrate under Article 
227 of the Constitution
The District Magistrate acting under Section 7(4) 
of the Indian Extradit ion Act, 1962 , is regarded as a tribunal 
within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution. Ihe 
order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 7(4) 
is revisable by the High Court under Article 227 of the Con­
stitution.^ It has not so far been decided whether such 
an order made under Sect ions 8 and 18 of the Act would be 
revisable under Article 227. In Haris: ankar, the question 
whether there was Jurisdiction in the High Court under 
Section 439,Criminal Procedure Code, to revise the order 
passed by the District Magistrate acting under Section 7(4) 
of the 1962 Act, was answered by Mr. Justice R.N. Dutta in 
the affirmative and by Mr. Just ice Sanaa SarRar in the 
negative.
1. Haris" ankar Prasad v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1971) 
75 C.W.N. 470.
Application under Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders
Act. 1881.
An application under Section 10 of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, can be made as an alternat ive to a 
petition for habeas corpus. Section 29 of the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1962, corresponds to Section 10 of the 
Act of 1881. Under Section 29 of the Act of 1962, 
powers have been given to the Central Government, whereas 
under the Act of 1881 the Court of Appeal had original 
Jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 10. 
Even if an appl icat ion for habeas corpus is unsuccessful, 
the Court of Appeal has original Jurisdiction to entertain
the application under Section 10 of the Act of 1881.1 The 
British Court dealing with the punctuation under Section 10 
of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and the difficulties 
that might be caused having regard to the words * or other­
wise* in the section, said:
"Upon reflection one cannot help 
thinking that the words * or other­
wise* in the fourth line leave it 
to the discretion of the Court to 
make the order in any case upon any 
ground where, having regard to the 
distance and facilities for commu­
nication, and to all the circum­
stances of the case, it appears to 
the court that it would be oppress­
ive or too severe a punishment to2 
return the fugitive immediately.**
1. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Savarkar, 1910 t&\ 
K.B. 1056 (C.A.); Pe Demko v. HomcTSecretary lTrT( 1959\ A.C. 
654, per Lord Reid at pp.661, 662 (h.L.)j R. v . Governor of 
Brixton Prison Ex parte Armah (1966) 3 W.L.R.* 828“"atT pd.6s9.h 
8WT; per Lord Pearce (57l7):
2. R# v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Waite, 1927, The 
Times, 22 Feb. Cited by ahene-PJan, infra, at p. 183.
This case confirmed the courts1 absolute discretion when 
dealing with application under Section 10 of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881* The House of Lords in Atkinson1 s
case, held that there is a complete discretion in extradi­
tion cases in the Secretary of State.2
Henderson* s case demonstrate the unwilling­
ness of the Court to apply Section 10. It was observed:
"An order under Section 10 of the Act, 
would be made for release of a fugitive 
only where it appeared that the contem­
plated proceedings, although perhaps, 
lawful by the law of the country con­
cerned, would be conducted in a way 
contrary to natural Justice, or if it 
appeared that the charges were trivial 
and the punishment awarded in being 
returned was out of all proport ion to 
the gravity of the alleged offence.”
The Court further observed that:
"the difficulties which the applicant 
would experience in presenting his de­
fence, due to the delay involved in 
the case, were matters for the consider­
ation of the tribunal dealing with the 
case, and factors which would be con- 
sidered by the tribunal of any civil­
ised country when dealing with a crimi­
nal matter."
However, instituting proceedings, resulting
in the fugitive being prejudiced in his defence, was held
4to be a good ground for discharge. On the question of
1. X.L. Ohene-Djan: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis of London Univer­
sity, 1965, The Fugitive Offenders and the Law of Extradition 
in the Commonwealth, at p.183.
2. Atkinson v. United States Government (1969) 3 All E.R. 1317 
at p.1327,H, per Lord Morris (H.L.).
3. Henderson v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1950) 1 All
I.R. 2&3, Head note (1), D,E.
4. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison. Ex parte Campbell. 1956, 
fee Times, July, Qhene-Pjan, p.183, supra.
refusal on account of passage or lapse of time (Section 
31(b) of the Extradition Act of 1962), Lord Parker observed:1 
that Teja could not invoke Section 8(3) of the 1967 Act be­
cause the passage of time, since the alleged offence, was 
not the result of any neglect on the part of the Indian 
Government but was mainly caused by Teja1 s conduct. It 
was further observed that there was no evidence that 
the judiciary in India was going to be prejudiced adversely 
to the applicant by reason of press comment and debates in 
Parliament there, it was very doubtful whether the court, 
in dec iding whether it would be * unjust or oppress ive * to 
return him on the ground, was entitled to take into account 
as part of the c ircumstances anything which did not flow 
from, or was unconnected with, the passage of time.
Regarding the interpretation of words political
opinion* in Section 4(1) (b) (c) of the 1967 Act, Lord* Parker 
3held that although Teja had been the centre of political 
controversy in India and attacks had been made in Parliament 
and elsewhere in complete disregard of the sub judice prin­
ciple, there was no evidence that Teja had at any time entered 
the political arena, and therefore, it could not be said that 
he was liable to prosecution for his political views and even 
giving the widest possible interpretation, paragraphs (a) (c) 
of Section 4(1) of the 1967 Act had no application to the 
present case.
1* R* v. Governor- of Pentonville Prison. Ex parte Teja. (19731 
All E.R. 11 at P.23C.
2. R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Sx paxte Teja, &97l) 2 
All E.R. p.11 at p.23e.
3. 1. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison. Ex parte_lM&. (1973) 2 
All E.R. 11 at p.22G.
CHAPTER VII
(1) Inter-Commonwealth Rendition and Special Procedure for
Commonwealth Countries with Extradition Arrangements
(a) Introduction
The Indian law on extradition rested on the Indian 
Extradit ion Act, 1903, which was intended to provide for con­
venient administration of the Extradition Acts of 1870,
1873, and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1881, enacted by the 
British Parliament. By an Order of Council of 7 March, 1904, 
it was declared that Chapter IV of the Indian Extradition Act, 
1903, may be considered as part of the Fugitive Offenders Act,
1881.1 The effect of such incorporat ion was that there was 
also provision for * inter-colonial backing of warrants* within 
the groups of*British possessions* to which Part I of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, had been applied by Order in 
Council. In such groups, a more rapid procedure for the 
return of fugitive offenders between possessions of the same 
group was in force. Where in a * British possession* of a 
group to which Part II of the Act applied, a warrant was 
issued for the apprehension of a person accused of an offence 
punishable in that possession and such person is or was sus­
pected of being in or on the way to another British possess­
ion of the same group, a magistrate in the last-mentioned 
possession if satisfied that the warrant was issued by a 
person having lawful authority to issue the same, was bound
1. J.N. Saxena, * India - The Extradition Act, 1962* (1964) 13
I.C.L.G.. pp. 116-138 at p. 117; R.C. Hingorani! The Indian 
IxrEraclTtion Law (1969), p.17.
to endorse such warrant, and the warrant so endorsed, with 
the jurisdiction of the endorsing magistrate, the person 
named in the warrant, and to bring him before the endorsing 
magistrate or some other magistrate in the same possession*
If the magistrate before whom he was brought was satisfied
that the warrant was duly authenticated and was issued by 
a person having lawful authority to issue it, and the iden­
tity of the prisoner was established, he could order the 
prisoner to be returned to the British possession in which 
the warrant was issued, and for that purpose to deliver into 
custody of the persons to whom the warrant was addressed or 
of any one or more of them, and to hold in custody and con­
veyed to the possession, there to be dealt with according to
1
law as if he had been there apprehended.
Ihe effect of these Acts was that the fugitive 
could be delivered to the Commonwealth countries and British 
colonies, which were categorised as non-foreign States, with­
out the formality of establishing a prima facie proof of 
guilt or prima facie evidence* French and Portuguese pos­
sessions in India were, however, not treated as foreign 
2States. Extradition requests between India and the
3French possessions were governed by the 1815 Treaty which 
stipulated for surrender without proof of prima facie evi­
dence against the fugitive. The British Extradition Act 
of 1870 was made applicable to India in pursuance of its
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171 at pp. 1176, ll>7. ^ ^ * ^ , 1 1!..
2. In Re Muthu Reddl, 59 M.L.J. 278; whether Pondicherry and 
nhanfiornagore were non-fore ign States under the Act of 1903, 
see S.K. Agarwala, op.cit., pp.197, 198.
3. S.K. Agarwala, op.cit*, p.198.
Section 17, and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was made 
applicable to India on the basis of Section 32 of the Act •
In conformity with the British enactments, the Indian Act 
also differentiated between foreign and non-foreign States• 
Foreign States were those which did not form part of the 
British Commonwealth or its colonies. Commonwealth 
countries and British colonies were categorised as non-foreign 
States. Princely States in India were also not treated as 
foreign States• Chapter II of the Indian Extradition Act, 
1903, regulated extradition proceedings in respect of foreign 
States, while Chapter III governed extradition proceedings in 
respect of non-foreign States. So are the provisions of 
the present Extradit ion Act, 1962, which make Chapter III 
applicable to extradition proceedings to Commonwealth 
countries with extradition arrangements, and Chapter II
applies to extradition of fugitive criminals to foreign 
States and to Commonwealth countries to which Chapter III 
does not apply, i.e. to Commonwealth countries with no 
extradition arrangements with India.
The Extradition Acts in Britain affects British 
subjects as well as aliens. The British Extradition Act, 
1870, as amended, provides that the Crown may, subject to 
certain instructions and formalities, hand over to any State 
with which reciprocal treaty has been made, any persons 
(whether British subjects or aliens) who have been found 
guilty of committing in that State any offence covered by 
the Extradition Acts. There is no prerogative power to 
seise an alien in Britain and hand him over to a foreign
State. So also in India, if a person is to be extra­
dited then all the formalities under the Extradition Act 
are to be completed, the executive of the Union Government 
has no power to capture or seize an alien and hand him over 
to the foreign Government.2 Of course, he may be expelled 
or deported under the Foreigner’s Act, 1946. The Foreign 
State, in return, undertakes to surrender to the United King­
dom persons who have committed extraditable crimes in British 
territory. The Act of 1870 enables the Crown to make an 
Order in Council directing that the Extradition Acts shall 
apply to any given State. So are the provisions made 
under Sections 3 and 12 of the Indian Extradition Act for 
the application of that Act to foreign States and this is 
done by the Central Government by publication of the Notifi­
cation in the Government Gazette of India.
When extradition is desired, the accused can be 
arrested either by a Bow Street Magistrate’s warrant issued 
on the order of the Home Secretary, or by a warrant of a 
justice of peace issued upon information on oath in the 
ordinary way. The Act provides its own Code of Procedure.
The Bow Street Magistrate receives the extradition order and 
documents from the Home Office, and decides whether or not 
there is sufficient evidence to allow the case to proceed.3
Section 3 of the British Act of 1870 provides
1. Forsyth: Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, pp.369-370* 
East India Co. v. Campbell i^79h^ 27 b.r. xaidj Mur e v.
KayeTTl8llT“4 Taunt.43.129 E.R. 239. — —
2. Hans Muller’s Case, supra, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367.
3. R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner v. Savundranavapirtloss) 
Crim. L.R. 309; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte 
Frenettee. The Times, 19 March, 1952.
that a person is not to be surrendered for * an offence of a 
political character** An offence is political only when 
there are two parties in the State each striving to impose 
its Government on the other. Thus,1 where a native of the 
Swiss canton of Ticino had committed murder during an in­
surrection and escaped to England, he was not surrendered.
But the mere fact of the prisoner being accused of murder 
in a political disturbance does not itself justify the re­
fusal of an order of his extradition, and an explosion caused 
by an anarchist is not a political offence within the Act.2 
On the other hand, in the case of Ex parte Kolczynski.3 the 
members of a Polish trawler took charge of the ship, putting 
the master under restraint, and steered her into an English 
port because they feared that they would be punished for 
their political opinions if they returned to Poland. The 
offences were committed in order to escape from political 
tyranny. The Poles were successful in their application 
for habeas corpus. the Divisional Court holding that they 
were entitled to the protection of Section 3 of the Act.
But the exact scope and extent of 1 offence of a political
character* has, even now, not been defined by the House of
4Lords in the recent case of Tzti-Tsai Cheng. When a Bow 
Street Magistrate commits a prisoner for surrender, such 
surrender cannot take place for 15 days, or such further 
time as a habeas corpus application (if applied for) may
l* In re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B. 149.
2. Re Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415.
3* R* v. Governor of Brixton Prison. Ex parte Kolczynski (1955)
I Q.B.~540:
4. Tzu-Tsai Cheno v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (19731 2 AllEm m imih  mvimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmrnimmm 9.R. 204.
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take. Section 12 of the Act of I8 7 0 provides that if 
a fugitive criminal is not conveyed out of the Kingdom with­
in two months after committal for surrender by the Bow Street 
Magistrate, or if a writ of habeas corpus is issued after the 
decision thereon, any Judge of the Superior Court may, upon 
the prisoner’s application and upon proof that the Home Secre­
tary has had reasonable notice of such application, order the 
discharge of the fugitive from custody,^ unless sufficient 
cause is shown to the contrary. If the fugitive is not 
discharged, he is surrendered under the warrant of the Home 
Secretary# in the case of Schtraks, where the charges in­
volved were perjury and child stealing, the case had become 
a political issue in Israel but that did not make it an of­
fence of a political character. The idea behind the latter 
phrase, said Viscount Radcliffe is that the fugitive is at 
odds with the State that applies for his extradition on some
issue connected with the political control or Government of
3the country. The offence that is of a political character
should be vis-a-vis the State requesting extradition.^ This 
is the procedure for surrender of fugitives to foreign States.
The Pug it ive Offenders Act, 1881, makes provision 
for the arrest and surrender of persons of any nationality 
accused of crimes to which the Act applies, when they flee
%
1# Extradition Act, 1870, Section 11, Section 31(e) of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
2. Compare Section 24 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962.
3# Schtraks v. Government of Israel (1964) A.C. 556 (H.L,).
4. Tsa-Tsai Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (1973) 2 All
B.H.204 (H.L.) | Reid on v. Governor of Brixton PrisonT 
Ex p^rte Schtraks, L.R. (1964) A.C. 556 (h.L,),
from one part of Her Majesty’s Dominion to another part• The 
Act continues to apply not only between the United Kingdom 
(which for this purpose, includes the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of Man) and colonies and other British dependencies 
but the Act may be extended to Protectorates and Protected 
States by Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act, 1890,^ and also between them and independent Common­
wealth countries• The act applies to treason, piracy, 
and any other criminal offence which is punishable for twelve
months or more in the place where it was committed, even
2
though it is not an offence in England. In this respect, 
it differs from the Indian Act inasmuch as the offence 
be punishable according to the laws of both countries.
Also, trivial offences would justify refusal of extradition.
The Act does not exclude political offences, but a superior ( 
court may discharge a fugitive by reasons of the trivial 
nature of the case, if the application of his return is not 
made in good faith in the interests of justice, or if, having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, it would be un- 
just or oppressive or too severe a punishment to return him.
In Zacharij*s case, the Home Secretary exercised his dis­
cretion not to hand the appellant over to Cyprus. Under 
Section 10 of the Act of 1881, the Court of Appeal has 
original, but not appellate jurisdiction to grant relief
.... :
1. R. V. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte Dex»*fc*&ntts. 
T1966) a Q.B. IW .---------------   Z
2. Section 9 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881.
3. Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Also see R. 
v. Bx parte Naraniansingh (1962) 1 Q.B. 211; Zacharia v. ~ 
Republic of Cyprus, L.R. "J1963) A.C. 634 (H.L.)
tmdcr that Section.1 Similar provisions will be found in 
Sections 29 and 31 of the present 1962 Indian Extradition 
Act, Application under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
is made through the Home Office, and arrest is made by war— 
rant of a magistrate. The detainee has 15 days to apply 
for habeas corpus (Section 5) and if he is not sent out of 
the country within one month thereafter, he may apply to a 
superior court to release him. In India, a detainee can 
apply to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu­
tion or can go in revision before the High Court under 
Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, against the order of 
the magistrate or can apply to the Supreme Court under 
Article 32 of the Constitution.
The Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, is a relic from 
the time when the Crown was considered indivisible. The 
anomaly thatNdoes not exclude political offences was brought 
out in fcx parte Enahoro, where a chief who was head of an 
opposition party in Nigeria was detained under the Act for 
return to Nigeria to answer a charge of treasonable felony.
Habeas corpus under Section 10 of the Act had been refused 
and the Home Secretary intended to return him to Nigeria, 
being satisfied that he would be allowed to be defended by 
counsel of his own choice; but the Home Secretary delayed 
returning him, pending a debate in the House of Commons.
1, De Demko v. Home Secretary, L.R. (1959) A.C. 654 per Lord Reid
at' pp.661-662. See also R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison. Ex
parte Armah (1966) 3 W.L.R. 828 at pp.859H, and 860A, per Lord 
Pearce (H.L.); R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte 
Sa-varkar (1910) 2 K.B. 1056 (C.A.).
2. Diamond v. Minter (1941) 1 K.B. 656.
3. Ex parte Enahoro. (1963) 2 Q.B. 455, supra
Enaharo then applied for habeas corpus under Section 7, as he 
had been detained for more than one month, but the Divisional 
Court held that this was reasonable and lawful and dismissed 
the application.1
In regard to the law relating to inter-Commonwealth
rendition, RamaJSwami J. in Re Chockalingam1 s case observed:
,fThus, we arrive at this position; 
viz. that at the time of passing of 
the Ext r adit ion Act, 1903, there were 
three enactments side by side, viz*
(1) Parliamentary Extradition Act 
applicable with British Treaty and 
Order in Council; (2) Indian Extra­
dition Act, Chapter III, applicable 
for any country to which Item 1 does 
not for the time being apply, and 
(3) Pugitive Offenders Act, 1881,n
"The English Extradition Act, 187Q, Chapter II , and 
the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, Chapter III, exhaust all 
the countries. The Pug it ive Offenders Act is a special Act 
which made special provision for one category out of Chapter 
III. Chapter III is the genus (not foreign States and 
fugitive offenders), and Chapter IV is the species, prescrib­
ing a special procedure for British possessions formed into 
a group by reason of their contiguity or otherwise.
As Chapter III would apply to any country in the 
world so long as the Par 1 iamentary Extradition Act does not 
apply, it is a complete Indian enactment on the subject of 
extradition supplementing the Parliamentary Extradition Act, 
wherever the latter is not applicable or even became not
1. For similar provision, see Section 24 of the Indian Extra­
dition Act, 1962 - Note on the Enahoro Case (1963) 12 I.C.L.Q.
1364.
2. RanTaswami J• In re Chockalmgamt A.I.R. 1960 Madras 548 at 
p.£36.
applicable« We have to bear in mind, the significant words
* Foreign State for the time being*. *
It was further observed that;
,fThe preamble of the Indian Act states 
that it is an Act to amend the law in 
cases to which the Parliamentary Extra­
dition Act does not apply for the time 
being. The words * for the time being* 
make the meaning of Foreign State ambu­
latory and as a necessary result make 
the meaning of the words 1 State not be­
ing a Foreign State* in Sections 7 and 
9 ambulatory. On this basis, the 
Fugitive Offenders Act is a law relating 
to a species, viz. British Dominions, 
out of the genus, being the larger cate­
gory, namely, any State not being a 
State to which the Parliamentary Extra­
dition Act applies.
In these circumstances, the logical con<- 
clusion is that Dominions are also with­
in the ambit of Chapter III. The reason 
why the Fugitive Offenders Act is appli­
cable to Dominions was because it is a 
special provision relating to Dominions.
But for this provision, these Dominions 
also would be within the ambit of Chapter 
III (of the Extradition Act of 1903).
Therefore, when a special provision fails, 
because the Fugitive Offenders Act is held 
inapplicable to India after 1950, the case 
of Dominions would be governed by Chapter 
III.**1
Part II of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, pro­
vides that in groups of contiguous Brit ish possessions to 
which that part may be applied by Order in Council, a more 
rapid procedure for the return of the fugitive offenders 
between possessions in the same group may be in force. The 
warrant is ‘backed* in the possession in which the fugitive 
is found and he is sent for trial without any hearing in
1. pama ^warn-f j 0 in Re Chockalingama A.I.R* 1960 Madras 548 at
p.556 (F.B.)•
that possession.^ In C.G. Menon. which was later over­
ruled, the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was held by the 
Indian Supreme Court, not to be applicable to India after 
the coming into force of the Constitution of India and sifter 
India became a Republic. Ihe Madras High Court in Chocka- 
1 ingam held that even though the provisions of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, were no longer in force in India, the 
extradition of the fugitive to Ceylon was legally permissible 
under the provisions of Sections 7 and 9 of Chapter III of the 
Extradition Act of 1903.^
In spite of the Supreme Court judgment in C.G.
(K
Menon's case (supra) Anantjnarayanan J. in Chockalingam^s
* 4case observed:
11 Again we are unable to see how any 
other construction is possible, since 
that would really involve the assump­
tion of a total vacuum in the law re­
lating to Extradition and Extradition 
procedures governing this country, and 
all other countries in relation to this 
country, of the comity of nations; for 
the argument would equally strike down 
not merely the Act itself but all pre­
vious treaties and international agree­
ments. We have no hesitation in 
holding that the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1903, and Chapter III thereof, do 
survive, and are part of the Law of 
this country, as saved by the effect 
of Article 372 of the Indian Consti­
tution.”
1. Ram4j5wami J. In Re Chockalingam, A.I.R. 1960 Madras 548 at
p.555.
2. State of Madras v* C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1954 S.C• 517*
3. In Re Chockalingam, A.I.R. 1960 Madras 548, Rama>wami J, at 
p .558, and Anantanarayanan J. at p.564.
4 # in Re Chockalingam, A.I.R. 1960 Madras 548 at p.564.
The Indian Supreme Court’s decision in C.G. Menon was over­
ruled by the Court in Jugal Kishore More, where it was held 
that the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was in force by virtue 
of Section l(i) of the India (Consequential Provisions) Act,
1949,1
(b) Extradition to Commonwealth Countries
under Chapter III of the Act of 1962
Extradition includes not only the decision of
surrender but also the procedure by which the accused or
convicted persons of one State are delivered by the latter 
2to the former* But the divergent views of States on the 
legal position of Dominions and colonies have deeply influ­
enced the procedural provisions relating to extradition.
Under the laws of States which consider colonies or possess-
3
ions as the overseas departments, there is a single pro­
cedure for Extradition of the fugitive criminals, because 
a request from one colony to another or the parts of the 
Empire is deemed to be a request from one department to 
another of the same office. On the other hand, the 
British Empire has historically evolved itself as an asso- 
ciation of self-governing dominions and colonies enjoying
1. State of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171.
2. Savarkar Arbitration counter-case of the Government of His 
Britannic Majesty, 1911 (Comnd.9761), pp.14—15, cited in C * 
Parry, ed. A British Digest of International Law, (London, 
1965), Part VI, Chapter 17, p.443.
3. Amos J. Peas lee, Constitutions of the Nations, Vol.II, The 
Hague, 2nd ed. (1950), Ihe Constitution of the French Republic 
of 28 Septentoer, 1916, Section III. See also Pol it ical Con­
stitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1 August 1935, Vol.III.
uninterrupted and complete internal independence, with the 
Imperial Parliament at Westminster exercising overall suprem­
acy. Consequently, prior to the attainment of the status 
of international^ personality by a certain number of Common­
wealth countries the British Empire had developed in the 
historical process two distinct procedures for surrendering 
the fugitive offenders found within its jurisdiction. One 
was, with respect to the procedure to be adopted, for the 
extradition of the fugitives from one part of the Empire to 
other parts, which might be called * inter-colonial rendition1 ,1
’Commonwealth intense law* , or * intra-Commonwealth Extradi- 
3tion’. The other was international controlling the rela­
tions between the Commonwealth countries and foreign States.
The former is based on the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, en­
acted by the Imperial Parliament at Westminster and extended 
to all parts of the Empire which were subject to the overall 
supremacy of the Brit ish Parliament. The latter, on the 
other hand, is the direct result of some treaty arrangement 
between the two contracting parties in accordance with rules 
of international law.
countries by geographical considerations, the scheme of 
extradition linking members of the Commonwealth is an example 
of a multiple arrangement springing from common political 
heritage; the use of English language; the Constitutional
1. W.J. O’ Hearn: * Ext radit ion ’, Canadian Bar Rev ., Vol •8 (1930) . 
p.175.
2. Robert E. Clute: ’Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition’
A.J.C.L.. Vol.8 (1959) p.15.
3 # i ‘ition within the Commonwealth1 ,(1960)
Apart from the question of grouping Commonwealth
relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of the Government, the adversary system of criminal 
procedure code; rules of evidence; the writ of habeas corpus 
which are all common traditions and which considerably simplify 
the common ground upon which to base measures of co-operation 
as to the extradition of the fugitive criminals. The Fugi­
tive Offenders Act, 1881, was passed at a time when all parts 
of the Empire owed allegiance ^ to a single sovereign and a 
political crime was committed in some way against the sover­
eign and this is why treason was one of the offences specifi­
cally named as extraditable in the Act. After the countries 
under the domination of the British rule either became * Re­
publics within Commonwealth* or * Realms in the Commonwealth* , 
modifications were required in the laws of extradition.
Commonwealth countries that may have extradition 
arrangements with India are to be treated under Chapter III 
of the Act of 1962 to a simplified procedure for extradition. 
Other Commonwealth countries that may not have such specific 
arrangements came under Chapter II of the Act of 1962.
Regarding political offence, Section 32 made 
Sections 29 and 31 of the present Indian Extradition Act,
1962, applicable even to Commonwealth countries. These
sections mentioned that a fugitive will not be extradited 
for ’offences of a political character*. Since the Indian 
Act of 1962 was heavily influenced by the British Extradi­
tion Act of 1870, and since the same words * offences of a 
political character* occur in the 1870 Act, English autho- 
rities will h e on the interpretation of the 
words used in the Indian Extradit ion Act of 1962. The
Indian Extradition Act of 1903 differed from the Indian Act
of 1962 in several respects. The principle of speciality, 
double criminality were introduced for the first time in 
extradition in relation to the Commonwealth. Contrary to 
the 1881 Act, the enumerative method is used in the defini­
tion of an extraditable offence, though in treaties with 
different countries, the definitions are indicat ive rather 
than eschaustive. It seems in bilateral treaties between 
India and other countries, The European Extradition Conven­
tion of 1957 is adopted as a model or at least much resem­
blance will be found in those treaties•
Resort to alternative methods of rendition may be 
contemplated in the absence of an ’extradition treaty with 
the state desiring to prosecute, where the legislation of 
the State of Asylum requires a treaty as a pre-condition of 
extradition. The negotiation, signature and satisfaction 
of an extradition treaty necessarily occupy considerable time 
and an individual case that arises before must be disposed of 
sooner. These considerations culminated in the procedure 
for rendition under Chapter II of the Act of 1962 for extra- 
dition of fugitives to Commonwealth countries with no extra­
dition arrangements and foreign States with no treaties.
(c) Procedure for Extradition to Commonwealth Countries 
under Chapter III of the Act of 1962
A common procedure was adopted in regard to the 
extradition of fugitives from one part of His Majesty's 
Dominions to another in the Indian Extradition Act of 1903, 
and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. In the Indian Act 
of 1962, a similar procedure is laid down for inter-Common­
wealth extradition. By virtue of Section 17(1) of the Act
for extradition to Commonwealth countries that have extra­
dition arrangements with India, to which Chapter III has 
been made applicable only two prerequisites are necessary 
before extradition. They are: (1) The magistrate before
whom the fugitive is brought, is satisfied on inquiry that 
the endorsed warrant for the *a^*ehens ion of the fug it ive 
criminal is duly authenticated and (2 ) the offence of which 
he is accused of or has been convicted is an extraditable 
offence. On the fulfilment of these two prerequisite con­
ditions, the magistrate shall commit the fugitive to prison 
to await his return and shall forthwith send the Central 
Government a certificate of committal. In this chapter 
the identity clause has been inserted in Sect ions 15 and 
16. The clause seems to be the basis for the foundation 
of acceptance or entertainment of the requisition from the 
requesting State and the warrant is to be backed only if the 
Central Government is satisfied about the authenticity of the 
warrant and competency of the authority validly issuing it 
with perfect jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the Indian Extradition Act,
1903 (Chapter II) which provided for the extradition of 
fugitive criminals to foreign States, and in the present Act 
of 1962 extradition to foreign States and to Commonwealth 
countries to which Chapter III does not apply, require docu­
ments as part of the evidence necessary to establish a prima 
facie case against the person claimed.1 Under the British 
Extradition Act of 1870, a prima facie case was obligatory in
1. See Sections 7, 9, 10 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962; 
Canadian Ext rad it ion Act, 1952, Article 18 (lb); English 
Extradition Act, 1870, .Section 10; U.S. Criminal Code and 
Criminal Procedure, Sec.651.
every case. This prima facie requirement is a feature of 
the law of extradition in the Common Law countries• A prima 
facie case*means at first blush or at first sight, a complete 
case against the accused ... in order to prove a pri^a facie 
case, there must be evidence direct or circumstantial on each 
element • *1 The just ificat ion for requirement of a prfm 
facie case, is that it operates as a protection for the indi­
vidual • He will not be removed to another country which may 
be hundreds and thousands of miles away, with the inevitable 
disturbances to his life and employment, in a strange land 
with no friends, no fund for defence, unless there are very 
good grounds justifying such removal• Above all, it pre­
vents the removal to another State of an individual who may 
be merely suspected of a criminal offence. Paul 0*Higgins 
has quoted two instances demonstrating this danger• The 
Federal Republic of Germany requested the extradition from 
the United Kingdom of Mrs. Elga Kronenberg in 1965. During 
the proceedings before the Bow Street Magistrate, Counsel 
informed him that this lady was arrested at a Hyde Park Hotel 
two years ago and was taken to Ireland by the Irish Police 
without the concurrence or order passed by any court in 
England. She then remained in Ireland awaiting trial for 
18 months and she left shortly before the trial was due to 
come in. The Court observed * It is a monstrous state of 
affairs that this lady should have been arrested without 
appearing before a Court in England*• The second instance
1. W.J. O'Hearn, 'Extradition* , 8 Can. Bar. Rev. 1930, p. 175 at
pp.180-181.
2. Paul O*Higgins: The Irish Extradition Act, 1965, (1966),
I.C.L.Q.. Vol.15, p.369 at p.377.
referred to was as follows: Allegations were made that a
person who was brought back from England on a ' backed warrant * 
in 1961, has been held in custody in Ireland for six weeks and 
ultimately released for lack of evidence, was brought back to 
Ireland in 1964 on the same charge.
Ireland has, however, by Section 22 of the Irish 
Extradition Act, 1965, dropped the requirement of production 
of prima facie evidence before surrender. Section 22 pro­
vides that a requirement of production of prima facie evidence 
can be included specially in an extradition arrangement with 
any State, in which event the Irish courts would not permit 
surrender in its absence. In modern practice, there does 
not seem to be any good grounds or reasons in favour of drop­
ping the requirement of the production of prima facie evidence 
before surrender• This may probably rest in part on the 
suggestion about the suspicion of inadequacy of proceedings 
under other systems of law, but in modern practice, this 
suspicion seems to have no foundation as would be evident 
that the British Parliament included such a requirement in 
the procedure for surrender under the Act of 1870 and the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and so did the Indian Extra­
dition Act, 1903, Chapter II, and the present Extradition 
Act of 1962 in Chapter II.
It is true that there is no rule of international 
law which requires that a prima facie case ought to be made 
out before a fugitive is Surrendered, but the rule rests on 
the need to safeguard the individual from unwarranted surrender 
A prima facie case, therefore, must be established that the 
fugitive committed the act he is charged with.
But the policy in this field has not been consistent
The quantum of proof required for a prima faoie case varied 
according to the country requesting extradition, or the 
country which was asked to extradite. For example, if the 
crime has been committed in Canada,1 in order to justify the 
prisoner's committal for extradition, the evidence thus laid 
before the Bxtradition Judge or Commissioner must be such as
would justify the prisoner's committal for trial. Strict 
proof of prima facie case was, and is necessary under Chapter 
II of the present Act of 1962.
In Part II of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
and the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, Chapter III, and in 
Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, no prima 
facie proof is necessary for a committal of the accused.
Only the identity of the accused and the extraditability of 
the offence has to be established. A warrant issued by a 
competent authority and evidence, usually of the police 
officer, to prove the warrant and to identify the person was 
sufficient in these statutes• Rendition under the British
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and the Indian Extradition Act, 
1903, and 1962, falls somewhere between extradition in inter­
national law terms and the intra-Commonwealth practice, a 
combination of two methods of extradition, namely, the exe­
cutive and the facultative or judicial method. The execu­
tive method seems to have been adopted for the purposes of 
Chapter III of the new Act and facultative or the judic ial 
method for extradit ion under Chapter II of the Act, and more 
precisely, somewhere between these two methods falls rendi­
tion under the 1962 Act.
1, Re Pennsylvania and Levi (1897) 6 Que Q.B. 151; Utah v. Peters 
(1936) 2 W.W.1.9; JleTnsull (1934) O.W.N. 194.
The return of the fugitive under Chapter II of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1962, is more analogous to extradition 
procedure under the Law of nations and is similar to that laid 
down in Sections 10 of the British Extradition Act, 1870, and 
Section 3 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903. The procedure 
adopted by Chapter III is? in spirit, the same as provided by
the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, by Sections 13 and 14. One
of the main differences affect ing the nature of extradit ion 
inquiry lies in the matter of proof of guilt which is the 
main difference between Chapter II and III of the 1962 Act. 
Under Chapter II, the magistrate “ayexpend considerable 
effort on proof of guilt before a fugitive offenddr is re­
turned. He has to be satisfied by evidence that there is 
a prima facie case against the offender; but the return of 
a fugitive under Chapter III is extremely informal with 
little concern as to proof of guilt, the need for such evi­
dence having been dispensed with. All that is required is
the sat isfact ion of the magistrate about the authenticity of 
the endorsed warrant and as to the offence being an extradi­
tion offence. So there is substantial and material differ­
ence in the procedures for surrendering a fugitive criminal 
prescribed by the two chapters of the Act. The reason for 
adopt ing these two different procedures in Chapters II and 
III will be obvious from the speech of the then Law Minister, 
who while introducing the Extradition Bill in the Indian 
Parliament (Lok Sabha) on 17 August, 1961, said:1
11 It was felt absolutely necessary that 
we must amend the law relating to 
extradition at least to enable our 
Government to get the criminals who
1. Parliamentary Debates, 17 August, 1961
have gone over to Commonwealth 
countries, especially Pakistan 
and neighbouring countries.”
The procedure adopted in Chapter III dealing with the return 
of fugitive criminals to Commonwealth countries with extradi­
tion arrangement is akin to the 1 Backing of the warrants' or 
1 Endorsement and Execution of warrants' in the British Extra­
dit ion Act, 1870, the British Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
or the Irish Extradition Act, 1965. Under Chapter III, 
no proof or prima facie evidence of guilt is necessary, but 
if the Central Government is satisfied the warrant was issued 
by a person having lawful authority, it will endorse such a 
warrant for the apprehension of the accused and such an en­
dorsed warrant shall be sufficient authority to apprehend the 
person named in the warrant and to bring him before the magi­
strate in India.1 This represents the executive method 
adopted in the Extradition Act, 1962, but in any case as the 
executive action of extradition is within the sole discretion 
of the Minister or executive wing of the Government, such a 
provision is not arbitrary, especially when the same matter 
is subject td the magisterial scrutiny in the presence of 
the accused person as laid down by Section 17(1) of the Act.
It is not clear whether the matters referred to 
in Sections 292 and 3d 3 of the Act of 1962 are justiciable. 
Section 29 begins with the words, * If it appears to the Cen­
tral Government that by reason of the trivial nature of the
1. Section 15 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1962; see also 
Jugal Kishore More, supra, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1171•
2. Section 29 of % e  Extradition Act, 1962, Appendix Ip*595%
3. Section 31 of Extradition Act, 1962, Appendix I.p.596.
case ««• etc .* ,which suggests that the primary responsibility 
for decision is with the Central Government• Chapter V,
which is the 1Miscellaneous * chapter, is not as specific as 
Chapters II and III (of Sections 7(3) and 17 respectively) 
in empowering the magistrate or any other court to inquire 
into the matters referred to by it* However, Section 31 1 
which applies to both the Commonwealth and foreign States is 
clearly within the Courts * jurisdiction and not exclusively 
in the Central Government1s area of discretion*
Of course, surrender or extradition of fugitive 
offenders under Chapter III is just as much extradition in 
the international legal sense as surrender to any other State 
under Chapter II*
While introducing the Extradition Act of 1962, the 
Indian Law Minister just if ied the difference in the procedures 
under Chapter II and Chapter III as having reference to * reci­
procity* and certain geographical factors. The latter ground 
was the subject matter of challenge under Articles 13 and 14 
of the Constitution in C.G. Menon*s case before the Madras 
High Court under the old Act of 1903 • Rajgopalan J * ob­
served that:2'
♦'The need for offering evidence to show 
that prima facie the offender is guilty 
of crimes with which he has been 
charged by the country asking for his 
extradition has been well recognised*
Though it may not be an integral part 
of the law of extradition of every 
State in relation to every other State, 
it is certainly a normal feature, and 
one can even say, almost a universal 
feature of extradition laws* To dis­
pense with such a need, there must, in 
my opinion, be some basis, better than
1. Section 31 of The Extradition Act, 1962, Appendix 1, p.5 9 6 .
In Re C.G. Menon, supra, A.I.R. 1953 Madras 729 at p.736*
geographical contiguity alone, if the 
test of 1 equal protection of laws with­
in the territory of India1 specifically 
provided for by Art *14 of the Consti­
tution isfto apply.”
The provisions of the Act providing for different procedures 
were held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.1 
In appeal against that judgment, the Supreme Court did not 
express any opinion on that point as the matter was decided 
on another ground. The question whether reciprocity can 
satisfy the test of reasonableness of class if icat ion that 
underlay Parts I and II of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
was left open by the Madras High Court 3 itself as that 
question did not arise in that case, but it was observed 
that there can be circumstances of valid classif icat ion 
which would be possible under Article 14.4 Hingorani 3 
is of the opinion that classification is based on reason— 
able grounds, as the requirement of proof of prima facie 
evidence is dispensed with on the ground of reciprocity 
and it is restricted to Commonwealth countries which have 
extradition arrangements with India, and therefore, such a 
dispensation of prima facie proof is a permissible classi­
fication and does not violate Article 14. v.N. Shukla is 
also of the same view.**
Because of the Supreme Court * s decision in
1« In Re C.G. Menon, ibid. at pp.739 , 740. See also R.C. 
Hingorani, op.cTt., p.82.
2. State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 517, supra.
3. In Re C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1953 Madras 729 at p.735.
4* In Re C.G. Menon, ibid. at p.736.
5. R.C. Hingorani, op.cit., pp.82, 83.
6. V.N. Shukla, The Constitution of India. 1964, pp.23-24.
1C.G. Menon. a stalemate was created in India. Since the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, could not be used, the Central 
Government had to issue executive instructions to the magi­
strates regarding the procedure to be followed in extraditing 
fugitive criminals to the Commonwealth countries and this 
state of affairs continued until the Indian Extradition Act 
of 1962 came into force. In J.K. More.2 the inter°regnum 
arrangements were approved and held valid by the Supreme 
Court and the instructions were held not to fetter the judi­
cial discretion of the magistracy. Being, as it were, a 
family arrangement, the Fugitive Offenders Act, IS81, did 
not include the safeguards usually provided in international 
ext r adit ion, such as are embodied in the principles of double 
criminality and speciality, non-extradition of political 
offenders.
The Indian Extradition Act of 1962, while repeal­
ing the earlier Acts on the subject, tried to maintain the 
principles of reciprocity, geographical nearness, in order 
to bring harmony and avoid discrimination, inserted Section 
32 which made the provisions of Sections 29 and 31 applicable 
to Chapter III also and thus set at rest the whole contro­
versy revolving around the British Act of 1870 with respect 
to political offences, unjust and oppressive results by 
rendition and also resolved the controversy arising on 
account of the procedure provided under Chapters I and II
3
Of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. The House of Lords,
1. State of Madras v. C.G. Menon, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 517.
2. state of West Bengal v. Jugal Kishore More, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 
1171 at p.1182.
3» Keano v. Governor of Brixton Prison (1971) 2 W.L.R. 1243•
while considering the provisions of the Backing of Warrants 
(Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, held that the Act of 1965 
made no provision requiring a magistrate to inquire whether 
a prima facie case has been made out • it was observed by 
Lord Pearson at page 1247,
”in my opinion, Section 2 and schedule 
to the Act do not provide for any in­
quiry by a magistrate into the merits 
of charges on this point. I agree 
with the decision of the Divisional 
Court in the present case and in the 
previous decision in Reg. v. Metropoli- 
tan Police Ex parte Arkin.”^
Thus, there is a remarkable change in the present Act from 
the old practice that existed in most Commonwealth countries, 
including India. All the safeguards mentioned in Section 
32 of the Indian Act of 1962 were not available under the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. Section 32 specifically 
mentions that those safeguards will be available equally 
to all fugitives, whether they are from a foreign State 
or a Commonwealth country with or without extradition 
arrangements• The insertion of these provisions are in
consonance with current judicial pronouncements, like the
2observations of English courts in Mubarak Ali’s case, and
Q  A
the case of Zacharia, also in line with academic opinions •
But in spite of all the efforts by the legislature, there
1. Reg. v. Metropolitan Police Ex parte Arkin (1966) 1 W.L.R. 
1593.
2. Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed (1952) 1 All E.R.
1 060 at p.1 0 6 3.
3 . Zacharia v* Republic of Cyprus (1962) 2 All E.R. 438•
4. See Paul O1 Higgins: ’Extradition within the Commonwealth* ,9 
(I960) I.C.L.Q. 491; Robert E. Clute: ’Law and Practice in
C ommonw ealth Ext r adit ion», (1959) 8 A.J.C .L. p. 15 at pp.27,28.
can be more improvements to secure equal opportunit ies for 
all fugitives in defending themselves• For example, though 
Sections 29 and 31 have been made applicable to Chapter III 
also, but the right to submit explanation before the magi­
strate has been given under Chapter II and not under Chapter 
III, and thus it may be said that while an offender falling 
under Chapter II has an opportunity to satisfy the judiciary
or the executive regarding the political nature of his crime 
or other allied matters mentioned in Sections 29 and 31, one 
falling under Chapter III will have to look for such relief 
mainly to the executive. Further, under Section 30 of the 
new Aot, wide powers to surrender the fug it ive have been con­
ferred upon the Central Government. In cases where con­
current requisitions or demands are made by different States 
for the same offender for the same or different offences, 
the Central Government may in its discretion surrender the 
fugitive to any State it thinks fit. This discretion is 
not accompanied by any guiding policy or definite criteria.
In order to avoid any apprehensions of arbitrary powers on 
behalf of the Central Government, a definite policy should 
be laid down by further amendment of the Act in this direct­
ion. At present, it is apparent that under Section 30 of 
the 1962 Act, the Government of India’s policy is to decide 
each case of simultaneous requisitions on its own merits.
The Act as it stands, does not curtail the discretionary 
power of the Central Government by incorporating such prin­
ciples into the Act as the priority of the request, gravity 
of the offence, nationality of the offender, the penalty to 
be imposed, etc.
APPENDIX I 
THE EXTRADITION ACT. 1962
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the 
extradition of fugitive criminals.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirteenth year of 
the Republic of India as follows:
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY 
1* Short title, extent and commencement•
(1) This Act may be called the Extradition Act, 1962*
(2) It extends to the whole of India.
(3 ) Xt shall come into foree on such date as the Central 
Government may, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, appoint•
2. Definitions.
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(a) *Commonwealth country* means a commonwealth country 
specified in the First Schedule and such other common­
wealth country as may be added to that Schedule by the 
Central Government by notification in the Official 
Gazette and includes every constituent part, colony or 
dependency of any Commonwealth country so specified or 
added;
(b) "conviction* and "convicted" do not include or refer 
to a oonviotion which under foreign law is a convict­
ion for contumacy but the term "person accused* includes 
a person so convicted for oontumaoy;
(c) "extradition offence" means -
(i) in relation to a foreign State, being a treaty State, 
an offence provided for in the extradition treaty with 
that State;
(ii)in relation to a foreign State other than a treaty 
State or in relation to a commonwealth country an 
offence which is spec if ied in, or which may be speci­
fied by notification under, the Second Schedule;
(d) "extradition treaty" means a treaty or agreement made by 
India with a foreign State relating to the extradition of 
fugitive criminals, and includes any treaty or agreement 
relating to the extradition of fugitive criminals made 
before the 15th day of August, 1947, which extends to, 
and is binding on, India;
(e) "foreign State" means any State outside India other than 
a commonwealth country, and includes every constituent 
part, colony or dependency of such State;
(f) "fugitive criminal" means an individual who is accused 
or convicted of an extradition offence committed within 
the jurisdiction of a foreign State or a commonwealth 
country and is, or is suspected to be, in some part of 
India;
(g) "magistrate” means a magistrate of the first class or a 
presidency magistrate;
(h) "notified order" means an order not if ied in Official Gazette
(i) "prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act; 
and
(j) "treaty State" means a foreign State with which an extra­
dition treaty is in operation.
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%  Applieation of Aet.
(1) The Central Government may, by notified order, direct
that the provisions of this Act other than Chapter III shall
apply -
(a) to such foreign State or part thereof or
(b) to such commonwealth country or part thereof to which 
Chapter III does not apply;
as may be specified in the order•
(2) Ihe Central Government may, by the same notified order 
as is referred to in sub-section (1) or any subsequent notified 
order, restrict such application to fugitive criminals found, 
or suspected to be, in such part of India as may be specified 
in the order•
(3) Where the notified order relates to such a treaty State
(a) it shall set out in full the extradition treaty with 
that State;
(b) it shall not remain in force for any period longer 
than that treaty; and
(c) the Central Government may, by the same or any subse­
quent notified order, render the application of this 
Act subject to such modifications, exceptions, condi­
tions and qualifications as may be deemed expedient 
for implementing the treaty with that State,
CHAPTER IX
EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS TO FOREIGN STATES AMD TO
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES TO WHICH CHAPTER III DOES NOT APPLY 
k. Requisition for surrender.
A requisition for the surrender of a fugitive criminal of a 
foreign State or a commonwealth country may be made to the 
Central Government -
(a) by a diplomatic representative of the foreign State or 
commonwealth country at Delhi; or
(b) by the Government of that foreign State or commonwealth 
country communicating with the Central Government through 
its diplomatic representative in that State or countryj
and if neither of these modes is convenient, the requisition 
shall be made in such other mode as is settled by arrangement 
made by the Government of the foreign State or commonwealth 
country with the Government of India.
5. Order for magisterial inquiry.
Where such requisition is made, the Central Government may, if 
it thinks fit, issue an order to any magistrate who would have 
had jurisdiction to inquire into the offence if it had been an 
offence committed within the local limits of his jurisdiction, 
directing him to inquire into the case.
6. Issue of warrant for arrest.
On receipt of an order of the Central Government under section 
5, the magistrate shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the 
fugitive criminal•
7. Procedure before magistrate.
(l) When the fugitive criminal appears or is brought before 
the magistrate, the magistrate shall inquire into the 
ease in the same manner and shall have th e same 
jurisdiction and powers, as
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nearly as may be, as if the case were one triable by a court 
of session or High Court•
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of* the foregoing 
provisions, the magistrate shall, in particular, take such 
evidence as may be produced in support of the requisition of* 
the foreign State or commonwealth country and on behalf of the 
fugitive oriminal, including any evidence to show that the 
offence of which the fugitive criminal is accused or has been 
convicted is an offence of politioal character or is not an 
extradition offence,
(3) If the magistrate is of opinion that a prima facie case 
is not made out in support of the requisition of the foreign 
State or commonwealth country, he shall discharge the fugitive 
oriminal•
(k) If the magistrate is of opinion that a prima facie* case 
is made out in support of the requisition of the foreign State 
or commonwealth country, he may commit the fugitive oriminal 
to pri son to await orders of the Central Government, and shall 
report the result of his inquiry to the Central Government, 
and shall forward together with such report, any written 
statement which the fugitive criminal may desire to submit for 
the consideration of the Central Government•
8. Surrender of fugitive criminal•
If, upon receipt of the report and statement under sub-section 
(%) of section 7, the Central Government is of opinion that 
the fugitive oriminal ought to be surrendered to the foreign 
State or commonwealth country, it may issue a warrant for the 
custody and removal of the fugitive criminal and for his de­
livery at a place and to a person to be named in the warrant•
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9• Power of magistrate to issue warrant of arrest in certain 
cases,
(1) Where it appears to any magistrate that a person within 
the local limits of his jurisdiction is a fugitive oriminal of 
a foreign State or commonwealth country he may, if he thinks 
issue a warrant for the arrest of that person on such inform­
ation and on suoh evidence as would, in his opinion, justify 
the issue of a warrant if the offence of which the person is 
acoused or has been convicted had been committed within the 
local limits of his jurisdiction,
(2) The magistrate shall forthwith report the issue of a 
warrant undctr sub—section (l) to the Central Government and 
shall forward the information, and the evidence or certified 
copies thereof to that Government•
(3) A person arrested on a warrant issued under sub-section
(l) shall not be detained for more than three months unless 
within that period the magistrate receives from the Central 
Government an order made with reference to such person under 
section 5*
10. Receipt in evidence of exhibits, depositions, and other 
documents and authentication thereof•
(1) In any proceedings against a fugitive criminal of a 
foreign State or commonwealth country under this Chapter, 
exhibits and depositions (whether received or taken in the 
presence of the person against whom they are used or not) and 
copies thereof and official certificates of fact s and judicial 
documents stating facts may, if duly authenticated, be received 
as evidence,
(2) Warrants, depositions or statements on oath, which 
purport to have been issued or taken by any court of justice
outside India or copies thereof, certificates of, or judicial 
documents stating the facts of, conviction before any such 
court shall be deemed to be duly authenticated if —
(a) the warrant purports to be signed by a judge, magi­
strate or officer of the State or country where the 
same was issued or acting in or for such State or 
country|
(b) the depositions or statements or copies thereof purport 
to be certified, under the hand of a judge magistrate 
or officer of the State or country where the same were 
taken, or acting in or for such State or country, to be 
the original depositions or statements or to be true 
copies thereof, as the case may require;
(c) the certificate of, or judicial document stating the 
fact of, a conviction purports to be certified by a 
judge, magistrate or officer of the State or country 
where the conviction took place or acting in or for 
such State;
(d) the warrants, depositions, statements, copies, certi­
ficates and judicial documents, as the case may be, 
are authenticated by the oath of some witness or by 
the official seal of a minister of the State or country 
where the same were respectively issued, taken or given,
11, Chapter not to apply to commonwealth countries to which 
Chapter III applies.
Nothing contained in this Chapter shall apply to fugitive
criminals of a commonwealth country to which Chapter XII
applies.
CHAPTER XII
RETURN Off FUGITIVE CRIMINALS TO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
WITH EXTRADITION ARRANGEMENTS 
12* Application of Chapter*
(1) This chapter shall apply to any such commonwealth 
country to whioh, by reason of an extradition arrange­
ment entered into with that country, it may seem exped­
ient to the Central Government to apply the same*
(2) Every such application shall be by notified order, and 
the Central Government may, by the same or any subse­
quent notified order, direct that this Chapter and 
Chapters I, IV and V shall, in relation to any such 
commonwealth country, apply subject to such modifica­
tions , exceptions, conditions and qualifications as it 
may think fit to specify in the order for the purpose 
of implementing the arrangement.
13* Liability of fugitive criminals from commonwealth countries 
to be apprehended and returned.
Where a fugitive criminal of any commonwealth country to which
this Chapter applies is found in India, he shall be liable to
be apprehended and returned in the manner provided by this
Chapter to that commonwealth country.
14. Endorsed and provi sional warrant s•
A fugitive criminal may be apprehended In India under an 
endorsed warrant or a provi sional warrant *
15, Endorsed warrant for apprehension cf fugitive criminal.
Where a warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive criminal 
has been issued in any commonwealth country to which this 
Chapter applies and such fugitive criminal is, or: is suspect­
ed to be, in India, the Central Government may, if satisfied
that the warrant was issued by a person having lawful autho­
rity to issue the same, endorse such warrant in the manner pre­
scribed, and the warrant so endorsed shall be sufficient autho­
rity to apprehend the person named in the warrant and to bring 
him before any magistrate in India.
16. (1) Any magistrate may issue a provisional warrant for the
Provisional warrant for apprehension of a fugitive criminal
apprehension of fugitive - ...from any commonwealth country to
criminal.
which this Chapter applies who is, 
or is suspected to be, in or on his way to India, on such inform­
ation and under such circumstances as would, in his opinion, 
justify the issue of a warrant, if the offence of which the fugi­
tive criminal is accused or has been convicted had been commit­
ted within his jurisdiction and such warrant may be executed 
accordingly.
(2) A magistrate issuing a provisional warrant shall forth­
with send a report of the issue of the warrant together with the 
information or a certified copy thereof to the Central Govern­
ment , and the Central Government may, if it thinks fit, discharge 
the person apprehended under such warrant•
(3) A fugitive criminal apprehended on a provisional warrant 
may, from time to time, be remanded for such reasonable time, 
not exceeding seven days at any one time, as under the circum- 
stances seems requisite for the production of an endorsed warrant.
17. (1) If the magistrate, before whom a person apprehended 
Dealing with fugitive under this Chapter is brought, is
criminal when appre- satisfied on inuqiry that the en-
hended.
dorsed warrant for the apprehens ion 
of the fugit ive criminal is duly authenticated and that the of­
fence of which the person is accused or has been convicted is
an extradition offence, the magistrate shall commit the fugitive 
criminal to prison to await his return and shall forthwith send 
to the Central Government a certificate of the committal.
(2) If on such inquiry the magistrate is of opinion that 
the endorsed warrant is not duly authenticated or that the of­
fence of which such person is accused or has been convicted is 
not an extradition offence, the magistrate may, pending the re­
ceipt of the orders of the Central Government, detain such per­
son in custody or release him on bail.
(3) The magistrate shall report the result of his inquiry to 
the Central Government and shall forward together with such re­
port any written statement which the fugitive criminal may de­
sire to submit for the consideration of that Government.
18* Return of fugitive criminal by warrant.
The Central Government may, at any time after a fugitive crimi­
nal has been committed to prison under this Chapter, issue a 
warrant for the custody and removal to the commonwealth country 
concerned of the fugitive criminal and for his delivery at a 
place and to a person to be named in the warrant•
CHAPTER IV
SURRENDER OR RETURN OF ACCUSED OR CONVICTED PERSONS FROM 
FOREIGN STATES OR COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
19. Mode of requisition or form of warrant for the surrender 
or return to India of accused or convicted person who is 
in a foreign State or commonwealth country.
(l) A requisition for the surrender of a person accusednor 
convicted of an extradition offence committed in India and who 
is or is suspected to be, in any foreign State or a common­
wealth country to which Chapter III does not apply, may be 
made by the Central Government -
(a) to a diplomatic repre sent at ive of that State or 
country at Delhi; or
(b) to the Government of that State or country through the 
diplomatic representative of India in that State or 
country; and if neither of these modes is convenient, 
the requisition shall be made in such other mode as is 
settled by arrangement made by the Government of India 
with that State or country.
(2) A warrant issued by a magistrate in India for the appre­
hension of any person who is, or is suspected to be, in any 
commonwealth country to which Chapter III applies shall be in 
such form as may be prescribed.
20. Conveyance of aocused or convicted person surrendered or 
returned.
Any person aocused or convicted of an extradition offence who 
is surrendered or returned by a foreign State or commonwealth 
country may, under the warrant of arrest for his surrender or 
return issued in such State or country, be brought into India 
and delivered to the proper authority to be dealt with accord­
ing to law.
21. Accused or convicted person surrendered or returned by 
foreign State or commonwealth country not to be tried 
for previous offence.
Whenever any person accused or convicted of an offence, which, 
if committed in India would be an extradition off enoe, is sur­
rendered or returned by a foreign State or commonwealth 
country, that person shall not, until he has been restored or 
has had an opportunity of returning to that State or country, 
be tried in India for an offence committed prior to the sur­
render or return, other than the extradition offence proved 
by the facts on which the surrender or return is based.
CHAPTER V
' miscellaneous
22. Liability of fugitive criminals to be arrested and 
surrendered or returned.
Every fugitive criminal of a foreign State or commonwealth.
country shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be
liable to be arrested and surrendered or returned, whether
the offence in respeot of which the surrender or return is
sought was committed before or after the commencement of this
Act, and whether or not a court in India has jurisdiction to
try that offence.
23. Jurisdiction as to offences oommitted at sea or in air. 
Where the offenoe in respect of which the surrender or return 
of a fugitive oriminal is sought was committed on board any 
vessel on the high seas or any aircraft while in the air out­
side India or the Indian territorial waters which comes into 
any port or aerodrome of India, the Central Government and any 
magistrate having jurisdiction in such port or aerodrome may 
exercise the powers conferred by rthis Act.
2k, Discharge of person apprehended if not surrendered or 
returned within two months.
If a fugitive criminal who, in pursuance of this Act, has 
been committed to prison to await his surrender or return 
to any foreign State or commonwealth country is not conveyed 
out of India within two months after such committal, the High 
Court, upon application made to it by or on behalf of the
fugitive
criminal and upon proof that reasonable notice of the inten­
tion to make such application has been given to the Central 
Government f pay order such prisoner to be discharged unless 
sufficient caus<* is shown to the contrarv,
25. In the case of a person who is a fugitive criminal arrested
Release of persons or detained under this Act, the
arrested on bail. . . . ^ ^ .provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898, relating to bail shall apply in the same
manner as they would apply, if such person were accused of
committing in India the offence of which he is accused or has
been convicted, and in relation to such bail, the magistrate
before whom the fugitive criminal is brought shall have, as
far as may be, the same powers and jurisdiction as a court of
session under that Code.
26. A fugitive criminal who is accused or convicted of abetting 
Abetment of extra- any ext r adit ion offence shall be
dition offences. deemed for the purposes of this
Act to be accused or convicted of having committed such offence 
and shall be liable to be arrested and surrendered accordingly.
27. It shall be lawful for any person to whom a warrant is 
Lawfulness of, and re- directed for the apprehension of
taking on escape from, a fugitive criminal to hold in
custody under warrants.
custody and convey the person 
mentioned in the warrant to the place named in the warrant, 
and if such person escapes out of any custody to which he may 
be delivered in pursuance of such warrant, he may be re-taken 
as a person accus ed of an offence agams t the law of India may 
be re-taken upon an escape•
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28. Property found on fugitive crimal.
Everything found in the possession of a fugitive criminal 
at the time of his arrest which may be material as evi­
dence in proving the extradition offence may be delivered 
up with the fugitive criminal on his surrender or return, 
subject to the rights, if any, of third parties with respect 
thereto.
29• Power of Central Government to discharge any fugitive 
criminal•
If it appears to the Central Government that by reason of 
the trivial nature of the case or by reason of the applica­
tion for the surrender or return of a fugitive criminal not 
being made in good faith or in the interests of justice or 
for political reasons or otherwise, it is unjust or inexped­
ient to surrender or return the fugitive criminal, it may, 
by order, at any time stay any proceedings under this Act 
and direct any warrant issued or endorsed under this Act to 
be cancelled and the person for whose arrest the warrant 
has been issued or endorsed to be discharged.
30. Simultaneous requisitions.
If requisitions for the surrender of a fugitive criminal 
are received from more than one foreign State or common­
wealth country or from any foreign State and any common­
wealth country, the Central Government may, having regard 
to the circumstances of the case, surrender the fugitive
criminal to such State or country as that Government thinks fit
31. Restrictions on surrender.
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered or returned to 
a foreign State or commonwealth country -
(a) if the offence in respect of which his surrender is 
sought is of a political character or if he proves
to the satisfaction of the magistrate or court before 
whom he may be produced or of the Central Government 
that the requisition or warrant for his surrender has, 
in fact, been made, with a view to try or punish him 
for an offence of a political character;
(b) if prosecution for the offence in respect of which 
his surrender is sought is according to the law of 
that State or country barred by time;
(c) unless provision is made by the law of the foreign 
State or commonwealth country or in the extradition 
treaty with the foreign State or extradition arrange - 
ment with the commonwealth country, that the fugitive 
criminal shall not, until he has been restored or has 
had an opportunity of returning to India, be detained 
or tried in that State or country for any offence com­
mitted prior to his surrender or return, other than 
the extradition offence proved by the facts on which 
his surrender or return is based;
(d) if he has been accused of some offence in India, not 
being the offence for which his surrender or return 
is sought, or is undergoing sentence under any con­
viction in India until he has been discharged,
whether by acquittal or on expiration 'of his sentence
or otherwise;
(e) until after the expiration of fifteen days from the
date of his being committed to prison by the magistrate*
32. Sections 29 and 31 to apply without any modification 
thereof.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Section 3 
or Section 12, the provisions of sections 29 and 31 shall apply 
without any modification to every foreign State or commonwealth 
country.
33* Act not to affect the Foreigners Act, 19^6.
Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of the 
Foreigners Act, 19^6, or any order made thereunder.
34. Application of Act to Republic of Ireland.
The provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to the 
Republic of Ireland in the like manner and subject to the 
like conditions as they apply in relation to a commonwealth 
country.
35. Notified orders and notifications to be laid before 
Parliament.
Every notified order made or notification issued under this 
Act shall, as soon as may be after it is made or issued, be 
laid before each House of Parliament.
3 6 • Power to make rules.
(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of 
this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality 
of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any 
of the following matters, namely:
(a) the form in which a requisition for the surrender of a 
fugitive criminal may be made;
(b) the form in which a warrant for the apprehens ion 
of any person in a commonwealth country to which 
Chapter III applies may be made;
(c) the manner in which any warrant may be endorsed or 
authenticated under this Act;
(d) the removal of fugitive criminals accused or in 
custody under this Act and their control and main­
tenance until such time as they are handed over to 
the persons named in the warrant as entitled to re­
ceive them;
(e) the seizure and disposition of any property which is 
the subject of, or required for proof of, any alleged 
offence to which this Act applies;
(f) the form and manner in which or the channel through 
which a magistrate may be required to make his report 
to the Central Government under this Act;
(g) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed
(3) Every rule made under this section shall be laid as
soon as may be after it is made before each House of Parlia­
ment while it is in session for a total period of thirty days 
which may be comprised in one session or in two successive 
sessions, and if before the expiry of the session in which it 
is so laid or the session immediately following, both Houses 
agree in making any modification in the rule, or both Houses
agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall there­
after have effect only in such modified form or be of no
effect, as the case may be; so however that any such modifi­
cation or annulment shall be without prejudice to the valid­
ity of anything previously done under that rule.
37. (1) The Indian Extradition Act, 1903, and any law corre- 
Repeals and savings. sponding thereto in force at the
commencement of this Act in the 
territories which, immediately before the 1st day of November, 
1956, were comprised in Part B States and the North East 
Frontier Agency and Tuensang District (Extradition) Regula­
tion, 1961, are hereby repealed.
(2) The ExtraditionActs, 1870 to 1932 and the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, in so far as they apply to and operate 
as part of the law of India, are hereby repealed.
THE FIRST SCHEDULE
i -
tSee section 2(a)1
The following are commonwealth countries:
1. Commonwealth of Australia.
2. Canada.
3. Ceylon•
4. Cyprus.
5. Federation of Malaya•
6. Ghana.
7. New Zealand.
8. Nigeria.
9. Pakistan. 
lO.Sierra Leone•
11.Singapore.
12.Tanganyika.
13.United Kingdom.
THE SECOND SCHEDULE
L
tSee section 2(c)(ii)l
Extradition offences in relation to foreign States other 
than treaty States or in relation to commonwealth countries
The following list of extradition offences is to be construed 
according to the law in force in India on the date of the 
alleged offence. Wherever the names of the relevant Acts 
are not given, the sections referred to are the sections of 
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860):
1. Culpable homicide (sections 299 to 304).
2. At tempt to murder (section 307).
3. Causing miscarriage and abandonment of child (sections 
312 to 317).
4. Kidnapping,'abduction, slavery and forced labour 
(sections 360 to 374).
5. Rape and unnatural offences (sections 375 to 377).
6. Theft, extortion, robbery and dacoity (sections 378
to 402).
7# Criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of 
trust (sect ions 403 to 414)•
8. Cheating (sections 415 to 420).
9. Mischief (sections 425 to 440).
10. Forgery, using forged documents and other offences 
relating to false documents (sections 463 to 477A)*
11. Offences relating to coins and stamps (sections 230
to 263A)•
12. Sinking or destroying a vessel at sea or attempting 
or conspiring to do so.
601.
13. Damaging or destroying an aircraft in the air or 
attempting or conspiring to do so.
14. Assault on board a vessel on the high seas or an 
aircraft in the air outside India or the Indian 
territorial waters with intent to destroy life or 
to do grievous bodily harm.
15. Revolt or conspiracy to revolt by two or more persons 
or board a vessel on the high seas or an aircraft in 
the air outside India or the Indian territorial waters 
against the authority of the master or the pilot in 
command.
16• Smuggling of gold, gold manufactures, diamonds and 
other precious stones or of any narcotic substance 
fsection 167, entry 81 in column 2 of schedule,
Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878)1.
17. Immoral traffic in women and girls {sections 4, 5, 6 
and 8 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women 
and Girls Act, 1956 (104 of 1956)1.
18. Any offence which if committed in India would be 
punishable under any other sections of the Indian 
Penal Code or any other law, and which may, from 
time to time, be specified by the Central Government 
by notification in the Official Gazette either gener­
ally for all foreign States or for all commonwealth 
countries or specially for one or more such States
or countries.
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